Counsel and Command in Anglophone Political Thought, 1485-1651

Joanne Paul

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Queen Mary, University of London
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Declaration

I hereby confirm that all work presented below is my own except where indicated.

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Joanne Paul

Abstract

This thesis investigates the role and vocabulary of 'political counsel' in Anglophone discourse from the end of the Wars of the Roses (1485) to the end of the English Civil War (1651), demonstrating its importance as a parallel concept to sovereignty. Whereas theories of monarchical power and sovereign command have been thoroughly explored in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, counsel has received comparatively little attention. The principal aim of this thesis is to correct this imbalance by presenting a broad exploration of the concept and related themes. Part I treats the Henrician period from the accession of Henry VII in 1485 to the death of Henry VIII in 1547, exploring the English humanist discourse of political counsel in this period. In Part II, covering the remaining decades of the Tudor era (1547-1603), the combined challenge to this tradition presented by Machiavellian discourse and the perceptions of an English monarchy 'weakened' by the accession of young and female rulers is explored. Particular attention is paid to the resultant suspicion of the figure of the counsellor and the increasing institutionalisation of counsel. Finally, in Part III the thesis turns to the discourse of political counsel in the first half of the seventeenth century, with emphasis on the 'reason of state' tradition, and the vocabulary of counsel in civil war propaganda. The thesis ends with a consideration of the work of Henry Parker and Thomas Hobbes, noting that whereas the humanist tradition had emphasised the separation of counsel and command, both the parliamentarianism espoused by Parker and Hobbes's state theory – arguably the precursors of modern political thought – subsume counsel under sovereign authority, focusing on the latter as the relevant topic for political thought.

Contents

Conventions

Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in the footnotes:

ODNB: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (online version)
Sl. MS: Sloane Manuscript

Bibliographies
The bibliographies list all of the primary sources I have quoted and the secondary scholarship on which I have relied. Where the attribution of an anonymous work is subject to conjecture, I have put the name of the suggested author in square brackets and added a question mark.

Biographical Details
All biographical information has been taken from the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* online edition, unless otherwise indicated. I have attempted to use biographical details to identify lesser-known figures, but have not done so in the case of major historical figures.

Dates
I have given dates in Common Era (BCE and CE) and taken the year to begin on the 1 January.

Definitions
All definitions are provided by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, online edition, unless otherwise indicated.

Line-breaks
As a number of medieval and Renaissance works of literature use a slash (/) mid-line, I have used a vertical bar (|) to indicate line-breaks.

Names
Authors' names have been given as they appear in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online edition, and *Early English Books Online*. Names and noble titles have been employed interchangeably, except in cases where this may cause confusion. For instance, William Cecil, Lord Burghley is referred to as 'Burghley' throughout in order to avoid confusion with his son, Robert Cecil. Titles such as 'Sir' or 'Saint' have been dropped from authors' names.

Transcriptions
I have preserved original spelling, capitalisation, and punctuation as far as possible, but have normalised the long 's'. Abbreviations and contractions have been extended in square brackets where the meaning would otherwise be unclear.

Translations
All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. I make extensive use of the Loeb Classical Library and have indicated these editions in my references. Original terms and phrases have been included in square brackets where these are of note.

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Introduction

Assessing recent accounts of the emergence of the modern 'discourse of counsel', J. G. A. Pocock suggests that one of the principal casualties of the English Civil War was a particular variant of the English monarchy: the 'monarchy of counsel'.[1] From the Wars of the Roses to the English Civil War, he tells us, Latin republican rhetoric was put to work within the mechanisms of the English monarchical system and, specifically, within the council chamber.[2] He notes, however, that this development fell apart during the course of the civil war, and what emerged in its place was a distinctive and modern discourse of sovereignty.[3]

In the two decades since Pocock introduced the idea of the English 'monarchy of counsel' there has been increasing interest in fleshing out the theories which underpin it.[4] This development has been led by the work of John Guy, whose treatment of the 'rhetoric of counsel' from the Wars of the Roses to the English Civil War notes the articulation of two 'vocabularies' of counsel – feudal-baronial and humanist-classical.[5] In agreement with Pocock, he suggests that by the end of the civil war era these vocabularies had become 'redundant' in the changed political

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[1] Pocock 1993, p. 395.

[2] Pocock is consciously drawing on preliminary work on this topic, especially that of Skinner 1978a and Skinner 1978b. For the purposes of this introduction I am primarily concerned with detailing those works which have dealt explicitly with the discourse of counsel in the last twenty years, as these provide the most pertinent background, consciously re-evaluating what went before. For details of earlier works in Tudor political history, see Fideler and Mayer 1992, pp. 1-11; Guy 1997, pp. 1-11; Alford 1999, pp. 535-48; for previous works in the history of political thought see Goldie 2006, pp. 3-19. Note that both these fields have come together in a rejection of the work of G. R. Elton as being too focused on the study of institutions over ideas; see Guy 1997, pp. 3-9; Skinner 2002a, pp. 9-25.

[3] Pocock 1993, pp. 377-421.

[4] As Walker 2005, p. 143 notes 'The relationship between prince and counsellor was, then, the lynchpin of the humanist conception of the state' and as such is essential to historians of sixteenth-century political thought.

[5] Guy 1995b, pp. 292-310.

context.[6] Recently, Guy's work has been expanded by David Colclough and Jacqueline Rose, who introduce a third vocabulary, an 'exclusively religious' language of counsel.[7] Although these studies have made great strides in assessing the role of counsel within this period, they all remain consciously preliminary. Political historians and historians of political thought still lack a detailed survey of the early modern discourse of counsel in England.

This dissertation builds on this scholarship in order to provide such an account. My analysis is similarly framed by the Wars of the Roses and the English Civil War, exploring the development, negotiation and fall of theories of counsel in the Tudor and early Stuart periods.[8] Importantly, rather than focusing on the monarchy of counsel – approaching counsel from the perspective of the 'personal monarchy'[9] or questions of *imperium*[10] – this study is concerned first and foremost with the figure of the counsellor himself, and seeks from this perspective to understand the relationship of counsel to issues of sovereignty and command. What emerges is not only a more thorough understanding of a complex political discourse with a distinct and important relationship to that of sovereignty, but also new perspectives on a number of related concepts, contributing to our grasp of the politics and political theory of the age.

The discoveries described in this dissertation have been made possible only by leaving questions of modern sovereignty aside and engaging with the writings of

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[6] Guy 1995b, p. 310.
[7] Colclough 1999, pp. 177-212; Colcough 2005; Rose 2011, pp. 47-71; see also Mears 2003, pp. 703-22.
[8] Unlike Rose, I do not see an active discourse of counsel being developed in the period after the civil war, but it must be acknowledged that her focus is on ecclesiastical counsel, whereas mine is on humanist-classical counsel.
[9] Rose 2011, p. 47.
[10] Guy 1995b, p. 292.

the period, as much as possible, 'on their own terms'.[11] Recently, an approach combining Quentin Skinner's observations regarding vocabulary and context with an acknowledgement of advances in the political history of the Tudor and early Stuart periods has been outlined by Guy, with the intention of building a 'New Political History'.[12] This new approach seeks to emphasise the 'mutually-informing' relations between institutions and ideas by bringing together the history of political thought and political history.[13] In overt contrast to the work of G. R. Elton, Guy notes that Tudor historians have organised their work 'the wrong way round'; they have 'first reconstructed the politics of the period, and only then attempted to relate their accounts, if at all, to the contemporary literature and other sources'.[14] There are, as Stephen Alford has similarly suggested, 'important conceptual problems associated with writing an institutional account of Tudor government', not the least of which is the uncertainty regarding the language of 'counsel' and 'council' in this period.[15]

As we shall see, the ambiguity between these two terms in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reflects a larger tension between 'personal' or 'informal' counsel and its more formal public variants. To attempt to impose a modern understanding on these ideas would be to obfuscate crucial debates. Thus I have turned to Thomas Elyot's distinction between 'Consultation' – the 'acte wherin

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[11] See Skinner 2002a; Brett and Tully, eds. 2006.
[12] Guy 1997, p. 3.
[13] Guy 1997, p. 7:

> 1. Tudor 'political' historians should seek to undertake genuinely *political* investigations, i.e. they should adopt holistic and socially derived approaches which attend to the cultural as well as the institutional structures of politics.
> 2. The focus of a New Political History should be the interrelationships of, and interactions between, people, institutions and ideas...
> 3. The history of politics and the history of ideas are interrelated and mutually informing...

[14] Guy 1997, p. 3.
[15] Alford 1999, pp. 538-9.

men do deuise to gether' – and 'Counsayle' – which is the 'sentence or aduise particulerly gyuen by euery man for that purpose assembled' – to shape my own vocabulary, associating 'council' with the former and 'counsel' with the latter, although there remain ambiguities.[16] The lingering uncertainty between the use of these terms demonstrates the importance of Guy's suggestion that we must begin with an understanding of ideas and concepts, only afterward examining their uses and applications in institutional contexts, a sequence which not only dictates the direction of my research, but also its presentation, as I shall detail below.

Of particular importance to this endeavour is Guy's further suggestion that the sources with which Renaissance and early modern historians engage should go beyond written texts.[17] This undertaking is supported by the growth of scholarship concerned with the expression of political thought in a variety of Renaissance media, especially drama[18] and visual sources.[19] These latter works highlight the importance of illustrative modes, exemplified in the genre of the Renaissance emblem. This dissertation explores theories of counsel through the use of a particular emblem by Andrea Alciato, noting its similarities to the portrayals of the relationship between kings and counsellors in English print woodcuts. This analysis is combined with the work of Greg Walker on the expression of political ideas – particularly political counsel – through court performance, a theme I pick up in relation to the imagery of *paradiastole* in Tudor morality plays. Perhaps the most

[16] Elyot 1970 [1531], fo. 252^{v}.
[17] Guy 1997, p. 7:

> 4. A New Political History will continue to be primarily archival in its methodology, but should not be narrowly positivist or empirical. It must respond to contemporary fictive and imaginative literature and to iconographical evidence as well as to traditional manuscript and printed sources.

See Skinner 2002b, pp. 39-117.
[18] See Walker 1996; Walker 1998.
[19] See King 1989; Bath 1994; Sharpe 2009; Sharpe 2010.

exciting recent development in the examination of drama as political text is the inclusion of Shakespeare's oeuvre, and I have expanded upon work in this area in order to present an analysis of *Hamlet* in the context of contemporary theories of counsel.[20] Such an approach not only yields insights into the tensions in the Elizabethan discourse of counsel, but also presents a new way of looking at the play itself.

These new perspectives are provided by adhering to Guy's suggestion that historians of this period pay close attention to the classical vocabularies characteristic of the English Renaissance, especially the rhetorical tradition detailed by Skinner.[21] Although Guy initially isolated both a humanist-classical and a feudal-baronial language of counsel, in later work he acknowledges that 'Tudor culture became distinctively Renaissance... and therefore (by definition) humanist-classical.'[22] I have therefore given primary attention to this vocabulary, and my study begins with a survey of the classical underpinnings of Renaissance theories of counsel.

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[20] For Shakespeare and the history of political thought see Armitage, Condren and Fitzmaurice, eds. 2009.

[21] Guy 1997, pp. 7-8:

> 5. Historians must pay the closest attention to the classical and Renaissance traditions which underpinned Tudor political culture...
>
> 8. Tudor historians should be sensitive to the use of language in sources... language must be set firmly in the context of the rhetorical and classical traditions that underpinned Tudor educational and political practice.
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> 9. Between 1500 and 1600 politics, for Renaissance councillors and 'men of business', became the state of their art and the art of the state. Historians need to investigate this process and to illuminate not only the convolutions of policy-making, but the expansion of the horizons of politics and statecraft which occurred in the sixteenth century. To conceptualize what was specifically *Renaissance* about Tudor politics and government lies at the heart of this challenge.

See Skinner 1996; Skinner 2002b; Skinner 2002c.

[22] Guy 1997, p. 3.

Perhaps the most striking discovery that emerges from following this approach concerns the importance of the vocabulary of *kairos* in the political thought of the period.[23] Having established Elyot's *Pasquil the Playne* as an important text within the humanist-classical – or what I more often refer to as the 'orthodox humanist'[24] – tradition of counsel, I investigate the Greek play from which Elyot quotes in a crucial passage of the dialogue. This allows me to compare the original line in the Greek with Elyot's translation, taking into account Elyot's experience with the classical tradition. Given previous scholarship on rhetoric which stresses importance of *decorum*, I had expected that the central term in the quotation would be *prepon*.[25] Instead, I discovered that the word in question was *kairos*, and from this I have been able to uncover a series of insights into the re-emergence of this crucial concept in the Renaissance and early modern periods.

Further, I would contend that Guy's suggestion that we pay close attention to classical texts is somewhat narrow, which is why I have also drawn upon the growing scholarship on the medieval discourse of counsel that points to a continuity rather than a break between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[26] Although my work does suggest that there are important developments in theories of counsel in the sixteenth century, this does not negate the legacy of the previous centuries, especially in the establishment of prudence as the essential quality of the counsellor, upon which the entire discourse becomes based.[27] In attempting to

[23] See Paul 2014b [forthcoming].
[24] This is to differentiate it from the Machiavellian challenge, which is also has strong roots in classical and humanist theory, but presents a different model of political counsel; see Kahn 1994a; Skinner 1996, pp. 170-2; Skinner 2000.
[25] See Kapust 2011, pp. 92-112.
[26] See Ferster 1996; Deist 2003; Gillespie 2006; Coleman 2012, pp. 19-31.
[27] See Green 2007.

understand what was 'specifically Renaissance' about the Tudor (and early Stuart) periods, I have sought to ensure that I do not ignore important medieval legacies.[28]

I also want to suggest an extension of Guy's argument that Tudor history 'should not be narrowly or unthinkingly "English" (or lowland English)'.[29] It is true that, in my attempt to provide a survey of the print culture of the period, Irish, Scottish and borderland experiences have necessarily received less attention.[30] However, I have expanded Guy's suggestion in a different direction by considering the influence of continental sources. Focusing on an 'Anglophone' rather than 'English' discourse allows us to uncover nuances in the translation and adaptation of ancient and continental texts, paying particular attention to the use and meaning of particular allusions or concepts.

Finally, Guy declares that the focus of this approach should be the analysis of counsel: 'Considerable attention will need to be paid to issues of "counsel" and policy-making, Court and conciliar politics, and the processes of political advice and persuasion.'[31] This subject follows naturally from the agenda formed at the convergence of political history and the history of political thought between the Wars of the Roses and the English Civil War. It is an expansive topic, and one to which this study contributes only an element, albeit a crucial one.

There are three avenues which I have chosen not to pursue in this research, but which remain closely related to the themes I discuss. These choices have been

[28] Guy 1997, p. 8.
[29] Guy 1997, p. 7.
[30] My work is supplemented in this way by that of other members of the Politics of Counsel research project, based at the University of St. Andrews and convened by Jacqueline Rose, which includes a number of projects that exclusively detail the Scottish discourse of counsel in this period.
[31] Guy 1997, p. 7.

governed, in large part, by a distinction that Guy draws in reviewing the advances facilitated by his approach. He notes that results will fall broadly into two categories: 'the history of ideas, stimulated by the work of quintessentially Renaissance historians such as Quentin Skinner' and 'at the points where '"public" and "private"' overlap and intersect.[32] Counsel unquestionably sits at precisely the type of connective point between public and private to which Guy refers, and my work notes the negotiation of these lines as the delineation of a sphere of 'the political' grows. My efforts, however, have been concentrated primarily on the history of political ideas rather than more specific local and private concerns.

I have therefore chosen to focus on what I have termed political counsel, rather than the prevalent advice literature on private matters.[33] This division is not arbitrary, but is clearly marked in the early modern literature. For example, William Cornwallis writes at the turn of the seventeenth century that 'Aduice fitteth friend to friend: counsaile counsailours to states, the first priuate, the other publike'.[34] It is when the one bleeds into the other that many writers see a particular issue with political counsel, so the distinction is an important one, and I have chosen to approach my research from the perspective of 'counsel' rather than 'advice'.

Second, much of this concern with the transformation of private into political counsel revolves around questions of gender. Women were not only external to the sphere of the political, but also were not seen to have the requisite skills to give political counsel, and thus their counsel was largely feared and

[32] Guy 1997, p. 6.
[33] For instance Whitford 1533; Colet 1534; Breton 1605.
[34] Cornwallis 1610, sig. Bb, 5^{v}. Although I sometimes use 'advice' and 'counsel' interchangeably (along with 'counsellor' and 'adviser'), it is important to note at the outset that these could represent distinct categories, which is why I more often use the language of 'counsel'.

rejected.[35] Work has been done to detail the important interplay between gender and counsel in the relationship between a female monarch and her male counsellors, as well as the rare instances of women proffering their political advice in print (for instance in the cases of Christine de Pisan and Anne Dowriche, both whom I include in my survey).[36] But this remains a vast subject requiring further research.

Of particular interest is the relationship between the condemnation of female counsel and the prevalent personification of counsel as a feminine counterpart to male sovereignty. As Cornwallis states in the essay quoted from above, 'Counsailes part, is Cassandraes parte', referring not just to the difficulty of being believed, but the understanding of counsel as essentially female.[37] His contemporary and fellow essayist Francis Bacon articulates this idea even more strongly, using the myth of Jupiter and Metis to illustrate the proper relationship between male sovereignty and female counsel:

> ...they say Iupiter did marrie Metis (which signifieth Counsell.)... shee conceiu'd by him, and was with childe, but Iupiter suffered her not to stay till shee brought fourth, but eate her vp; whereby hee became with child and was deliuered of Pallas, armed out of his head. Which montrous fable containeth a secret of Empire: How Kings are to make vse of their Counsell of state.[38]

[35] It is for these reasons that I use the masculine pronoun when referring to the counsellor. There was a general agreement that this figure should be male, even though this may not have always been true in practice. Personal counsel, on the other hand, could be seen as being the purview of women; see Deist 2003, pp. 171, 229, 231.

[36] For female counsel in medieval literature see Deist 2003; Schieberle 2008. For the counsel of Pisan and Dowriche see Nederman 2008, pp. 28-9; Suzuki 2009, pp. 174-93, respectively. For the influence of gender in the relationship between Elizabeth and her counsellors see Crane 1988; Guy 1995a; Alford 1998; Mears 2001, pp. 629-50; McLaren 2004.

[37] See also Alford 2004, p. 49.

[38] Bacon 1612, pp. 59-60.

Counsel is an inherently feminine – and potentially threatening – counterpart to masculine sovereign power, which needs to be conquered and absorbed.[39] Understanding the importance of this characterisation, especially given the 'death' of counsel in the face of modern state sovereignty, would provide a fascinating theoretical background to studies of counsel and counsellors within this period, but it cannot be attempted here.

Finally, I have also left aside issues of religion and 'ecclesiastical counsel'. There is no question that religion and politics were intimately intertwined in this period; however, my attention to the humanist-classical discourse of counsel has led me to consult different sources than a focus on religion would require. The forthcoming work by Rose promises to supplement any omissions caused by such a choice, just as my own expands the work on which she and others are engaged.[40]

The structure of this thesis is governed by two divisions – chronological and thematic, which I have interwoven in order to avoid the pitfalls of an exclusive focus on either. The three parts of the work are organised chronologically, each covering an approximate fifty-year period, according to considerations of both political and intellectual context. Part I surveys the Henrician period (1485-1547), as well as noting pertinent classical and medieval precedents. This first era saw the emergence of the humanist discourse in England and its expression in the humanist-classical vocabulary of counsel. These developments took place in the context of widespread political and religious upheaval, as well as within the reigns of two

[39] See King 2001, p. 589; Leeming 2005, p. 262.
[40] Rose 2011, p. 49. See also Chavura 2011 for the ecclesiastical political thought of the period, although note that his assertion that the 'synthetic tensions within the English polity' of 'the absolutist claims of the prince and the conciliar claims of parliament' leaves aside precisely the discourse of political counsel that this thesis attempts to uncover.

adult male monarchs. The importance of the age and gender of the monarch becomes clear in Part II of the thesis, which considers the later Tudor period (1547-1603), characterised by the reign of a minor – Edward VI – and two women – Mary I and Elizabeth I. This section is also marked by the rise of the Machiavellian challenge to the orthodox humanist discourse of counsel; a challenge not explored in the previous literature on counsel surveyed above nor in relation to the situation of 'weakened' monarchical rule in England.[41] Finally, Part III is framed not only according to the rise and fall of the early Stuarts (1603-1651), but also the emergence of a third intellectual development – reason of state – ending with the debates of the English Civil War.

A second tripartite division works across these chronological boundaries, organising the chapters according to thematic concerns. The first chapter in each part introduces the broad theoretical shifts in question – humanism, Machiavellianism and reason of state respectively – and notes their expression in writings on counsel. These chapters, in other words, seek to determine the 'why' of counsel – the ends towards which it ought to aim. Chapters 2, 5 and 8 provide the 'how' of counsel – the means by which a counsellor ought to deliver his counsel, and from what sources he should draw his political knowledge. The final chapter in each section details the 'what' and 'who', connecting counsel more intimately with the political context of the time, as well as cultural expressions such as visual media and theatre.[42]

[41] For the limited acknowledgement of Machiavelli in this context see Guy 1995a, p. 69 Alford 1998, p. 211; McLaren 1999, pp. 96; Alford 2004, p. 23 and Alford 2012, p. 13.

[42] The exception to this is Chapter 9, which focuses exclusively on the works of Parker and Hobbes.

With this dual approach outlined, it is worth adding a few words about the content of each chapter. Chapter 1 opens with the emergence of the figure of the counsellor. Rather than beginning in the sixteenth century, I trace its source to the Aristotelian division of the Platonic philosopher-king into two distinct roles: the philosopher who counsels and the king who commands. This model of a philosopher-counsellor, the personification of prudence, is retained in the political writings of the middle ages, but consistently occupies an absentee or abstract role outside court politics. It is only with the introduction of Ciceronian humanism that this figure acquires a place within the court of kings, necessitated by Cicero's insistence that the *vir civilis* fulfil his role on the political stage. Although these ideas are reflected in the works of continental humanists, I note here an important distinction between their view of such a figure as a teacher of the virtues and a particularly English perspective, drawn from Seneca, which instead envisages a figure who counsels on particular political actions.

Following this discussion of Ciceronian humanism, Chapter 2 considers the revival of classical rhetoric in the period. This chapter expands on the work done on rhetoric and counsel by considering the neglected yet essential concept of *kairos*. Due to its rhetorical meaning as the opportune time for frank speech, the concept becomes strongly associated with the role of the counsellor in the English tradition, especially within the works of Thomas Elyot. This association between rhetoric and *kairos* is also connected with the rise of the suspicion of the counsellor, a topic introduced in Chapter 3. As Elyot makes clear, *kairos* has the power both to make counsel more efficacious and more pernicious, as it can be employed to turn virtue into vice, a rhetorical technique associated with the figure of *paradiastole*.[43]

[43] See Skinner 2007, pp. 148-63.

Through an engagement with literary sources, this chapter shows how the revolutionary actions of Henry VIII in the course of the English Reformation were interpreted as the result of rhetorically adept counsellors employing paradiastolic techniques. Conciliar proposals thus become figured within attempts to minimalise their influence, a tendency illustrated through the changing imagery of counsel.

With this, we move into Part II of the thesis, which begins in Chapter 4 with an exploration of counsel in Machiavellian thought and the articulation of a 'Machiavellian challenge' to the orthodox-humanist model. Here, the focus on counsel enables me to make two important additions to existing scholarship on Machiavelli's political theory and its reception in England.[44] First, we are able to observe that Machiavellian thought in England was almost entirely focused on the figure of the counsellor, not the prince, resulting in what might be described as an 'advice to counsellors' literature. Second, we see that this reception was not one of assimilation/rejection, but rather of negotiation, as even opponents of Machiavellian thought appropriated his vocabulary – and thus his framing – in the articulation of their attacks.

Developing a more thorough understanding of Machiavelli's own view of counsel is thus essential to an understanding of this complex reception. It is in the course of such a reevaluation that *kairos* once again appears, in a guise that will continue to be of significance in the political thought of the next century. Machiavelli draws on the meaning of *kairos* not just as an opportune time for speech, but for action, and relates this understanding to his themes of necessity and adaptation. With the reception and application of such ideas, prudence – still the essential skill of the counsellor – becomes reconceived and a dual meaning

[44] See Raab 1964; Anglo 2005; Petrina 2009; Arienzo and Petrina, eds. 2013.

emerges. The first retains the Aristotelian and orthodox humanist concern for determining virtuous action. The second, however, opposes this view by prioritising *utile* over *honestum* and focusing on the navigation of kairotic temporal considerations.

In Chapter 5 we see how these shifts lead many writers to reconsider the use of rhetorical techniques as tools of political counsel, suggesting instead that counsel should be based upon, and communicated through, histories. For those who adopt a Machiavellian view of prudence, focused on timeliness and the variability of fortune, it is history, not moral philosophy, which will impart these lessons. For those who fear counsellors' rhetorical skill and Machiavellian scheming, histories offer a more trustworthy source of counsel. This for some results in an outright rejection of the figure of the counsellor, expressed in the oft-repeated maxim *optimi consiliarii mortui* – the best counsellors are [the] dead.

This maxim is realised both in English politics and on the English stage, as Chapter 6 illustrates. Expanding further on the themes of institutionalisation as a response to evil counsel, this chapter begins with a consideration of the unique nature of the late Tudor polity, especially the perceptions of a monarchy 'weakened' by the rule of the children of Henry VIII, and a focus on the various attempts to solve this problem through the development of conciliar institutions. This emphasis on counsel/council as the solution to monarchical instability adds weight to the suspicion of counsellors, especially those close to the monarch, such as Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester and William Cecil, Lord Burghley, who are accused of hiding their Machiavellian scheming behind humanist rhetorical practices. The dire consequences brought about by such counsellors are played out before audiences in a number of late Tudor plays, epitomised by Shakespeare's

Hamlet. Here I offer a novel reading, noting echoes of Plutarch's 'How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend' in the treatment of the courtiers who surround Hamlet. An understanding of the discourse of counsel especially highlights the role of Polonius as an adviser who combines humanist rhetoric with Machiavellian plotting, demonstrating that the best counsellor is indeed a dead one.

My consideration of reason of state in Part III follows from this treatment of the Machiavellian challenge. Chapter 7 explores the vocabularies of this tradition – policy, reason of state and interest – and their association with counsel. This discussion demonstrates once again that, whereas continental discourse focuses on sovereign and state, the English are more concerned with the role of the counsellor. The introduction of the vocabulary of interests gives the increasing suspicion of counsellors a language with which to express itself; counsellors are to be feared for their prioritisation of private interests over interests of state.

Concern regarding dangerous self-interests leads, in Chapter 8, to another shift in the sources of counsel. History, which had been presented as a more trustworthy and relevant alternative to humanist rhetorical figures in Chapter 5, becomes problematised by the language of interests in the early Stuart period. It is now argued that those who write and use history politically distort such sources for their own ends. A number of writers accordingly suggest that counsel ought to be derived instead from direct observation of other states and turn to the reports of travellers and spies to glean the knowledge essential to politics.

Chapter 9 brings these themes together in a consideration of the political thought of the English Civil War, focusing in particular on Henry Parker and Thomas Hobbes as examplars of the two sides of the civil war debates. Despite writing from opposing ends of the ideological divide, Parker and Hobbes both base

their theories of sovereignty – popular and state – upon an engagement with political counsel. These writers see a 'crisis of counsel' in the English political system, caused by the powerful influence of counsellors who prioritise private interests over public. For Parker, this crisis necessitates a deviation from the 'ordinary' course of affairs in which counsel and command must remain distinct, and the assumption of sovereign power by the realm's 'proper' conciliar body, parliament. Hobbes, on the other hand, seeks to mitigate (or rather eliminate) the influence of evil counsel by wholly rejecting the foundations upon which the discourse of counsel had been built, especially the quality of prudence, which he holds to be insufficient for political knowledge. In both Parker's and Hobbes's view of politics, the figure of the counsellor all but disappears.

Appended to the third part of the thesis are two original manuscript transcriptions. The first is an early seventeenth-century abridgement of Botero's *Ragione di Stato*, prepared by Richard Etherington, a disgraced landowner attempting to win favour with the chancellor to Prince Charles. It is the only contemporary English translation of Botero's work, and is included to supplement the use of the 1956 Waley and Waley translation, which at times obscures the text's connections with Machiavellian ideas, especially *virtù* and *occasione*. Furthermore, Etherington's abridgement gives us a clearer idea of how Botero's ideas were received in the English context. For instance, we might note Etherington's treatment of *interesse*. In the first instance of the term, relating to the interests of princes and states, Etherington chooses to translate *interesse* as 'reputation' rather than 'interest', and in the second, concerning the interests of counsellors, he eliminates the passage altogether. As Etherington explicitly sets out to extract 'the marrow of [Botero's]

Bookes his seuerall politiqe positions', his choices regarding what to include and exclude tell us a great deal about what contemporary English readers saw as the important elements of Botero's work.[45]

I have also incorporated a transcription of Sloane MS 3938, an English translation of the *Secretissima instructio*, probably produced in the early 1620s. Noel Malcolm has recently uncovered the importance of *secretissima instructio* texts and reproduced the English translation of the *Altera secretissima instructio* prepared by Hobbes; however, he has little to say about this earlier text and almost nothing regarding its translation.[46] Although the translator and purpose of the manuscript remain unclear, a full reading enables us to appreciate the ways in which the counsellor who is purported to have written the text is portrayed as a scheming, devious figure, as well as the importance placed upon on the observation of other states. By examining such texts, we are able to understanding the ways in which the ever-complex relationship between counsellor and sovereign was perceived, mistrusted and manipulated.

[45] MS Sloane 1065, fo. 2[r].
[46] Malcolm 2007.

Part I: The Henrician Humanists, 1485-1547

Chapter 1: The Figure of the Counsellor

Plato's philosopher-king combines the elements of sovereign command and wise counsel in a single figure.[47] The Aristotelian rejection – or rather alteration – of this ideal lies at the heart of the development of the humanist figure of the counsellor. Power comes from the king, but this power is guided – even ruled – by the prudence of counsel. By separating the roles of command and counsel into two distinct figures, Aristotle generates a very different theory of governance, one that requires a position not just for the sovereign but also for the counsellor. Although the discourse of counsel that emerges from this tradition is reflected in classical and medieval political traditions, it is in the writing of the Henrician humanists of the early sixteenth century that the figure of the counsellor first becomes fully realised, taking his place within the political structures of the time.

I. Medieval Aristotelianism and Prudent Counsel

The Aristotelian tradition accepts Plato's basic premise that reason must govern the ruler's passions and the appetites in order for good governance to rule over all. This is possible through the inculcation of the virtues, the most important being *phronesis* (φρόνησις - *prudentia*) – prudence or practical wisdom – understood as the ability to determine which action one ought to take in a given situation. Without prudence, Aristotle writes, 'real virtue does not develop' for 'we cannot be really good without practical wisdom, or practically wise without virtue of character'.[48] Prudence is distinct from wisdom (Σοφία – *sapientia*) as, unlike wisdom, it is

[47] Barker 2006, p. 45.
[48] Aristotle 1988, pp. 117, 118.

'concerned with worldly affairs, namely, with what we can deliberate about'.[49] It is this dedication to *phronesis* which leads Aristotle to reject the view that a philosophic nature – obeying at all times the rule of reason – is likely to exist in the prince.[50] As the prince is a single and corruptible figure, there is no guarantee that he will have the knowledge that supports prudence, nor the self-control to follow it in choosing virtuous actions. Instead, this prudence must exist externally in a philosopher who rules and guides him.[51] Reason will rule, if a philosopher rules a king through his prudent counsel.

The diffusion of this idea in the middle ages primarily came not through a text of Aristotle's own hand, but one ascribed to him: the *Secretum Secretorum*. Perhaps the most popular secular book of the medieval period, the *Secretum* was thought to be a translation of an original from Aristotle.[52] Although in fact a later fabrication, the arguments presented do find their foundation in Aristotelian sources, as does the role played by the character of Aristotle himself in the text.[53] From this work, there emerges a tradition of the counsellor as a wise but absent and/or otherworldly figure, who teaches the prince about the virtues requisite to his reign.[54]

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[49] Aristotle 1988, p. 110. See Surprenant 2012, pp. 221-7.
[50] From Themistius's *Oratio*: 'Plato, even if in all other respects he was divine and deserving our unlimited admiration, was utterly reckless when he made the statement that evils would never cease for men until either philosophers became kings, or kings became philosophers. This pronouncement of Plato's has been refuted and has paid its debt to time. We should honor Aristotle, who slightly altered Plato's statement and made his advice truer. Aristotle said that it was not merely unnecessary for a king to be a philosopher, but even distinct disadvantage. What a king should do was to listen to and take the advice of true philosophers. In doing so he would enrich his reign with good deeds and not merely with fine words'; quoted in Chroust 1968, pp. 16-17.
[51] See Chroust 1968, p. 17; Barker 2006, pp. 31-46.
[52] Williams 2003, p. 1.
[53] See Manzalaoui 1977, pp. ix; Williams 2003, pp. 10-28; Spencer 2006, p. 87.
[54] Kukkonen 2010, p. 71.

The bulk of the *Secretum* contains letters purported to have passed between Aristotle and his royal student, Alexander, alongside narration from the author/translator, illustrating and describing the proper relationship between a prince and his philosopher-counsellor.[55] Alexander is wholly obedient to Aristotle's advice, requesting it at every turn. Aristotle, however, refuses the call to accompany the prince in person, instead using his letters to further impress upon the young king the importance of counsel, advising him that it is 'by the counsaylle of Phylosophers wyse' that he shall bring his people 'easyly to good gouernaunce'.[56] Underscoring the limitations of a singular ruler, Aristotle reminds Alexander that he ought 'prudent counsayll [to] make thy chefe pryncesse' for he 'arte but one man'.[57] Alexander, like all princes, ought to be ruled by prudent counsel from outside sources, beginning with Aristotle himself.

This lesson is echoed in the multiple translations of the text. Forming a crucial part of the prevalent medieval *speculum principis* literature, the *Secretum* was utilised as a means to offer counsel on good governance, including the importance of prudent advice.[58] The 'original' translator dedicates the work to his caliph, reminding him to 'in vertue... set his gouernaunce' and to acquire virtue 'by grete aduysenesse'.[59] Subsequent translations were prepared for other princes – John Lydgate's fifteenth-century English text was prepared for the reading of

[55] In some cases this 'illustration' is literal; for instance in an illumination from the fifteenth-century University College, Oxford Manuscript 85 version of the text, the two figures – presumably Aristotle and Alexander – are pictured as equal and level, despite the latter's dais and throne (Figure 1). We might compare this illustrated equality to the earliest examples of Alciato's emblems, considered in Chapter 3; note especially Aristotle's pointed finger in the context of this later discussion. See Ferster 1996, pp. 48-9.
[56] *Gouernaunce of Kynges and Prynces* 1511, sig. A, v^{r}.
[57] *Gouernaunce of Kynges and Prynces* 1511, sig. B, ii^{v}; F, iv^{r}.
[58] See Nederman 2008, pp. 18-38.
[59] *Gouernaunce of Kynges and Prynces* 1511, sig. A, ii^{r}; see Williams 2003, p. 7.

Henry VI, and it is likely that the 1511 print edition of this text was intended for the eyes of the recently-crowned Henry VIII.[60]

Other *specula* serve a similar purpose.[61] For instance, the fourteenth-century French text, the *III Consideracions Right Necessarye to the Good Gouernaunce of a Prince*, originally intended for the future John II of France, was translated into English and compiled in a manuscript with the *Secretum* in the 1450s, most likely at the request of the soldier and counsellor Sir John Fastolf for Richard, Duke of York, claimant to the English throne.[62] This text draws on Aristotelian thought to establish the two parts to the prince's knowledge, both to be provided by 'good counseyllours, true and wyse'.[63] First, such counsel would make up for the limits in the prince's knowledge of self, rents and revenues, and duties – the three considerations of the title. Second, wise advice would also support the attainment of the '*IIII vertues necessarye for the good governaunce of a Prince*' – science, providence, justice and mercy – without which the first 'consideracions' cannot be achieved.[64] For these reasons 'it is full good and necessarye to a Prince to have aboute him good and auncient, sage, true counseillours, and to theyme yive credence'.[65] This is especially true in regards to the 'the vertue of providence' or prudence: a 'vertue comyng and growing of science, by the whiche men knowe what they shall doo, whanne and how they shall doo', upon which the performance of the other virtues rests.[66] Although the text was most likely written by a counsellor in the French court, and offers advice about counsel, it is anonymous,

[60] Williams 2003, p. 257. An edition was also prepared for Edward VI in 1548; see Steele 1894, p. xviii.
[61] See Perkins 2001; Nederman 2008, pp. 18-38.
[62] Genet 1977, p. 174.
[63] *III Consideracions* 1977, p. 194.
[64] *III Consideracions* 1977, p. 191.
[65] *III Consideracions* 1977, p. 192.
[66] *III Consideracions* 1977, p. 193.

and there is no counsellor figured within it.[67] This is often the case with *speculum* texts; although they give important information about the purpose of counsel in guiding the king, their place as mirror held before the prince leaves little room for the figure of the counsellor himself.

When a counsellor-figure does appear, he or she is often presented as a divine or imagined figure, difficult to imagine in the court of a contemporary monarch. This is the case in Christine de Pisan's *L'Épistre de Othéa a Hector*, written at the turn of the fourteenth century and printed in English in 1549, which uses the goddess of prudence, Othea, to communicate advice.[68] Othea counsels Hector throughout the text, demonstrating 'howe the vertue of Prudence is moche to be reco[m]mended' for 'Prudence is the most noble of all other thynges'.[69] Pisan also gives the example of the relationship between Joseph – another divine figure – and the pharaoh from Genesis, noting that it was only by 'the counsayle of his prudence' that Joseph saved Egypt from famine, concluding that 'As longe as thou shalt beleue the counsayle of them whiche vseth sapyence, and that loueth the loyally, thou shalt reygne victoryously'.[70]

By the fifteenth century, this tradition of the rule of the wise, or more specifically *prudent*, philosopher-counsellor was a strong and established tradition in England as well, based in large part on the widespread circulation of texts such

[67] Genet 1977, pp. 177-9.
[68] The connection between prudence and counsel stands at the core of Pisan's corpus, which contains a total of nine *speculum* works, many of which were circulated and read widely, including in England; see Green 2007, pp. 23-38. Nederman 2008, pp. 28-9 points out how Pisan's *speculum* works carried specific criticisms of her social and political environment, offering direct counsel to her royal audience, marking her as one of the most prolific writers of the *speculum* genre. For discussions of women and counsel in the middle ages see Deist 2003 and Schieberle 2008.
[69] Pisan 1549, sig. A, vi^{v}.
[70] Pisan 1549, sig. T, ii^{r}.

as the *Secretum* and the *specula* of Christine de Pisan. Much of the interest in such texts was spurred by the political turmoil surrounding the overthrow of Richard II in 1399.[71] Writers used the Aristotelian tradition of the philosopher-counsellor to criticise Richard's failure to obey advice, a mistake they made clear ought not to be repeated by the new king, Henry IV. This is the lesson communicated by the poet John Gower's *Confessio Amantis*, originally written in the 1380s and dedicated to Richard II, but revised and re-dedicated to Henry of Lancaster upon Richard's overthrow.[72] It once again figures a wise and otherworldly adviser – Genius[73] – who must guide and rule the passionate Amans, imparting to him Aristotelian philosophy as a way to temper his affections. In place of prudence, Genius speaks of 'practique' by which 'the vertu tryeth fro the vice' structuring the principles 'hou that a worthi king schal rule'.[74] Throughout the text he provides examples of kings who because of their 'wisdom and hih prudence' kept wise advisers near them, listening to their advice, and the downfall of those – like Richard II – who did not.[75]

It is in this tumultuous context at the turn of the fifteenth century that an image of the counsellor himself begins to emerge. Rather than presenting an absent or a reified persona, two texts written in this period begin to bring the figure himself into more light.[76] The first is the anonymous *Mum and the Sothsegger*, presented as a paired text with *Richard the Redeless*, a reflection on the downfall of Richard II, which attributes Richard's demise to his lack of proper 'rede' –

[71] Ferguson 1955, p. 69.
[72] See Ferster 1996, pp. 108-36.
[73] 'Genius' is here used in the sense of a 'tutelary god or attendant spirit allotted to every person at his birth, to govern his fortunes and determine his character, and finally to conduct him out of the world'.
[74] Gower 1899-1902, p. 234.
[75] Gower 1899-1902, p. 281.
[76] Ferguson 1955, pp. 67-83; see Barr and Ward-Perkins 1997, pp. 249-72.

advice.[77] *Mum* suggests the remedy to such 'redeless' rule through a reflection on the figure who offers frank counsel within the court. In the text, the character of Sothsegger sets out to find a courtly truth-teller, but he finds such a figure elusive and undefined; he searches the works of past authors and the sciences of the universities, but none tell him where to look for such a frank speaker, for the topic is new and unexplored. Finally, in a dream, Sothsegger receives the advice of a wise bee-keeper (much like Gower's Genius) who tells him that the truth-teller he seeks has the potential to exist within all men, including Sothsegger himself, and thus he ought to write a series of advice-books to his prince which will prevent the situation portrayed in *Richard the Redeless*. Sothsegger's duty to give counsel is figured in the text as a natural extension of the feudal duties to any liege-lord; if Sothsegger is meant to defend his king against harm, he should also offer advice which will protect him: 'And as my body and my beste/ oute to be my liegis,| So rithffully be reson/ my rede should also'.[78] Although Sothsegger's own adviser comes to him in a vision like a divine being, the counsellor of the court is not an absent or abstract figure but rather an educated lord such as Sothsegger, whose feudal duty to 'schelde [the king] from harmes' also extends to a duty to give him counsel.[79]

The contemporary *Regement of Princes*, written by the poet and clerk of the privy seal Thomas Hoccleve in 1410-11 and also dedicated to Henry IV, paints a similar picture of the counsellor-figure.[80] The *Regement* begins with a lengthy account of the motives of the author, who too becomes the recipient of advice from a wise older teacher in a dream before he himself takes that role with his prince.

[77] See Ferguson 1955.
[78] *Richard the Redeless* 2000, ln. 47-9.
[79] *Richard the Redeless* 2000, ln. 74.
[80] See Ferster 1996, pp. 137-59.

Hoccleve, as he tells his readers, is out of favour and out of money, and unsure how to regain both. Like *Sothsegger's* beekeeper, Hoccleve's old man advises him to 'Wryte to' his prince 'a goodly tale or two' following which 'his free grace shal upon thee lyght'.[81] Although not an extension of feudal duties as in *Mum*, in the *Regement* advice-giving is still seen as a part of the reciprocal relationship between lord and servant; Hoccleve will give his advice, and expects a reward for it.

The rest of the text is the result of this encounter: a *speculum* in the medieval style, once again emphasising the connection between prudence and counsel. Only by the light of prudence, Hoccleve writes, can the other cardinal virtues be known, for prudence 'counseil[s] what tho othir thre do' and what works are proper to them.[82] It is the faculty of understanding that 'makith man by reson him governe' and works through 'avysament', which is why Hoccleve goes on in the section on prudence to tell his prince to set his estate 'by wys counseil', before moving on in the subsequent chapter to address counsel specifically.[83] For Hoccleve too it is the problem of the singular and limited nature of the king which necessitates this counsel. As 'a kyng is but a man soul' and 'his wit nevere so good' he still may make mistakes, whereas 'good counseil may exclude a wrong'.[84] Furthering the idea that counsel not only guides but governs the prince, Hoccleve likens it 'to a brydil| Which that a hors up keepeth fro fallyng'.[85] Without the rule of prudent counsel, the affections of the prince may run wild over the whole of the commonwealth.

[81] Hoccleve 1999, ln. 1902, 1904.
[82] Hoccleve 1999, ln. 4757.
[83] Hoccleve 1999, ln. 4762, 4775, 4831.
[84] Hoccleve 1999, ln. 4862, 4863, 4865.
[85] Hoccleve 1999, ln. 4929-30.

II. Ciceronian Humanism and the Duty to Counsel

From the medieval Aristotelian tradition we have the generation of a philosopher-counsellor who guides and even governs the prince, making up for insufficiencies in both his knowledge and his reason, captured in the key virtue of prudence. Towards the middle of the fifteenth century, we encounter the construction of worldly counsellors within the court, driven by their feudal duty or desire for favour to offer advice regarding the virtues to their prince. With the spread of Ciceronian (or civic) humanism this figure becomes reconceptualised as the *vir civilis*, who has a *moral* duty to offer counsel to the prince, guaranteeing the achievement of the common good.[86] The attention to prudence also leads this figure to be placed in the context of the royal court; no longer the unyielding philosopher envisaged within the Aristotelian tradition, he must adapt to the 'theatre' of politics in order to play his role effectively.

This is laid out in the work of one of the leading humanists of the Northern Renaissance – Desiderius Erasmus. Although he himself remained distanced from active political engagement, he addresses the figure of the counsellor in two key texts, his *Moriae encomium*, written in 1509, published in 1511 and translated into English in 1549, and his *Institutio principis Christiani*, written in 1516 and published in 1532.[87] This latter text is written in the *speculum* tradition; Erasmus outlines the qualities necessary in a prince to the future Emperor Charles V. As the

[86] See Skinner 1996, pp. 70-6, 87. The line between medieval and Renaissance political thought drawn by civic humanism has not gone uncontested; see Blythe 2000, pp. 30-74. For the differences in Greek (Platonic/Aristotelian) and Roman (Ciceronian) thought see Nelson 2004. Central to the Greek conceptions is the idea that happiness, as the highest good, comes from contemplation, not civic engagement, leaving little room for a political philosopher-counsellor; Nelson 2004, pp. 13-15, 22. See also Anderson 2010 for the application of civic humanist philosophy in the work and political careers of John Cheke, Walter Haddon, Thomas Wilson, Thomas Smith, Nicholas Bacon and William Cecil.

[87] No contemporary English translation.

translator of the *Secretum* had told his caliph, Erasmus writes to Charles that he will 'not be able to be a king unless reason is king over you', and he must use 'reason and judgment' in all things. He agrees with Plato that a commonwealth can only be happy when 'philosophers are put at the helm, or those to whose lot the rule happens to have fallen embrace philosophy'.[88] However, he suggests that the system of hereditary monarchy makes this improbable and so 'When there is no power to select the prince, the man who is to educate the future prince must be selected with comparable care'; thus 'a country owes everything to a good prince; but it owes the prince himself to the one whose right counsel [*recta ratio*] has made him what he is'.[89] Like Aristotle, he sees the Platonic philosopher-king as unattainable within his political context and so a second figure must provide the philosophical element essential to rule.

The prince, in Erasmus's text, becomes no more than an instrument through which the wisdom of the philosopher is transmitted to the rest of the commonwealth. For this, he borrows from Plutarch, who had set out in his *Moralia* that philosophers who address themselves only to one man benefit only that single individual; if, on the other hand, they speak to kings, 'the benefit will be imparted unto many'.[90] In Plutarch and Erasmus's works, the prince is simply a fountainhead, through which the influence of the philosopher – good or bad – flows.[91]

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[88] Erasmus 1997, p. 2.
[89] Erasmus 1997, p. 6. This is what Rundle 1998, p. 148 refers to as 'pride of pedagogy', immediately noting the *didactic* rather than *advisory* functions of Erasmus's works.
[90] Plutarch 1603, p. 290.
[91] See Plutarch 1603, p. 292 and More 1551, sig. C, i^{r}; Starkey 1948, p. 44 and Erasmus 1997, p. 2. Contemporary translations of ancient authors will be used where available, read in consultation with originals and modern translations, in order to draw attention to similarities in language and vocabulary.

The view of the role of the philosopher set out by Erasmus is very different from the one presented in medieval works. It is not a feudal duty to protect the prince nor hope of reward which motivates him to share his wisdom, but rather a sense of moral duty to the commonwealth, a view drawn from Cicero's *De Officiis*. For Cicero, those who adopt the Platonic view that the philosopher ought to absent himself from politics abandon their primary duty to social life, for those who have 'their selfe fully gyuen to the doctryne [*doctrina*], study, and wisdom [*sapientia*], dyd specially bestowe their prudence [*prudentia*] and intelligence [*intellegentia*] to the profyte and behofe of all men'.[92] In the ranking of moral duties, 'all offyces that is of any power to kepe and contynue the company of man is to be preferred before the offyce that is comprysed in knowlege and scynce'.[93]

The counter-argument is laid out in Erasmus's satire, *Moriae,* in which the character of Folly rejects the idea of the political philosopher, marvelling at the suggestion that '*commen weales most happily shoulde flourish, that were gouerned by philosophers, or whose gouernours applied them selfes to philosophie*', for if one examines history, it becomes clear that 'no rulers were euermore pestilent to a commen weale, than if the same at any tyme fell into the hand[es] of suche one, as was geuen to any sect of philosophie'.[94] Those who, like Cicero, choose to 'meddle with matters of the commen weale' are as 'vnapte for all publike offices and affaires' as '*an asse is to fynger an harpe*' and so will, like Socrates, be 'laught to scorn'.[95] Contrary to what one might think, prudence comes of folly, not of reason. Since prudence is developed by way of experience, and a philosopher only learns from books, it is fools who possess 'perfect true prudence', based on their

[92] Cicero 1534, sig. I, 6^{r}.
[93] Cicero 1543, sig. I, 7^{r}.
[94] Erasmus 1549, sig. D, iv^{r-v}.
[95] Erasmus 1549, sig. F, iiii^{v}.

willingness to take an active role in worldly affairs.[96] Furthermore, prudence consists in the knowledge and judgement of things, which, according to Folly, requires knowing that all things 'haue two faces muche vnlyke and dissemblable'.[97] This 'pageant' is essential to life, but a philosopher – dedicated to truth – is likely to disrupt it.[98]

Folly's critique misunderstands Cicero's point and rejects the figure of the active philosopher too readily, as Erasmus makes clear in the *Institutio*. In this text he creates for himself a critic not unlike Folly, 'some idiot courtier, who is both more stupid and more misguided than any woman ever was', who protests that Erasmus is '"making a philosopher for us, not a prince"' in his insistence that the prince be guided by a philosopher.[99] He defends his position on the grounds that '"philosopher" does not mean someone who is clever at dialectics or science but someone who rejects illusory appearance and undauntedly seeks out and follows what is good'.[100] A philosopher is not someone divorced from reality, but heavily embedded within it. Folly is right that prudence comes from experience, and from participating in the stage-play of life, but she has not realised that it is the skill of the philosopher to sift through such information, distinguishing reality from falsehood, and thus identifying true virtuous action; such a philosopher fulfils precisely the role that Folly had set out for prudence.

This is clearest in Erasmus's treatment of the princely virtues in both texts. In the *Moriae*, Folly suggests that a king is nothing but a simple man who carries all the symbols of kingship which signify virtue, but does not actually demonstrate

[96] Erasmus 1549, sig. E, ii^{v}.
[97] Erasmus 1549, sig. E, iii^{r}.
[98] Erasmus 1549, sig. E, iiii^{r}.
[99] Erasmus 1997, p. 15.
[100] Erasmus 1997, p. 15.

them: ‘geue hym a chayne about his necke, for token that all vertues woulde agreablie be euchayned in hym: geue hym also a crowne frette with perle and stone, in signe he ought to excelle others in all princely vertues: than a sceptre in his hand betokennyng iustice with an vpright mynde on all sydes: lastly a Robe of purpre, whiche signifieth zeale and feruent affection towarde his subiectes’.[101] Such a prince ought to be ‘ashamed to weare’ such trappings, for he hath ‘no maner part of a prince in hym, sauyng onely the clothing’.[102] In the *Institutio* these symbols and their corresponding virtues are repeated, with the same admonishment that they are not simply accessories but should ‘serve to remind [the prince] of [his] duty’.[103] In a prince who does not wield the accompanying virtues, ‘these symbols are not decorations but reproaches of his defects’ and thus become ‘stigmata of vice’.[104] Erasmus asks: ‘If all that makes a king is a chain, a scepter, robes of purple, and a train of attendants, what after all is to prevent the actors in a drama who come on the state decked with all the pomp of state from being regarded as real kings?’, to distinguish real-life from the ‘stage play of Folie”?[105] The answer, as we have seen, is the philosopher.

A similar Ciceronian amendment to the Aristotelian philosopher-counsellor is presented by Baldassare Castiglione in his *Libro del Cortegiano*, written between 1513-1528 and translated into English by Thomas Hoby in 1561. Instead of changing the definition of ‘philosopher’ to place him in the context of the court, as Erasmus does, Castiglione reassigns the role to the courtier himself. He begins his dialogue with a lengthy discussion of the education, pastimes and characteristics of

[101] Erasmus 1549, sig. O, ii^{v}.
[102] Erasmus 1549, sig. O, ii^{v}.
[103] Erasmus 1997, p. 16.
[104] Erasmus 1549, sig. O, ii^{v}.; Erasmus 1997, p. 17.
[105] Erasmus 1997, p. 17; Erasmus 1549, sig. E, iii^{v}.

the good courtier, declaring that 'the ende therfore of a perfect Courtier [is]... that he may breake his minde to [the prince], and alwaies enfourme hym franklye of the trueth of euerie matter... and to set him in y^{e} waye of vertue'.[106] Castiglione echoes Folly's view of the philosopher, rejecting the suggestion that he will fulfill this role, for if such a one should endeavour to show a prince 'plainlie & without enie circomstance the horrible face of true vertue and teache them good maners and what the lief [sic] of a good Prince ought to be, I ame assured they wolde abhorr him at the first sight, as a most venimous serpent, or elles they wolde make him a laughinge stocke'.[107] Thus it must be the well-trained and virtuous courtier described in the text who will 'leade [the prince] throughe the roughe way of vertue'.[108] Castiglione ends by summarizing the qualities of the courtier whom he had described, concluding that:

> THE FINAL END OF A COVRTIER, VVHERTO AL HIS good condicions and honest qualities tende, is to beecome *An Instructer and Teacher of his Prince or Lorde*, inclininge him to vertuous practises: And to be francke and free with him, after he is once in fauour in matters touching his honour and estimation, alwayes puttinge him in minde to folow vertue and to flee vice.[109]

Whether invested in the active philosopher or a virtuous and knowing courtier, the Ciceronian amendment to Aristotle's philosopher-counsellor sees such a figure as fulfilling a moral duty within the theatre of politics. But is this truly the counsellor? Erasmus tells us in the *Institutio* that the figure he addresses is not a counsellor in the truest sense, but rather a princely tutor, and the same can be said of Castiglione's courtly '*Instructer and Teacher*'. As the title might suggest, Erasmus's subject in the *Institutio* is 'the man who is to educate the future prince',

[106] Castligione 1561, sig. Mm, iiii^{v}-Nn, i^{r}.
[107] Castligione 1561, sig. Nn, ii^{v}.
[108] Castiglione 1561, sig. Nn, iii^{r}.
[109] Castiglione 1561, sig. Zz, ii^{v}.

whose role he makes distinct from that of the counsellor.[110] It is 'fruitless', he suggests, 'to give advice on the principles of government' – as a counsellor would – 'without previously setting a prince's mind free' through philosophic instruction in 'established principles and ideas' which emerge 'from theory and not from practice'.[111] It is only after this instruction that the 'practical experience which [the prince's] youth denies him' should be supplemented by the advice of counsellors.[112] As prudence is a 'wretched sort of wisdom', only acquired by the sort of experience that could ruin a state, the prince ought to come to it 'by sitting in on consultations' and acting 'by the advice of wise counsellors', but this is only '*after instruction in the principles involved*'.[113] Erasmus draws a clear distinction between the tutor who plants the seeds of virtue in a prince and counsellors who provide the prudence necessary to apply this learning to determining virtuous action, and his attention is on the former.[114]

III. Henrician Humanists and the Political Counsellor

It is the Henrician humanists who take the final step in the development of the political counsellor by shifting focus from the role of instruction in the principles of virtue to that of guiding daily political action. The argument made by Erasmus, that practical counsel is 'fruitless' without previous instruction in higher principles is rejected, creating the need for a permanent conciliar presence at court. It is a subtle

[110] Erasmus 1997, p. 6.
[111] Erasmus 1997, pp. 11, 20.
[112] Erasmus 1997, p. 20.
[113] Erasmus 1997, pp. 20, 46; emphasis added.
[114] Other historians have conflated the views of Erasmus, Castiglione and Elyot on counsel without an awareness of this Senecan distinction between the teacher and the counsellor; see for example Walker 2005, pp. 142-5.

extension of the arguments of Aristotle and Cicero, but an important one in the development of the figure of the counsellor in the sixteenth-century.

The key lies in the work of the originator of the *speculum* genre: Seneca.[115] Erasmus's argument for the futility of counsel in the case of an uneducated prince is precisely that which Seneca had opposed in Epistle XCIV of his *Epistolae morales ad Lucilium*. Arguing against the position set out by Aristo and the Stoics, he makes a distinction between 'decrees [*decreta*] and precepts [*praecepta*] of Philosophie' in that 'the one are generall, the other particular'.[116] The former provide universal principles, the latter pragmatic advice. From this Seneca divides virtue into two parts – contemplation and action – concluding that 'institution teacheth contemplation, admonition action [*contemplationem instituio tradit, actionem admonitio*]'.[117] As virtue is incomplete without virtuous action, and it is counsel which acts as a guide to virtuous action, so 'it followeth that admonition is necessary'.[118] Nature provides the 'seeds of vertue', but they only 'fructify by meanes of admonition', like a 'sparke being assisted with a light blast, becometh a great flame: vertue is awakened, when she is either touched or shaken'.[119] Thus, it does not follow that in the absence of a virtuous education admonitions are to be rejected.

The fully realised political counsellor – combining the Platonic rule of reason, the Aristotelian separation of counsel and command, the Ciceronian *vita activa* and the Senecan distinction between instruction and counsel – is first set out in Book I of Thomas More's *Utopia*, published in Latin in 1516 and translated into

[115] Stacey 2007, pp. 4-5. For Seneca's influence in the Renaissance see Stacey 2007, pp. 173-203.
[116] Seneca 1614, p. 391.
[117] Seneca 1614, p. 397.
[118] Seneca 1614, p. 397.
[119] Seneca 1614, p. 395.

English in 1551. In what has become known as the 'dialogue of counsel', the character of More attempts to convince Hythloday that it is his duty to 'apply your wytte and delygence to the proffyt of the weale publyque', which he can '[n]euer so well doo, nor with so greate proffitte perfourme' but if he chooses to be 'of sum great prynces councell' where he shall guide him 'to honeste opynyons, and vertuous persuasyons'.[120] His suggestion is framed according to Aristotle's pragmatic adjustment of the Platonic philosopher-king, for he notes that 'Plato Iudgethe that weale publyques shall by this mea[n]es attayne perfecte felicitie, other if phylosophers be kynges, or els if kynges giue them se[l]fes to the study of Philosophie' and asks 'how farre I praye yowe, shall commen wealthes then be from thys felicitie, if phylosophers wyll vouchsaufe to instructe kynges w^{t} their good counsell?'[121]

Hythloday, however, does not give up the Platonic ideal; echoing the view that Seneca had countered, he maintaines that 'oneles kynges themselfes would applye their myndes to the studye of philosophie, that elles they would neuer thoroughlye allowe the counsell of phylosophers, beyng themselfes before euen from their te[n]der age infecteyd, and corrupt with peruerse, and euyll opinio[n]s'.[122] Hythloday even employs the same vocabulary that Seneca had rejected, arguing that 'If I should propose to any kynge holsome decrees [*decreta*], doinge my endeuour to pluck out of his mynde the pernitious originall causes of vice and noughtenes, thynke you not that I shoulde furth[er] with other be dryuen

[120] More 1551, sig. C, i^{r}; see Hexter 1978, p. 61. Nelson 2004, figures this dialogue, as well as the description of Utopia in Book Two as a debate between Greek and Roman ideals of the republic, the first focused on the joys of contemplation, the second concerned with civic engagement and liberty (pp. 23, 36-7), as well as connecting the 'problem of counsel' with Erasmus's discussion in *Praise of Folly* (p. 29).
[121] More 1551, sig. E, iiii^{v}.
[122] More 1551, sig. E, v^{r}.

awaye, or elles made a laughy[n]ge stocke?'[123] Hythloday has misunderstood Cicero's *and* Seneca's construction of the ideal counsellor, repeating the same arguments of Erasmus's Folly and Seneca's Aristo.

The character of More recognises Hythloday's mistake. He tells him that 'this schole philosophie [*philosophia scholastica*]' which teaches of universal truths and 'thinketh all thinges mete for euery place', truly does not have a place amongst kings.[124] That being said, 'ther is an other philosophie more cyuyle' which is more practical and 'knoweth... her owne stage'.[125] Echoing the words of Folly and Cicero, More agrees with Hythloday that a philosopher embracing the academic philosophy would be akin to, during a comedy, 'sodenlye com[ing] vpon the state in a philosophers apparell' and playing out the scene from *Octavia* 'wherin Seneca disputeth with Nero', but this is not what he is suggesting.[126] The counsellor must not only compromise in order to participate in the stage-play of politics, as Cicero had set out, but also accept his role as guiding action, not implanting virtue and uprooting vice, as Seneca had made clear.

In a sense, however, the character of More loses the debate, for the rest of the text is taken up by precisely the sort of abstract Platonic theorising that the counsellor is meant to avoid. This lesson becomes even more apparent when compared to another sixteenth-century work which considers the role of the counsellor and, unlike *Utopia*, fully embeds him in his political context. Thomas Starkey's *Dialogue Between Pole and Lupset*, written between 1529 and 1532, stands as an utter rejection of Hythloday's position, as well as his discussion of

[123] More 1551, sig. E, v[r].
[124] More 1551, sig. F, v[r].
[125] More 1551, sig. F, v[r]. For the connection between this metaphor and Cicero's *De Officiis* see Skinner 1987, pp. 130-1.
[126] More 1551, sig. F, v[v].

Utopia in Book II, further establishing a specific position for counsel in the context of early sixteenth-century England.[127]

Like *Utopia*, the *Dialogue* begins with an exhortation to counsel; the character of Lupset comments to the character of Reginald Pole: 'I have much and many times marvelled... Master Pole, after so many years spent in quiet studies and learning [why you] have not settled yourself and applied your mind to the handling of matters of the common weal', and asks him to present his views on the state of England.[128] When Pole objects that the contemplative life is superior to the active, Lupset agrees that 'the perfection of man resteth in the mind' and thus 'prudence and policy were not to be compared with high philosophy', however, he suggests that neither can be reached without the other.[129] A man must 'first to make himself perfit, with all virtues garnishing his mind' through contemplation and then 'commune the same perfection to other', requiring active engagement in politics.[130] He too makes allusion to Seneca's 'seeds' of virtue, noting that the cardinal virtues 'are rooted and planted' in the hearts of man, but they require 'the diligence of

[127] See Mayer 1989, p. 36 for Starkey's familiarity with More's text.
[128] Starkey 1948, pp. 21, 22; 'I have much & many tymys marvelyd... why <you *ma*stur pole> aftur so many yerys spent in quyet studys of letturys <& lernyng>, & <aft*u*r> such experyence of the manerys of ma*n* <, taken> in dyvers partyss beyond the see, have not <before thys> settylyd your self, [...] applyd your mynd to the handelyng of the materys of the co*m*mon wele' (Starkey 1989, p. 1). For the sake of clarity I am employing the 1948 edition of Starkey's text rather than the 1989 direct transcription of the manuscript by T. F. Mayer, which will be given in the footnotes. Mayer 1989, p. 89 establishes that the original intention of the text was to convince Pole – at the time Starkey's patron – to enter political life; see also Mayer 1985, p. 2 and Mayer 1992, pp. 51-75 for Pole and Starkey's intellectual and political network.
[129] Starkey 1948, p. 23; 'the p*er*fection of ma*n* restyth in the mynd'... 'prudence & pollycy were not to be co*m*paryd with hye phylosophye' (Starkey 1989, p. 3).
[130] Starkey 1948, p. 24; 'fyrst to make himself p*er*fayte wythal vertues garnyschyng hys mynd, & then to co*m*myn the same perfection to other' (Starkey 1989, p. 4).

man... for their springing up and good culture'.[131] Without the guidance of 'great, wise and politic men', such as Pole, men's own vanity will get in the way of the cultivation of virtue, and so Pole ought not to withhold his advice.[132]

Pole accepts this argument, but wonders whether it is true that it is *always* a good idea to live an active life, or whether it is contingent upon 'time and place'.[133] Directly echoing Hythloday (as well as Erasmus's Folly), he tells Lupset that in time of tyranny his counsel 'should be laughed at' and fall upon the ears of 'deaf men'.[134] Like Hythloday, he also highlights a concern for corruption, concluding that 'to attempt the handling of the matters of the common weal without regard either of time or place, nothing obtaining but only to be corrupt'.[135]

Lupset counters Pole's objection in two parts. First, he suggests that even if one were to consider time and place in a decision to offer counsel, it would not stand as an objection in this case, as England is free from tyranny, and so Pole should take the opportunity of Henry's goodness to offer his counsel to him. Lupset emphasises that Henry has a 'fervant love to the wealth of his subjects' and a zeal for justice and equity.[136] Notably, this is '*after* he is thereof informed and surely instruct by his wise counsellors and politic men' and 'when he knoweth the best'

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[131] Starkey 1948, p. 32; 'rotyd &pla*n*tyd'... 'dylyge*n*ce of ma*n*... <for theyr spry*n*gng up & <gud> culture>' (Starkey 1989, pp. 10-11).
[132] Starkey 1948, p. 36; 'grete wyse & polytyke me*n*' (Starkey 1989, p. 15).
[133] Starkey 1948, p. 36; 'tyme & place' (Starkey 1989, p. 15). The theme of 'time and place' in Starkey's *Dialogue* will be addressed in Chapter 2.
[134] Starkey 1948, p. 36; 'schold be layghyd at'... 'deffe me*n*' (Starkey 1989, p. 15).
[135] Starkey 1948, p. 37; 'to atte*m*pt the handelyng of the mat*er*ys of the co*m*myn wele, wythout regard other of tyme or place no thyng optayny*n*g but only to be corrupt' (Starkey 1989, p. 16). Pole here employs the same metaphor of the man who goes out into the rain to attempt to convince others to go inside as Hythloday does in *Utopia* (More 1551, sig. F, viii^{r-v}) but attributes it to Plutarch rather than Plato (*Republic* Book VI). It is unclear whether this is a mistake made by Starkey, or if he purposefully writes this mistake into his *Dialogue*.
[136] Starkey 1948, p. 38; 'ferve*n*t love to the welth of hys subectys' (Starkey 1989, p. 17).

path to follow.[137] Henry's goodness itself is contingent upon receiving the right sort of counsel, further reason for Pole to provide it.

Second, he denounces those who 'so narrowly and so curiously... ponder the time and the place, that in all their lives they nother find time nor place' and thus, like Hythloday, spend their lives looking 'for Plato's common weal'.[138] There is no place for Utopias in counselling kings. Once Pole acquiesces to the request for counsel, Lupset further emphasises this point, encouraging Pole to reject the example of Plato in addressing a non-existent ideal republic and to speak instead of the commonwealth of England in which they live. Pole agrees, and so instead of a discussion of a republic out of time and place as in *Utopia*, they move on to a discussion of the specific 'fauts and misorders' of England.[139]

In doing so, it quickly becomes apparent that the most pressing problem is a familiar one. The system of hereditary monarchy does nothing to ensure against a prince driven by his affections instead of reason. Because of this the people are ignorant of virtue and therefore miserable, which by 'diligent instruction and wise counsel' should be rectified, if only there was someone to provide it.[140] Adopting Lupset's Senecan metaphor of the seeds of virtue, Pole remarks that if man would 'hear counsel of wise and prudent men' the 'seeds of nature planted in his mind' would not be choked, which causes him him to be 'led by ignorance and folly'.[141]

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[137] Starkey 1948, p. 38, emphasis added; 'aftur he ys <therof> informyd & surely instructe, by hys wyse co*n*seylyrs & polytyke'... 'when he knowyth the best' (Starkey 1989, p. 17).
[138] Starkey 1948, p. 38; 'so naroly & so curyously <they> po*n*dur the tyme & the place, that in al theyr lyfys they nother fynd tyme nor place, they loke I trow for platos co*m*myn wele' (Starkey 1989, p. 16).
[139] Starkey 1948, p. 75; 'fautys & mysordurys' (Starkey 1989, p. 18).
[140] Starkey 1948, p. 44; 'dylyge*n*t instructyon & wyse co*n*seyl' (Starkey 1989, p. 21).
[141] Starkey 1948, p. 44; 'here counseyl of wyse & prude*n*t me*n*'... 'sedys of nature pan*n*tyd in hys mynd'... 'lad by ignora*n*ce <& foly>' (Starkey 1989, p. 22).

As ‘the end of all politic rule is to induce the multitude to virtuous living’, and this is done by counsel, it is crucial that counsel be suffused throughout the political system.[142]

This requires, first, that wise men offer their counsel and, second, that it is then spread to the rest of the commonwealth. Recalling the Plutarchan metaphor of the fountain, good governance requires both nourishing water – provided by prudent counsellors – and the proper functioning of the fountain to distribute it – the prince. Even if the first problem is rectified, the second would persist, for, Pole argues, ‘this is sure, and a Gospel word: that country cannot be long well governed nor maintained with good policy where all is ruled by the will of one not chosen by election, but cometh to it by natural succession’, as he is unlikely to have the ‘virtue and wisdom’ required for such a post.[143] Resolving this problem would provide a ‘common remedy... for all the rest of misorders’ of England.[144]

Although the ideal option, in Pole’s mind, would be to elect the monarch, he and Lupset agree that this is unrealistic in their current political context, and so instead Pole sets out a second solution – the prince ought to be joined to a council, ‘tempering his power’ and substituting his lack of reason.[145] Pole’s remedy to this recurrent problem is stated in much stronger terms than that of previous theorists, as he creates an elaborate institutional structure whereby ‘the prince would... be

[142] Starkey 1948, p. 61; ‘so that the end of al polytyke rule ys, to enduce the multytud to vertuse lyvyng, accordyng to the dygnyte of the nature of nature of ma*n*’ (Starkey 1989, p. 36).
[143] Starkey 1948, p. 99; ‘thys ys sure & a gospel word, that cu*n*trey ca*n* not be long wel gov*er*nyd nor mayntayneyd wyth gud pollycy, where al ys rulyd by the wyl of one not chosen by electyon but co*m*myth to hyt by natural successyon’... ‘wysdome & vertue’ (Starkey 1989, p. 68).
[144] Starkey 1948, p. 151; ‘co*m*myn remedy... for al the rest <of the mysordurys’ (Starkey 1989, p. 109).
[145] Starkey 1948, p. 168; ‘te*m*puryng hys powar’ (Starkey 1989, p. 123).

restrained and brought to order'.[146] By such 'good prudence and policy', Pole and Lupset agree, the commonwealth will come to its proper end and perfection.[147]

The text does not end with this accord, however, for Lupset continues to push Pole to give his counsel publicly, rather than in the 'leisure' in which they find themselves.[148] Pole suggests that they ought to have a further discussion on the matters of 'true nobility' and whether a counsellor ought to wait until he is called before giving his advice.[149] They resolve to discuss these concerns another time, indicating Starkey's intention to compose a second volume, but there is no evidence that it was ever completed. Starkey takes More's introduction of the political counsellor a step further, embedding him in the Henrician political structure, but stops short of a description of the figure himself.

It is Thomas Elyot who fully articulates the figure of the counsellor in the English humanist tradition.[150] He addresses the counsellor in a number of his texts, most notably the *Boke Named the Gouernour* (1531).[151] Whereas the medieval *specula* had addressed the figure of the counsellor by way of the discussion of the prince, Erasmus and Castiglione had focused on a figure distinct from the counsellor, and More and Starkey had discussed an adviser in treating the best state

[146] Starkey 1948, p. 168; 'restraynyd <& brought to ordur>' (Starkey 1989, p. 123). The precise structure of Starkey's institutional arrangement will be discussed in Chapter 3.
[147] Starkey 1948, p. 190; 'gud prud*e*nce & pollycy' (Starkey 1989, p. 142).
[148] Starkey 1948, p. 21; 'leser' (Starkey 1989, p. 1).
[149] Starkey 1948, p. 191; 'true nobylyte' (Starkey 1989, p. 143).
[150] As Conrad 1992, p. 78 points out, Elyot was 'arguably England's foremost exponent of what [Francis] Bacon termed 'counsel of manners' and at least three of his works – *Pasquil the Playne, Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man* and *The Boke named the Gouernour* – deal specifically with the subject; Walzer 2012b, p. 2 amends this number to five, but does not note the works he has in mind.
[151] For the *Gouernour* as a particularly political text see Walker 2005, pp. 141-5.

of the commonwealth, Elyot at last gives the counsellor a full and specific treatment in his *Gouernour*.[152]

Elyot couches his discussion in the same acknowledgement of the inevitable insufficiencies of a single monarch first introduced in the *Secretum*. Since 'one mortall man can not haue knowlege of all thynges done in a realme or large dominion' in order to support both parts of this governance 'it is expedient and also nedefull/ that vnder the capitall gouernour be sondry meane authorities'.[153] A prince must have a 'double gouernaunce', for not only must he maintain an 'exterior or outwarde gouernaunce', consisting of governance over 'his chyldren/ his seruauntes/ and other subiectes', but he must also possess an internal governance over 'his affectes & passio[n]s/ which do inhabite within his soule/ & be subiectes to reason'.[154]

Guidance, once again, is provided by means of prudence.[155] Whereas wisdom contemplates the divine, prudence 'teacheth: warneth/ exhorteth/ ordereth/ & profiteth/ like a wise capitaine' in regards to 'execution or actuall operation'.[156] With reference to Seneca, Elyot notes that instruction in wisdom and science are important to the achievement of virtue, but they do not guarantee virtuous action: 'we instructe our children in the llberall [sic] sciences/ nat bycause those sciences may gyue any vertue: but bicause they prepare the mynde, and make it apt to receyue vertue'.[157] True virtue is gained through prudence, which comes either from actual experience, study of history or, most importantly to a prince, counsel.

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[152] As Walker 2005, pp. 167-77 makes clear, the *Gouernour* is not a mirror-for-princes text.
[153] Elyot 1970 [1531], fo. 13^{v}.
[154] Elyot 1970 [1531], fo. 196^{r}.
[155] See Walzer 2012b, pp. 16-17.
[156] Elyot 1970 [1531], fo. 241^{r}.
[157] Elyot 1970 [1531], fo. 241^{v}.

For a courtier, such as the one Elyot addresses, 'the ende of al doctrine and studie is good counsayle', for it is 'in good counsaile/ wherin vertue may be founden'.[158] Counsel is the 'propre mantion or palice' of virtue, where her power 'concernynge gouernaunce' may be found, whether it is the governance of one – internal governance – 'called morall', or of many – external governance – 'called polityke'.[159] It is counsel which forms the connection between these two forms of governance; it is 'the last part of morall Sapience, and the begynnynge of sapience politike'.[160] By providing this counsel to his prince, the figure that Elyot addresses will ensure that he rules within the strictures of reason and virtue. This is the humanist counsellor, fully realised.

[158] Elyot 1970 [1531], fos. 254^{r-v}. As Walker 2005, p. 147 points out, these final chapters on counsel and consultation make up the most original section of the *Gouernour*.
[159] Elyot 1970 [1531], fo. 254^{r}.
[160] Elyot 1970 [1531], fos. 257^{v}-258^{r}.

Chapter 2: Classical Rhetoric

By the early Tudor period, theorists had developed an understanding of the figure of the counsellor adapted from the Aristotelian philosopher-counsellor, whose role was to supplement the limitations of the prince, especially in terms of the prudence required to guide virtuous action. The key element added in the sixteenth century was to situate this figure within his political context, participating in, rather than disrupting, the theatre of politics. Crucial to this role was an understanding of the classical art of rhetoric, particularly deliberative rhetoric. The figure of the Henrician humanist counsellor combined the philosopher with the orator to recreate the active citizens of old, whose wise rhetoric guided the *res publica* towards the twin aims of *utile* and *honestum*. Deliberative rhetoric was *the* talent requisite in a counsellor to fulfil the ends of counsel established above.

I. The Orator and the Philosopher

The rearticulation of the classical art of rhetoric is most clearly represented in Thomas Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique*.[161] First published in 1553, it went through a further eight editions during the sixteenth century.[162] Drawing in particular on Cicero and Quintilian, as well as his contemporaries, Wilson presents the most comprehensive account of the neo-Roman theory of rhetoric for a practising readership – whether lawyers, teachers, politicians or, indeed, counsellors.

Wilson opens his handbook with the story of Cineas, a Greek orator, scholar and counsellor, who is able to persuade the people and captains of the Roman cities besieged by his king to surrender. From this tale Wilson remarks 'Good was that

[161] Mack 2004, pp. 76, 79, 84.
[162] *The Arte of Rhetorique* was published in 1553, 1560, 1562, 1563, 1567, 1580, 1584 and 1585.

Oratour whiche coulde do so muche: & wise was that king which woulde vse suche a meane.'[163] The construction of the humanist counsellor is an attempt to reproduce precisely such a figure, who combines the wisdom of the philosopher with impressive oratorical ability.

It was such a man, Wilson tells his readers, who first drew men from their beastly living into civility. Drawing on Cicero's *De inventione*, Wilson writes that after the Fall, people lived 'man againste manne, one agaynste another, and all agaynste order'.[164] To repair this vicious and ungodly manner of living, God 'stirred vp his faythfull and elect, to perswade with reason, all men to societye. And gaue his appoynted ministers knowledge bothe to se the natures of men, and also graunted them the gift of vtteraunce, that they myghte wyth ease wynne folke at their will, and frame theim by reason to all good order'.[165] Such figures continue to be needed in a commonwealth to stand between men and their beastly natures, as Thomas Starkey had written in his *Dialogue*. Just as 'by the persuasion of wise men in the beginning men were brought from their rudeness and bestial life to this civility so natural to man', Starkey writes that by the wisdom of 'wise and politic men... the multitude might be contained and kept in good order and civility'.[166]

The wise orator, however, is generally accepted by such writers to be a rare commodity. Just as Starkey and his contemporaries wrote in order to convince philosophers to become more active in political life, so too must orators be convinced to become more like wise and prudent philosophers. As Cicero writes,

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[163] Wilson 1553, sig. A, i[r-v].
[164] Wilson 1553, sig. A, iii[r]. See Cicero 1949, p. 3.
[165] Wilson 1553, sig. A, iii[r].
[166] Starkey 1948, p. 28; 'by the p*er*suasyon of wyse me*n*, in the begynnyng me*n* were brought fro*m* thayr rudenes & bestyal lyfe, to <thys> cyvylyte so natural to ma*n*'... 'wyse & polytyke men... the multytude myght be co*n*teyned & kept in gud ordur & cyvylyte' (Starkey 1989, p. 7).

'wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states, but that eloquence without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous and is never helpful'.[167] For Cicero, rhetoric had been divorced from philosophy, and thus orators imitate rather than cultivate the virtues: 'But when a certain agreeableness of manner – a depraved imitation of virtue – acquired the power of eloquence unaccompanied by any consideration of moral duty, then low cunning supported by talent grew accustomed to corrupt cities and undermine the lives of men'.[168] The talented but immoral orators were deemed 'fit to govern the state', which 'brought eloquence into such odium and unpopularity that men of the greatest talent left a life of strife and tumult for some quiet pursuit', the resultant exodus of philosophers from the public sphere further intensifying the effect of these virtueless rhetoricians.[169] Both orators more interested in popularity than philosophy and philosophers more interested in contemplation than the good of society are to blame for 'the rupture, so to speak, between the tongue and the brain', resulting in the split of the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric.[170]

Quintilian adopts this story as well, agreeing with Cicero that 'philosophers and orators' were 'once so closely joined by nature and united in function' that they 'were taken to be the same'.[171] Quintilian seeks to bring them together again by emphasising that the 'ideal' orator is *a good man*. Whereas Cicero's ideal orator had been 'admirable' by virtue of his possessing the skill of oratory – for 'who can exhort people to virtue more passionately than the orator, and who can call them back from vice more vigorously?' – Quintilian is deliberate in his assertion that

[167] Cicero 1949, p. 3.
[168] Cicero 1949, p. 9.
[169] Cicero 1949, pp. 9, 11.
[170] Cicero 2001, p. 241.
[171] Quintilian 2001, vol. 1, p. 59.

only a good man can possess these skills in the first place.[172] His purpose is 'to educate the perfect orator, who cannot exist except in the person of a good man'.[173] In order to avoid the corruption described above, the orator must have 'not only exceptional powers of speech, but all the virtues of character as well'.[174] Quintilian makes clear that '*no one* can be an orator *unless* he is a good man', for 'one could surely not concede intelligence to people who are offered the paths of virtue and vice and then choose the worse'.[175] It is not oratorical skill which makes one a good man; it is only the good man who can learn and practice the art of rhetoric.

Thus the orator must not just learn the mechanics, techniques and figures of rhetoric, but he must 'above all else develop his moral character by study, and undergo thorough training in the honourable and the just'.[176] The 'principles of upright and honourable [*honestas*] living' should not belong just to the philosophers, for this is the source of all the trouble surrounding rhetoric previously recounted.[177] Instead, philosophical ideas 'truly and rightly belong to [the orator's] work, and are strictly relevant to the art of oratory'.[178] Rather than the orator infringing on the discipline of philosophy, 'the truth is rather that *they* are busy with *our* material', and so discussion of the 'good, the expedient and the just' falls just as much under the heading of rhetoric as it does philosophy.[179] That being said, Quintilian does not 'want the orator to be a philosopher, for no other way of life is

[172] Cicero 2001, p. 133. Morgan 1998, pp. 245-62 suggests that this assertion underpins Quintilian's educational theory and thus his political thought.
[173] Quintilian 2001, vol. 1, p. 57.
[174] Quintilian 2001, vol. 1, p. 57.
[175] Quintilian 2001, vol. 5, p. 201.
[176] Quintilian 2001, vol. 5, p. 221.
[177] Quintilian 2001, vol. 1, p. 57.
[178] Quintilian 2001, vol. 1, p. 57.
[179] Quintilian 2001, vol. 1, p. 411. As we shall see these three headings are reflected in the three divisions of rhetoric: demonstrative/epideictic/laudatory; deliberative; and forensic/judicial.

more remote from the duties of the citizen and the task of an orator generally'.[180] Instead, he wants him to be a 'Roman wise man' who is 'able to play the part of the statesman not in private seminars but in the experience and activity of real life'.[181] Whether it is encouraging the philosopher to a more active life, or pushing the active orator to embrace philosophy, the synthesis between the two is what results in the generation of the figure of the counsellor – he who will, in the words of Cicero 'exhort people to virtue'.[182]

II. Deliberative Rhetoric and *Decorum*

This connection between oratory and the counsellor becomes especially clear when one turns to the forms of rhetoric set out by the classical authors. These were demonstrative (also referred to as epideictic or laudatory) – which is 'in praise, or dispraise of a thynge', judicial (also called forensic) – which disputes 'whether the matter be right, or wrong', and deliberative – which is 'in consultyng'.[183] This last form treats decision-making, attempting to convince the hearer to or from a path of action. It is thus 'for those who give advice in private and those who speak in the assembly', in other words, those who give counsel.[184] The topic of this form of rhetoric, as Aristotle had first laid out, is *utilitas* – will the outcome of the decision be useful or harmful to the hearer? This is not to say it is an amoral form of argument, however, for in seeking to ascertain 'what kind of good or bad things the deliberative orator advises', Aristotle concludes that men will always seek their own happiness, thus 'all who exhort or dissuade discuss happiness and the things

[180] Quintilian 2001, vol. 5, pp. 223, 225.
[181] Quintilian 2001, vol. 5, p. 225.
[182] Cicero 2001, p. 133.
[183] Wilson 1553, fo. 6^{v}.
[184] Aristotle 1926, p. 33.

which conduce or are detrimental to it'.[185] As true happiness, for Aristotle, can only come from virtue, the deliberative orator – like the humanist counsellor – must lead his listener to virtuous action in order to lead him to *utilitas*.

Cicero is even clearer regarding the need for virtue to be considered in the speech of the deliberative orator. In treating 'speeches before deliberative bodies [*deliberations*]', he goes against 'some writers' who 'have thought that advantage [*utilitas*] alone should be proposed as an object in urging or proposing a political measure' and instead suggests that they should concern themselves with both 'what is honourable [*honestum*] and what is advantageous [*utile*]'.[186] As he sets out in *De officiis*, 'nothynge is profytable that is not ioyned with honesty'.[187] In choosing a path of action, or counselling towards it, one will never have to choose between an action which is advantageous but dishonest, or honest but unprofitable, for the two will always be united. In considering 'com[m]en cou[n]sayles', Cicero sets out that 'there is nothynge profytable that is cruell' and declares 'therfore let this be a conclusyon that that thynge whiche is honest is neuer profytable.... For it is yuell to iudge that to be profytable that may not be honest'.[188]

Wilson repeats a similar formula. Deliberative rhetoric considers 'whether the cause is profitable or unprofitable', under which comes a variety of considerations, including that it is 'honest, Saufe, Profitable, Easie, Pleasant, Harde' and so on.[189] Like his classical predecessors, Wilson gives a lengthy description of the four cardinal virtues and suggests that these should be the first consideration in attempting to persuade someone. Thus, in all cases, despite a

[185] Aristotle 1926, p. 47.
[186] Cicero 1949, p. 177.
[187] Cicero 1534, sig. Bb, 1^{r}.
[188] Cicero 1534, sig. S^{v}.
[189] Wilson 1553, fos. 6^{v}; 16^{r}.

division that ascribes utility to the domain of deliberative rhetoric, these authors include the consideration of *honestas* alongside, or often above, that which is *utile* in discussions of the rhetoric of counsel.

The key element in the connection between these two ends of advice is *decorum*. We have already seen this idea in the metaphor of the 'stage-play' in the works of More and Erasmus – More had advised that the philosopher-counsellor ought to play his part in the theatre of politics '*cum decoro*' – translated by Ralph Robinson in 1551 as 'with comlynesse'.[190] *Decorum* is the ability, as Cicero makes clear, to adapt one's speech and action to the circumstances of time and place. As he explains in his *Orator*, 'the same style and the same thoughts must not be used in portraying every condition in life, or every rank, position or age, and in fact a similar distinction must be made in respect of place, time and audience' and so *decorum* is the 'universal rule' both of oratory and life.[191]

For the sixteenth-century English rhetoricians, the far more influential discussion of *decorum* is in *De Officiis*. Here Cicero uses his definition of *decorum* to make the important connection between *utile* and *honestum*. He makes clear from the outset that this conception of *decorum*, translated from the Greek *prepon* [πρεπον], is related to *honestum*; *decorum* 'can not be separat from honesty, for bothe that whiche is comly is honest, and that whiche is honest is comly'.[192] It is 'hole medled with vertue', so any action that is comely, will also be honest, and any action that is in accordance with virtue, will also accord with *decorum*.[193] As *decorum* rests in the opinion of those around us – 'this comlynesse that apereth in the lyfe of man moueth prayse of the[m] with whome we lyue' – speaking and

[190] More 1551, sig. F, v[r]; see Skinner 1987, pp. 123-57.
[191] Cicero 1952, pp. 359, 357.
[192] Cicero 1534, sig. F, 3[r].
[193] Cicero 1534, sig. F, 3[r].

living in accordance with *decorum* will produce a good reputation.[194] This is the basis for the connection between *honestum* and *utile*; for Cicero, honest actions will be useful, because they will always incur good repute.

Deliberately echoing Cicero, Quintilian too writes that 'different styles of eloquence... are appropriate to different people'.[195] By this he not only means the hearer or judge, but the speaker himself. He who is engaged in a life of active citizenship, 'the good citizen and true Wise Man', unlike the reclusive philosopher, is 'happy to use anything which is effective in achieving the objects of his speech'.[196] Nevertheless, Quintilian reiterates that such speech must remain in line with the virtuous ends of rhetoric, for this active citizen is willing to use these means only 'once he has established his own mind what is honourable to achieve'.[197] Quintilian states outright that when expediency (*utilitas*) and propriety (*decorum*) conflict, 'expediency must give way to propriety'.[198] On the other hand, propriety is always in line with the honourable; it is 'always becoming to act in an honourable [*honestum*] way'.[199] For Quintilian, too, acting and speaking with *decorum* always lead to the dual ends of the useful and the honourable.

In the sixteenth century, the first conscious attempt to translate a Ciceronian notion of *decorum* comes with the 1518 edition of the work of the Italian humanist Dominico Mancini – rendered as *The Myrrour of Good Maners* by Alexander Barclay, a poet and monk best known for his *Ship of Fools* of 1509. Barclay translates *decorum* as a 'comly order/ in euery worde and dede' as well as 'dewe

[194] Cicero 1534, sig. F, 3[r].
[195] Quintilian 2001, vol. 5, p. 25.
[196] Quintilian 2001, vol. 5, p. 27.
[197] Quintilian 2001, vol. 5, p. 27.
[198] Quintilian 2001, vol. 5, p. 13.
[199] Quintilian 2001, vol. 5, p. 15.

conuenience| And semely proporcion'.[200] Mancini's text begins with a treatment of 'outwarde comelyness in behauour', noting that it is 'so sure annexed/ to lyfe of honeste| That without it/ honest/ can be nothyng at all'.[201] Honesty, he says, cannot exist without comeliness, because it is 'opyn to beholders/ both for to heare and se', and so 'without this behauour (after my iugement)| No lyfe can seme honest/ ryght nor conuenient'.[202] As Cicero had suggested, without the outward performance of honesty through decorous behaviour, honesty loses the all-important aspect of esteem and the connection to *utilitas* collapses.

The 'second comelyness' refers to the inner *decorum* which 'belongeth in mankynde: in proper gouernaunce', which, as we learned from the Aristotelian tradition, occurs 'whan clere reason ruleth/ as regent souerayne'.[203] Here too, however, there is an outward component, for Mancinus notes that these emotions must also 'wele agre| In habyte: voyce/ iesture/ in loke and countenaunce| In shamefastnesse/ measure/ tyme/ place/ & cyrcu[m]staunce'.[204] This is done, 'so that in all thy maners/ in worde/ loke and iesture| Is the tyme requyreth/ be ordered by measure'.[205] Even internal *decorum*, rule of reason over the passions, has an important outward component, earning the respect of observers.

The rhetorician George Puttenham, in his *Arte of English Poesie* of 1589, applies the notion of *decorum* specifically to the task of counselling the monarch. When it comes to 'matter[s] of aduise', Puttenham suggests a middle ground between flattery and frankness, for 'it is neither decent to flatter him for that is seruile, neither to be rough or plaine with him, for that is dangerous, but truly to

[200] Mancini 1518, sig. F, i^{r}.
[201] Mancini 1518, sig. F, i^{r}.
[202] Mancini 1518, sig. F, i^{r}.
[203] Mancini 1518, sig. F, i^{v}; F, ii^{r}.
[204] Mancini 1518, sig. F, i^{r}.
[205] Mancini 1518, sig. F, i^{r}.

Counsell & to admonish, grauely not greuously, sincerely not sourly'.[206] Like Wilson, he uses the example of the counsellor Cineas who was able to keep 'that decencie in all his perswasions' and thus 'he euer preuailed in aduise, and carried the king which way he would'.[207] 'Decencie', he explains, is the translation of the Latin *decorum* and the Greek *prepon*: 'The Greeks call this good grace of euery thing in his kind πρεπον [*prepon*], the Latins "*decorum*" we in our vulgar call it by a scholasticall term "*decencie*"'.[208]

III. *Kairos* and the Counsellor

Puttenham's direct translation of *prepon* into *decorum* veils another important concept for the proper timing of speech, especially as pertains to the political counsellor.[209] In Cicero's treatment of *decorum*, he not only makes reference to *prepon*, but to a second Greek concept, *kairos* – καιρός – which denotes the 'efficacy both of place and tyme'.[210] It is not appropriate, for example 'in a mater of grauyte to bringe comunicacyon mete for a bankettynge'.[211] A man 'maye seme inhonest, bycause he knoweth not tyme', i.e. the 'right time' to speak in a certain

[206] Puttenham 1589, p. 247.
[207] Puttenham 1589, p. 247.
[208] Puttenham 1589, p. 219. Puttenham here is drawing on the references made to *decorum* by others such as Roger Ascham and Angel Day. Ascham (1570, p. 37), tells his readers that 'it is a matter, of moch readyng, of great learning, and tried iudgement, to make trew difference betwixt... *Decorum, et ineptum*' and is thus 'the hardest point in all learning' as well as 'the fairest and onelie marke, that scholars, in all their studie, must always shote at'. Day (1586, p. 13) translates *decorum* as comeliness and suggests that it is 'of most choice regard' and 'extendeth to the consideration of the person to whome, and of the cause whereof we meane at any time to write'.
[209] Much of the following section will be published in a forthcoming article with *Renaissance Quarterly*; Paul 2014b.
[210] Cicero 1534, sig. I, 2^{r}.
[211] Cicero 1534, sig. I, 2^{r}.

way.[212] Cicero is deliberate in his use of *kairos*, for directly preceding his chapter which the 1534 translator Robert Whittington names 'The ordre of dedes with comlynesse [*Ordo actionum cum decoro*]', Cicero treats 'the order of thynges and oportunyte of tyme', in which he tells the reader that the 'tyme of dede mete is called in greke tonge Enkeria'.[213] He translates this as *occasio* in the Latin (rendered 'occasyon' by Whittington) and blends it into his definition of *decorum* as an element of temperance: 'this temperaunce that we interpretate so as I haue sayd', in addition to being 'a scyence of those thynges whiche shall be done or sayde, to be set in their due place', becomes also 'a scyence of oportynyte of tyme to do any thynge'.[214] Thus, although Cicero's *decorum* is understood to be a direct translation of the Greek *prepon*, it in fact combines the propriety associated with *prepon* and the sense of right timing associated with *kairos*.[215] It is essential to also appreciate the history and meaning of this latter term in order to understanding the Henrician figure of the counsellor.

The word *kairos* has its roots in archery, where it denoted a 'penetrable opening, an aperture' through which Greek archers aimed, simulating the forest of shields and armour through which an arrow must pass to reach its target.[216] The development of *kairos* from this source explains its dual meaning as an opening or opportunity and as due measure, for the shot requires not only accuracy but also the right amount of power – neither too much nor too little – in order to pass

[212] Cicero 1534, sig. I, 2[r].
[213] Cicero 1534, sig. I, 1[r]. 'Enkaria' refers to the Greek *eukairos*, which (as opposed to *akairos*) emphasises the *good* or *correct* timing of an action; see Kinneavy 1986, p. 86.
[214] Cicero 1534, sig. I, 1[r].
[215] Kinneavy 1986, p. 82.
[216] Onians 1988, p. 345. Onians 1988, p. 348 suggests that this etymological background may also be behind the Latin *opportunitas*, formed from the root *porta*, a door.

successfully through the opening.[217] In most cases, *kairos* carried a temporal connotation – a rare singularity standing in opposition to the linear *chronos*.[218]

Many Greek writers focused on *kairos* as a fleeting moment in which to present efficacious speech. This was especially true in relation to the timing of *parrhesia* (παρρησία) – frank speech – an especially pertinent question to the political counsellor.[219] This issue is most clearly taken up by Plutarch.[220] He emphasises the importance of the orator's knowledge of *kairos*: 'occasions [*kairoi*] arise quickly and often bring with them in public affairs sudden developments,' thus 'the man who is so moved by the events which take place and the opportunities which offer themselves that he springs to his feet is the one who most thrills the crowd, attracts it, and carries it with him'.[221]

Plutarch's most extensive treatment of *parrhesia* and *kairos* can be found in his *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur*, a text which became an important source for discussions of the role of the counsellor in the Renaissance. Plutarch employs *kairos* repeatedly throughout this text, marking its importance to those wishing to give truthful and virtuous advice for the honour and profit of the hearer. This is in contrast to the flatterer, whose speech is directed at the pleasure of the hearer and who has no notion of *kairos* at all. A true friend is willing to give admonishment as well as praise, so long 'it be done in time and place convenient [*kairos*]'.[222]

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[217] Onians 1988, p. 345. See the definitions of *kairos* given by Kinneavy 1986, 80; Baumlin 2002, p. 177; Miller 2002, pp. xi-xiii. See also Haskins 2004, p. 67.
[218] See Kinneavy 1986, 79.
[219] See Colclough 1999, pp. 177-212.
[220] See Spencer and Theodorakopoulos 2006, pp. 1-30 for the advisory role of Greeks under the Roman empire in the period in which Plutarch was writing.
[221] Plutarch 1874, vol. 10, p. 187.
[222] Plutarch 1603, p. 85.

Discussing *parrhesia*, Plutarch notes that 'this libertie of speech [*parrhesia*] where of I speake, is the nature of a medicine, which if it be not given in time convenient and as it ought to be, besides, that it doth no good at all, it troubleth the body, worketh greevance, and in stead of a remedie prooveth to be a mischiefe'.[223] Without *kairos*, frank counsel is no better than flattery, and in fact may even be worse, for 'fit opportunity overslipt and neglected doth much hurt'.[224] Recalling Cicero's discussion of speaking appropriately at a banquet, Plutarch writes that 'we must take heed how we speake broad at a table where friends be met together to drinke wine liberally and to make good cheere: for he that amid pleasant discourses and mery talke mooveth a speech that causeth bending and knitting of browes' causes great disruption and even risk, for 'this neglect of opportunitie bringeth with it great danger.'[225] On the other hand, 'a faithfull and carefull friend' will not 'reject such occasions', but will 'take hold thereof quickly, and make good use of them'.[226] In short, 'opportunitie a wise and skilfull friend will not omit, but make especial good use of'.[227] Such moments 'open the doore and make way for us to enter, and give us leave to speak frankly'.[228]

Given the power of *parrhesia* for good or ill, Plutarch addresses the questions: 'In what cases and occurrences then, ought a friend to be earnest and vehement? and when is he to use his libertie of speech, and extend it to the full?'[229] In other words, what is it exactly that makes counsel kairotic and (thus) justifies free speech? The answer combines the virtuous ends of counsel with a

[223] Plutarch 1603, p. 105; see also Plutarch 1603, p. 105.
[224] Plutarch 1603, p. 108.
[225] Plutarch 1603, p. 108.
[226] Plutarch 1603, p. 110.
[227] Plutarch 1603, p. 111.
[228] Plutarch 1603, p. 110; recall Onians 1988, p. 348.
[229] Plutarch 1603, p. 110.

consideration of *kairos*. One should give frank counsel 'when occasion is offered, and the time serveth best to represse excessive pleasure, to restraine unbridled choler, to refraine intollerable pride and insolencie, to stay insatiable avarice, or to stand against any foolish habitude and inconsiderate motion'.[230] *Kairos* exists in the opportunity to encourage virtuous action and bridle vice. For Plutarch this 'define[s]... the opportunity of free speech'.[231]

Although most Renaissance writers focused far more on the tradition of *decorum* rather than *kairos*, there are a few notable exceptions.[232] For instance, Thomas Starkey places a great deal of emphasis on time and place in his *Dialogue*, articulated as a tension between decorous abstention from politics and kairotic timeliness. As Lupset tells Pole 'like as there is some respect to be had of time for the abstaining from the entreaty of matters of the common weal, so there is much more of taking the time when it is, and taking occasion when it offereth itself'.[233] He exhorts Pole to 'let not occasion slip; suffer not your time vainly to pass, which without recovery fleeth away; for, as they say, occasion and time will never be restored again'.[234] These themes are recalled at the conclusion of the dialogue, when Lupset encourages Pole to speak his mind not only in the context of their private discussion, but before the king. To Pole's objection that he ought to wait for Henry VIII's solicitation, and thus 'tarry my time', Lupset tells him once again not

[230] Plutarch 1603, p. 110.
[231] Plutarch 1603, p. 110.
[232] Kinneavy 1986, pp. 59, 86 argues that, although the Ciceronian concept of *decorum* continued well into the medieval and Renaissance periods, the influence of *karios* was completely lost. This argument is countered in Baumlin 2002, p. 138.
[233] Starkey 1948, p. 38; 'kyke as ther ys some respecte to be had of tyme for the abstenyng fro*m* the intrety of mat*ery*s of the co*m*myn wele, so ther ys much more of takyng the tyme when hyt ys, & takyng occasyon when hyt offryth hyt selfe' (Starkey 1989, p. 17).
[234] Starkey 1948, pp. 38-9; 'let not occasyon slyppe, suffur not your tyme vaynly to pas, wych wythout recovery fleth a way, <fer as they say> occasyon & tyme wyl nev*er* be restoryd <agayne>' (Starkey 1989, p. 17).

to ‘let this occasion slip’ for such ‘tarrying of time... is the destruction of all’.[235] Pole suggests that they will discuss ‘whether a wise man ought to desire to handle matters of the common weal, or tarry till he be called’ at another time, but assures Lupset that he ‘shall ever, as occasion moveth me, be ready to do service to my prince and country’.[236]

Starkey’s second dialogue on the temporal dimension of political counsel has not survived and was probably never written. There is, however, a contemporary text which discusses precisely these themes, deliberately placed in the tradition of *kairos* set out by Plutarch in the Second Sophistic. This is Thomas Elyot’s *Pasquil the Playne* of 1533, which like his other works of the early 1530s directly addresses the office of a good counsellor.[237] Whereas Starkey makes no direct mention of the tradition of *kairos*, Elyot is explicit in making an understanding of this term the central theme of his text.[238]

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[235] Starkey 1948, p. 191; ‘tary my tyme’... ‘let thys occasyon slype’... ‘thys tarying of tyme... ys the destructyon of al’ (Starkey 1989, p. 142).

[236] Starkey 1948, p. 191; ‘wether a wyse ma*n* aught to desyre to ha*n*dle mate*r*ys of the co*m*myn wele, or tary tyl he be callyd’... ‘schal ev*er* as occasyon movyth me be redy to dow s*er*vyce to my pry*n*ce & cu*n*trey’ (Starkey 1989, p. 143).

[237] Walker 2005, p. 183 describes *Pasquil* as ‘the high water mark of Elyot’s direct assault upon individuals in his attempt to counsel the King towards moderation’. As Conrad 1992, p. 95 points out, Elyot’s *Pasquil* is the earliest English example of a pasquinade, a genre which had developed in Rome in the first decades of the sixteenth century. Walzer 2012a, pp. 25-6; Walzer 2012b, pp. 2-3 suggest that *Pasquil* was written as a reflection on Elyot’s failed attempts to counsel Henry VIII against his marriage to Anne Boleyn and his subsequent removal from his diplomatic posting. For Elyot’s interventions in Henry VIII’s divorce case see Walker 2005, pp. 124-40.

[238] Although Conrad 1992, pp. 95-9 gives a careful reading of the dialogue of *Pasquil*, including the passage from Aeschylus, the important vocabulary of *kairos* is not mentioned. Likewise Walzer 2012a, p. 38; Walzer 2012b, pp. 1-21 provide a close reading of *Pasquil* in the context of classical rhetoric, considering both *prepon* and *kairos*, but does not note the connection between the quotation from Aeschylus and *kairos*, nor the use of ‘season’ for *kairos* in the dialogue between Pasquil and Harpocrates.

He certainly would have been aware of the tradition that he was drawing on. Elyot translated Plutarch's *De liberis educandis* in 1530 and it has been suggested that he also produced a translation of Plutarch's *Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur* for Henry VIII.[239] In the same year that Elyot published *Pasquil*, he also published a translation of Isocrates' *Ad Nicoclem* – a work of political advice to the Cyprian king Nicocles – in which Isocrates notes that the crucial virtue of a counsellor is the ability to speak in accordance with *kairos*.[240] In Elyot's words: 'specyally they that be *counsailors ought to haue consideration of the occasyon, tyme, and opportunyte* [*kairos*]'.[241]

This idea is played out in *Pasquil*. *Pasquil* is a dialogue between three counsellors on the best method of giving advice to their prince. The title character must defend his frank speech against two other figures: Gnatho, who argues that flattery is the best way to counsel a king, and Harpocrates, who favours silent

[239] Jardine 1997, xxiii. Elyot was not ignorant of the tradition of *decorum* either, as he translates the term in his *Dictionary* of 1538 as 'a semelynesse, or that which becommeth the person, hauynge respecte to his nature, degree, study, offyce, or professyon, be it in doinge or speakynge, a grace. sometyme it sygnifyeth honestie' (1538, sig. XXX^{v}). It is interesting that all sense of the temporal element of *decorum* is missing here. Elyot thus represents one of the few English humanist writers who noted and adopted an understanding of *kairos* distinct from that of *decorum*, probably based largely on his reading of Isocrates and Plutarch.

[240] See Walzer 2012a, pp. 36-7; Walzer 2012b, pp. 20-1. As Walker 2005, p. 181 points out, *Pasquil* was the first of Elyot's texts to be published in 1533, followed closely by *Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man*, also a dialogue on the subject of counsel, and then his translation of Isocrates. He was, however, already very familiar with the text, having recommended it in the *Gouernour* two years earlier (Walker 2005, p. 218).

[241] Isocrates 1533, 11. Elyot's translation emphasizes the themes of *kairos* and the counsellor far more strongly than the modern: 'You should, therefore, avoid what is in controversy and test men's value in the light of what is generally agreed upon, if possible taking careful note of them when they present their views on particular situations'; Isocrates 1980, vol. 1, p. 107. Sipiora 2002, pp. 1-11 notes that Isocrates was particularly concerned with the concept of *kairos*.

acquiescence.[242] Gnatho chides Pasquil for 'raylyng' on without considering 'what, and to whome, and where thou spekest.'[243] He suggests that Pasquil's 'libertie in speche' is 'vnprofitable'.[244] This argument is based upon his interpretation of 'Aeschylus counsaylle', given in *Pasquil* as 'holding thy thonge wher it behoueth the. And spekyng in tyme that which is conuenient'.[245]

The line quoted is from the second play of Aeschylus's *Oresteia, The Libation Bearers*. The character of Orestes addresses the chorus, instructing them: 'σιγᾶν θ' ὅπου δεῖ καὶ λέγειν τὰ καίρια' – keep silent in places where there is need and speak that which is in the right place.[246] Like Plutarch, Elyot seeks to identify exactly what constitutes kairotic counsel, and so the rest of the dialogue concerns the proper interpretation of this line from Aeschylus – in other words, the proper interpretation of *kairos* for a counsellor.

Gnatho gives his reading first. He interprets the statement as meaning that 'it behoueth a man to holde his tunge, whan he aforeseeth by any experience, that the thinge, whiche he wolde purpose or speke of to his superior, shall neyther be pleasantly herde nor thankefully taken'.[247] He suggests that, when it comes to words, 'oportunitie & tyme alwaye do depende on the affection and appetite of hym that hereth them'.[248] Of course, anyone well read in their Plutarch, as Elyot was, would know that this was an interpretation of *kairos* completely at odds with the one that a good counsellor was meant to adopt.

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[242] Walker 2005, p. 185 makes the argument that Harpocrates is intended as a criticism of Thomas Cramner.
[243] Elyot 1533, fos. 4^{r-v}.
[244] Elyot 1533, fo. 4^{v}.
[245] Elyot 1533, fos. 5^{v}-6^{r}.
[246] Aeschylus 1926, vol. 2, p. 216. Note that the form here is *kairios*, a variant of *kairos*. Note as well that the added temporal reference 'spekyng *in time*' given by Elyot has no precedent in the original.
[247] Elyot 1533, fos. 5^{v}-6^{r}.
[248] Elyot 1533, fo. 6^{r}.

In response, Elyot has Pasquil reiterate much of Plutarch's doctrine of *kairos* explored above. He begins with examples drawn from the discussion of table talk: 'When men be set at a good soupper, and be busily occupyed in eatynge and drinkinge, though thou be depely sene in philosophie, holde thy tonge and dispute not of temperaunce'.[249] This is juxtaposed with a more formal council setting: 'Whan thou arte sittynge in counsaile aboute maters of weighty importaunce: talke not than of passe tyme or daliaunce, but omittinge affection or dreede, speke than to the pourpose'.[250] If one takes account of the proper occasion, Pasquil tells Gnatho, then the counsel will be even more effective. For example, 'Whan thy frendes be set downe to souper, before the cuppes betwise fylled: reherce the peryll and also dishonesti that hapneth by glotony'.[251] When it comes to councils, the right time comes 'after thou haste either herde one raisonne bifore the, or at the leest weye, in the balaunce of thynge owne raison ponderid the questio[n]'.[252] It is then that one should 'spare not to shew thine aduise, & to speke truely'.[253]

Pasquil then proceeds to give Gnatho a full definition of the classical concept of *kairos*:

> Oportunite consisteth in place or tyme, where and whan the sayd affections or passion of wrath be mitigate and out of extremitie. And wordes be called conueniente, whiche haue respecte to the nature and state of the person, vnto whom they be spoken, and also to the detrimente, whiche mought ensue by the vice or lacke that thou hast espied, & it ought not to be as thou hast supposed. For oportunite & tyme for a counsayllour to speke, do not depend of the affection and appetite of hym that is counsayled: mary than counsaylle were but a vayne worde, and euery man wolde do as hym lyste.[254]

[249] Elyot 1533, fo. 7^{r}.
[250] Elyot 1533, fo. 7^{r}.
[251] Elyot 1533, fo. 7^{r}.
[252] Elyot 1533, fo. 7^{r}.
[253] Elyot 1533, fos. 7^{r}; 8^{r}.
[254] Elyot 1533, fos. 8^{v}-9^{r}.

As Plutarch had established, the affections should *not* be entered into a consideration of opportunity, in fact the opportune time is when they are 'out of extremitie'. Rather one should only consider those things that will ensure that truthful and virtuous counsel will be most efficacious.

Pasquil and the third member of the dialogue, Harpocrates, also enter into a consideration of *kairos* and timeliness. Hearing that his master will 'syt in counsail about waightie causes' after dining, Harpocrates declares that only after he too has dined will he give attendance.[255] This prompts in Pasquil a diatribe against the reversals of the world, which cause men to counsel after the day is done, instead of attending to such matters first thing in the morning.[256] He reflects that 'after noone is tourned to fore noone, vertue into vice.'[257] This discussion of the importance of the timing of pleasurable pursuits (namely dinner) and counsel, following closely on the heels of Pasquil's previous examples which juxtaposed the same, recalls the reader to a consideration of the importance of the opportune time to counsel, especially as regards the definition of virtue and vice.

Challenging Harpocrates's dedication to silence, Pasquil asks him 'If I perceyued one at thy backe with a swerde drawne, redy to strike the, woldest thou that I shulde holde my peace, or else tell the?'[258] Harpocrates responds that 'Naye, sylence were than oute of season' – 'season' being another common translation for *kairos*.[259] Pasquil responds that Harpocrates 'wyll season silence' and jokes that

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[255] Elyot 1533, fo. 12^{v}.
[256] See Dillon 2002, p. 37 for the importance of dining and philosophic counsel.
[257] Elyot 1533, fo. 13^{v}. This 'turning virtue into vice' speaks to the tradition of *paradiastole* which will be addressed in the next chapter. Notably, Elyot may have been the first English writer to attempt to define *paradiastole* in his *Dictionary* of 1538 (sig. Q, iv^{r}): '*Paradiastole,* a dilatinge of a mater by an interpretation'.
[258] Elyot 1533, fo. 13^{v}.
[259] Elyot 1533, fo. 13^{v}. For the translation of *kairos* as 'season', see Baumlin 2002, pp. 141-4. 'To season' in English has its root in the temporal meaning of 'season',

‘Marye I wene my lorde shulde haue a better cooke of you thanne a counsayllour.’[260] He asks Harpocrates ‘howe thou doest season thy sylence[?]’[261] Harpocrates responds that he does so ‘with sugar, for I vse lyttell salte,’ and Pasquil retorts that this ‘maketh your counsayl more swete than sauery.’[262]

Harpocrates’s seasoning of his silence with sugar, Pasquil suggests, makes it more appealing to the pleasurable appetites of his master, but less wholesome. The timing or season of his counsel alone changes its direction from virtuous ends to serving only the passions. Harpocrates concedes this point and so Pasquil asks him again, ‘whan is your silence in season?’[263] Harpocrates admits that he ‘can not shortly tel’ for he is ‘so abashed’ by the ‘froward reson’ of Pasquil.[264] Pasquil comes to an end by encouraging his listeners to ‘Beare away the sayde sentence [of Aesychlus] with myne exposition, and vse it’ – to take away his interpretation of *kairos* and apply it to their counsel.[265] Elyot’s lesson is clear: without understanding all the important elements of oratory, including the considerations of *decorum* and *kairos*, the positive effects of the humanist counsellor’s advice can be completed reversed, leading his prince to vice rather than virtue.

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originally referring to allowing fruits, etc to ‘season’ – i.e. ‘to render (fruit) palatable by the influence of the seasons’ – before picking them. Thus ‘right time’ is etymologically linked to this sense of seasoning, and Elyot’s pun has even greater meaning.

[260] Elyot 1533, fos. 13^{v}-14^{r}.

[261] Elyot 1533, fo. 15^{v}.

[262] Elyot 1533, fos. 15^{v}-16^{r}.

[263] Elyot 1533, fo. 28^{v}.

[264] Elyot 1533, fo. 28^{v}.

[265] Elyot 1533, fo. 29^{r}. Although it is true as Walzer 2012b, pp. 13-14 points out that Pasquil as the *parrhesiastes* is unlikely to have been the model of counsel that Elyot was propounding (this instead being the negotiation of a *via media* between the three characterised models based on the cultivation of prudence), his arguments regarding the kairotic timing of counsel go unchallenged and accepted by the end of the dialogue, strongly suggesting that they are Elyot’s own.

Chapter 3: Illustrations of Counsel and Councils

The construction of a discourse of the ideal counsellor was paralleled by developments in a tradition of evil counsel. In the medieval period this involved a preoccupation with figures perceived as irrational, primarily women and youths. In the humanist discourse this grows to include a concern about rhetoricians who are able and willing to dress the vices as virtues – embracing the rhetorical figure of *paradiastole* [παραδιαστολή] – thereby leading their prince down a path of pleasure-seeking rather than virtue. This becomes a particular concern in the context of the Henrician regime, in which the dramatic actions of Henry VIII were cast as resulting from the dominance of evil counsel over good. Such pernicious counsellors, in addition to leading their prince to worldly, self-serving pursuits, stifle rather than mediate the voices of the people who are seen as having a legitimate right to provide their monarch with counsel. The increasing institutionalisation of counsel in the period is thus both a way to strengthen the power of good counsel as a bridle on the prince's arbitrary power, and as a way to ensure that the interests of the people are served through the mediating role of the good counsellor.

I. Counsel and the *Fall of Princes*

Whereas the good counsellor in the medieval Aristotelian tradition helps to govern the prince's passions and appetites, the evil counsellor has the opposite effect, spurring the prince's pleasurable or self-interested pursuits. Such evil counsellors are unable to provide the governing counsel so necessary to the prince, as they themselves are ruled by their passions. It is therefore unsurprising that women and youths were typically castigated as being improper counsellors, as they were not

credited as having the rationality and experience necessary to provide the prince with the prudence requisite of good counsel.[266]

This lesson is clearly demonstrated in Giovanni Boccaccio's *De casibus virorum illustrium*, written in the late fourteenth century. This text details the lives of powerful men and women throughout history, demonstrating the influence of fortune to both bestow and withdraw worldly gain. It was the early fifteenth-century version expanded by the French humanist Laurent de Premierfait that John Lydgate (also responsible for the English translation of the *Secretum*) translated into English in the first half of the fifteenth century as the *Fall of Princes*.[267] Lydgate not only translated many of the commentaries added by Premierfait to Boccaccio's original, but inserted many of his own as 'envoys' before each tale.

These additions came at the suggestion of his patron, Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, who was an opponent of conciliar government in the period that the *Fall* was being composed, which may have been the cause of the recurring theme of evil counsel in Lydgate's envoys.[268] Certainly, the vast majority of the additions to the text address the importance of the lessons for a royal readership, emphasising the use of the *Fall* as a *speculum principis*.[269] Such changes add a greater moral

[266] Bradshaw 1991, pp. 557-73 notes that for Aristotle, whereas both women and men have the ability to deliberate rationally, women will be subject to the dictates of their passions and therefore will not be capable of acting according to rational deliberation.
[267] Budra 2000, pp. 5-6. As Budra 2000, p. 7 points out, the original Latin version was never circulated widely in England, so this was the only edition of the *De casibus* for the vast majority of English readers.
[268] Mortimer 2005, p. 58. Budra 2000, p. 19 notes that while the *de casibus* tradition is distinct from the *speculum principis* genre, they can coincide, as they do in the case of Lydgate's *Fall*.
[269] See Mortimer 2005, pp. 58-61.

depth to the tales, changing the actions of arbitrary blind fortune into lessons about 'vicious lyuyng'.[270]

For instance, in the chapter addressing the fates of kings 'that yeueth hasty credence to liers and flaterers', Lydgate begins by giving general precepts about the danger of flatterers, and the importance of critically engaging with the advice that one is given.[271] Lydgate then turns to women in particular, arguing that they can never be good counsellors, for 'Of their nature wymen can flater and fage| And be sumtyme to copious of their language'.[272] These lessons are repeated in the chapter describing 'Howe Saul kinge of Ierusalem borne of lowe degre, as longe as he dred god was obedient to him, and rulyd by good counseile had many great disconfitures' and how when he did not he 'lost his crowne, and was slayne by Philistees'.[273] Lydgate highlights three elements that made the early part of Saul's reign successful: humility, obedience to God and good counsel:

> while that he was meke and humble in dede
> Voide of pride and fals presumpcion
> And prudent counseyle with him did lede
> Him to gouerne by good discrecion
> He fonde quiete through all his region
> No foreyn enmy durst him to werreye
> While he the lorde mekely dyd obeye[274]

Saul's downfall comes when his pride 'outraied reason to haue the gouernaunce'.[275] After this transformation Saul refuses proper counsel, for he 'stode disconsolate|

[270] Boccaccio 1494, sig. I, iii^{v}. Although this sort of moralising did not actually apply to many of Boccaccio's tales – which featured the downfall of virtuous as well as vicious rulers – Lydgate was persistent in these lessons in his envoys; see Budra 2000, pp. 49-51.
[271] Boccaccio 1494, sig. D, iii^{v}.
[272] Boccaccio 1494, sig. D, iv^{v}. Lydgate had tempered much of Boccaccio's misogyny, but it is still present even in the amended English version; Budra 2000, pp. 61-2.
[273] Boccaccio 1494, sig. F, iv^{r}.
[274] Boccaccio 1494, sig. F, iv^{v}.
[275] Boccaccio 1494, sig. F, iv^{v}.

Counseyl of god nor prophete knewe he none' making him a 'man moost infortunate'.[276] Instead, Saul takes the counsel of a woman, a 'phetonesse' whose counsel was 'nat accodynge... to reson| Nor like a thinge which that is credible'.[277] Thus, when he does finally seek counsel, it is clear that Saul seeks it from the wrong source – a woman – and thus is failed by it.[278]

Young advisers are also to be avoided, as Lydgate makes clear in the chapter 'Howe king Roboam for gyunge feith to yonge counseyle lost the beneuolence of his people and dyed a fool'.[279] The prince, 'whan he entryd into his region... Rulyd him silf by will and no reason' and 'despised the doctryne and counsayle' of the 'olde [and] wise to his greate disauaile'.[280] Like women, the young are all will and no reason, and therefore equated with flatterers.

Such examples are commonplace within medieval texts. We have already seen how the anonymous poem *Richard the Redeless* had blamed a lack of adequate counsel for the downfall of Richard II, particularly criticising his choice of young men as counsellors: 'For it fallith as well to fodis/ of xxiiij yeris,| Or yonge men of

[276] Boccaccio 1494, sig. F, iv^{v}.
[277] Boccaccio 1494, sig. F, iv^{v}.
[278] Ferster 2006, p. 110. The suspicion of women's counsel was a long-standing tradition. In the *Secretum* the character of Aristotle details a list of people who cannot be trusted – women among them – and then recounts a tale of how he warned Alexander against a woman bent on poisoning him (poison being an oft-employed metaphor for evil counsel); see Ferster 2006, p. 42. John Gower's *Mirour de l'Omme* also criticises male monarchs ruled by women as a commentary on Edward III and his mistress Alice Perrers. Such examples are in some sense contradictory to the widespread use of female figures who communicate advice within the *speculum* literature; see Schieberle 2008. However, these divine and otherworldly figures – such as personified prudence – were presented in a much different light than the female influences surrounding the prince, who were dangerous sources of advice. Where a female counsellor was acceptable, even commonplace, in the private sphere, it was male prudence that dominated the political; see Deist 2003, p. 231.
[279] Boccaccio 1494, sig. F, vi^{r}.
[280] Boccaccio 1494, sig. F, vi^{r}.

yisterday/ to yeue good redis,| As becometh a kow/ to hoppe/ in a cage!'.[281] Particularly the story of Rehoboam (or Roboam as Lydgate calls him) was a tried and true exemplar of the ruler who takes the advice of the young and passionate, rather than the old and prudent.[282]

Like the *specula* texts, the proliferation and translation of the *De casibus* literature also functioned as performance – rather than just example – of political counsel. The 1527 edition of the Lydgate text produced by crown printer Richard Pynson stands as a prime example. Like most editions of the work, the front matter contains a traditional 'presentation portrait' of the author gifting his work to his patron, with the rest of the court attentively making note of the act, both through word and gesture.[283] In the 1527 edition, the figure of authority pictured is a clerical one, most likely a cardinal or high-ranking bishop, who receives the book before the rest of his court (Figure 2).

An illustration later in the text also features a similar high-ranking cleric, but this time in a much more compromised position, atop Fortune's wheel. It was common in the *de casibus* texts to include an illustration of Fortune and her wheel (Figure 3), but this one is rather different (Figure 4). At the centre of the image, atop the wheel, is a figure not included in other representations of this scene: a cardinal, identifiable by his dress (in particular his hat), who seems to reflect the image of the recipient in the presentation portrait.[284] The text is intended as a message to a high-ranking cleric, holding court and perched at the height of

[281] *Richard the Redeless* 2000, ln. 260-2.
[282] Ferster 2006, pp. 125-6.
[283] See Perkins 2003, p. 174.
[284] As both Perkins 2003 and Gillespie 2006 suggest, the image of Fortune's wheel was often paired with the presentation portrait in manuscript editions of Lydgate's work.

fortune's wheel. The implication appears to be clear: the cardinal is Wolsey.[285] In February of 1527, when the *Fall* was published, Wolsey was still at the high point, perhaps the highest point, of his career. But he was not above criticism, and an image of Wolsey poised high on Fortune's wheel about to take a disastrous tumble is not so much prophetic (given the catastrophic year that he was about to have) as advisory.

Fortune's wheel, like the *specula*, functions as a mirror for those in authority; as such, it shows the cardinal the dangers of his current path and the ramifications if he does not treat the textual counsel portrayed in the presentation portrait and contained within the text with the gravity it deserves.[286] Not only will he suffer a fall in life, the picture suggests, but his downfall will live in infamy as well, for – like his acceptance of the textual advice in the presentation portrait – this latter scene is also carefully watched, as the figure of Boccaccio, poised to write, replaces the watchful group of spectators on the frontispiece. The Janus-faced *Fortuna*, also a unique feature of the 1527 *Fall*, serves to remind the reader that Fortune 'sees, the yeares bothe oulde, and newe' and watchful authors are ever ready to take the examples of the present and immortalise them.[287] Lydgate's examples of evil counsellors are brought into the context of the Henrician court by the illustrations in the 1527 edition of the *Fall*.

II. Painting Vice as Virtue

The warning to Cardinal Wolsey brings us to a type of evil counsel particular to the humanist discourse. This is not to say that the concern for the passionate influences

[285] Gillespie 2006, p. 173.
[286] See Gillespie 2006, p. 175.
[287] Whitney 1586, p. 108.

of seductive women and wilful youths disappears – Henry VIII in particular was often criticised for his willingness to favour both.[288] But there emerges with the Henrician humanist tradition a new and predominant concern for the influence of persuasive orators in the courts of princes, who are able to use their skills to deceive princes into mistaking vices for virtues, contrary to the true ends of the political counsellor.

For the classical rhetoricians, there were cases where techniques of rhetorical ornamentation and amplification extended into something else, a figure of speech identified by Quintilian as *paradiastole*, or 'rhetorical redescription', for instance 'when you call yourself wise instead of astute, brave instead of rash, economical instead of mean'.[289] This sort of euphemistic language poses a problem for Renaissance theorists, who were aware of the proximity between virtues and vices; the ability to describe one as the other meant that one could easily lead the hearer down the wrong path.[290]

Perhaps the clearest illustration of this paradiastolic transformation exists in the popular morality plays of the period, which also served as examples and presentations of counsel. Their performance replaces the text in the presentation portrait with a live play, but the role as mirror and exemplar does not change, nor does the importance of the watchful spectators, who are not just observing the play but also its intended recipient.[291] The requirement that the lord or prince in question

[288] For instance in 1519, Henry's young courtier-companions were 'expelled' from court 'under pretence of their being youths of evil counsel, and intent upon their own benefit, to the detriment, hurt and discredit of his Majesty' as the Venetian ambassador reports; quoted in Walker 1989, p. 3, and the concern over the influence of Anne Boleyn cannot be overstated; see Ives 2005.
[289] Quintilian 1922, p. 484; see Skinner 2002b, p. 273 and Skinner 2007, pp. 148-63.
[290] Skinner 2002b, pp. 274-85.
[291] Walker 1998, p. 64.

be seen as fulfilling the role of a patron seeking advice from such sources left a space – albeit a small one – for the airing of criticism and the opening of public debate.[292] The plays themselves, more often than not, also portray models of counsel in which the monarch must beware of evil, dissembling or flattering counsellors. In particular, they highlight the thin line between vice and virtue, between good and bad counsel, that is defined by language alone. A recurring trope sees the counsellor-characters represented as vices which transform themselves into associated virtues, a real-life depiction of the flatterer's 'dressing virtue for vice'.[293]

For example, in *Magnyfycence*, a play written as early as 1504 by the former royal tutor and clergyman John Skelton, the king of the title becomes convinced by Fancy, masquerading as Largesse, that Measure is only suited for 'a marchauntes hall| But largesse becometh a state ryall' and thus has Measure banished from the court.[294] Fancy brings in a host of other vices, all who take on the appearance and title of a virtue – Crafty Conveyance poses as 'Surveyaunce', Counterfeit Countenance becomes Good 'Demeynaunce' and Cloaked Collusion hides as Sober Sadness. By their counsel, Magnificence lets Liberty free of the rule of Measure, declaring: 'nowe syrs I am lyke as a prynce sholde be| I haue welth at wyll largesse and lyberte| Fortune to her lawys can not abandune me| But I shall of fortune rule the reyne'.[295] Of course, such pride cannot end well for our prince, and his statement allows another counsellor in, 'Courtly Abusyon', who counsels the king always to regard his pleasure: 'By waywarde wylfulnes let eche thynge be

[292] Walker 1998, p. 64.
[293] See Spivack 1958 and Wierum 1966 for this tradition in English drama; see Skinner 2002b, p. 275 and Skinner 2007, pp. 156-7 for the rhetorical tradition of dressing vice as virtue.
[294] Skelton 1533, fo. v^{v}. For the dating of *Magnyfycence* see Winsor 1970, pp. 14-25.
[295] Skelton 1533, fo. xvii^{v}.

conuayed| what so euer ye do folowe your owne wyll| Be it reason or none it shall not gretely skyll| Be it ryght or wronge by the aduyse of me| Take your pleasure and vse free lyberte... Here no man what so eyer they say| But do as ye lyst and take your owne way'.[296]

Very quickly, the king learns of the consequences of his choices, as Felicity and Liberty depart, and other characters such as Poverty and Adversity enter. The character of Circumspection declares the moral of the piece: 'A myrour incleryd is this interlude| This lyfe inconstant for to beholde and se'.[297] He draws attention to the public character of the counsel, as well as to the *speculum principis* nature of the exemplarity it contains. A prince must beware of those counsellors who disguise vice as virtue, tempting the prince to follow his pleasure rather than prudent measure.

The same lesson is communicated by the Scottish poet and humanist George Buchanan's *Baptistes sive Calumnia*, written in the 1540s, although not published until the late sixteenth century. Unlike *Magnyfycence* and other contemporary morality plays, *Baptistes* does not feature vices who dress as virtues to counsel their prince, but rather human counsellors who use their language to accomplish the same ends, a theme emphasised in the prologue, in which the author speaks of those 'who assume new faces and change themselves into any form they please'.[298] Although the play tells the tale of John the Baptist, the majority of action is given over to the machinations of the counsellors within Herod's court who contribute to

[296] Skelton 1533, fo. xix^{r}.
[297] Skelton 1533, fo. xix^{v}.
[298] Buchanan 1992, p. 355.

the martyr's death.[299] It begins with a dialogue between two counsellors: Malchus and Gamaliel, the latter the voice of reason and moderation who attempts – unsuccessfully – to calm the rage of Malchus against John the Baptist. Like his classical predecessors, Buchanan writes a 'Chorus' into his play, who comment on the action on the stage, noting the worth – but futility – of the counsel of Gamaliel, for 'wrath, the enemy of Gods advice, darkens his minds cleer light, who stops his ears to wholsome admonitions'.[300]

Gamaliel complains that Malchus will counsel the king according to 'what ere he holds commodious to himself, masking his wickedness with honest names'.[301] It is a 'common fault' among Princes, he complains, that they are susceptible to such counsellors, who 'change the name of *quondam* vertue' and 'with glorious titles proudly preferre the Vulgar we beguile'.[302] The Chorus picks up this theme as well, decrying a world in which 'False modesty doth skreen the brazen face, pieties vale the impious doth conceale'.[303] Herod himself is presented in a favourable light; it is the evil counsel that surrounds him – personified not only through the deceptive Malchus but also the 'enraged' Queen[304] – which prompts him to persecute the only truthful and god-serving counsellor in the piece: John the Baptist.

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[299] A focus made clear by the 1642 English title: *Tyrannicall-Government Anatomized: Or, A Discourse concerning Evil-Councellors. Being the Life and Death of John the Baptist*.
[300] [Buchanan] 1642, p. 7.
[301] [Buchanan] 1642, p. 8.
[302] [Buchanan] 1642, p. 8.
[303] [Buchanan] 1642, p. 8.
[304] As noted above, the medieval tradition warning against taking counsel from women continues into the period, but it is Malchus who is identified as using his abilities to paint vice as virtue and who not only urges Herod on, but also stands as the motivating force behind the queen's persuasions.

John protests to Herod that his truth telling is actually in the king's interest; warning him of the divine law to which he will be held to account. To Herod's suggestion that he ought to separate the divine and the political – 'When thou shalt come to Heaven speak heavenly things, but while thou livest on earth, earths Laws abide' – John responds that he has a higher duty than his allegiance to his country – 'To earthly Kingdoms reverence I bear, and Kings obey, but those eternall Kingdoms I hold my Country and their King adore'.[305]

It has been suggested that *Baptistes* was written as a commentary on the death of Thomas More, whose own historical drama – the *History of King Richard III* – also demonstrates the pernicious power of persuasion to shape political realities.[306] Written between 1514 and 1518, *Richard III* was composed in both Latin and English, with subtle divergences between the two, the former intended for the educated humanist audience, the latter for a vernacular readership.[307] Neither version was finished, and in both cases the portrayal of English history is a dark one; the powerful use their rhetorical skills to shape the theatre of politics into one defined by deception and dissimulation.[308]

This ability to shape politics through language is first emphasised by the dying Edward IV in the opening scene of the text. Concerned for the well-being of his young sons, Edward calls together his lords to impress on them the importance of their good counsel to his children, for 'whyle the youth of hys children shoulde lacke discrecion of themself and good counsayle of their frendes', they are vulnerable to many dangers, especially from those who 'should counsayle for their own commodity and rather by pleasaunte aduyse too wynne themselfe fauour, then

[305] [Buchanan] 1642, p. 12.
[306] See Williamson 2012, p. 175.
[307] McCutcheon 2007, p. 5.
[308] Yoran 2001, pp. 522, 527-34; McCutcheon 2007, p. 5.

by profitable aduertisemente to do the children good'.[309] In the competitive vying for power, Edward tells them, 'flattery shall haue more place then plaine and faithfull aduyse', which will 'infect' the young minds of the princes.[310] Despite emphasising the power of persuasion to corrupt the princes, Edward's own oration goes completely ignored by the nobles present.[311] His words draw the reader's attention to the real issues of the history – rhetoric and counsel – but beyond this, it has no effect on the plot, and the entire episode is quickly forgotten.

The scheming Richard III is not only a master actor within the theatre of politics – he is introduced in the Latin version as '*Personam quamlibet induere, gerereque, et tueri naviter; hilarem, severam, gravem, remissam, prout sumere aut ponere suasit commodum*' – but also a master director, knowing who to select for which role, and when to deploy them.[312] Two of Richard's key actors are the Dukes of Hastings and Buckingham.[313] As 'no manne doubted or neded to doubte' Hasting's 'trouth towarde the king', he uses him to persuade 'the Lordes to belieue, that [Richard] the Duke of Gloucester, was sure and fastlye faithfull to his prince'.[314] More notes that Hastings himself only 'parte hym selfe beliued' his words to the lords and 'parte he wist the contraye'.[315] Nevertheless he is willing to use his skills and credibility to move the lords towards support of Gloucester, to the loss not only of his life, but his reputation, as after Hastings's death, Richard puts

[309] More 1963, p. 10. This lengthy speech reflects the tone of that given by Marcus Aurilius in Guevara's 1535 edition of the *Golden Book*, sig. 85[r].
[310] More 1963, p. 12.
[311] Yoran 2001, p. 531.
[312] Yoran 2001, p. 527.
[313] Yoran 2001, p. 519 and Logan 2007, p. 27 point out that the events of the history are dependent not just on the acts of Richard, but those of the entire court, as Edward's oration indicates.
[314] More 1963, p. 23.
[315] More 1963, p. 23.

his skills to work to ‘colour... the matter’, painting him as an ‘euil counsellor to the kinges father’.[316]

Like Hastings, the Duke of Buckingham is described as ‘marueilouslye well spoken’, employing his powers of persuasion on three critical occasions: the breaking of the queen’s sanctuary, the manufacturing of the consent of the people to the accession of Richard and the petition to Richard to accept the crown.[317] Each event reflects the ability of words to shape the political environment: immoral and unlawful actions become just, the consent of the people is fabricated and evil kings are appointed.[318] This lesson is epitomised in the final example – the lords’ petition to Richard to take the crown of England. Despite having orchestrated the event himself, Richard resists the pleadings of Buckingham to take the crown in order to create the appearance of yielding to the will of the people. It is at this moment that the most lasting and resilient metaphor of the work is put forward. The people in attendance recognise that ‘to shewe out of seasonne’ the truth behind the pageantry, and ‘calle him by his owne name whyle he standeth in his magestie’ not only would cause ‘one of his tormentors... to breake his head’ but lead to ‘marring of the play’.[319] Thus it is that ‘these matters bee Kynges games, as it were stage playes, and for the more part plaied vpon scafoldes’.[320] Politics is an illusion, generated by words, and those who have not the skill to participate ‘disorder the play & do themself no good’ and so ‘they that wise be, wil medle no farther’.[321] Of course, this is the same theme communicated by Hythloday in *Utopia* – participation in the theatre of politics without skill is destructive to the play itself; but the skills

[316] More 1963, p. 52.
[317] More 1963, p. 15.
[318] Logan 2007, pp. 28-32 notes how these are exemplars of paradiastolic speech.
[319] More 1963, p. 81.
[320] More 1963, p. 81.
[321] More 1963, p. 81.

required are more often than not turned to evil purposes. The Latin play ends here, on this dark and pessimistic note regarding to the possibility of positive civic engagement.

But the English account contains a glimmer of hope. In this version, More goes on to describe to the reader how Richard's reign is plagued from the start with division, and Richard himself is tormented by his conscience, as all tyrants are.[322] More focuses on the break between Richard and Buckingham, who, unlike Hastings, survives the usurpation. It is at this point, in the final pages of the English text, that we have Richard's antithesis presented in the person of Morton, Bishop of Ely. Like Richard, Morton has the ability to shape his surroundings and direct those around him with his words, but is uses such skills in the service of the realm. This is the same Morton who appears in *Utopia*, marked by his 'polished and pointed' speech, ability to test the 'mettle' and 'presence of mind [of] a person' through 'rough address' and in whose advice the king had the 'greatest confidence'.[323] In *Richard III* More describes him as 'a man of great natural wit, very wel learned & honourable' who is also of 'greate experience... [with] a depe insight in politike worldly driftes'.[324] He is thus able to navigate the changing political scene without sacrificing his loyalty and integrity. Although he appears to be 'taken by y^{e} tirant', and is mentioned in the text as being present in Richard's councils, he secretly aligns himself with the future Henry VII, who ultimately overthrows the usurper.[325]

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[322] Yoran 2001, p. 517.
[323] More 1965, pp. 59, 61.
[324] More 1963, p. 91.
[325] More 1963, p. 91. Morton's earlier presence in the text is in the scene in the Tower of London, which results in the execution of Hastings. Richard, arriving late to the meeting and in a deceptively good mood, asks Morton to have some of his strawberries brought from Holborn, to which Morton readily acquiesces. There have been a variety of theories put forward for the inclusion of this exchange – given the setting, and the characters involved, it is unlikely to be as trivial as it

While Richard was constructing his drama, Morton was working all the while within and underneath it to subvert it. More even credits him with the arrangement of the marriage between Henry VII and Elizabeth of York, which ends the Wars of the Roses and establishes the Tudor line, bringing 'infinite benefite to the realm'.[326]

Morton uses his rhetorical abilities to manipulate Buckingham; playing upon the Duke's pride, 'he craftely sought waies to pricke him forwarde taking always the thoccasion of his comming & so keeping him close w^{t}in his bondes, that he rather semed to folow hym then to lead him'.[327] Morton even manages to lead Buckingham into a position of supplication, exhorting the cardinal for his advice: 'Then longed the duke sore to here what he would haue sayd... & exhorted him so familiarly betwene them twain, to be bold so say what soeuer he thought'.[328] Morton at first denies these requests, drawing a striking parallel to Richard's refusal to accept the crown from Buckingham. Both Richard and Morton create scenes whereby they are convinced into doing what they had always intended, in order to stay within the bounds of law and propriety. The power of words – the exchange between duke and future king or between duke and bishop – are the real power behind political action, even if the spectators know them to be false.

Morton brings this lesson to the fore through a tale nominally from Aesop.[329] In the tale, the lion declares that 'on pain of deth there should be none horned beast in that wood' and so a creature with a 'bonch of flesh' on his forehead

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might at first seem (notably, it is also retained in Shakespeare's version of the history). Perhaps most convincing is the suggestion in Heal 2008, pp. 41-70 that the request of the strawberries represent Richard's imposition of his will in a demand of property – a gift not freely given – as well as Morton's attempts to convince Richard of his obedience, all the while working against him.

[326] More 1963, p. 91.

[327] More 1963, pp. 91-2

[328] More 1963, p. 92.

[329] More 1963, p. 62. There is no reference to this story outside of this text; although it sounds like a fable from Aesop, it appears to be More's own creation.

escapes the realm. When a fox asks the creature why he flees – after all he has not the dangerous horn the lion fears, the creature responds, 'But what & he cal it an horn, wher am I then?'.[330] The words of the lion are enough to construct a political reality powerful enough to turn innocence into guilt, even when the evidence to the contrary is staring everyone right in the face. Of course, Morton's tale is itself deceptive; what he has in his head is not so harmless, but rather the treason that Richard fears. However, his words are powerful enough to receive Buckingham's assurances of the secrecy of his counsel, and so Morton lays his (ultimately successful) trap.

Morton, like the ideal counsellor described by More in *Utopia*, combines the Erasmian philosopher's prudential ability to discern truth from falsehood with the willingness and ability to play his part in the theatre of politics, doing the best he can within it.[331] Morton bides his time through the usurpation, when he cannot hope to draw Richard from his plan, until the passions of Buckingham present the perfect opportunity to act. Thus, in the closing passages of the extant *Richard III*, More gives us an example of an ideal counsellor, who has the power to bring infinite good to the realm through his manipulation of language.[332]

Two further portrayals comment even more directly on the political context of early Tudor England by profiling counsellors of the early Henrician period whose use of language plays a crucial role in the character of their counsel. Both pieces – William Roper's biography of Thomas More and George Cavendish's

[330] More 1963, p. 62.
[331] Logan 2007, p. 32 suggests that *Richard III* is a pedagogical tool to help readers 'to be immune to paradiastole: to be able to see things for what they really are, and call them by their right names'; a sentiment echoed in Wegemar 2007, p. 48 in regards to the lessons of prudence the text contains.
[332] Thus this version of the text is not as dark as Yoran 2001, pp. 514-37 and Yoran 2010 suggest.

account of the rise and fall of Cardinal Wolsey – were written in the same period, from 1554 to 1558, recounting events of the Henrician revolution.[333] The work of Roper, son-in-law of Thomas More, proclaims the value, nature and action of the ideal counsellor; Cavendish, Wolsey's former gentleman usher, on the other hand, acknowledges that his title character makes all the wrong choices, serving as an example for other counsellor-figures.[334]

Cavendish tells his readers that Wolsey is able to climb so high on Fortune's wheel, not because of the pursuit of virtue in his own life, nor the inculcation of virtue in the actions of his prince, but rather in the application of his talents in bringing into reality whatever the prince's will or pleasure might demand. In particular, Cavendish highlights the cardinal's 'especiall gift of Natural Eloquence' by which he could 'perswade and allure all men to his purposes'.[335] He applied this ability to 'advanc[ing] the Kings owne will and pleasure, having no respect to the Case', which won him the favour of the king.[336] Cavendish juxtaposes Wolsey's indulgence of the king's pleasure with the counsel of Henry's other advisers, who act in line with the ideals of counsel advanced by humanist writers. Wolsey even stands in the way of the king receiving their advice, convincing him instead to

[333] Neither piece was published at this time, however, but rather in the first half of the seventeenth century. Despite their shared context, there is no evidence of any communication or involvement between the two authors. That being said, it may be of note that the two authors were first cousins by marriage (Roper's mother-in-law was the sister of Cavendish's mother-in-law), as well as occupying many of the same court circles during the reign of Henry VIII. Given this and the similarities in many of the passages of the two texts, a suggestion of at least some communication, if not collaboration, can be made.

[334] As Schwartz-Leeper 2013, p. 117 points out, although the *Life and Death of Cardinal Wolsey* was intended as a 'defense' of Wolsey, it is 'far from obsequiously complimentary' and 'confirms many details of more generally negative representations of the Cardinal'. For the neglected importance of the *Life* see Schwartz-Leeper 2013, pp. 105-7, 124-7.

[335] Cavendish 1641, pp. 8, 9.

[336] Cavendish 1641, p. 8.

pursue only his will and pleasure: 'Now the King being young, and much given to his pleasure, his old Councellors advised him to have recourse sometimes to the Councell about his weightie affairs, but [Wolsey] on the contrary, perswaded him to mind his pleasure'.[337]

When he finally decides to use his rhetorical powers to give advice contrary to the king's will and pleasure, in the matter of his divorce, Cavendish makes it clear that it is too late: 'It is a wonderfull thing to consider the strength of Princes Wils when they are bent to have their pleasure fulfilled, wherin no reasonable perswasions wil serve the turne'.[338] His biggest mistake, Wolsey says, in a reversal of John the Baptist's claim in *Baptistes*, is serving the king's pleasure over the will of God: 'had I but served God as diligently as I have served the King, he would not have given me over in my grey haires. But this is the just reward that I must receive for my diligent pains and study, not regarding my service to God, but onely to my Prince'.[339] He admonishes William Kingston, who is present to take him to the tower, that 'if you be[come] one of the Privie Counsell', which he does only years later, 'take heede what you put in the Kings head, for you can never put it out againe'.[340] These references harken back to Wolsey's earlier advice to William Shelley on counselling the king:

> I counsel you and all other fathers of the law and learned men of [the king's] counsel to put no more into [his] head than the law may stand with good conscience; for when ye tell him that 'this is the law' it were well done yet should tell him also that 'although this be the law, yet this is conscience.' For law without conscience is not good to be given unto a King in counsel... for '*laus est facere quod decet, non quod licet*'.[341]

[337] Cavendish 1641, p. 8.
[338] Cavendish 1641, p. 61.
[339] Cavendish 1641, p. 113.
[340] Cavendish 1641, p. 113.
[341] I use here the Sylvester and Harding 1987 edition (p. 121) for clarity's sake as the passage in the 1641 edition contains commas which render its meaning confusing to a modern reader.

This Latin quotation, 'It is praiseworthy to do what is fitting [*decus*], not what is permitted' comes from the pseudo-Senecan *Octavia* (ln. 454), in which Seneca attempts to counsel the tyrannous Nero, the same passage referenced by More in *Utopia* when he describes the importance of *decorum* in counsel.

This quotation also reflects a moral written into Roper's biography of More: *The mirrour of vertue in worldly greatnes*. Unlike the ambitious Wolsey, who worked his way into the king's counsel by 'attend[ing] those men whom hee thought to beare most rule in the councell' and seizing every opportunity for advancement that he could, Roper tells his reader that More, like the reluctant Morton in *Richard III*, had to be convinced to take on roles in the king's court.[342] In fact, it is Wolsey himself, Roper suggests, who exhorts More to take a more prominent place at court: 'the Cardinall accordin[g] to the Kinges pleasure, earnestly laboured with [More], & amongst his many other persuasio[n]s, he alleadged vnto him, how deere his seruice must needs be to the King'.[343] In contrast to Wolsey and the rest of the counsellors, More's humility and attention to his conscience is stronger than his desire to serve the king's pleasures. This is the cause, Roper suggests, for both the downfall of More and the troubles in England surrounding Henry's divorce. As the character of More tells his daughter: 'it is a great pity, that any Christia[n] Prince should, by so flexible a Counsell ready to follow his affections, & by so weake a Clergy wanting grace to stand constantly to their Religion, with flattery be so grossely abused'.[344] It is the evil counsel surrounding the king which is responsible for the fate of England.

[342] Cavendish 1641, p. 4.
[343] Roper 1626, p. 11.
[344] Roper 1626, pp. 130-1.

Wolsey, as we saw, ends his life regretting his choice to serve the king's will over and above that of God, whereas More makes it clear from the outset of his relationship with Henry that he will 'first looke vnto God, after God, [then] vnto his King' and, although Roper does not report it, More's famous last words repeat the same dedication to God's will over that of the king: beseeching those in attendance 'earnestly to pray to God to give the King good counsel, protesting that he died his faithful servant, and God's first'.[345] The counsellor is meant to put regard for right action over that of the king's pleasure or will. This is reflected in More's instruction to another rising counsellor, Thomas Cromwell, which repeats the message that Wolsey had passed on to Shelley and Kingston. More tells Cromwell that 'if you follow my poore aduise, you shall in your Counsell-giuing, euer tell [the king] what he ought to do, but neuer what he is able to do. So shall you shew your selfe a true and faythfull seruant, & a right worthy Cou[n]sellour'.[346]

III. Counsel and Councils

Roper also recounts an event in the life of More which brings us to another important theme in the Henrician conciliar tradition. In 1523, shortly after coming to court, More is appointed Speaker in Parliament, a role he is disinclined to take, but accepts from the king on two conditions: 'the one priuately concerning my self,

[345] Roper 1626, p. 80; Wegemer and Smith, eds. 2004, p. 357.
[346] Roper 1626, p. 92. This message also repeats of the words of Antonio de Guevara in his 1529 *Diall of Princes*, translated into English in 1557: 'my purpose is not to tell princes in this booke, what they be, but to warne theim, what they ought to be: not to tel them what they doe, but to aduise them, what they ought to doe' (sig. a, ii^{v}) and represents a stark opposition to Machiavelli's *Prince*, translated as part of *A Discourse on the Coming of the English and Normans to Britain* in the early 1550s as 'our purpose at present is not to show what a prince is permitted to do and what he is not permitted to do, but only to show by what ways and means a prince can maintain or lose his state' (p. 138).

the other concerning your whole asembly of Commons in Parlament'.[347] First, he asks the king to forgive him if he should fail in his role of intermediary between the parliament and the king. He worries that he will 'preuert or impayre their prudent instructions' and so asks the king to allow him, if this should happen, to 'repayre agayne to the Co[m]mon House, there to conferre anew with them, and take the more substantiall aduice'.[348] More suggests that the counsel given by parliament might in fact be better than his own, and that he runs this risk of 'perverting' it in his attempts to mediate between the king and the commons.

The value of parliament as a source of counsel is further emphasised in More's second petition to the king, in which he requests that the Commons be given 'your most gracious licence, and pardon' to freely 'declare [their] aduice'.[349] The members of the commons do not have the eloquence required within the theatre of politics and so run the risk of angering the king with their counsel. Amongst so many, 'euery man is not alike witted, or so well spoken, as other'; just as 'it often happeneth, that much folly is vttered, in a paynted speach; As likewise, many that are boystrous & rude in language, do yet giue right good substa[n]tiall Cou[n]sell'.[350] For the 'aduise of the commons' is to be highly valued, as it is there that 'matter[s] of weight & importance' are treated of... which doth chiefly, & meerly concern this your most flourishing Realme, and your owne Royall Estate'.[351]

More's defence of the counsel provided by parliament is presented in stark contrast to Wolsey's relationship with the Commons. More opposes Wolsey's

[347] Roper 1626, p. 17.
[348] Roper 1626, p. 18.
[349] Roper 1626, p. 22.
[350] Roper 1626, p. 20.
[351] Roper 1626, p. 21.

complaints 'that nothing was either spoken, or done in the Parliament house, but was immediately blowne abroad in euery Alehouse and Tauerne'.[352] At More's encouragement, the House rejects Wolsey's requests for subsidies, mocking the 'Pompe' with which he approaches them.[353] In answering Wolsey's demands, More further defends parliament's ability to represent the diversity of the king's subjects, for 'although they had with all their voyces chosen and trusted him to speake, yet except euery one of the[m] could put into his owne head all their seuerall wittes, he along in so weighty a matter, was far vnmeete to make his Grace [an] answere'.[354] The value of the 'many wits' of Parliament makes it a valuable source for counsel, which cannot be equalled in the advice of any one man, even a man such as Thomas More.[355]

We have already seen how many of the portrayals of counsel and politics from the period emphasised the neglected wisdom of the people. The Chorus of Buchanan's *Baptistes* remain on the sideline of the action, for the majority of the play their cries and warnings go unheard. So too with the people of London in More's *Richard III*, they are aware of the stage-play before them, but their parts

[352] Roper 1626, p. 23.
[353] Roper 1626, p. 24.
[354] Roper 1626, p. 27.
[355] More's statement as given by Roper repeats the words of Bishop of London Cuthbert Tunstall who opened the 1523 parliament by declaring that 'It is necessary for a king to have sage and wise counsellors... for many eyes see better than one alone, therefore Parliaments and Councils be called' (Holmes 1990, p. 17). Similar sentiments are expressed by Erasmus in a dedicatory letter accompanying his translation of Plutarch's 'How to tell a Flatterer' and in Starkey's *Dialogue*. The growth in the power and influence of parliament in this period has been well documented. Henry VIII's execution of his father's personal counsellors – Richard Empson and Edmond Dudley – was seen as a rejection of the personal rule of such men for the more enlightened counsel of the humanists who filled the young king's court, as well as a return to parliament as a source of counsel, and parliament played a critical role throughout the reign, especially in regards to the legislation behind the Henrician Reformation. See Holmes 1990, p. 17; also Starkey 1987, pp. 71-118 and Walker 1997, p. 13.

within it are fabricated by those more powerful than them, and they are not able to participate fully, even when their participation might dramatically change the tragic outcome.[356] It is worth recalling that it is in the vernacular version of the text – for a wider readership – that More includes his example of how to participate prudently in politics.[357]

Even in models emphasising the counsel of the people, however, the humanist counsellor still has a vital role to play in communicating the advice of parliament, as Roper's description of More shows. If, as *Richard III* seems to suggest, the people are able to recognise the stage-play of politics, but do not have a voice to be more than spectators of it, this voice can be provided by a counsellor who, like More, speaks for them to the king. These figures are poised between ruler and ruled; Elyot refers to counsellors in his *Book Named the Gouernour* as the 'sondry meane authorities' who stand below the king but above all others.[358]

An illustration of this role is given by John Heywood, playwright and friend of Thomas More, in his *Play of the Wether*, published in England in 1533.[359] Unlike *Magnyfycence*, which portrays a prince easily swayed by the deceptions of counsellors, Heywood's play presents a strong and capable monarch – Jupiter – whose 'hye parlyament' has presented him with the problem of the varied weather across the kingdom.[360] He will base his decision, he says, on advice from 'all our

[356] See Paul 2012, pp. 36-54.
[357] Wegemer 2007, p. 48 suggests that the lessons of *Richard III* are aimed at cultivating a prudent citizenship. We might suggest instead that *Richard III* demonstrates that the citizens already possess the prudence necessary to see through the falsities and performances of politics – as Hythloday had – but lack the ability or will to put such knowledge into action.
[358] Elyot 1970 [1531], fo. 13^{v}.
[359] For the connection between Heywood and More see Walker 1998, pp. 108-16. For the *Play of the Wether* as an 'audacious example of the literature of counsel' see Walker 2005, pp. 100-19.
[360] Heywood 1544, sig. A, ii^{r}.

people' and invites 'eche man [to] auaunce' and state his case.[361] Jupiter himself will not be privy to these meetings, for he knows his absence will 'enbolde all suche more playnely to disclose' their counsel, so he appoints an intermediary to hear the petitions from the people, Merry Report, who claims to speak 'all waye truely' and be 'so indyfferent' to the matter that 'all is one to me'.[362]

It is important to note that both the king and Merry are presented as truthful, honest and virtuous, which is what makes this model successful. The king, for example, is only interested in what 'beste may stande to our honour infynyte| For welth in co[m]mune and eche mannes singular profyte' and will not make a decision based on anyone's counsel until he has 'harde eche man indifferently'.[363] Merry performs his role as promised – being truthful and unbiased throughout, and Jupiter declares that he has no reason to regret his appointment.

Merry's role is portrayed as necessary, as the counsel presented before him is not only varied but irreconcilable and often presented in inappropriate and indecorous ways. This is brought to the fore in the long dialogue between the Water Miller and the Wind Miller. In addressing the first, Merry tells him that he 'doute[s] nothynge in your audacite| But I fere me ye lacke capacite' and remarks 'Howe rudely ye erre frome rules of curtesye', coming in 'reuelynge and reheytynge| Euen as a knaue myght go to a beare beytynge'.[364] When they have both made their requests – the one for rain but no wind, the other for wind but no rain – the Water Miller remarks that their requests cannot both be filled for 'ye must lacke wynde or I must lacke rayne' and so he who 'is though^{t} weyken when we haue fynysht'

[361] Heywood 1544, sig. A, iii^{v}.
[362] Heywood 1544, sig. A, iv^{r}.
[363] Heywood 1544, sig. B, iii^{r}.
[364] Heywood 1544, sig. C, ii^{v}.

should ‘Leue of his sute and content to be banysht’.[365] The greed of each petitioner to have his way absolutely is recognised by Merry, who comments that ‘bothe mylles may serue in place... eche myll may haue tyme to vse his set’; the weather may be varied enough so that each citizen has what he requires for a set space of time.[366]

Jupiter, having heard the report, rejects the offer of Merry’s advice on the issue, declaring ‘we nede no whyt thy counsel| For in our selfe we haue forseen remedy’.[367] Interestingly, however, his decision is the same as that which Merry had suggested in his absence, to vary the weather so everyone gets what they need.[368] Merry’s role is not to give counsel on action in this case, but simply to communicate the complaints of parliament. It is clear, however, that if Jupiter had needed it, Merry would have been ready at hand to provide the ideal solution.[369]

Merry’s intermediary role is transformed into an institutionalised body by the humanist writer Christopher St. German in a draft bill composed in 1531. Although the bill was never presented to the House, it was retained in Thomas

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[365] Heywood 1544, sig. C, iv^{r}.
[366] Heywood 1544, sig. D, ii^{v}.
[367] Heywood 1544, sig. F, i^{v}. Walker 1998, p. 89 suggests Heywood is here arguing that a prince does not need counsel; however, this undermines the important role that Merry plays, as well as Jupiter’s insistence that he consult with his parliament, even if he makes a decision independently of it.
[368] Heywood 1544, sig. F, iii^{r}.
[369] On the frontispiece, the character is described as ‘Mery Reporte the vyce’ and there has been much debate about the meaning of this designation (the first of its kind): whether Merry Report represents vice in the same way as other morality play characters, such as in *Magnyfycence*, or instead if he is meant to play the fool, as later characters designated by ‘the vice’; see ‘Is Merry Report a Clown or a Courtier?’ *Staging the Henrician Court* (accessed 18 Feb 2013). Instead, given Merry’s role within the play, which is neither vicious nor particularly foolish, we might examine other meanings of the term ‘vice’ in the sixteenth century, including as ‘counsel, advice’ and ‘one who acts in the place of another; a substitute or deputy’. In this way I depart from those such as Walker 2005, p. 106 who see Merry as ‘the unruly court “hanger-on”... a source of both social and sexual misrule’.

Cromwell's papers pertaining to theological and political theory.[370] The draft establishes that the pressing issues outlined (ranging from the translation of the New Testament to public welfare policy) will be addressed by a 'great standynge counsayll', which will 'here the reasons and opynyons' of those involved and then 'make reporte unto the kynges highnes' who will decide in each case.[371] It does not serve simply an intermediary function, however, as it is also given authority to assign Justices of the Peace, as well as to punish vagabonds, publish ordinances and appoint its own members. That being said, like the role of Merry Report, this council is purely institutional and mediary; it has no function in guiding the actions of the prince towards virtue, nor is there talk of restraining his passions.

Thomas Starkey, on the other hand, does combine this humanist purpose of the counsellor with an institutional structure in order to rectify and control the prince's actions. We have already seen how Starkey's character of Reginald Pole in his *Dialogue* sets out a neo-classical theory of counsel, concluding that the remedy for England's many problems lies in the improvement of counsel: 'the general fauts and misorders and universal decays of this common weal... by common counsel and good policy may be redressed, reformed and brought to good civility'.[372] Arguing that a 'country cannot be long governed nor maintained with good policy where all is ruled by the will of one not chosen by election but cometh to it by natural succession', he suggests that 'better is the state of the common weal to restrain from the prince such high authority, committing that only to the common counsel of

[370] Guy 1985, p. 33; Guy 1985, p. 26 speaks to the importance of this document.
[371] St. German 1985, pp. 127, 128.
[372] Starkey 1948, p. 75; 'the gen*er*al fautys & misordurys & unyv*er*sal dekeys of thys co*m*myn wele... by co*m*myn counseyle & gud pollycy may be redressyd reformyd <& brought to gud cyvylyte>' (Starkey 1989, p. 48).

the ream and parliament assembled here in our country'.[373] Pole backs up his suggestion with the familiar argument that 'the wit of one commonly cannot compass so much as the wit of many, in matters of policy'.[374] In order to avoid 'great destruction' the prince must 'submit himself to the order of his counsel'.[375]

Pole establishes four bodies – three already existing in the English system: prince, privy council and parliament, and a fourth of his own construction: a council of fourteen appointed by parliament. This parliamentary council is the main authority over the other three, for it carries the weight of parliament, 'to this end and purpose: to see that the king and his proper counsel should do nothing again[st] the ordinance of his laws and good policy', and also has the power to call parliament 'for the reformation' of any faults.[376] This council has many of the powers traditionally assigned to the king, such as 'pass[ing] all acts of leagues, confederation, peace and war'.[377] 'All the rest', which is not much, 'should be ministered by the king and his [privy] counsel'.[378]

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[373] Starkey 1948, pp. 99, 100; 'cu*n*trey ca*n* not be long wel gov*er*nyd nor maynteyned with gud pollycy, where al ys rulyd by the wyl of one not chosen by electyon but co*m*myth to hyt by natural syccessyon'... 'bettur hyt ys to the state of the co*m*myn wele, to restrayne <fro*m* the pry*n*ce> such hye authoryte, co*m*myttyng that only to the co*m*myn counseyl of the reame & p*ar*lyame*n*te assemblyd here in our cu*n*trey' (Starkey 1989, pp. 68-9).

[374] Starkey 1948, p. 101; 'the wyt of one <co*m*my*n*ly> ca*n* <not> compass so much as the wyt of many <in mat*er*ys of pollycy>' (Starkey 1989, p. 69).

[375] Starkey 1948, p. 102; 'grete destructyon'... 'submyt hymselfe to the ordur of hys co*n*seyl' (Starkey 1989, p. 70).

[376] Starkey 1948, p. 155. The fourteen members of this council are: 'four of the greatest and ancient lords of the temporality; two bishops, as of London and Canterbury; four of the chief judges; and four of the most wise citizens of London' (p. 155; 'iiij of the gretyst & ancyent lordys <of the te*mper*alty>, ij byschoppys as of london & ca*n*terbury, iiij of the chefe jugys & iiij of the most wyse cytyzyns of london', 1989, p. 112).

[377] Starkey 1948, p. 156; 'passe al actys of <leegys> co*n*federatyon peace & warre' (Starkey 1989, p. 113).

[378] Starkey 1948, p. 156; 'al the rest schold be mynystryd by the kyng & hys co*n*seyl' (Starkey 1989, p. 113).

The privy council is also subject to the power of parliament, but does sit above the king: 'the king should do nothing pertaining to the state of his ream without the authority of his proper counsel'.[379] Importantly, the privy council must not be chosen by the prince himself, as it was in England at the time; it 'may in no case be committed to the arbitrament of the prince – to choose his own counsel – for that were all one and to commit all to his affects, liberty and rule'.[380] Instead, Pole writes, councillors should be appointed 'as the most part of the parliament shall be judged to be wise and meet thereunto'.[381] Parliament has the power to select councillors, who in turn control the arbitrary passions of the king.

This, he repeats, is the solution to all problems of the commonwealth, for 'this counsel, though we took our prince by succession, for the avoiding of sedition, should deliver us from all tyranny, setting us in true liberty', and he proceeds to demonstrate specifically how counsel will solve each of the commonwealth's diseases that he had detailed in the body of the dialogue.[382] By a complex system of councils and parliament Starkey suggests that the king will receive the counsel requisite to his good governance and be restrained by it.[383]

The increasing institutionalisation of counsel into councils in order to restrain the passions of the king is most vividly illustrated in visual terms,

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[379] Starkey 1948, p. 156; 'the kyng schold dow no thing p*er*teynyng to the state of hys reame without the authoryte of hys <p*ro*pur> counseyl' (Starkey 1989, p. 113). This 'proper counsel' should consist of 'two bishops, four lords, and four of the best learned and politic men' (p. 156; 'ij byschoppys, iiij lordys, & iiij or the best lernyd & polytyke me*n*', 1989, p. 113).

[380] Starkey 1948, p. 166; 'may in no case be co*m*myttyd to the arbytryme*n*t of the pry*n*ce to chose hys owne co*n*seyl' (Starkey 1989, p. 121).

[381] Starkey 1948, p. 155; 'as by the most p*ar*te of the parliament schal <be> jugyd to be wyse & mete ther<un>to' (Starkey 1989, p. 112).

[382] Starkey 1948, p. 156; 'thys co*n*seyl though we toke our pry*n*ce by successyon for <the> avoydyng <of> sedycyon schold delyv*ur* us fro*m* al tyra*n*ny <setting us in true lyberty>' (Starkey 1989, p. 113). See Sălăvăstru 2012, pp. 18-47.

[383] For the connection that Starkey's theories have to the legacy of medieval conciliarism see Mayer 1988, pp. 201-27.

particularly by the popular emblematic literature of the time. The emblem, which simultaneously functioned as a symbol, a literary genre and a poetic mode, was the invention of the Milanese humanist Andrea Alciato, whose emblem book was first published in 1531.[384] Like many of the texts we have seen thus far, such books held counsel for kings and princes, as well as reflecting consciously on the nature and form of political counsel.[385] One emblem in particular – the *in senatum boni principis* – sets out the proper model for a king receiving counsel. The changes to this image over time reflect the formalisation of counsel, taking place in a wide European context, with echoes in contemporary English images.

The *in senatum* is present in the first edition of Alciato's *Emblematum liber* in 1531, and its title and description vary little from this first presentation. The text reads:

> *Effigies manibus trunce ante altaria Divum,*
> *Hic resident, quarum lumine capta prior.*
> *Signa potestatis summae sanctique senatus,*
> *Thebanis fuerant ista reperta viris.*
> *Cur resident? quia mente graves decet esse quieta,*
> *Iuridicos animo ne* [sic] *variare levi.*
> *Cur sine sunt manibus? capiant ne xaenia, nec se*
> *Pollicitis flecti muneribusve sinant.*
> *Caecus at est princeps, quod solis auribus, absque*
> *Affectu constans iussa senatus agit.*
>
> [Figures without hands sit here before the altars of the gods. The chief of them is deprived of sight. These symbols of the supreme power and of the reverend senate were discovered by men of Thebes. – Why do they sit? – Because lawgivers should be serious, of a calm mind, and not change with inconstant thoughts. – Why have they no hands? – So that they may not take gifts, nor let themselves be influenced by promises or bribes. But the president is blind, because the Senate, by hearing alone, uninfluenced by feeling, impartially discharges what it is bidden to do.][386]

[384] Leisher 1987 [1952], p. 13; see Diehl 1986, p. 3; Bath 1994, p. 7; Drysall, 2008, pp. 79-97.
[385] Clements 1955, p. 117.
[386] Alciato 1531, sig. D1^{v}. Translation provided by 'In Senatum Boni Principis' *Alciato at Glasglow Emblem Project* (accessed 16 Aug 2011).

There is no designation of king or counsellors in the written passage. There is a *capta prior*, later a *princeps*, – a 'chief' or 'prince' – among them, who is 'deprived' of sight, representing the proper functioning of the senate, which ought to operate through discussion and dialogue, not the passions, and the members of which have no hands to take bribes.

The emblem itself tells a slightly different tale. In the 1531 edition (Figure 5), as in all editions, the *princeps* is undoubtedly a king. Holding a sceptre and wearing a crown, his eyes appear to be closed, rather than obstructed, and he is relaxed, contemplative in his unadorned chair. Seated on the same level and very close to the king, on either side, are two counsellor-figures. Lacking hands, as the passage indicates, they still gesture to the king, working to make themselves heard in the wordless medium of the emblem. Other than the centrality and dress of the *princeps*, there is little difference between him and the other two figures. It is an informal scene of counsel: the king in discourse with close advisers who are seen as equals.[387]

Three years later the same emblem appears again in a new edition of Alciato's collection (Figure 6).[388] Although the text remains the same (aside from a small correction), the picture is vastly different. The king continues to be the central figure, marked by his sceptre, crown and closed eyes. His position, however, is more prominent in this illustration than it had been in 1531. He is given a throne, and the counsellor-figures are ranged around and behind him, not sitting on a level with him. There are also significantly more of them. Once again gesturing with

[387] This image is also used in the editions of Alciato produced in Ausburg in 1531 and 1534.
[388] This is the Paris edition from 1534. The same image is used in the Paris editions of 1539 and 1542.

handless limbs, they appear to be appealing to him as he addresses a counsellor on his left side.[389]

By 1549, the image has transformed once again (Figure 7); the counsellors find themselves seated in an ornate and organized privy chamber. The king is seated in the middle on a raised throne under a cloth of state. The counsellors, sitting on benches, three on either side of the king, debate with each other, not addressing or even looking at their monarch who faces forward. Instead of closed eyes, the king has been blindfolded. His vision is obstructed by an outside force, not his own will. His presence in the image, while still imposing and central, is separated from the discursive action that goes on around him. It is this image, portraying a much more formal scene with an uninvolved monarch, which is also used in the editions of 1551 and 1558. An institutionalised council quite different from the personal and informal model of a few decades before becomes the dominant image.

Comparing these images to those produced in England in the first half of the sixteenth century, a similar pattern emerges. In the late fifteenth century, a stock woodcut (Figure 8) begins to be used by the printer Richard Pynson for a wide variety of texts, most of them having to do with statutes from the reigns of Richard III and Henry VII.[390] This image, strongly reminiscent of the first two Alciato emblems, shows a crowned monarch, seated on his throne, holding the sceptre and orb of his office. On either side are two figures who appear to be instructing the king. Four other figures range behind the king, partially obstructed by the arms of his large throne. Although the king is the central figure, and abnormally larger than

[389] This image is also used in the French versions of Alciato in 1536.
[390] This figure continues to be used following Pynson's appointment as the king's printer in 1506 and into the reign of Henry VIII; see Hodnett 1973, p. 348.

the others pictured, the two counsellors are standing very close to the monarch, occupying the space in front of the throne. Their strong role in relation to the king is suggested by their pointed forefingers, which indicate power and dominion.[391] Although the king holds the symbols of regal authority, the two figures have an authority of their own.

Later representations of counsel are not so informal, and reflect the distance created between king and counsellors also illustrated by the later Alciato image. An excellent example is provided by the 1548 publication of Edward Hall's *Vnion of the two noble and illustre famelies of Lancastre* [and] *Yorke*. The frontispiece (Figure 12) shows a picture of the newly crowned Edward VI, with seated counsellors on either side, who converse among themselves.[392] A parallel image comes at the end of the text (Figure 13), of his father also in council.[393] Henry VIII is notably more active and engaged with his counsellors, and the scene is less formal, although certainly more so than the Pyson images above. Both reflect the same sort of changes applied to the 1549 edition of the Alciato image – a formal council chamber, active conversant councillors and a detached king. It is perhaps no surprise that it is Edward who is figured in the more institutionalised setting, and who appears only as a symbolic presence, rather than an active one. With the

[391] Ripa 1707, p. 25 (original 1607): '*Dominio*: DOMINION. A Man, in a noble and sumptuous Habit... pointing with his Fore-finger, as is usual with those who have Dominion'. We might compare this image with a pair of images used as the frontispieces to the tale of *Salomon and Marcolphus* – the first published in Antwerp in 1492 (Figure 9), the second by Pynson in 1529 (Figure 10). Both tell the tale of the fool who was able to outdo the wise king in a battle of wits, walking away with the promised reward. In the earlier image, the king, sat on his throne under his cloth of estate points a figure at the poorly clad Marcolphus. In Pynson's version, the roles are reversed. Marcolphus, not looking quite so drab, points his finger in instruction to the pictured king. Compare, too, the woodcuts common to the period which show a scholar teaching students, almost always with his forefinger extended (Figure 11); see Hodnett 1973, figs. 77-81.

[392] For the emblematic significance of frontispieces see Höltgen 2008, pp. 393-410.

[393] Metal-cut image, see Luborsky and Ingram 1998, vol. 1, p. 422.

accession of Edward in 1547, there is a dramatic shift in the humanist discourse of counsel, contending not only with the challenge of a monarch in his minority, followed rapidly by two female monarchs, but that presented by a single individual: Niccolò Machiavelli.

Part II: The Machiavellian Challenge, 1547-1603

Chapter 4: The Redefinition of Prudence

The introduction of Machiavellian political thought into the context of an England weakened by perceived monarchical instabilities opens a new chapter in the history of the English discourse of counsel. Machiavelli's works offer a challenge to what we may now think of as the traditional or orthodox humanist theory of counsel by questioning its fundamental assumptions, most notably the understanding of the role of counsel as serving to bridle the vices and passions by guiding the prince to virtuous action. Rather than functioning to combat the internal motives of the prince, in this new tradition prudence – still the special skill of the political counsellor – acts to mitigate and navigate the outside forces of fortune and circumstance.

The introduction of contingent temporality generates a theory of moral flexibility amongst many writers, even those who are self-described anti-Machiavellians, especially in considering 'policy' and political deliberation. In order to reconcile this change with traditional views, late sixteenth century writers experimented with the idea of a two-tiered system – traditional universal morality for the private sphere and an ethics of contingency for the political realm. Counsellors must weigh both these considerations; offering advice that takes into account necessity and advantage politically, but with an awareness of traditional views, embracing the skill of paradiastolic redescription when occasion calls for the employment of vice.

I. Machiavelli and Advice-to-Counsellors Literature

Especially in England, Machiavelli becomes understood as presenting advice not only to princes, but also to counsellors, and so the history of Machiavellianism becomes inseparable from a history of the understanding of the role of counsel in the political arena. Although the first publication of an entire Machiavellian text in English does not occur until the 1562 translation of the *Arte of Warre*, and *The Prince* and the *Discourses* are not printed in English until much later, there is no question that there was an active English readership of Machiavelli's works even within the first decade of their publication in Italian.[394] In fact, of the small number of examples of articulated responses to Machiavelli in the first half of the sixteenth century, most address an English context, and the first attempts to apply his theories to political analysis were by English writers.[395] These responses were intimately connected to the discourse of counsel and the figure of the counsellor; *The Prince* in particular was seen as especially pertinent to this role. For example, in 1539 Henry Parker, Lord Morley wrote to Thomas Cromwell recommending both the *Istorie Florentine* and *Il Principe* to the high-profile counsellor, suggesting that the latter 'ys surely a very speciall good thing for youre Lordschip, whiche are ny aboughte oure Soueraigne Lorde in Counsell'.[396] It would seem that other prominent counsellors thought the same, as there are records of the purchase or

[394] Raab 1964; Anglo 2005; Petrina 2009; Petrina 2013, p. 14. See particularly Petrina 2009, p. 15: 'There is ample evidence for the circulation of Machiavelli's books in England, and for an articulate readership that dates back as far as the 1530s'. In what follows I am less concerned with evaluating writers on their (mis)use of Machiavelli, and more concerned with what they did draw from his texts and what purpose such references have in their overall argument and as applies to counsel.

[395] Anglo 2005, p. 102.

[396] Ellis 1824, p. 66. The dating of the letter as 1539 is given by Petrina 2009, p.15, although Ellis 1824, p. 63 and Anglo 2005, p. 97 date the letter to 1537.

ownership of *Il Principe* by a number of noted counsellors, including Thomas Smith, William Thomas and William Cecil.[397]

With the exception of the 1562 translation of the *Arte of Warre*, when Machiavelli's works are translated and published in English, translators consistently dedicate such works to counsellor-figures. Thomas Bedingfield's translation of *The Florentine Historie* was dedicated to Sir Christopher Hatton, Lord Chancellor of England, as it contained matters for 'such as be called to consultation of publike affaires & gouernment'.[398] In the same way, Edward Dacres' later translations of the *Discourses* and *The Prince* are both addressed to James, Duke of Lennox, prominent councillor and cousin to the king. Dacres notes that Machiavelli's work will be especially of use to him whose 'neereness of bloud, as affection and favour, his Sacred Majestie may most probably imploy in this ship of State near the helme'.[399]

Of course, large selections of Machiavelli's texts had already been published through other works, and these too were specifically dedicated to counsellors. Perhaps the greatest example of such selective use of Machiavelli is presented in the 1590 translation of Francisco Sansovino's *The Quintensence of Wit* by soldier and writer Robert Hitchcock. Taken from Sansovino's *Concette Politici* published in 1578, and including the added *concetti* of the 1583 amended *Propositioni... di cose di Stato*, Hitchcock faithfully translates all 805 of Sansovino's listed maxims, including the 186 directly derived from Machiavelli's

[397] Anglo 2005, p. 20; Petrina 2009, p.20.
[398] The letter is dated 1588, seven years before the translation is published, and three years before the death of Hatton. It is unclear why Bedingfield waited until after Hatton's death to publish the work, although we may speculate that was related to the reputation of Machiavelli at the time.
[399] Machiavelli 1636, A, 4^{v}.

works.[400] Notably, although this represented the largest contribution to the *Quintensence* from any single author, Machiavelli is not listed among the 'names of those Authors and writers' from whom 'the conceites of this present booke be gathered'.[401] Nevertheless, educated English readers would have known where most of these precepts were coming from, perhaps even more intimately and with more immediacy than modern-day readers. For example, John Donne, poet and secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, correctly identified the passages drawn from Machiavelli in his 1588 copy of the *Propositioni*, and there is no reason to think that Hitchcock's talented and educated patron, the counsellor Robert Cecil, would lack the ability to do the same.[402] Although Sansovino had originally dedicated his precepts to the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolph II, Hitchcock dedicates his to Cecil, who in the same year had been created Secretary of State, emerging as one of the leading counsellors in Elizabeth's court. Hitchcock writes to Cecil that 'the value and varietie of the worke is so excellent' that it would be a great 'fault committed against the common societie of men' to keep it hidden.[403]

The English connection between Machiavelli's works and the role of the counsellor had been established by one of the earliest English responses to Machiavelli, Reginald Pole's *Apologia ad Carolum Quintum* of 1539. The use of Machiavelli by Pole is only incidental to his purpose, which is an attack on the

[400] See Luciani 1952, p. 839. Luciani provides a meticulous account of the influence of Machiavelli on the *Concetti*, including a list of the Machiavellian precepts and their sources.
[401] 'The historie of *Florence*' is listed, although only 25 of the 186 Machiavellian precepts come from this work; Luciani 1952, p. 836. It has been suggested that this had to do with the papal ban on place against Machiavelli's works; see Luciani 1952, pp. 823, 839; Grendler 1969, p. 163.
[402] Grendler 1969, p. 163.
[403] Sansovino 1590, sig. A, 2[r].

Henrician Reformation.[404] In particular, and in the passages where he makes reference to Machiavelli's work, Pole argues that the entire event can be blamed on a lack of good counsel in the court of Henry VIII.[405] Pole suggests that it is the timidity of the majority of Henry's council, combined with the vicious forwardness of one – namely Cromwell – which is to blame for Henry's actions in the break with Rome. He then suggests that Cromwell got his ideas from *another* satanic counsellor, Machiavelli in his *Prince*, and proceeds to offer up his own impassioned critique of the text.[406]

Although the reading of Machiavelli as offering advice to counsellors such as Cromwell is unjustified, there is no question that Machiavelli was acting as a counsellor himself by offering advice to a prince in his work. Machiavelli's first engagement with the classical discourse of counsel comes in the opening lines of the dedicatory epistle of *The Prince*, in which he borrows directly from one of the foundational texts in the classical advice-to-princes literature: Isocrates's *To Nicocles*.[407] Just as Isocrates had begun his address by acknowledging that the gifts of most courtiers 'be wonte Nicocles, to bringe to you, that be kynges, garmentes, vesseil, or plate, or other lyke iewelles', Machiavelli tells his addressee, Lorenzo de' Medici, that 'They, that desire to ingratiate themselves with a Prince,

[404] Anglo 2005, p. 155.
[405] Petrina 2013, p. 18.
[406] Petrina 2013, p. 25.
[407] Burke 1984, p. 92, one of the few secondary sources to mention Isocrates in relation to Machiavelli, makes the argument that the *Ad Nicoclem* is the first text in the *speculum principis* genre, whereas Stacey 2007 attributes its foundation to Seneca's *De Clementia*. Regardless, *Ad Nicoclem* marks an early advice-to-princes text, which sets out many of the classical themes and arguments related to counsel, as well as its relationship to temporal and contextual considerations such as *kairos*. *To Nicocles* was translated into English by Thomas Elyot and published as *The Doctrinall of Princes* in 1533. It is to his translation that I refer here (though as the extant 1533 edition is incomplete, I am using that of 1550).

commonly use to offer... Horses and Armes, cloth of gold, pretious stones, and such like ornaments.'[408] Isocrates had argued that his gift was the 'beste gefte and moste profitable, also most conuenient as well for me to geue, as for the to receiue' and Machiavelli likewise had 'found nothing in my whole Inventory, that I thinke better of, or more esteem' than his gift – *The Prince*.[409] Machiavelli's reference to a text that stresses so strongly the need for political counsel to princes sets the tone of *The Prince*, locating it within the advice-to-princes genre and figuring Machiavelli as the reimagined political counsellor.[410] So to what end was his counsellor to direct his liege? According to what guiding rules and principles? And how does Machiavelli describe other counsellor-figures?

Machiavelli's answer to the first question is contained largely within the crucial opening passages of Chapter XV. It is here that Machiavelli states most clearly his critique of the classical and humanist advice-to-princes genre.[411] Machiavelli's reference to, and refutation of, these other political writers is direct; he declares that many have written on 'what the conditions of a Prince ought to be' but he will be presenting 'an opinion different from others'.[412] This is based on his

[408] Isocrates 1550, sig. 3^{r}, Machiavelli 1640, sig. A, 5^{r}. My reading of Machiavelli attempts to get as close as possible to that of the mid or late sixteenth century reading, which is why I have employed the Dacres translation, read in consultation with the Italian edition (edited by Brian Richardson in 1979) and the English manuscript copies published by Petrina 2009: the Fowler (F) translation of the 1580s and the Queen's College (QC) translation of an undefined date.
[409] Isocrates 1550, sig. 3^{r}; Machiavelli 1640, sig. A, 5^{r}.
[410] This paper stands in contrast to those, such as Garver 1987, who claim that Machiavelli 'endows the prince with powers that will make his own position as advisor superfluous' (p. 60) and that he 'reject[s] the value of such a role [as advisor] in the discussion of counsel and advice that appears in chapters 22-23' (p. 63).
[411] Skinner 1988, pp. xv-xvii gives this refutation in detail, and Stacey 2007 focuses on how this attack is concentrated specifically on the work of Seneca in *De clementia*. These chapters are, as Skinner 1988, p. xv put it, 'the most sensational and "Machiavellian" sections of the book'.
[412] Machiavelli 1640, p. 117.

'intent... to write for the advantage of him[413] that understands mee', for which he has thought it 'fitter to follow the effectual truth of the matter, than the imagination thereof'.[414] The connection between Machiavelli's intent to write for advantage, or *utile*, and his determination that the proper method is thus to study 'effectual truth' is a close one, as 'there is such a distance between how men doe live, and how men ought to live; that hee who leaves that which is done,[415] learnes sooner his ruine, than his preservation'[416] and 'that man who will professe honesty in all his actions, must needs goe to ruine, among so many that are dishonest.'[417] Thus, it is necessary, Machiavelli tells his reader, for the prince to be able to treat honesty as a tool, to 'make use of that honestie, and to lay it aside againe, as need [*necessità*][418] shall require'.[419]

Although intertwined, two critiques of the princely virtues are presented by Machiavelli at the outset of Chapter XV.[420] The first is quite familiar – one cannot expect a single, fallible man to be well-learned and adhere strictly to all of the virtues; although 'every one will confesse, it were exceedingly praiseworthy for a Prince to be adorned with all the above nam'd qualities that are good', such as liberality, piety and so on, 'this is not possible, nor doe humane conditions admit such perfection in vertues'.[421] As we have already seen, writers from Aristotle

[413] F: 'to wryte proffitable instructions'; QC: 'to wright matters profitable'.
[414] Machiavelli 1640, p. 117.
[415] F: 'for that which becummeth him to do'.
[416] The passage in QC is more strongly orientated to counsellors, for it reads 'that leauinge what is dunn by menn, and lookinge at theyr duties: they rather instructe them to thaire ruen then to thaire safety'.
[417] Machiavelli 1640, p. 118. Here F replaces his original use of 'gud' with 'honest' and adds '& vnhonest' after 'euill', perhaps to draw more attention to the connection with *honestum*.
[418] F: 'necessestie and extremetie of the tyme'.
[419] Machiavelli 1640, p. 118.
[420] For the princely virtues see Skinner 1988, p. xvi.
[421] Machiavelli 1640, pp. 119-20.

onward had accepted this premise, providing it as the foundation for the necessity of political counsel; Machiavelli, however, takes it in a different direction.

His second critique is more revolutionary, although perhaps not as radical as many have thought. Even if the prince *could* adopt all the virtues, Machiavelli writes, there is a further skill needed for 'some things we shall find which have the colour and face of Vertue [*virtù*], and following them, will lead thee to thy destruction; whereas some others, that shall as much seeme vice, if we take the course they lead us, shall discover unto us the way to our safety and well-being'.[422] This idea too, that those actions which have the 'colour' of virtue may in fact be vice, we have seen before, in the language and expression of *paradiastole* of the rhetoricians and morality plays. However, Machiavelli goes a step further. In none of the morality plays, for example, does the prince succeed by following virtue disguised as a vice, but Machiavelli here suggests that on occasion a prince must embrace an action which appears as vice in order to pursue his advantage. Thus, the virtues are meaningless beyond their appearance to those upon whose esteem the prince's power is based. The prince must be willing to employ the virtues *as necessity dictates*, and in that way, rethink how he conceptualises the virtues as virtues.

As such, Machiavelli has two pieces of advice for the Prince. First, he must have *prudence*: 'it is necessary for him to be so discreet [*prudente*],[423] that he know how to avoid the infamie of those vices, which would thrust him out of his State; and if it be possible, beware of those also which are not able to remove him thence, but where it cannot bee, let them passe with lesse regard'.[424] Machiavelli's

[422] Machiavelli 1640, p. 120.
[423] F: 'so much fursight wisdome and discretioun'. QC: 'bee soe wise'.
[424] Machiavelli 1640, p. 120.

definition of prudence comes in Chapter XXI, shortly on the heels of his discussion of the other cardinal and princely virtues, and pertains directly to this skill of seeing through the appearance of vice and virtue to what will be most advantageous.[425] Prudence, or 'the principall point of judgement' as Dacres renders it, 'is in discerning between the qualities of inconvenients, and not taking the bad for the good.'[426]

Second, the prince must embrace paradiastolic redescription himself: 'it is necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition, and to bee able to faine and dissemble thoroughly'.[427] Even the adoption of these more pernicious vices may be less disadvantageous than following their associated virtues, as long as the prince is able to manage the people's perception of his actions. The adoption of a vice is only disadvantageous if the people recognise it and are motivated to hatred or contempt by its performance.[428]

Machiavelli's view of prudence and *paradiastole*, then, is subtly different from those of the orthodox humanists. Whereas they, likewise, had recognised the need for prudence in distinguishing between true and false virtue, in seeing through redescription, Machiavelli builds on this to suggest that the prince himself must become the master of *paradiastole* in order to hold the esteem of the people. Whereas for Cicero the people's ability to see through such deception was the important link between *honestum* and *utile* formed by *decorum*, Machiavelli holds no such expectation, for 'men are so simple and yeeld so much to the present necessities, that hee who hath a mind to deceive, shall always find another that will

[425] Skinner 2000 [1981], pp. 40-1.
[426] Machiavelli 1640, p. 186.
[427] Machiavelli 1640, p. 138.
[428] See Garver 1987, p. 28 of the analogous relationship between the use of rhetoric in presenting advice and the role of the prince in persuading the people of his reputation.

be deceived'.[429] Thus as long as he manages well how he is perceived, 'there is no necessity for a Prince to bee endued with all these above written qualities, but it behooves well that he seeme to be so, or rather', Machiavelli continues, 'I will boldly say this, that having these qualities, and always regulating himselfe by them, they are hurtfull; but seeming to have them, they are advantagious [*utile*]'.[430]

Following Machiavelli, these skills become not only the content of political counsel to the prince, as they are for Machiavelli, but also advice to counsellors regarding how they ought to frame their own speech and actions.[431] This is especially true in the English context where, as we saw, Machiavelli's precepts were seen as particularly pertinent to advisers. The clearest example is provided by the translation of the Spanish writer Fadrique Furió Ceriol's Machiavellian work on the counsellor by the prominent English humanist Thomas Blundeville in 1570.[432] Blundeville's translation, *A very brief and profitable treatise declaring howe many counsells and what maner of counselers a prince that will gouerne well ought to haue*, is intended to be read and adopted by counsellors, not princes. In contrast to Ceriol's original dedication of the text to Philip II, Blundeville's is dedicated to the Earl of Leicester and is meant to be 'a glasse' of the 'vertues and qualities that... ought to raigne in euery other good counseler'.[433] He removes much of the

[429] Machiavelli 1640, p. 138.
[430] Machiavelli 1640, p. 139.
[431] Bałuk-Ulewiczowa 2009, p. 26, pp. 42. Bałuk-Ulewiczowa 2009 presents scholarship on popular *De optimo senatore* by Wawrzyniec Grymała Goślicki, first published in Venice in 1568 and translated in English as *The Counsellor* in 1598. Despite the wide circulation of this text, I have chosen not to consider it in what follows as it represents a largely straightforward restatement of the Ciceronian view of the counsellor seen in Elyot (as Bałuk-Ulewiczowa 2009, pp. 42-3 acknowledges).
[432] See Howard 2011, pp. 1-17.
[433] Ceriol 1570, sig. A, 2^{r}.

explicitly Machiavellian content; Ceriol's original text contained near word-for-word quotations from *The Prince*, which Blundeville does not translate, claiming to have cut 'all superfluous talke' in his abridged translation.[434] That being said, the Machiavellian themes still persist, even where the verbatim passages have been removed.

It is especially worth noting the emphasis given to prudence in this text, and how it is understood. Blundeville lists prudence as one of the five 'qualities of the mind' – reduced from Ceriol's fifteen – needed by the counsellor. Whereas Ceriol's original inventory had been a straightforward list, Blundeville describes them under the headings of the four cardinal virtues, plus science. However, prudence, even in Blundeville's translation, has little to do with virtue, and more to do with evaluating the utility of actions in a given political circumstance. Under this heading he includes the expectation that the counsellor be wise, 'politique', well-travelled, and expert in contemporary affairs ('to knowe the force as well of hys Prince, as of his enymies and neyghbours').[435] Being a 'pollitike counseler', for Ceriol and Blundeville, means being able to answer questions from his prince such as:

> whyther it be better to builde a Citie in a fertyll or barren soyle? which winds are to be barred from an habitation or dwelling place? how manye wayes a state or kingdome is woont to bee lost? by what meanes the good gouernement of anye common wealth is decayed? of what causes seditions and rebellions doe spring? how they may be oppressed? wherin the power of a Prince doth consist? whyther in riches, or in good Souldiers?[436]

We may recognise most of these questions (and the others in his list) as being dealt with in the *Discorsi*, most even being rough translation of chapter titles.[437] If the

[434] Ceriol 1570, sig. A, 2^{v}; see Howard 2011, especially p. 4.
[435] Ceriol 1570, sig. D, 3^{r}.
[436] Ceriol 1570, sig. G, 3^{r-v}.
[437] They are also reminiscent of William Thomas's list to Edward VI; see Ellis 1827, pp. 189-95.

counsellor can 'rightly and readily answere' these and like questions, the section concludes, 'he is worthy to bee called a pollitike counseler'.[438] To be politic, therefore, is to have knowledge of the important circumstances and realist considerations of the Machiavellian tradition.

For Machiavelli, prudence is essential in order to navigate the changing winds of Fortune.[439] This means that, despite the definition he gives in Chapter XXI, it is almost impossible to define what exactly *constitutes* prudence, what activities or behaviours define prudent action or the prudential person, for it varies with the times.[440] The path that Machiavelli endorses involves using both virtues and vices as tools, according to the variation in circumstances: 'it behooves [the prince] to have a mind so disposd as to turne and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes; and as formerly I said, not forsake the good; while he can, but to know how to make use of the evill upon necessity.'[441]

This discussion of necessity cannot be separated from Machiavelli's engagement with the tradition of *kairos*.[442] We have already seen how *kairos* functioned in the rhetorical tradition, as expressed by Thomas Elyot in his *Pasquil the Playne* of 1533. There was, however, another understanding of *kairos* in the classical (largely Greek) tradition, which articulated a theory of political action, rather than speech. This understanding was built upon the same temporal view of

[438] Ceriol 1570, sig. G, 4[r].
[439] Garver 1987, p. 7; Stacey 2007, pp. 282-5.
[440] Garver 1987, p. 10. As Garver 1987, p. 12 points out, prudence, understood in this way, is 'easier to accomplish than to explain... easier to perform than to account for'.
[441] Machiavelli 1640, p. 140.
[442] See Paul 2014b.

kairos, denoting both the character of a time – as in a season – as well as a rare opportunity or occasion to be taken advantage of.[443]

For many ancient thinkers, the understanding of *kairos* as related to political action necessitated a flexible view of morality. If one accepts *kairos* as a deviation from linear and universal time, any expectation that one must match actions to the character of the times presents a problem for universal or absolute moral systems. It is no surprise, then, that from the early centuries of Greek philosophy, the concept of *kairos* was linked to moral relativism, especially that of the sophists of the fifth century BCE.[444] For such thinkers, morality was determined by the nature of the times, by *kairos*: '"there is nothing that is in every respect seemly or shameful, but *kairos* takes the same things and makes them shameful and then changes them round and makes them seemly."'[445]

We have already seen how Plutarch, writing in the Second Sophistic, embraced the importance of *kairos* in giving advice and counsel. It is also one of the most important factors in determining the success of political actions in his *Lives*. Those who succeed or fail do so according to their ability to match their actions to *kairos*. He gives the example of Cato, whose qualities, admirable though they were, did not accord with his times. He 'fared just as fruits do which make their appearance out of season [*kairos*]', as his qualities were 'look[ed] upon... with delight and admiration' but did not lead to success.[446] He 'enjoyed great repute and fame, but was not suited to the needs of men because of the weight and grandeur of

[443] See Kinneavy 1986, p. 79.
[444] See Kinneavy 1986, pp. 81-2; Carter 1988, p. 101; Sipiora 2002, p. 3; Beehler 2003, pp. 78-9.
[445] *Dissoi Logoi* 1979, p. 111. The quotation is probably taken from Euripides; see Sipiora 2002, pp. 3-6; MacPhail 2011, p. 102.
[446] Plutarch 1919, 8:151.

[his] virtue, which were out of all proportion to the immediate times'.[447] He 'acted as if he lived in Plato's commonwealth, and not among the dregs of Romulus' and so he was defeated in his bid for the consulship.[448] Likewise, political leaders must make use of the opportunities presented to them, as Caesar, who 'took advantage of the favourable instant... and thereby... in a brief portion of one day he made himself master of three camps'.[449] By contrast, Philopoemen 'threw away his life... by hastening to attack Messene before occasion offered'.[450] The lesson of Plutarch's *exempla* is that 'it is *kairos* which gives the scales their saving or their fatal inclination'.[451]

This urge to act, whereby an actor can assert his agency against the press of *chronos*, often slips into a reverse relationship, whereby *kairos* forces action, and thus becomes strongly connected to a consideration of necessity, leading to the same sort of moral relativism presented by the sophists. For example, Plutarch writes that Titus's 'natural gift of leadership' led him to realise that he should not only rule 'in accordance with the laws' but must also 'when *kairos* required it' know 'how to dominate the laws for the common good.'[452] Echoing the sophists, Plutarch writes that 'honourable action has its fitting time and season: nay, rather, it is the observance of due bounds that constitutes an utter difference between honourable and base actions', a sentiment echoed in his *Moralia*: 'every natural

[447] Plutarch 1919, 8:151.
[448] Montaigne 1603, p. 593 cites this example in his discussion of 'the times' in his essay *On Vanitie*: 'Catoes vertue was vigorous, beyond the reason of the age he lived in: and for a man that entermedled with governing other men, destinated for the common service; it might be saide to have beene a justice, if not vnjust, at least vaine and out of season'.
[449] Plutarch, 1919, 7:505
[450] Plutarch 1919, 10:389.
[451] Plutarch 1919, 2:521.
[452] Plutarch 1919, 10:392.

virtue produceth the effect to which it is ordained better or worse, according as its season is more or less proper.'[453]

Machiavelli's use of this tradition is expressed through his emphasis on *occasione*, most notably in the sixth chapter of *The Prince*.[454] Like Plutarch, Machiavelli sets out examples of the 'worthiest persons' to be imitated. In these exemplary cases, the leaders were dependent on Fortune only for the opportunity or occasion to demonstrate their *virtù*: 'it will not appeare, that they had other help of fortune, than the occasion [*occasione*], which presented them with the matter wherein they might introduce what forme they then pleas'd'.[455] Machiavelli sets out a mutually supportive relationship between *occasione* and *virtù*; neither can be realised without the other: 'without that occasion, the vertue [*virtù*] of their mind [*animo*] had been extinguish'd; and without that vertue, the occasion had been offer'd in vaine.'[456] *Occasione* for Machiavelli, as for Plutarch, functions as a rare opportunity in chronological time, which only the truly prudent can recognise and take hold of: 'their excellent vertue made the occasion be taken notice of' which 'made these men happy' and 'their country... enobled, and exceedingly fortunate.'[457]

These lessons are applied in the final chapter of *The Prince*, added at the same time as the dedicatory epistle. Like the epistle, this chapter is addressed to Lorenzo de' Medici and draws directly on a work of Isocrates – in this case his

[453] Plutarch 1919, 5:101; Plutarch 1874, 5:495.
[454] Isocrates's works (including the *Ad Nicoclem*, *Panegyricus*, *Panathenaicus* and *Against the Sophists*, which articulate his views of *kairos*) were published in Venice and Milan in 1493 and 1513 respectively; see Gnoza 2012. Plutarch's *Lives* were prevalent and available in Machiavelli's Florence; see Desideri 1995, pp. 107-22; Pade 2007, pp. 15, 343-44, 347; Geiger 2008, pp. 5-12.
[455] Machiavelli 1640, p. 35.
[456] Machiavelli 1640, pp. 35-6.
[457] As Skinner and Price 2010, p. 107 point out, Cesare Borgia also stands as an exemplar of a leader who knows and takes advantage of *occasione*.

Panegyricus, which urges the people of Athens to take up arms against the barbarian invaders.[458] Echoing Chapter VI, Machiavelli suggests that 'the times might serve to honour a new Prince', as 'there were matter, that might minister occasion [*occasione*] to a wise [*prudente*] and valorous [*virtuoso*] prince, to introduce such a forme, that might doe honour to him'.[459] The moral rectitude of the act is based on the consideration of its necessity, for 'that warre is just, that is necessary', and the Medici are forced into action, for 'Circumstances are now very favourable indeed, and the difficulties cannot be very great when the circumstances are propitious, if only your family will imitate the men I have proposed as exemplars'.[460] Just as Isocrates had concluded his exhortation by emphasising that one 'must not throw [*kairos*] away; for it is disgraceful to neglect a chance when it is present and regret it when it is past,' Machiavelli ends his chapter, and his book, by concluding that 'this occasion [*occasione*] should not bee let passe'.[461]

Here, too, when this idea is articulated in subsequent work it is applied not the prince but to the counsellor. For instance, John Thorius's 1589 translation of *The Counseller* by the Spanish Bartolome Felippe, dedicated to the privy councillor John Fortescue, suggests that the prudence required of the counsellor consists in being aware of such occasions and opportunities, as the 'singular wit and rare iudgment, and the putting of matters in execution' required by counsel, 'demaunded fit opportunitie, with occasion proportionable, and much fidelitie'.[462] Due to the nature of their subject matter – that which is particular and unpredictable –

[458] Isocrates was also a strong proponent of this understanding of *kairos*; see Sipiora 2002, p. 9.
[459] Machiavelli 1640, p. 212.
[460] Machiavelli 1640, pp. 213, 215.
[461] Machiavelli 1640, p. 220.
[462] Felippe 1589, p. 4.

'Counsellers for the most part, depend vpon the occasions and circumstances'.[463] This is the skill which 'in matters touching counsel... is to be considered'.[464]

Felippe explicitly connects Machiavelli's discussion of *occasione* with the ancient tradition of *kairos*, writing that 'in ancient times past, the Image of opportunitie was set vp in many places, that men might remember to let no occasion slip, which might be to their commoditie when opportunitie was offered'.[465] Felippe goes on to describe the ancient personification of *occasio* in detail:

> they painted her on a wheele, because she neuer standeth still, nor remaineth in one place, with wings on her feete, because she passeth away swiftly, her face couered with the haire of her forehead, because she lets none know her, but such as be verie attentiue to looke on her: with a raser in her hande, because shee cuts of their hope that take no heede of her but let her passe: with the hinder part of her head balde, because if she once be gone, no man can catch hold of her, and with a Maid that waits vpon her which is called *Poenitentia*, for repentance doth accompanie them that cannot tell how to reape profit by occasion.[466]

Thus it is that the important consideration of the prudent counsellor is not whether an action should or should not be done – whether it is *utile* or *honestum* – but rather *when* it should be done. Echoing the sophists, Plutarch and Machiavelli, Felippe writes that 'many things in mans life are mard, not for that they ought not to be doone, but because they be not doone in time and place.'[467] The pertinent question to the counsellor is not one of morality, but of timing.

[463] Felippe 1589, p. 43.
[464] Felippe 1589, p. 44.
[465] Felippe 1589, p. 8.
[466] Felippe 1589, p. 8; see Figure 14. For a discussion between the relationship between *kairos* and repentance or *metanoia* see Myers 2011, pp. 1-18.
[467] Felippe 1589, p. 9.

II. Dissimulation and Two Types of Prudence

Reginald Pole's *Apologia*, one of the first written commentaries on *The Prince*, had criticised Machiavellianism for working through the counsel of Thomas Cromwell to the detriment of the English commonwealth. His objection to such ideas was not just that they ran counter to traditional moral or religious concerns, but that they disadvantaged the well-being of the kingdom, as well as Henry VIII himself. The quality of Machiavellianism as counsel is judged on utilitarian, not moral, grounds as part of Pole's attempt to undermine Henry's regime.[468] Similar concessions are reflected in the work of many of the anti-Machiavellians of the late sixteenth century, serving to generate a theory of permissible transgression of traditional morality based, once again, on ideas of variable temporality and, further, a distinction between the private and public realms.

The French writer and ambassador Mathieu Coignet's *Politique discourses upon trueth and lying*, originally published in 1584 and translated by Edward Hoby in 1586, refutes Machiavelli's counsel, on the grounds that princes who follow them 'haue had most miserable endes, after hauing beene made a laughing stocke vnto their enemyes.'[469] To ensure that his own advice does not lead to such a miserable end, Coignet is forced to soften what is otherwise a complete rejection of deception. He concedes in his chapter on 'faining and dissembling' that he does not mean 'that euerie one, nor at al times, nor of euerie matter, should speake what he thinketh', allowing not only for selective silence, but outright deception.[470] For although 'euerie counterfaiting done to the ende to deceiue an other is reprooued... if it bee to conceale a good counsell, fearing lest it might be preuented, then is it not

[468] Anglo 2005, p. 141.
[469] Coignet 1586, p. 120.
[470] Coignet 1586, p. 11.

to bee blamed'.[471] In particular this applies to those in politics, for 'hee who cannot dissemble, shall neuer raigne prosperously'.[472]

He provides a similar defence of promise-breaking in select circumstances. Although it is to be rejected and reproved, 'neuerthlesse he ought not to bee accused for a lyar, who maye not lawfully keepe [his promise] for some iust occasion'.[473] So it is that 'Necessitie is the mother of dispensation' and he suggests that failure to keep promises is 'likewise excusable, if any preiudice, or interest happen not thorough [sic] the not accomplishing of a promise'.[474] Coignet, in discussion of these issues, notes that 'Here I could alledge the opinion of an *Athenian* embassador recited by *Thucidides*, that a Prince ought somtime to be a friend, somtime an enimie, & to ply himselfe according to occurents'.[475]

The French soldier and statesman Jacques Hurault's *Politicke, Moral, and Martial Discourses*, translated by Arthur Golding in 1595, is also written in refutation of Machiavelli, but he too makes concessions in certain circumstances.[476] Despite objecting at length to the idea that princes should be held to different standards of morality, Harault admits that the prince should 'be skilfull both in playing the lion to encounter such as will assaile him, and in playing the fox to saue himselfe from the trains and snares that are layd for him'.[477] Dissimulation can be used as a defensive strategy, and he supports this with the same maxim that Coignet

[471] Coignet 1586, p. 11.
[472] Coignet 1586, p. 11.
[473] Coignet 1586, p. 29.
[474] Coignet 1586, p. 29.
[475] Coignet 1586, p. 35; note that the original for 'occurants' in Thucydides is *kairos*.
[476] See Golding 1937, p. 115.
[477] Hurault 1595, pp. 92-3; 'trains' here has the meaning of 'treachery, guile, deceit, trickery'.

had, that 'he which can no skill to dissemble can no skill to reign'.[478] In order to defend this position, he makes a distinction between deceit and dissimulation. Deceit is 'to pretend to be a man of honestie, and to promise that which he intendeth not to performe', which Hurault rejects completely.[479] Dissimulation, on the other hand, 'commeth of Wisedome', for 'to dissemble in time and place, is great wisedome'.[480] As others had done, he equates the role of such wisdom to the skill of a navigator: 'it is as much to say, as that a man must strike saile, apply himselfe to the wind like a good pilot, & take good heed to the seasons'.[481] In other words, it is the skill which allows a prince to change with the times and fortunes as he encounters them. 'Such dissimulation', rather than being vicious, 'is needfull for a king'.[482]

The best-known anti-Machiavelli work of this period is that of Innocent Gentillet, which was widely read in England, even before its translation in 1602 by Simon Patrick.[483] Gentillet's main purpose, as he states in the preface, is to show 'that *Nicholas Machiavell*... understood nothing or little in this Politicke science... and that he hath taken Maximes and rules altogether wicked, and hath builded upon them, not a Politicke, but a Tyrannical science'.[484] He divides his attack into three sections which treat counsel, religion and policy respectively. He begins in the first pages by attacking the Machiavellian model of counsel in favour of the traditional

[478] Hurault 1595, p. 100.
[479] Hurault 1595, p. 102.
[480] Hurault 1595, pp. 100-1.
[481] Hurault 1595, p. 101.
[482] Hurault 1595, p. 101.
[483] See Kahn 1994b; Martin 1997, pp. 40-2; Bawcutt 2004; Anglo 2005, pp. 282-324.
[484] Gentillet 1602, sig. A, ii^{r}. In this preface he discusses the characteristics of this 'Politicke science', which we shall explore in the next chapter on the methods and requisite knowledge of counsel.

model we saw in Part I, refuting Machiavelli on traditional grounds – concern for virtue and *honestum*, before moving on to his (ir)religious advice.

It is in the section on 'such Pollicie, as a Prince ought to hold in his Commonweale', that Gentillet's arguments lean towards those of his intended target, for it is here that Gentillet takes on Machiavelli's concern for advantage. The term 'policy' had acquired, by the time Gentillet was translated, a strong association with precisely the sort of Machiavellian moral flexibility we have been exploring. Although on the most basic level it retained a meaning as the particular skill or knowledge of the political, as Hurault writes, the 'the skil to gouerne and rule a whole multitude of men', it had also taken on a more pejorative meaning.[485]

Here Gentillet discusses the much-used maxim 'A Prince ought to follow the Nature of the Lyon, and of the Foxe: not of the one without the other'; however, he presents a novel counter to Machiavelli's precept by providing a redefinition of the concept of prudence.[486] Rather than suggesting that resorting to beastly behaviour is unbecoming of a prince, or that the deceptive nature of the fox is

[485] Hurault 1595, p. 1. For instance, it appears in the Machiavellian counsel provided by William Thomas to the young Edward VI on the question of 'Wheather it be expedient to varie with tym' in the early 1550s. Opening with a reference to the biblical discussion of *kairos* in Ecclesiastes 3:1, Thomas tells Edward that 'he who in tyme can take his tyme is most happie in this world' (1774, p. 133). With explicit reference to Machiavelli, Thomas writes that 'man in his affaires shulde proceed according to his tyme altering as the occasion requireth' (1774, p. 134). For instance, when a prince can 'not plaie the Lyon' – i.e. to use overt force – 'it [is] no shame to plaie the Foxe' or, in other words, to '*worke by policie*' (1774, p. 136; emphasis added). In 'these daies' when most princes practice such 'subtiltie', 'policie is no vice' (1774, p. 137). If the 'tyme require[s]' to act in such a way it is 'rather honourable than otherwise' (1774, p. 143). So it is that 'among Princes, of all thinges', even above morality, 'tyme and advauntaige is to be observed' (1774, p. 140). Blundeville too used 'pollicie' to describe the 'pollitike counseler' of Ceriol (1570, sig. D, 3^{r}), with all his Machiavellian attention to circumstance, and Coignet's discussion of the variability of the prince described in Thucydides had been marked by Hoby in the margin as describing 'Policie in a Prince' (1586, p. 35).

[486] Gentillet 1602, p. 222.

always to be eschewed, Gentillet's argument is over the definition of the terms. He wants to ensure that *lawful* deception, when 'in warre a man may lawfully use subtilties against his enemies', is disassociated with such beastly vocabulary. These actions are 'not called foxlike subtiltie, or unlawful deceiving, but ought to be called militarie prudence'.[487] This prudence, 'to use subtiltie, fraud and militarie sharpenesse of wit (for all those names may be well used)', Gentillet emphasises, 'is not to counterfeit the beast, nor to play the Fox'.[488] For Gentillet, there is a type of prudence, associated with policy, which involves the use of a type of legitimate deception and fraud.

The idea that there are two types of prudence is taken furthest by Justus Lipsius in his *Sixe Bookes of Politickes,* translated by William Jones in 1594.[489] The six books can be separated into two halves: the first three presenting a traditional notion of the political, the second three taking a 'realist' approach.[490] The overall aim is to generate a theory that encapsulates both these dimensions of the political. This may be why scholars have such difficulty categorising Lipsius into Machiavellian or anti-Machiavellian camps.[491] His intent was not to associate with either exclusively, but rather to fuse them together.[492]

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[487] Gentillet 1602, p. 224.
[488] Gentillet 1602, p. 224.
[489] There appears to be little known about William Jones the translator of Lipsius.
[490] Waszink 2004, p. 82.
[491] For example, Birely 1990 lists Lipsius as one of the founders of the anti-Machiavellian discourse in Europe, a position countered by McCrea 1997, p. xxiii. For this reason Waszink 2004, p. 102 chooses to label him either a '*moderate* Machiavellian or a *moderate* anti-Machiavellian', in other words neither.
[492] This view is in opposition to that presented by De Bom 2011, p. 64 who suggests that Lipsius's 'definition of prudence was entirely conventional', even 'bland and non-committal', and that he was uninterested in the 'fraught relationship between prudence and virtue'. On the other hand, McCrea 1997, p. xxvii suggests that Lipsius took 'a number of key humanist concepts – "constantia", "prudentia", and "similitudo temporum"' and 'infused them with new meaning, and re-presented them as tools with which to confront the contemporary situation' as a way to

There is no question, given this preoccupation, that the *Sixe Bookes* is a work with a lot to say about the nature and aims of counsel. Lipsius draws the reader's attention to this theme from the outset, noting in his opening letter to 'Emperovr. Kings. Princes' the role and importance of counsel to such rulers. Despite these royal addressees, Lipsius is speaking to fellow counsellors in the epistle, writing that 'to deserue well of the Common-wealth, we ought to deserue well of our Prince: that is, we ought to guide and direct him, to this marke of the common profit'.[493] Jones further emphasises these themes in his translation, for where Lipsius had exhorted his royal addressees not to 'despise our counsels, because you are above *iussa'* – above the laws, Jones here adds an absent possessive pronoun to render the passage: 'because you are above our commandements' – i.e. the commandments of his counsellors.[494] Jones too, like many of those we have examined in this tradition, chooses to dedicate his translation to an English counsellor – Sir John Puckering, who was sworn into the privy council two years before.

Jones makes a further important change in his translation of this opening passage. It is here that Lipsius first sets out his theme of an equal distribution of Ciceronian moral and Tacitean/Machiavellian pragmatic concerns in political affairs. He writes that a prince is 'iust, & lawfull' who 'had not rather heare men say, that he is mightie, then that he is good: and who knoweth, how to conioyne two most diuerse things'.[495] In the original Latin, those things that must be conjoined are *potentia* and *modestia*, to mirror the dichotomy between 'mightie' and 'good' in

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counter the 'perceived threats' to the Ciceronian dedication to the *vita activa*. See also Brooke 2012, pp. 59-75.

[493] Lipsius 1594, sig. A, v[r].

[494] Lipsius 1594, sig. A, v[r].

[495] Lipsius 1594, sig. A, v[r].

the first part of the sentence.[496] Jones, however, chooses to translate these terms as 'Modestie, and *Prudence*', not power.[497] It is very unlikely that this is a misreading or misinterpretation, given Jones's skills as a translator throughout the rest of the text. Instead, we must conclude that Jones chose to employ the term 'prudence' either because he felt that the concept carried such strong Machiavellian and Tacitean overtones that it would strike the right balance with modesty or, more likely, he was foreshadowing the later dichotomy Lipsius makes between virtue and prudence.

This pairing is presented at the outset of the first book, in which Lipsius sets out how all men should guide their lives. In general, he states, there are two directors that every man should be attentive to: prudence and virtue. Immediately we must take note that Lipsius presents these two distinctly: prudence is not to be counted among the virtues, but instead holds equal weight with all other virtues in the determinations of daily life. Prudence is the guide of these virtues, it 'not onlely ruleth your self, but vertue likewise, yea it directeth it'.[498] It also stands as a counter to fortune, for '*All things yeeld obedience vnto Prudence, euen Fortune her selfe*'; the wise man, like Machiavelli's man of *virtù*, '*frameth his own fortune*'.[499] Virtue and prudence each have their own jurisdictions as well: virtue is what is required to be a good man, prudence to be a good citizen; virtue is the director of the private sphere, prudence of the political.

It is in the third book that Lipsius explicitly addresses prudence in the prince, emphasising that although 'the vse of *Prudence* is necessarie in all worldly

[496] Original Latin from the 2004 edition of the text by Jan Waszink.
[497] Lipsius 1594, sig. A, v^{r}; emphasis added.
[498] Lipsius 1594, p. 11.
[499] Lipsius 1594, p. 12. He proceeds in the rest of this first book to describe the ways to acquire prudence, which I shall treat in the subsequent chapter.

affaires' it is especially required in government and is the '*onely proper vertue belonging to a Gouernour*'.[500] He immediately equates prudence with counsel, suggesting that 'the euent of all ages hath, and will euer instruct vs, that *in the managing of waightie affaires, more things are brought to passe by good aduise and counsell, then by force of armes*'.[501] He notes that it is most commendable for a man to be able to '*foresee all things to come*', but that '*he in like manner doth derserue great praise, that can follow the wise aduise of others*'.[502] In line with traditional views of counsel, Lipsius suggests that counsellors are necessary to supplement the prudence of the prince, but his definition of prudence is more in line with that of Machiavelli and those who follow him. Prudence must take into account the ability to vary with circumstance, for 'he is *truly prouident* [*prudens*] *and wise, that keepeth not alwayes the same pase, but the same way. And he is not therefore to be esteemed variable, but rather applyable, and fitting things to the purpose*'.[503] Lipsius concludes that the prudent man is he 'who holdeth not one, and the same course, though he tend, to one and the same hauen'; prudence consists in a variability and adaptability when it comes to ways and means, but a constancy in intended ends.[504]

In the second half of the book Lipsius carries this acceptance of adaptability into a discussion of dissimulation and deception. He begins the 'new preface' to the work by making clearer his views on 'proper prudence' or 'that which is requesite

[500] Lipsius 1594, p. 42. The use of 'virtue' here having the meaning of 'quality', rather than the sense of justice or clemency.
[501] Lipsius 1594, p. 42.
[502] Lipsius 1594, p. 43.
[503] Lipsius 1594, pp. 47-8.
[504] Lipsius 1594, p. 48.

to be in a Prince'.[505] Such prudence, he suggests, has three main characteristics. First, it is 'diffused' and '*concerneth particular matters*', for which reasons precepts are not enough to teach such a skill.[506] Second, it is 'confused', for it is 'imploied about things vncertaine'.[507] Because of these characteristics, prudence itself has no static form:

> if the things themselues are vncertaine, *Prudence* it selfe likewise must of necessitie be so, and so much the rather, because it is not onely tied to the things themselues, but to their dependents, hauing regard vnto the times, the places, and to men and for their least change, she changeth her selfe, which is the reason why she is not in all places alike, no nor the same in one and the selfe same thing.[508]

Having presented 'the best and purest wine' of prudence in the first three books, Lipsius wonders if, based on this new understanding of prudence, 'it be lawfull for me to mingle lightly, and ioyne with it some dregs of deceipt?'[509] He decides that it would indeed be allowable, based on the conditions of 'this age, and the men that liue therein', suggesting that those who oppose this position '*giue their opinion, as if they liued in the common wealth of Plato, and not in the dregs of the state of Romulus*'.[510] We may recognise this line from Plutarch's discussion of *kairos* in his life of Cato; Lipsius applies it to the question of stretching the definition of prudence to allow for deception, concluding with Thomas that since 'we conuerse... with craftie and malicious persons, who seeme *to be made of fraude, deceipt and lying*', especially princes, who 'although they shewe themselues to be like Lyons, *yet are they in their corrupt hearts dissembling*

[505] Lipsius 1594, p. 59; see Waszink 2004, p. 81. McCrea 1997, p. 16 suggests that this section holds the 'key to [the] argument' of the *Sixe Bookes*.
[506] Lipsius 1594, p. 59. I shall be returning to this theme in Chapter 5.
[507] Lipsius 1594, p. 59.
[508] Lipsius 1594, p. 60.
[509] Lipsius 1594, p. 112.
[510] Lipsius 1594, p. 112.

Foxes', we ought to adopt the same practices, in order to match our actions to the conditions of the times.[511]

A prince '*hauing to deal with a foxe*' must sometimes '*play the foxe*', especially in cases where 'the good and publike profit', synonymous with '*the benefit and profit of the Prince*', is concerned.[512] Such a cause changes the very moral value and appellation of an action: '*that which is commonly reputed dishonest for this cause, will not be so*'.[513] Thus a prince will 'intermingle that which is profitable, with that which is honest'.[514] Prudence does not change 'albeit a few drops of deceipt bee mingled therewith'.[515] He makes the connection that this argument has to Machiavelli explicit by defending him at the close of this chapter. Lipsius refers to him as the 'Italian *faulte-writer*', identified by name in the margin, whose 'poore soule is layde at of all hands' and whom an experienced man will not condemn for the recognition that '*there is a certain honest and laudable deceipt*.'[516]

In the following chapter Lipsius informs the reader of what this honest deceit consists. It is, he writes, 'a *subtile counsell, which swarveth from vertue or the lawes for the good of the Prince and the estate*'.[517] He sets out three levels of such honest deceit – light, middling and great – claiming that 'the first sort of deceipt I persuade, the second I tollerate, and the third I condemne', although he does not denounce any form absolutely, even the gravest, for there is always an occasion where it may be necessary.[518]

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[511] Lipsius 1594, pp. 112-13. See Thomas 1774, p. 136.
[512] Lipsius 1594, p. 113.
[513] Lipsius 1594, p. 113.
[514] Lipsius 1594, p. 113.
[515] Lipsius 1594, p. 114.
[516] Lipsius 1594, p. 114.
[517] Lipsius 1594, p. 115.
[518] Lipsius 1594, p. 115.

The first, 'light' type of deceit '*paceth not farre from vertue*' and is only '*slightly watered with the dewe of euill*', involving practices such as distrust and dissimulation.[519] He repeats the oft-quoted idea that '*he knew not wel how to beare rule, that knew not how to dissemble'*.[520] In fact, for Lipsius dissembling is *only* allowable when it comes to rulers, for 'it ought not to bee amongst priuat persons' but when it comes to governors 'they shall neuer gouerne well, who know not how to couer well'.[521] This dissembling is not just in relation to 'strangers, or their enemies' but 'likewise towards their owne subiects' and princes must do it '*cunningly*'.[522]

He defines middling deceit as 'when for thy profit thou intisest another by an error or false tale' and, although it is not allowed to those who use such means *against* princes, he argues that it 'be lawfull in a Prince... *for the commoditie of their subiects... to vse lying and deceipt*', for '*to deceiue in time and place is wisedome*'.[523] He suggests that such strategies are often stronger and more effective than force, and notes that 'oftentimes *by pollicie of counsel* [princes] *atchieue that*, which the necessitie of affaires, *and want of time doth denie them*', deceiving in speech, letters and through their ambassadors.[524] This 'pollicie of counsel', he suggests, 'albeit is not to be praised, is certainly necessary and justifiable 'if you enter into a consideration of humane prudence'.[525]

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[519] Lipsius 1594, p. 115.
[520] Lipsius 1594, p. 117.
[521] Lipsius 1594, p. 117.
[522] Lipsius 1594, pp. 117, 118.
[523] Lipsius 1594, p. 119.
[524] Lipsius 1594, p. 119.
[525] Lipsius 1594, p. 119. It is worth noting that this is not the only time that such strategies are described as 'counsel'. In the final book addressing warfare, Lipsius acknowledges that the power of occasion, which 'hath power in all humaine affaires, but especiallie in matter of warre' necessitates the use of not only '*direct counsels*', which '*march in the beaten way of warre*' but also '*indirect counsels,*

He classifies great deceit under the headings of '*Trecherie* and *Iniustice*'.[526] Even in this discussion, however, Lipsius redefines many otherwise dubious actions in order to make them allowable for princes, for '*it is necessarie to be a little withdrawn from iustice, in matters of small importance*, to the end they may keepe it in waightie matters'.[527] Thus, if a prince commits 'some small iniustice' and it is 'kept secret' then it might be allowable, particularly if it is '*for the commoditie of the common wealth*'.[528] In such cases, Lipsius suggests that the prince employ his skills of paradiastolic redescription, for '*A happie and prosperous mischeife is called vertue*'.[529] For Lipsius, virtue is only one part of the consideration of political success, the other consists of a view of prudence quite removed from its place as one of the cardinal virtues, which allows, based on temporal considerations, for the use of devious practices within the political sphere.[530]

III. The Morality of Princes and Counsellors

The creation of a flexible morality based on prudential evaluation of diverse circumstances which is proper to politics, as opposed to private affairs, is even more clearly outlined in the works of the essay writers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, whose subjective medium causes them to consider not just the theatre of politics, but the nature of the actors involved.

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which passe by the secret path of fraud and deceipt' (p. 167). Direct counsels involve attention to the temporal forces so important in war: 'times and seasons', 'the moment of occasion' and 'necessitie' (p. 171). He devotes an entire chapter to the consideration of indirect counsels, or what is referred to in the chapter title as 'Politicke Counsels, or strategemes' (p. 175). These 'crooked and couert' counsels', consisting in 'art, and pollicie' are not only 'of great profit' in warfare, 'but honorable likewise' (p. 175).

[526] Lipsius 1594, p. 120.
[527] Lipsius 1594, p. 122.
[528] Lipsius 1594, p. 122.
[529] Lipsius 1594, p. 122.
[530] Waszink 2004, p. 100.

This tendency, and the essay-writing genre, is originated by Michel de Montaigne, whose *Essais* were translated into English in 1603 by John Florio, a noted translator and writer in London. Montaigne's work is intimately connected to that of Lipsius; Lipsius himself wrote of Montaigne that 'I have found no one in Europe whose way of thinking about things is closer to my own' and Montaigne described Lipsius as 'the most sufficient and learned man now living'.[531] Montaigne, like Lipsius, has been variously declared both a Machiavellian and anti-Machiavellian by turns, most likely because his intention too was to form a synthesis of the two, rather than place himself in one or the other camp.[532]

Although he originally had set out to collect sources on many of the questions Machiavelli, Lipsius and others had tackled – such as 'the role of chance in military and political undertakings [and] the stability of regimes' – he had found the results to be contradictory, and hence gave up the task of producing a cohesive political treatise in the style of his predecessors.[533] Instead, he published a series of '*essais*', attempts to grapple with these questions, with no claim to success, objectivity or conclusion. In fact, the entire collection presents a rejection of such notions. It is the intention, Montaigne's *essai*, that counts.[534]

This emphasis on intention is present in the essays themselves, for Montaigne claims that it is intention that 'iudgeth our actions'.[535] In fact, 'nothing is truely in

[531] Tuck 1993, p. 45.
[532] See Langer 2005, pp. 122-5; Fontana 2008, pp. 57-8.
[533] Fontana 2008, pp. 11-12.
[534] As Langer 2005, p. 3 points out, 'the term *essai* in sixteenth-century French does not refer to a delineated segment of text, but instead retains the senses of "attempt," "trying-out,".... [Montaigne's] book is full of all sorts of "attempts". He tries out all sorts of judgments, of observations, of reflections, and of arguments. But... they are not meant to be the final word on the matter'.
[535] Montaigne 1603, p. 14.

our power', he suggests, 'except our will'.[536] Thus it is the will which should be the subject of all discussions of morality: '*It is no parte of a well-grounded iudgement, simplie to iudge our selves by our exterior actions*'.[537] As such, deception becomes the worst sort of immoral act; it is 'an ill and detestable vice' and Montaigne 'hate[s] it to the death'.[538] He declares it 'a vaine and servile humour, for a man to disguise and hide himselfe vnder a maske, and not dare to shew himselfe as he is'.[539] Thus in truth-telling, as in all things, Montaigne chooses the course whereby he can defend his intentions, and leave the rest to fortune: 'I apply my selfe to ingenuitie, and ever to speake truth and what I thinke, both by [my] complexion and by [my] intention; leaving the successe thereof vnto fortune'.[540]

The same applies to counsels – it is the intention that matters: 'our counsels go astray, becayse they are not rightly addressed, and have no fixed end'.[541] Such considerations come before any other thoughts of means: 'a skilfull archer ought first to know the marke he aimeth at, and then apply his hand, his bow, his string, his arrow and his motion accordingly'.[542] Whether or not he hits his mark is inconsequential: '*counsels ought not to be iudged by the events*' for 'events are but weake testimonies of our worth and capacity'.[543] Just as it is 'folly to thinke, that humane wisedome may acte the full part of fortune', 'vaine is his enterprise, that presumeth to embrace both causes and consequences'.[544] Thus there are two parts that make up correct action and counsel for Montaigne: that the intention has the

[536] Montaigne 1603, p. 14.
[537] Montaigne 1603, p. 197.
[538] Montaigne 1603, p. 16.
[539] Montaigne 1603, p. 376.
[540] Montaigne 1603, p. 377.
[541] Montaigne 1603, p. 197.
[542] Montaigne 1603, p. 197.
[543] Montaigne 1603, p. 559.
[544] Montaigne 1603, p. 560.

right aim and that it is in accordance with one's own nature. The power of Fortune will determine the rest.

Unlike Lipsius, for Montaigne prudence does not have the power to combat Fortune, and so it is that one will see 'Divers events from one selfe same counsell'.[545] 'So vaine and frivolous a thing is humane wisedome [*prudence*]' he declares, 'and contrary to all projects, devises, counsels, & precautions: fortune doth ever keep a full sway and possessions of all events'.[546] Fortune's abilities far outstrip man's; she 'sometimes addresse[s] and correct[s] our counsells' for she 'hath better advise than wee' and 'in hir directions exceedeth all the rules of humane wisedome'.[547] This is even more the case in the political realm: '*publike innouations, depend more on the conduct of fortune*' than private ones.[548] As Fortune 'seldome wil yeeld, or never subject her-selfe vnto our discourse or wisedome', the great power of prudence is humbled by her incomprehensibility.[549]

Although, for Montaigne, prudence does not give us the power to counter Fortune, we do have the power to change how we view and describe the outcomes. 'Fortune doth vs neither good nor ill', it is only in our own estimation of events that they are either good or bad: 'fortune simply affoord-vs the matter, it lieth in vs to give-it the forme... that which wee terme evill, is not so of it selfe'.[550] It is in *this* ability, Montaigne suggests, that we have a greater power than Fortune, for Fortune can do us no harm unless we declare it so: 'she offereth-vs the seede and matter of it, which our minde more powerfull than she, turneth and applieth as best it

[545] Montaigne 1603, p. 57.
[546] Montaigne 1603, p. 57.
[547] Montaigne 1603, p. 110.
[548] Montaigne 1603, p. 564.
[549] Montaigne 1603, p. 155.
[550] Montaigne 1603, pp. 137, 127.

pleaseth: as the efficient cause and mistris of condition, whether happie or vnhappie'.[551]

All of these themes are brought together in the essay, 'Of profit and honestie'.[552] Whereas others had rejected the concerns of *honestum/utile* based on particular temporal concerns, Montaigne's objections are based on another particularity. He makes clear in this chapter that both the traditional and Machiavellian arguments about *honestum* and *utile* have one weakness in common: a universality that does not take into account the nature of the individuals involved.[553]

He begins the chapter with an acknowledgement of the logical consistency of the Machiavellian argument that vices must, at least on occasion, be profitable. This is presented in the form of a simple syllogism. As (P_1) 'there is nothing in nature vnseruiceable, no not invtilie itselfe' and (P_2) 'our essence is symented with crased qualities; ambition, jealousie, enuie...' therefore (C) even these baser and seemingly unnatural qualities must have a purpose and utility: 'the seede of which qualities, who should roote out of man; should ruine the fundamentall conditions of our life'.[554] He notes that this is especially true in regards to 'policy': 'in a mater of policie-likewise, some necessary functions are not onely base but faultie: vices find

[551] Montaigne 1603, p. 127.
[552] Montaigne 1603, p. 475.
[553] Thus this argument finds itself between those, such as Skinner 1978a, p. 253 and Tuck 1993, who suggest that Montaigne was advancing arguments for reason of state and those, such as Collins 1992 and Fontana 2008, p. 18, who suggest that he was critiquing this view. Montaigne's point, I suggest, was not to take either side, but rather to suggest that both had a fundamental flaw in that they prescribed universalities; either moral system *could* be viable, depending on the particulars. In this way it is aligned with the argument in Fontana 2008, p. 138: 'on Montaigne's terms, acting prudently, in the private as in the public domain, meant something quite different in each individual case', as 'prudent conduct' consisted of '"following nature"'.
[554] Montaigne 1603, pp. 475-6.

therein a seat, and employ themselues in the stitching vp of our frame: as poisons in the preseruation of our health'.[555]

The use of such vices is particular to the political sphere, or rather, to those within it. Even if some deplorable actions 'become excusable, because we have need of them', that does not mean, Montaigne makes clear, that such actions are to be performed by all men.[556] Albeit an action might be excusable because it is necessary, that still does not make it good, and one's conscience may still suffer for it. It therefore should be performed only by those individuals who are suited to it. As he had remarked in his tenth essay, actions ought to be matched to the nature of the individual performing them. When he suggests that '*The way to trueth is but one and simple*', Montaigne is not suggesting a universal moral system, but quite the opposite, for the ruling maxim is '*that becomes euery man especially, which is his owne especially*'.[557]

Taking this into consideration, Montaigne can make allowance for what he terms 'lawfull vices'.[558] It is true, he says, that true justice would never allow such things, but we must refer to an 'especiall, and nationall iustice' which is 'restrained and suted to the neede of our pollicies'.[559] We, as fallen beings, do not have the ability to know the exact nature of true justice. As a result, all we have is imitation, as '*we haue no liuely nor life-like purtrature of vpright law and naturall iustice: we vse but the shaddowes and colours of them.*'[560] Montaigne thus suggests that we

[555] Montaigne 1603, p. 476.
[556] Montaigne 1603, p. 476.
[557] Montaigne 1603, p. 478.
[558] Montaigne 1603, p. 478.
[559] Montaigne 1603, p. 478.
[560] Montaigne 1603, p. 478. There are similar themes in his essay 'On Vanitie', in which he distinguishes between universal and worldly virtue. The latter, he suggests, has placed unrealistic expectations on man: 'To whom prescribes he that, which he expects no man will performe?'. Such virtue is 'vaine and out of season'

‘follow the common phrase, which makes a difference betweene profitable and honest things; terming some naturall actions, which are not onely profitable but necessarie, dishonesty and filthie’.[561]

In fact, especially when it comes to princes, the performance of vicious actions may be divinely mandated punishment. Princes may have to conduct themselves immorally, suffering the damage this does to their conscience, for some previous sin:

> When an vrgent circumstance, or any violent and vnexpected accident, induceth a Prince for the necessity of his estate, or as they say for state matters, to breake his worde and faith, or otherwise forceth him out of his ordinarie dutie, he is to ascribe that necessitie vnto a lash of God’s rod: It is no vice, for he hath quit his reason, vnto a reason more publike, and more powerfull, but surelie t’is fortune.[562]

For a prince, Montaigne suggests, there is no remedy to this ill fortune: ‘were he trulie rackt between these two extreames... he must haue done it’.[563] However, if he is a different sort of person, ‘one of so tender or cheverall a conscience, to whome no cure might seeme worthie of so extreame a remedie’ then his choice *not* to take the vicious action is likewise justifiable: ‘I should prise or regarde him no whit the lesse’.[564]

(p. 593). Instead, ‘the vertue assigned to the worlds affaires, is a vertue with sundry byases, turnings, bendings and elbowes, to apply and joyne it selfe to humane imbecilitie; mixed and artificially: neither right, pure or constant, nor meerly innocent’ (p. 593).

[561] Montaigne 1603, p. 478.

[562] Montaigne 1603, p. 480.

[563] Montaigne 1603, p. 480. To this first, more morally flexible, prince, Montaigne ascribes limits. First, he must keep in mind that ‘they are dangerous examples, rare and crased exceptions to our naturall rules’ and that they should be approached with ‘great moderation, and heedie circumspection’ (p. 481). Second, that ‘no priuate commoditie’ justifies such actions, neither are they justifiable based on ‘the encrease and profit of the publike revenues’ (p. 481).

[564] Montaigne 1603, p. 480.

This is because, for private men, dedication to the well-being of their country does not have to come above private concerns, such as conscience or family. It is part of our nature as humans to have such bonds, and overriding them fragments that fundamental unity: 'Let vs bereave wicked, bloodie and trayterous dispositions, of this pretext of reason [more publike]; leave we that impious and exorbitant [nationall] justice, and adhere vnto more humane imitations'.[565] It is these individual and particular relationships which define us, both as individuals and a human community, and trump all concerns of either honesty or utility. Thus, he concludes:

> Falselie doe we argue honour, and the beautie of an action, by it's [sic] profit: and conclude as ill, to thinke every one is bound vnto it, and that is is honest, if it be commodious.
> *Omnia non pariter rerum su*[*n*]*t omnibus opta.*
> All things a-like to all,
> Doe not well-fitting fall.[566]

Even before its translation into English, Montaigne's *Essais* were widely read in English intellectual circles, as evidenced by the spread of the essay in the decades following its publication. One of the earliest writers within the English genre was William Cornwallis, whose *Essayes* were first published in 1600, with a second half added the following year. Intimately acquainted not only with the works of Lipsius and Montaigne, but also with the real-world politics of counselling, Cornwallis's essays reflect a fusion of these influences.[567]

His first essay sets this tone. 'Of Resolution' begins with a reflection of his own thoughts and views, before turning his evaluating gaze outward – first to society, and then to the political. Touching on the themes of adaptation to

[565] Montaigne 1603, p. 482.
[566] Montaigne 1603, pp. 482-3.
[567] See Bowers 1952, p. v. Bennett 1933, pp. 1080-9 gives a full account of the influence of Montaigne on Cornwallis. Cornwallis's *Paradoxes* also demonstrate the power of redescription in the interpretation of events, as we shall see in Part III.

circumstance and *paradiastole*, he uses an example from Plutarch's *Lives* – Alexander's decision to wear the clothes of the 'barbarians' he had conquered – declaring that he is 'not of their mindes that tax *Alexanders* putting on the habit of the Persians', for this was a 'a politicke inte[n]t, he ioyned the[m] to him, by that yeelding'.[568] In this case, 'Fantasticknesse lent wisdome to Pollicy'.[569] He thus allows that 'some actions, if they be not wholely vicious, humanitie and good nature shall make [them] sociable'.[570]

This is particularly true of political actions. In the essay 'Of Suspicion', Cornwallis addresses the issue of necessary vicious actions done by princes and makes the argument for the separation of private and political moralities. Princes, he writes, are fundamentally different from private men, as 'vppon this state dependes the common good', and so 'among these States, Suspicion and Dissimulation are to be allowed' as they are the 'Handmaydes of Pollicie'.[571] He agrees with Hurault that princes 'ought to be conuersant' in such practices 'not to offend, but to defend'.[572]

Taking Montaigne's suggestion that morality should be based on the individual involved, Cornwallis founds his separation of private and public morality on the *state of the person acting*, not just the situation or timing. Princes in Cornwallis's estimation are fundamentally different from private men; they are allowed actions usually considered dishonest 'not in respect they are men, but in

[568] Cornwallis 1600, sig. B, 6^{r-v}.
[569] Cornwallis 1600, sig. N, 2^{v}.
[570] Cornwallis 1600, sig. B, 6^{v}.
[571] Cornwallis 1600, sigs. D, 5^{v}; D, 6^{r}.
[572] Cornwallis 1600, sig. D, 6^{r}.

regard they are princes'.[573] Beneath them, these actions 'are not to be allowed, not dissimulation at all'.[574]

Cornwallis goes further than Montaigne in making the suggestion that the moral valuation of these actions is fundamentally changed based on the consideration of who is performing the deed, for 'things [are] different in name and nature, according to the possessor'.[575] Thus 'to a lowe fortune belongs simply the vse of Vertue', but to princes '[virtue] must be often chaunged, not into vice, but not to looke alwayes like Vertue'.[576] Combining this doctrine with that of Lipsius, he tells his reader that the private man need only walk a straight and simple path, but the navigations of princes are more diverse and complex: 'couersant with multitude, [he] must sometime goe about & seek by wayes, which in him may bee vertuous, though in the other it would be termed dishonest'.[577] Virtue and vice are necessarily redescribed when speaking of princes.

Turning to the controversial topic of dissimulation, Cornwallis connects it directly to the discussions of variable circumstance, calling dissimulation 'a skillfull manager of time'.[578] It is thus 'tollerable; in some courses necessarie' to dissimulate, as Alexander did with his barbaric Persian attire.[579] These cases are defined, as they were for Plutarch and Machiavelli, by an understanding of *kairos*: 'Time in it selfe is alwayes one, but Occasion runs Diuision vpon Time, her note is

[573] Cornwallis 1600, sig. D, 6^{r}.
[574] Cornwallis 1600, sig. D, 6^{v}.
[575] Cornwallis 1600, sig. D, 6^{v}.
[576] Cornwallis 1600, sig. D, 7^{r}.
[577] Cornwallis 1600, sig. D, 7^{r}.
[578] Cornwallis 1610, sig. Nn, 4^{v}.
[579] Cornwallis 1610, sig. Nn, 4^{r}.

not alwayes one, which ought to be noted by them which are not negligent of their Time'.[580]

Recalling the important connection between *kairos* and counsel, Cornwallis suggests that this attention to occasion must be especially embraced by counsellors, for 'it is the duty of a faithfull seruant to tell his maister of his faultes... but he must watch fit oportunity'.[581] Counsel is essential to every man, Cornwallis suggests in his second essay 'Of Advice', for 'if the end of life be to be good', and 'if the safest purchase of goodnesse bee counsayle', then 'why eschew wee the blessing of Aduise?'[582] In line with the Aristotelian tradition, Cornwallis suggests that it is advice which is 'the medium transporting' the rays of reason, the means by which we can control the affections and passions.[583] This is especially pertinent in political considerations, for he 'see[s] nothing more decay the fairest branches of our Commonwealth, then this neglect; either wee will not endure Aduise, or not beleeue it'.[584] He ends this essay with an exhortation to political counsel: 'let vs then infranchize Aduise, and perswade our eares to become good common-wealth men, to respect the generall profit: Counsell, and Aduise, are the parents of Gouernment'.[585]

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[580] Cornwallis 1600, sig. N, 2^{v}. Compare with Thomas's discussion of occasion and music in the 1550s: 'Trulie as the musicien useth sometime a flatt and sometime a sharpe note, sometime a short and sometime a longe to make his songe perfect, so saieth Macchiavegli ought man to phrame his proceadings unto his tyme' (1774, p. 134) and 'ffor as there is nothing more pleasaunt than the concorde of musicke: nor nothing more displeasaunt than the discorde therof, so whan doinges and tyme agree there is nothing more happie, nor whan they disagree nothing more unhappie: having in them much more variacion than twenes in musicke have' (1774, p. 144).
[581] Cornwallis 1610, sig. Ll, 7^{v}.
[582] Cornwallis 1600, sig. C, 1^{v}.
[583] Cornwallis 1600, sig. C, 5^{r}.
[584] Cornwallis 1600, sig. C, 2^{r}.
[585] Cornwallis 1600, sig. C, 6^{r-v}.

In the 1610 edition he adds a further consideration of advice in the political realm in the essay 'Of Counsaile'. Here he distinguishes between 'counsel' – proper to politics – and private advice, for 'aduice fitteth friend to friend: counsaile counsailours to states'.[586] Whereas in the Aristotelian tradition counsel was proposed as a counter to the tyranny of a passionate ruler – which Cornwallis applies to personal advice – political tyranny comes in another form, to which counsel, once again, is the answer: 'cha[n]ce chalengeth vnpremeditated actions; what more tyrannous?' and so 'must we admit counsaile'.[587] Counsel, specifically *political* counsel as opposed to *personal* advice, is thus transformed from a remedy to the passions of a prince to the counter to the whims of capricious fortune. He concludes that 'counsell then vpholds states, and to Counsaile, and to bee counsailed, fittes a states man'.[588]

These themes are also considered by the best-known of the English essayists – Francis Bacon – who sets out two kinds of prudence: a traditional variant suited to the common man and another for those who must adapt to political circumstance. In his *Twoo Bookes... Of the proficiency and aduancement of Learning, diuine and humane*, published in 1605, Bacon presents two forms of wisdom: a 'wisedome of counsell' and a 'wisedome of pressiing [sic] a mans own fortune'.[589] Like Lipsius, Bacon imposes a division between the wisdom required for political counsel and that which brings success in day-to-day affairs: 'many are wise in their owne ways, that are weak for gouernmente or Counsell'.[590] The wisdom of fortune, he writes, must be acknowledged by those with public roles for 'great Pollitiques indeede euer

[586] Cornwallis 1610, sig. Bb, 5^{v}.
[587] Cornwallis 1610, sig. Bb, 4^{v}-5^{r}.
[588] Cornwallis 1610, sig. Bb, 5^{r}.
[589] Bacon 1605, p. 92.
[590] Bacon 1605, pp. 92-3.

ascribed their successes to their felicitie; and not to their skill or vertue'.[591] Bacon feels the need to set out a doctrine for fortune's disciples, 'for *fortune* layeth as heauy impositions as vertue, and it is as harde and severe a thinge to be a *Pollipolitique* as to be truely moral'.[592] It is his task to ascribe a curriculum for this 'Architecture of fortune', for although many will not esteem him for doing it, 'neuerthelesse fortune as an organ of vertue and merit deserueth the consideration'.[593] Bacon intends instruction in this kind of wisdom to those in 'gouernment or Counsell' – politicians and, importantly, counsellors.[594]

He sets out eleven precepts for their education, most of which will now be familiar to us. For instance, such a man must know the nature and ends of those around him, and learn to mistrust them as unfaithful dissimulators. He must be able to embrace the tools of rhetoric, and specifically *paradiastole,* in order to provide 'flourishes and inhansements of vertue', and for 'the couering of defects... by *Caution*, by *Colour*, and by *Confidence'*.[595] From this, Bacon makes clear that the disciple of fortune must also know how to recognise and take hold of *kairos*, to 'frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion', for 'nothing hindereth mens fortunes so much' as to lack the ability to change with the times.[596] Politicians

[591] Bacon 1605, p. 93.
[592] Bacon 1605, pp. 93-4.
[593] Bacon 1605, p. 94.
[594] As Gaukroger 2004, pp. 52, 55 points out, Bacon's natural philosopher, whose training is set out in the *Twoo Bookes* (p. 74), would lead an active life in the service of the crown.
[595] Bacon 1605, p. 97. Bacon had alluded to the use of such techniques in his *Coulers of good and euill*, first published in 1597, noting that 'In deliberatiues the point is what is good and what is euill' and so 'the perswaders labor is to make things appeare good or euill... by coulers, popularities and circumstances' (fo. 17[r]).
[596] Bacon 1605, p. 98.

especially must have this skill, for 'nothing is more pollitique then to make the wheels of our mind concentrique with the wheels of fortune'.[597]

Bacon attempts to make a clear distinction between his brand of temporally-based counsel and that associated with Machiavellianism, which he makes a point to deride.[598] Bacon assures his readers that his instructions are '*Bonae Artes*' and to be distinguished from 'euill arts', which consist in 'that principle of *Machiauel*: *That a man seeke not to attain vertue it selfe: But the apparance only thereof*'.[599] This flexibility and willingness to embrace redescription on occasion should not, Bacon makes clear, replace the desire to attain true virtue, a lesson he reads into Machiavelli's works. Nevertheless, the surest way to this, and all other skills of government, Bacon suggests, is to follow precisely Machiavelli's own method, for 'the fourme of writing which of al others is fittest for this variable argumente of Negotiation and occasions is which *Machiauel* chose wisely and aptly for Gouernmente: *namely discourse vpon Histories and Examples*.'[600]

[597] Bacon 1605, p. 98.
[598] He had set out a similar character to his architect of fortune in the entertainment provided for Elizabeth's Accession Day in 1595. The play itself is a series of orations by counsellors to the Earl of Essex on how to win favour with the queen, each representing a specific type of counsellor-figure. The second such character is the Secretary, whose title and oration identify him immediately with the Machiavel. The Secretary tells Essex that if his end is 'to make the Prince happie whom he serves' he ought to 'make himself cunning... in the humors & drifts of persons' and always 'haue an eye rather to the by [sic] circumstance then to the matter itself' (2012, p. 714). In the end, however, the Secretary's advice is rejected, and he is chided for thinking that he can 'governe the wheele of fortune', for no man can make 'his own cunning & practices (without regard of religion, honour, & morall honesty) his foundation'. Such an 'vntrue Politique' is the 'truest bondman to *Philautia*' for trying to 'binde occasion, & to ouer-worke fortune' (2012, p. 718).
[599] Bacon 1605, p. 105.
[600] Bacon 1605, p. 92.

Chapter 5: History and Counsel

This chapter explores the intersection of the discourses of counsel we have been examining with the rise of historical literature in the latter half of the sixteenth century. Following the attacks on the rhetorical strategies of counsellors, written histories come to be seen by many late sixteenth century writers as the only legitimate means of presenting political counsel. In addition, when it comes to presenting material for political counsel, histories are seen as providing insight into the 'occasions' and variability of time which had become essential to the role of the counsellor. Historical knowledge thus takes the place of moral philosophy as the source of political knowledge, and histories the place of rhetorical techniques in the communication of this knowledge.

There are three models of history-as-counsel presented in this period. The first figures history in the position of the counsellor, directly addressing the monarch as the beneficiary of the advice it contains. The second model retains the figure of the counsellor and positions him as the recipient of the benefits of history's wisdom. He acts as mediator, communicating the lessons of history to the monarch according to his own discretion. Finally, towards the end of the century, we encounter a model of history which sees its lessons as belonging to the people as a whole; it is they who will best use it to navigate the vicissitudes of time and circumstance.

I. The Rejection of Rhetoric and the Turn to History

Both the problems which the turn to history is meant to solve – distrust of the counsellor and the changed definition of prudence – are laid out in Chapters XXII and XXIII of Machiavelli's *Prince*. First, in a world where human nature leads us to

consider only our own self-interest, and where prudential counsellors will constantly and actively be changing their allegiances, Machiavelli has to deal with the problem of trust. Princes must be wary of a servant who 'stud[ies] more for his owne advantage than thine, and that in all his actions, hee searches most after his owne profit [*utile*]' for such a man 'shall never prove a good servant [*ministro*], nor canst thou ever relie upon him'.[601]

In the figure of the counsellor Machiavelli finds a conflict between the humanist theories that he is willing to jettison and those which he desires to retain. He clings to the view that the counsellor must be selfless in classically humanist terms: 'he that holds the sterne of the State in hand, ought never call home his cares to his owne particular, but give himselfe wholly to his Princes service'.[602] He, however, has placed this figure in a world which makes selflessness impossible, or at least unprofitable, and thus to be rejected by a prudent counsellor.

As a remedy, Machiavelli proposes that the prince ought to keep the loyalty of such a counsellor by taking 'care for his servant, honouring him, enriching, and obliging him to him', so that the prince's and counsellor's interests are united.[603] In other words, to make him more servile by making him dependent on the prince's will. Of course Machiavelli was distrustful of such tactics as applied to mercenaries, so it is unclear whether he actually thought such a strategy would work when applied to counsellors.

We might be inclined to think not, because he goes on to suggest an inversion of the model of counsel proposed by orthodox humanists in an effort to bind royal counsellors. Whereas for previous writers the prudence of the counsellor

[601] Machiavelli 1640, pp. 189-90.
[602] Machiavelli 1640, p. 190.
[603] Machiavelli 1640, p. 190.

determines the prudence of the prince, Machiavelli's distrust of counsellors leads him to suggest that the influence should work in the other direction: 'some men have thought, that a Prince, that gaines the opinion to bee wise [*prudente*], may be held so, not by his owne naturall indowments, but by the good counsells hee hath about him; without question they are deceivd.'[604] In a rare generalisation, Machiavelli suggests instead that it 'is a generall rule and never failes, that a Prince who of himselfe is not wise [*savio*], can never bee well advisd'.[605] Based on this suspicion of the counsellor's motives, that 'each one of the counsellers, probably will follow that which is most properly his owne', Machiavelli concludes 'that counsells from whencesoever they proceed, must needs take their beginning from the Princes wisdome [*prudenzia*], and not the wisdome [*prudenzia*] of the Prince from good counsells'.[606]

This Machiavellian distrust of the counsellor becomes coupled with a general distaste for the long and stylised orations of the neo-classical rhetoricians and the fear that they only serve to hide the dangerous techniques of redescription.[607] Montaigne, for example, famously expressed his aversion to and distrust of 'that eloquence, that leaves-vs with a dessigne of-it, and not of things', arguing that such attention to ornamentation serves more to obscure the truth than

[604] Machiavelli 1640, p. 194.
[605] Machiavelli 1640, p. 194.
[606] Machiavelli 1640, p. 195. It may be worth noting that this is the only passage on which Dacres comments positively, going as far as to say that 'our Author will make him amends for his other errours by his good advice in his 22 Chap whether I referre him'. It is also one of the rare occasions that Machiavelli actually refers to a *conslig*l*iere*, either in *The Prince* or the *Discourses*, usually referring instead to *ministri*, as he does in Chapter XXII of *The Prince* or '*che consigliano*' (those that counsel) as he does through much of the *Discourses*.
[607] See Kahn 1994a, pp. 4-5, 9-10; Skinner 1996, pp. 163-79, 191; Skinner 2007, pp. 265-6, 279-82; Peltonen 2012, pp. 220-42.

bring it forward.[608] In his *Essais*, he compares rhetoricians to 'those that mask and paint women', though the latter 'commit not so foule a fault' as orators, for such makeup only obscures what is better left hidden from man's eyes.[609] On the other hand, orators 'professe and deceive and beguile, not our eyes, but our judgement' and 'bastardize and corrupt the essence of things'.[610] The best commonwealths, he suggests, will remove rhetoric entirely, for it is 'an instrument devised, to busie, to manage, and to agitate a vulgar and disordered multitude'.[611]

This problem of the persuasive power of rhetoric comes to be articulated by many as a distinction between counsel and command, with the use of rhetoric coming under the purview of the latter.[612] Bartolome Felippe, for example, treats such misuse of rhetoric in his eighth chapter: 'what punishment they deserue, that doe not couusell [sic] their Princes sincerely and faithfully without deceite'.[613] True counsel is employed by those who 'counsell a man to doo any thing, and dooe onely shew him a reason why they counsell him to doo so'.[614] These men simply 'make him acquainted with the reasons which mooue them to give such counsell'.[615] This is *exhortatio*, or simple encouragement, and does not 'bind, or by any necessitie force him to whom the counsell is giuen, to follow their counsell'.[616] Such counsel is given simply and straightforwardly, without use of rhetorical persuasive techniques.

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[608] Montaigne 1603, p. 126.
[609] Montaigne 1603, p. 166.
[610] Montaigne 1603, p. 166.
[611] Montaigne 1603, p. 166.
[612] We will see this distinction between counsel and command demonstrated through the histories of Hall 1548 and Holinshed 1577, and repeated in Hobbes 1651.
[613] Felippe 1589, p. 68.
[614] Felippe 1589, p. 70.
[615] Felippe 1589, pp. 70-1.
[616] Felippe 1589, p. 71.

This is distinct, he suggests, from those who 'commaund and perswade a man to doo a thing'.[617] To command and to persuade are *both* indications of a bad counsellor, for 'they that command will haue that doone which they commaund: and they that perswade, vrge the execution of that which they perswade'.[618] Persuasion, in fact, is even worse than command in the hands of a counsellor. Quoting the Roman jurist Ulpian, Felippe writes that 'it is more to perswade one to commit some offence, then to compell or constraine him to dooe it: for mens mindes are more mooued by perswasion, then by compulsion or commandement'.[619] Felippe ends this argument by turning the rhetoricians' own arguments for the efficacy and potency of oratory against themselves: 'therefore *Cornelius Tacitus* and *Plato* saie, that the Arte which teacheth men to perswade, is the most excellent and noble Arte of al Artes' and he quotes *De inventione* directly: 'for that which by mans force could not be atchieued, hath oftentimes beene obtained by eloquence'.[620] This is precisely the power of rhetoric – extolled by classical writers – that Felippe draws attention to and questions; if to sway a monarch by force is not permissible, why is it acceptable to use an even stronger method?[621]

In addition to this suspicion of counsellors, there is a second problem relating to counsel that Machiavelli is left with at the end of *The Prince*. Having established in Chapter XXV, as we saw, that 'he proves the fortunate man, whose manner of

[617] Felippe 1589, p. 70.
[618] Felippe 1589, p. 71.
[619] Felippe 1589, p. 71.
[620] Felippe 1589, p. 71.
[621] As Peltonen 2012, p. 13 makes clear, the orator was widely understood in sixteenth-century England to be a man of 'exceptionally wide powers of mythical and divine potency' and whose rhetoric 'wielded enormous power, much more so than even the mightiest sword'.

proceeding meets with the quality of the times: and so likewise he is unfortunate, from whose course of proceeding the times differ', Machiavelli is faced with his own dedication to reality, and is forced to doubt that 'there is any man so wise [*prudente*], that can frame himselfe' to change so completely with the times, both 'because he cannot go out of the way, from that whereunto Nature inclines him' and 'also, for that one having alwayes prosperd, walking such a way, cannot be perswaded to leave it'.[622] All that Machiavelli can suggest is to be more forceful to subdue Fortune, but there is no guarantee that this will ensure success.

Of course, Machiavelli's own use of history as the foundation for counsel is clear throughout *The Prince*, and his preference for historical lessons over those of moral philosophy explicit. So it is no surprise that history becomes the tool by which the newly defined skill of prudence can be developed, both in his writing and in the works of those who follow him.

History – the *artes historicae* – was categorised by Renaissance humanists, in line with their classical predecessors, as a branch of rhetoric.[623] By the second half of sixteenth century, however, the genre of history was in the process of undergoing a substantial shift.[624] Whereas focus had been on how histories were to be *written* (the rhetorical techniques at play), discussions began to move into a consideration of how histories ought to be *read* (the lessons that could be drawn from them).[625] Furthermore, many writers sought to free history from the confines and requirements of rhetorical practice, focusing on the sources and lessons of history more than the ornamental way in which it was presented.[626] Despite being a

[622] Machiavelli 1640, pp. 205, 206-7.
[623] Woolf 1987, p. 20; Popper 2012, pp. 3-4.
[624] As Woolf 1987, p. 11; Grafton 2007, p. 3, 231; Popper 2012, p. 4.
[625] Jardin and Grafton 1990, pp. 30-78; Grafton 2007, pp. 26, 64-5.
[626] Woolf 1987, p. 25; Grafton 2007, pp. 11, 21, 188.

branch of the rhetorical tradition, from the middle of the sixteenth century these changes stripped the genre of history of much of its rhetorical ornamentation, making the rhetorical arts look over-dressed and over-painted in comparison.

Despite, or perhaps because of, this shift, historical writing was in its 'heyday' in the closing decades of the sixteenth century.[627] In England this was due in large part to the propagandistic strategies of the Tudor regime, which encouraged historical studies as a means to root the dynasty to the past.[628] Coupled with this was the growing belief among sixteenth-century Englishmen that their place in history was a monumental one, requiring knowledge of the past to navigate the tempestuous times they found themselves in. For example, Francis Bacon in his 1605 *Aduancement of Learning* notes that especially the 'storie of England' from the 'Vniting of the Roses, to the Vniting of the Kingdomes' has seen 'the rarest varieties, that in like number of successio[n]s of any hereditary Monarchie hath bin known', and he proceeds to note the turbulent events of the previous decades, using this evidence as justification for the importance of writing histories.[629] The attempts to seize time and utilise it for the needs of the present and the demands of an uncertain future were grounded in a fear of the complex and unstable temporal vacillations of the sixteenth century.[630] Englishmen wanted to take hold of their time, to control and influence it rather than feel at its mercy. The application of historical lessons to political events – the use of history in political counsel – was one way of accomplishing such a desire.

[627] Grafton 2007, p. 192.
[628] Gransden 1982, pp. 470-4; Woolf 1992, pp. 19-50.
[629] Bacon 1605, fo. 12^{v}.
[630] Woolf 1987, p. 28.

II. Histories and Princes

The model of historical counsel as presented directly to the prince is expressed through the belief that 'there is nothing more necessary for a Prince in this world the[n] Histories' and in the oft-cited maxim *optimi conciliarii mortui* – the best counsellors are [the] dead.[631] Matthew Coignet, for example, employs both these adages in Chapter 17 of his 1586 *Discourses upon trueth and lying*, which stresses 'that it is needfull to read histories, there to see the truth which one is afraid to speake'.[632] Coignet questions the reliability of counsellors to present the king with frank and truthful advice, either due to the decorous demands of rhetoric, or their own self-interest. He supports his argument – that princes should thus turn instead to literary counsel – with the advice of Demetrius to King Ptolomy: to 'diligently reade such bookes, as intreated of the gouernmentes of kingdomes and segnuries, to the end he might be instructed in those thinges, which men dare not so freelie, deliuer them selues to princes'.[633] Coignet concludes that 'the penne is of a more free condition then the tongue' and thus it is best 'To take cou[n]sell of the deade'.[634]

Lipsius, too, employs this phrase in his treatment of history and counsel in the *Sixe Bookes*. Although experience, '*The knowledge of worldly matters which we haue either seene or had the handling of*', is far more valuable than memory, '*the like knowledge of those things, we haue eyther heard or read*', experience is more problematic as it is 'not learned by precepts, but taught by time'.[635] It is only old men who can possess such knowledge, and the lessons will die with them.

[631] Sansovino 1590, sig. A, 4[r].
[632] Coignet 1586, p. 69.
[633] Coignet 1586, p. 69.
[634] Coignet 1586, pp. 69-70.
[635] Lipsius 1594, p. 12.

Experience is conquered by time, rather than standing triumphant above it. Thus, 'the memorie of things, or of a historie' is the easier approach 'not onely to attain vnto prudence, but to goodnesse likewise'.[636] It 'bringeth more things that are profitable both to prudence, and beside to more persons then vse doth'.[637] Here we see the Machiavellian shift in the meaning of prudence linked to a preference for knowledge gleaned from histories, based in large part on its applicability to particular circumstances. In its contingency, such knowledge is universally valid; it 'agreeth with all men, and fitteth all times, and seasons'.[638] History is what provides us with the knowledge to recognise and seize *kairos*. Quoting Cicero, he notes that history is the '*preseruer of the vertue of worthy personages*', a '*benefactresse to all mankind*', the '*light of truth, the mistresse of life*' and a 'glasse' in which one may '*behold, all maner of instruction and examples*'.[639]

Just as he had argued that experience 'principally... conduceth vnto Ciuill policy', Lipsius suggests that this 'more safe, and assured' way to prudence 'is most necessarie in this part of Ciuill life' and 'Directeth those that haue publike authoritie'.[640] Furthermore, histories in particular 'are in matter of publike counsell... *most profitable*' and 'in consultation... holdeth the chiefest place'.[641] This is not to say that they should be wielded by counsellors, but rather that they should replace such a figure altogether, for he ends by declaring that 'the best counsellors are the dead, that is... authors, which are without dissimulatio[n]',

[636] Lipsius 1594, p. 13.
[637] Lipsius 1594, p. 13.
[638] Lipsius 1594, p. 13.
[639] Lipsius 1594, p. 14. Cicero 1967, p. 225: history 'bears witness to the passing of the ages, sheds light upon reality, gives life to recollection and guidance to human existence, and brings tidings of ancient days'. See Cicero 1967, pp. 223-5, 235-45. See Woodman 1988, pp. x, 78-97; Fox 2007, pp. 136, 140, 165.
[640] Lipsius 1594, p. 14.
[641] Lipsius 1594, p. 14.

meaning ‘the bookes, and treaties of histories’.[642] A living counsellor, armed with dissimulation and burdened by self-interest, cannot be trusted as much as a dead one.

These ideas are first expressed in the English context by Edward Forsett, a government official and member of parliament, in his treatise *A comparatiue discource of the bodies natural and politique* of 1606, which sets forward a strongly monarchical view of natural law. In addition to espousing the necessity of subjects’ obedience to and love of their sovereign, Forsett emphasises the role of ‘State-Phisicions’ or magistrates in ensuring the health of the commonwealth.[643] In doing so, he makes a number of Machiavellian realist concessions, recognising, for example, that ‘Magistrats may make vse of the wicked’, that is to say ‘vppon occasion make vse of wicked men’.[644] Such an allowance is ruled according to the magistrates’ use of their ‘discretion’ (Forsett is here translating *decorum*) which takes into account ‘particuler persons... sundrie circumstances, signes, and accidents’.[645] They are also to be attentive to kairotic themes, for the physician-magistrate must be aware that there ‘is a certaine point of opportunitie to be watched, and taken hold on’.[646] In doing so, he can employ a sort of ‘beguiling loue, by sweetning and giuing a more pleasing reliefe to his remedies’.[647]

In employing such strategies, the public has no right to accuse them of ‘vngodly policie’, but rather should ‘for such property & power liken them vnto

[642] Lipsius 1594, p. 14.
[643] Forsett 1606, p. 89.
[644] Forsett 1606, p. 88. Note once again the application of Machiavellian precepts, originally intended for a prince, to counsellors.
[645] Forsett 1606, p. 77.
[646] Forsett 1606, p. 79.
[647] Forsett 1606, p. 79.

God, who himselfe infinitly good, extracteth good out of euill'.[648] This is not to say, however, that such magistrates must be 'infinitly good'. Quite to the contrary, Forsett makes it clear that 'Magistrats may haue priuat faults, yet [be] good magistrats'.[649] A 'good Commonwealths man' may excel in his craft 'though otherwise for his priuat faults reproueable'.[650]

Having constructed such a dubious character, Forsett, in a separate concluding section, limits the effect that such a figure would have by employing the same topos that Coignet and Lipsius had. Like Coignet he makes reference to Demetrius and King Ptolomy, the former advising his prince that in books 'you find that which none dare or will tell you'.[651] In 'such workes aduisedly & faithfully compiled, be vnpartial infomers, and vncorrupted Councellours' who are able to apply 'the generallitie of right and reason' for 'vse in particuler considerations'.[652] What a governor will draw from such a book will always be 'simple and sincere, without admixture of either deceiptfull drifts, or affectional inclinations'.[653] It is from historical examples that governors are best instructed and counselled.

Francis Bacon also repeats these sentiments in his essay 'On Counsaile', first published in 1612. Describing counsel as the 'greatest trust' that can exist between men, Bacon emphasises what is at stake in taking the counsel of another; whereas 'in other confidences men commit the partes of their life', in counsel 'they commit the whole'.[654] This is not to say, however, that for princes it presents 'any diminution to their greatness... to rely vpon counsell', quite the contrary. Counsel is

[648] Forsett 1606, p. 89.
[649] Forsett 1606, p. 91.
[650] Forsett 1606, p. 91.
[651] Forsett 1606, p. 97.
[652] Forsett 1606, p. 97.
[653] Forsett 1606, p. 97.
[654] Bacon 1612, p. 56.

precisely what protects a prince from the vicissitudes of time and 'the waues of *Fortune*'.[655]

Bacon uses the mythic union of Jupiter and Metis, and the birth of Pallas, as a metaphor for the marriage that should exist between 'Soueraignty or authority' and counsel – suggesting that counsel serves to support the sovereignty of the king, as long as it occurs within the proper limits.[656] That is, first kings 'ought to referre matters to [the Counsell of state]' and then, when 'their counsel... grow ripe' kings ought to 'take the matter back into their own hand, & make it appeare to the world, that the decrees and final directions... proceede from themselues'.[657] In other words, counsel supports sovereignty as long as it too is subject to it.

This is the first of three 'inconueniences' of counsel which Bacon sets out and provides remedies for.[658] The fable of Jupiter, Metis and Pallas demonstrates that princes ought not to fear the 'weakning of authority' from counsel.[659] Second, he notes that although soliciting counsel has the potential for 'the reuealing of affaires', princes are not compelled to disclose secrets of state nor 'it is necessarie, that hee that consulteth what hee should doe; should declare what he will doe'.[660] Bacon's third inconvenience 'that men will counsel with an eie to themselues' he treats as having the most significance.[661] He gives a number of suggestions as to how princes can remedy this problem, but concludes with Coignet, Lipsius and

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[655] Bacon 1612, pp. 57, 58. In his *Historie of the reign of King Henrie the Seuenth*, published in 1622, Bacon emphasises the relationship between a king and his time. He writes of Henry that 'No doubt, in him as in all men (and most of all in *Kings*) his *Fortune* wrought vpon his *Nature*, and his *Nature* vpon his *Fortune*' (1629, p. 245). It is 'with *Times*, as it is with *Wayes*' in that 'Some are more *Vp-hill* and *Down-hill*' (1629, n.p.).
[656] Bacon 1612, p. 59.
[657] Bacon 1612, pp. 60, 61.
[658] Bacon 1612, p. 62.
[659] Bacon 1612, p. 62.
[660] Bacon 1612, pp. 62, 63.
[661] Bacon 1612, pp. 64-5.

Forsett that the best solution is to avoid living counsellors altogether. He ends his essay: 'It was truly said; *Optimi Consiliarij mortui*' for 'Books will speake plain, when *Counsellors* Blanch'.[662]

These ideas are also expressed through the prefatory material of the histories published in the middle and late sixteenth centuries. For example, this model of counsel can be seen in the earliest work to be treated here, Edward Hall's *The vnion of the two noble and illustre famelies of Lancaster* [*and*] *Yorke*, published posthumously in 1548 by the historian and printer Richard Grafton.[663] In the dedicatory epistle, Hall marks the importance of history in overcoming 'Obliuion the cancard enemie to Fame and renoune the suckyng serpe[n]t of auncient memory, the dedly darte to the glory of princes of time' and in preserving the knowledge needed by princes.[664] Examples give 'young Princes and fraile gouernours... the keye to enduce vertue, and represse vice' and 'Thus Fame triumpheth vpon death, and renoune vpon Obliuion, and all by reason of writyng and history'.[665] It is perhaps then no surprise that the work is dedicated to a 'young... and fraile' prince – Edward VI – who is to take the lessons that Hall's history contains, and apply them.[666]

A history published only a year after Hall's stresses more clearly the role that history should play in replacing the counsellor, as Coignet, Lipsius, Forsett and Bacon had. This is the 1549 *Epitome of Chronicles*, written by Thomas Lanquet

[662] Bacon 1612, pp. 68-9.
[663] Mack 2004, pp. 136-7.
[664] Hall 1548, sig. ii^{r}.
[665] Hall 1548, sig. ii^{r}.
[666] Hall 1548, sig. ii^{r}.

and finished by Thomas Cooper, a theologian and later bishop of Winchester.[667] Cooper's dedicatory address is written to 'the ryghte hyghe and myghtye Prynce, Edward', by whom he means not Edward VI, but rather his protector, the Duke of Somerset, the 'gouernour of the kynges maiestees most royall person, and protectour of all his hyghnesse realmes dominions, and subiectes'.[668] His address to Somerset stands as a striking example of the way in which history could serve as a replacement to living counsellors. He begins by praising the Duke for his openness to receiving counsel. As all people of all degree 'maye at all conueniente times haue free access' to Somerset, Cooper thinks it likely that 'the true knowledge of the state and condicion of the weale publike, is at all tymes to your grace reueled & opened'.[669] He goes on, however, to question this assumption, for in all commonwealths of the past there have been those who have 'hindered *true report*'.[670] He thus worries about those who through 'flatterye and dissimulacion' may 'abuse your godly gentlenesse', leading Somerset and England to ruin.[671]

Cooper does away with this traditional model of counsel, replacing it with one built on history. Since 'of all other it is a thinge mooste difficile and harde to rule well, and for a chiefe magistrate and gouernour to be truly and without dissimulacion informed in euerye case,' he suggests that 'the best and most sure way for a noble gouernour... is to reade such bookes as most wittily and pithilye treat of the states of common weales, and namely histories'.[672] Not only will true counsel be guaranteed through such means, but 'in bookes shall [the prince] lerne to know the wilie flattering foxes, from his sure and trustye friends: good and faythfull

[667] See Beer 2008, pp. 148-52.
[668] Lanquet 1549, sig. A, ii^{r}.
[669] Lanquet 1549, sig. A, ii^{r}.
[670] Lanquet 1549, sig. A, ii^{r}.
[671] Lanquet 1549, sig. A, ii^{r}.
[672] Lanquet 1549, sig. A, iii^{r}.

ministers, from false feigning dissemblers'.[673] Furnished with such knowledge, the duke will have no need of any external counsel, for 'he shall learne out of bookes to bee him selfe to him selfe, the best the truest and the surest counsaylour'.[674]

A similar model is presented by William Thomas in his 1549 *Historie of Italie*, subtitled *a boke exceedyng profitable to be redde: Because it intreateth of the astate of many and diuerse common weales*. Thomas was a counsellor – and 'informal royal tutor' – of Edward VI who in the 1550s set out 'lessons' for his prince based on chapter headings from the *Discourses*.[675] In the letter from 1550 recommending these Machiavellian lessons, Thomas identifies history as essential to the education of a young king: 'there is no earthlie thing more necessarie than the knowledge of such examples as in this and other regiments heretofore have happened'.[676]

He repeats these ideas in his opening letter to the *Historie of Italie*, noting the varieties of lessons that histories, and in particular *his* history, contain for princes – 'All these thynges, with infinite moe, histories dooe so set foorth to the eies of princes (if thei reade theim well)'.[677] Because 'many wise and lerned men haue so substancially set foorth the infinite co[m]modities that grow of the readyng of histories' he can afford to be brief, drawing attention to the fact that even as early as 1549, the utility of histories to kingship was already an accepted topos of the literature.[678]

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[673] Lanquet 1549, sig. A, iii^{v}.
[674] Lanquet 1549, sig. A, iii^{v}.
[675] See Dongu 2013, pp. 29-44. For Thomas's time as clerk of the Privy Council see Vaughn 2007, pp. 24-6. Thomas's Machiavellian discourses to Edward stand in stark contrast to his otherwise humanist-classical education; see Pollnitz 2006.
[676] Ellis 1827, p. 188.
[677] Thomas 1549, sig. A, 2^{v}.
[678] Thomas 1549, sig. A, 2^{r}.

Given Thomas's emphasis on the role that histories can play in guiding a king, it may seem at first curious that he chooses to address his history not to Edward but to a counsellor, John Dudley, the Earl of Warwick. However, in 1549 Somerset's power was waning and Warwick's on the rise. Just as Cooper chooses to address Lanquet's history to Somerset, Thomas throws his support behind Warwick by making him the recipient of histories – the proper science for a prince. That being said, there is a sense that this sequence – Hall, Cooper, Thomas – indicates a movement away from the throne itself, and to the power that surrounds it.

Elizabeth, too, was the dedicatee of historical works during the course of her reign, the authors of which justify their choice of addressee based on the same model of counsel-through-history.[679] One such example is the 1571 translation of Pierre Boaistuau's *A most excellent Hystorie, Of the Institution and first beginning of Christian Princes* by James Chillester. Not only does Chillester translate faithfully Boaistuau's use of the model which replaces an active counsellor with historical texts, but his translation also suggests an attempt to present specific relevant counsel to the queen, an influential strategy we shall see employed often in Elizabeth's reign.

The original French text purports to have been a translation from the work of Chelidonius Tigurinus, but there is no other record of such a person, and it has been suggested instead that Boaistuau obtained his material from the 1519 *De regis officio opusculum* by Josse van Clichtove, the ascription to a fictional Chelidonius

[679] Although, as we shall see in the next section, there are many more examples of histories dedicated to Elizabeth's most prominent counsellors than to the queen herself.

being a deliberate fabrication.[680] Boaistuau tells his readers that the original work fell short of his expectations; 'Chelidonius' neglected to write on several topics typical of the classical advice-to-princes genre. To make up for this, Boaistuau adds a number of treatises of his own construction, two of which are especially relevant here – the first outlining the theory of counsel-through-history, the second demonstrating it.

Boaistuau composes an elaborate treatise on flattery, which serves as his prologue. Like Coignet, Lipsius, Forsett and Bacon, he emphasises the truth-telling potential of history over and above living persons, based on the temporal constraints faced by the latter: 'Bookes do always franckly & with all libertie admonish vs of those things which our Friends (*commonly giuing place to time*) do suppresse and keepe in silence'.[681] It is worth quoting Boaistuau's articulation of this idea at length, as it is one of the fullest examples from the period:

> Bookes are as Iudges without feare, which neuer are ashamed to shewe the truth, nor neuer stay themselues for the dyspleasure or indignation of any King, Prince, or Magistrate, but folowing their free nature and condition, with sharp and nypping wordes to disclose mens corrupt manners, rebuking them sharply, that there is no sworde more to bee feared than the Learned pen.[682]

The living counsellors of the court, on the other hand, Boaistuau describes as 'flattering and mealy mouthed friends', who 'oftentymes did stoppe their eares, become mute and dumbe, and passe vnder consent the enormities and abuses they see... nothwithsta[n]ding they know and see very well, their Princes and Lordes want greatly admonition and councell'.[683] Thus, princes 'want nothing but frank and discrete mouthes that should tel them the truth', a role which Boaistuau would

[680] Tudor 1983, pp. 103-6.
[681] [Boaistuau] 1571, p. 4; emphasis added.
[682] [Boaistuau] 1571, p. 4.
[683] [Boaistuau] 1571, p. 5.

give to philosophers, who would act as 'a dog, that shal bee capable of reason, and shall bark agaynst all men, yea euen against your owne selfe if ye shal do any thing worthy of reprehensio[n], and shal vse with al wisdom & discretio[n], and haue regard to the time & season when and how he ought to do his office', and he gives several classical examples of such persons and their positive effects on princes.[684] However, in the context of the sixteenth-century court, respect to 'time & season' results in nothing but flattery and acquiescence. Thus, 'there is no medicine more meete' for the diseases of princes 'than the continuall reading of Bookes, which do the office of Iudges and refourmers, and giue them knowledge of their offences'.[685] And what sort of books should replace these 'gouerners of Princes'? Boaistuau makes it clear that it is the reading of histories which serves such a purpose: 'this is the ende, that reading the Heroical vertues and excellent commendations of an infinit number of Kings, Princes and Lordes which haue bene before them, they shal be pricked and stirred vp by the brightnesse of their glorie'.[686] The counsellor-figure is wholly replaced by history.

We might at this point inquire: if histories were meant to be the source of princely counsel, what advice were they communicating? In the case of Chillester's translation of Boaistuau, the answer is contained in the second added treatise, which addresses the importance of marriage. In this work, included towards the end of the piece, Boaistuau seeks to declare 'how that Princes and all other that feele them selues ouer prone of Nature, ought to marrie as well for the continuance of their race, as also for the comfort of the imperfection of mannes nature, and to auoide the

[684] [Boaistuau] 1571, p. 6.
[685] [Boaistuau] 1571, p. 9.
[686] [Boaistuau] 1571, p. 13.

displeasure and indignation of God'.[687] This is of course an apt and controversial topic for the 1570s, and one which Chillester would have only been able to present through such a medium. The unique ability of history to present naked truth without fear is employed to present counsel that otherwise could carry severe punishments.[688]

In regard to the earlier, larger chronicles, the work of Hall most clearly answers this question of what lessons such histories contain, as it deals with Edward's own realm, ancestors and context, as well as providing the most useful commentary on political events. Edward is immediately placed within the context of Hall's history, as he is pictured in the frontispiece of the 1548 edition, surrounded by his council (Figure 12). This image is balanced by a woodcut featured at the end of the volume of Edward's illustrious father, Henry VIII, also in discussion with his counsellors, who range around him in a similar fashion (Figure 13).

Within the history itself Hall's emphasis is on the importance of the strict line dividing counsel and command. Those who counsel properly are praised, and the king must always consider their advice carefully. On the other hand, those who cross the line and attempt to command the king must be punished and dispensed with. Hall draws attention to the examples of counsellors such as Empson and Dudley in the reign of Henry VII and Cardinal Wolsey in the reign of Edward's father, who feed rather than limit the appetites of the king in their attempts to command him. In particular, Hall focuses on the character of Wolsey, who he describes as 'very eloquente and fulle of witte'.[689] Because of these abilities,

[687] [Boaistuau] 1571, pp. 102-3.
[688] See Mears 2001, pp. 629-50.
[689] Hall 1548, sig. HHh, iv[r].

Wolsey is able to control and influence Henry for the first two decades of his reign. Hall tells his reader that Wolsey 'bare all the rule aboute y^{e} kynge' to the great dismay of council and commons.[690] When at last Henry discovers the ambition and dissimulation of Wolsey, he vows to 'be no more of so light credence hereafter' and Hall marks that this is a second beginning to his reign: 'The kyng whiche all the twentie yere paste, had been ruled by other and in especial by the Cardinal of Yorke, began now to be a ruler & a King, yea, a Kyng of suche wyte, wisedome and pollicie, that that like hath not reigned ouer this Realme'.[691] It is only after escaping Wolsey's commanding counsel that Henry VIII is able to rule as a true king.

Henry does continue to take counsel, but only from institutionalised bodies over which he has plain command. Hall makes numerous references to Henry as a counselled king; he acts 'with great deliberation like a wise prince, consult[ing] muche with his counsail'.[692] This is only so long, however, as the distinction between counsel and command is upheld. Just as Wolsey served as an example of the transgression over this dividing line, Hall also provides an important example of how the parliament should not try to command their king. Upon an adamant petition from parliament to show mercy to the clergy accused of Praemunire, Henry addresses the representatives of the parliament directly, telling them that 'he was their prince and soueraigne lorde & that they ought not to restraine him of his libertie, nor co[m]pel him to shewe his mercy', for he could use the laws to their extremity if he so pleased.[693] Henry tells the parliament that he would be 'well aduised' to pardon the clergy, but 'he would not be noted to be compelled to do it',

[690] Hall 1548, sig. KKk, ii^{r}.
[691] Hall 1548, sig. HHH, iii^{v}-iiii^{r}.
[692] Hall 1548, sig. BB, v^{v}.
[693] Hall 1548, sig. KKK, iii^{r}.

and thus refuses their request.[694] He later, 'like a good prince' signs the pardon of his own accord, and the commons 'louyngly tha[n]ked the kyng and muche praised his witte that he had denyed it to them when they vnworthely demaunded it' but granted it when he 'perceiued that they sorowed and lamented'.[695] Thus, the final image, given at the end of the book, which shows Henry VIII in council, serves to remind Edward VI that he must maintain the relationships with both his counsellors and parliament as his father had, if he would like to fulfil the majestic picture of himself featured on the frontispiece.

III. Histories and Counsellors

Although Chillester and a few others choose to address their histories to their queen, the Elizabethan period sees a far greater number of historical works addressed to her influential counsellors. Elizabeth's accession reopens the question of the proper site for counsel, as it calls into question the relationship between a female sovereign and her male counsellors.[696] For many, her counsellors ought to take a stronger role with such a weak monarch at the helm, and so it is they who receive the advice of history. Blundeville's translation of Ceriol, for example, shifts emphasis on the necessity of histories for princes by writing that 'nothing is more necessary for a *counseler*, than to bee a diligent reader of Hystories', and Felippe repeats a similar lesson: 'The Counsellers of Princes, ought to haue attentively read, both ancient and newe Histories'.[697]

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[694] Hall 1548, sig. KKK, iii^{v}.
[695] Hall 1548, sig. KKK, iii^{v}.
[696] This is discussed further in Chapter 6. See McLaren 1999; Mears 2001, pp. 629-50.
[697] Ceriol 1570, sig. F, 1^{v}-2^{r}; Felippe 1589, p. 45; emphasis added.

This model is expressed in most detail by Thomas Blundeville in his 1574 *The true order and methode of wryting and reading hystories*, dedicated to the Earl of Leicester. In his opening epistle Blundeville tells Leicester that his purpose in writing such a work is 'to gather thereof such iudgement and knowledge as you may therby be the more able, as well to direct your priuate actions, as to giue Counsell lyke a most prudent Counseller in publyke causes'.[698] Within the work, he stresses the role of the historian to present the truth in its entirety, so that those who read it can apply lessons to their present context. He also highlights history as the means to acquire the ability to navigate kairotic occasion; it is the 'skill' of the individual in history which 'causeth him to take occasion when it is offered, and to vse the meetest meanes to bring it to passe'.[699] This role is echoed by the reader of history, who by its knowledge gains 'better knowledge of the opportunitie of affayres' of his own time, and is thus better prepared to bring his own endeavours to success.[700]

In addressing 'What Profite hystories doe yeelde', Blundeville makes clear that the application of history is political, replacing moral philosophy as the proper raw material for the counsellor: 'the way to come to that peace [of the commonwealth] wherof I speake, is partly taught by the Philosophers in generall precepts and rules'.[701] However, it is 'the Historiographers' that 'doe teache it much more playnlye by perticular examples and experiences', especially if they write in the way he prescribes.[702] Such 'perticular examples' allow the reader to see the chain of causes and effects which bring political situations into being: 'the three

[698] Blundeville 1574, sig. A, ii^{r}.
[699] Blundeville 1574, sig. B, ii^{v}.
[700] Blundeville 1574, sig. B, iv^{r}.
[701] Blundeville 1574, sig. D, iii^{v}.
[702] Blundeville 1574, sig. D, iii^{v}-iv^{r}.

generall actions of any Citie, Prince, or common weale' – peace, sedition and war – 'we ought diligently to obserue in histories with such considerations, as we may learne thereby, how one selfe effect springeth of one selfe cause'.[703] By grasping such rules of causality, we can hope to influence the present, and thus the direction of time itself. The counsellor is resurrected as an agent in politics and in history.

This shift from prince to counsellor is notable in the republication of the Cooper-Lanquet history in 1560. Whereas the 1549 edition, as we saw, had been dedicated to Edward VI, the 1560 reprint replaces him not with his reigning sister, but with Lord Russell, the Earl of Bedford. In this opening letter, Cooper reiterates the purpose of history, based on Cicero, and its place above all other forms of knowledge and learning for bringing both 'delectacion' and 'profyte'.[704] Cooper makes the argument that history is even more reliable and useful than knowledge of contemporary affairs, for one may not come to know the truth of present politics either through the repression of truth by the prince or the 'ill reporte of enuious men'.[705] On the other hand, 'the faithfull historiographer', who never 'diminishe for feare, nor adde for flatterie', always 'playnly report[s] vnto posteritee the truth'.[706] He repeats the idea that such examples lead us to 'vertue and honestee', adding, like Blundeville, that they do so 'muche better then by thenstruction of any phylosopher'.[707] Thus history, once again, becomes the best way to ensure truth and virtue in counsel, but this time its lessons are directed at the counsellor himself, not at a monarch.

[703] Blundeville 1574, sig. E, iii^{v}.
[704] Cooper 1560, sig. a, 2^{r}.
[705] Cooper 1560, sig. a, 2^{v}.
[706] Cooper 1560, sig. a, 2^{v}.
[707] Cooper 1560, sig. a, 2^{v}.

Richard Grafton, who had published the 1548 chronicle by Hall with a dedication to Edward VI, also changes his strategy in the Elizabethan period and addresses his two histories – the 1562 *Abridgement of the chronicles of England* and *A Chronicle at large* of 1569 – to counsellors: Leicester and Burghley respectively. Drawing on the already popularised notions of the utility of history, Grafton writes to Dudley that 'beside many profitable causes... for which histories have bene written, the chiefest in polecie is this, that the examples in tymes passed are good lessons for tyme to come', especially in politics.[708] It is because Leicester has 'some great parte of gouernau[n]ce' in the council of Queen Elizabeth that he has addressed his history to him.[709] Similar sentiments are expressed in the opening letters of the 1569 *Chronicle* by Grafton to Burghley and the letter to the reader by Thomas Norton.

The advice given in Grafton's *Chronicle* reiterates the importance of counsel while, like Boaistuau, also broaching the controversial topic of marriage. The history he relates establishes a three-part 'pattern' for rule: the declaration of sovereignty, the submission to counsellors and finally, on their advice, a prudent marriage. This pattern is set in its ideal form by the founder of the Tudor regime, Henry VII. Grafton tells the reader that after his coronation, 'When the solempnities and geuing of thanks were done and passed: according as other kings had bene accustomed, he congregated together the sage Counsaylors of his realme: in which counsayle lyke of Prince of iust fayth and true of promis... appointed a daye to ioyne in matrimonye the Ladye Elizabeth [of York]'.[710] Grafton ties together the three elements of rule in this passage, noting that Henry VII's two immediate

[708] Grafton 1562, sig. B, ii^{r}.
[709] Grafton 1562, sig. B, ii^{v}.
[710] Grafton 1569, p. 854.

concerns following his coronation as divinely appointed monarch are, and should be, wise counsel and a good marriage. Grafton repeats this lesson a few pages later, noting that while Henry VII 'stablished in his house a graue counsayle of wyse and pollitique men, by whose iudgement, order, and determination, the people might be gouerned', there is something missing: 'Although by this election of wise and graue councellers al things semed to be brought to good and perfect conclusion, yet there lacked a wrest to the harpe, to set all the stringes in a monacorde and tune'.[711] This is the 'matrymoney to be finished betwene the king, and the Lady Elizabeth', which 'like a good Prince' he orchestrates not long after.[712]

The same pattern is repeated in the case of Henry VIII. Upon coming to the throne, the king, 'first of all... did therefore [based on his youth and learning] prudently for the good gouernement of the realme, elect and choose of the most wisest and grauest personages to be of his priuie counsayle... vnto whom he committed the charge and gouernaunce of the affayres of the whole realme'.[713] He writes that these counsellors, fearing the youth and great wealth of Henry, 'very prudently and diligently' encouraged the king to be always 'present with them and to be pryuie of their counsailes and deuises, and so dayly acquainted him with the politique affayres of the realme, that by litle and litle he of his owne accord applyed hym selfe to rule and gouerne'.[714] Thus Grafton portrays the proper way in which a young and inexperienced monarch should come into his (or her) own as a ruler – with the aid and support of a council that slowly transfers control of the helm. It is also by their advice that Henry VIII marries. After having established the solid base of counsel (and having removed the remnants of evil counsel in the form of

[711] Grafton 1569, p. 856.
[712] Grafton 1569, p. 856.
[713] Grafton 1569, p. 951.
[714] Grafton 1569, p. 951.

Empson and Dudley), Henry is ready to complete the final element required to reign: he is 'moued by some of his Counsayle' to marry.[715]

In the case of Edward VI, Grafton can only speak to the king's coronation and counsel, noting that 'The coronation beyng finished, the kinges Maiestie by the aduise of his Vncle the Protector, and other of his priuie Counsaile' begins a reformation of religion, the major contribution of his reign, which is only accomplishable after first being declared anointed sovereign and assembling a wise council.[716] Marriage is not a pertinent question in the case of the young king, but counsel certainly cannot be ignored.

It is with this tradition in mind that Mary's choice to marry Philip of Spain becomes an even clearer break with her royal duty. Her declaration, in the face of the Wyatt rebellion, that she is marrying Philip at the advice of her council – a blatant untruth in Grafton's narration – flaunts the pattern of rule established by her grandfather. Mary, for Grafton, was 'more stoute then it [was] credible' and had ignored her council's advice, plunging the country into turmoil and bloodshed.[717]

Grafton chooses not to speak of the reign of Elizabeth, leaving what appears to be an intentionally blank section to be filled in by the actions of the monarch, whose completion of the tri-partite requirements remained unfinished. This silence regarding Elizabeth's reign is made even clearer in Grafton's closing prayer, in which he marks the reverence owed to Elizabeth as anointed sovereign, praying equally for her council, but on the third aspect of his three-part pattern for rule is necessarily silent: 'here most hartily besseching Almightie God to preserue her

[715] Grafton 1569, p. 953.
[716] Grafton 1569, p. 1253.
[717] Grafton 1569, p. 1336. It is interesting to note that Grafton supported the claim of Jane Grey against Mary I, even printing the announcement of her accession to the English throne.

Maiestie in most prosperous and honorable estate... and also to keepe and preserue all her highnesse most honorable Counsellours'.[718] The hope is that these 'honorable Counsellours', Burghley especially, will fulfil their role and encourage the queen to and marry and thus secure her place in history.

IV. Histories and the People

We began by considering the two pervasive problems that Machiavelli encounters in his description of human nature and counsel – the distrust of the counsellor and man's inability to vary with time – both which can be solved through the study of histories. It is worth noting that Machiavelli himself presents a solution to both these problems, but not in *The Prince*. In the *Discourses*, Machiavelli constructs a counsellor who gives his advice not to a prince, but to the entire body of the people, and in this way overcomes the problems laid out in *The Prince*.

In Chapter 9, Book III of the *Discourses*, Machiavelli reiterates the importance of adaptation: 'a man must of necessitie change with the times, if hee will alwayes have good success in his undertakings'.[719] He once again acknowledges that 'a man that is accustomed to proceed in one manner, never alters, as it is sayd, and must of necessitie, when the times disagree with his way, goe to wracke', based on the same two-fold problem: 'one because wee cannot resist that, which our nature is inclin'd to, the other is, beause when one man in such a kind of proceeding hath gone on luckily, it is impossible to perswade him, that things will proove well, where hee proceeds otherwise'.[720] However, this time Machiavelli has a solution to these issues, for he is no longer talking about, or to, an

[718] Grafton 1569, p. 1369.
[719] Machiavelli 1636, p. 496.
[720] Machiavelli 1636, pp. 498, 499.

individual man, as he was in *The Prince*. Where it might be impossible to persuade an individual to change, Machiavelli is more optimistic about the ability of the multitude in a republic to vary with circumstance; a republic 'can better fit her selfe for severall accidents [*diversità de' temporali*], by reason of the variety of her Subjects [*diversità de' cittadini*], that are in her, then can a Prince'.[721]

The republic, based on its multitudinous populace, will have the ability to change with the times, over and above that of a singular individual, but can the people always be trusted to have the prudence to know what is required for their advantage in each case? And if not, how can they trust a counsellor to lead them, given the reasons to be suspicious of such a figure?

In the case that the 'opinions [of the people] were false' Machiavelli assures his readers that there is 'a meanes to rectify them'.[722] The people can be corrected, 'if some discreet Oratour in the assemblies' will 'perswade them of theire errour', for the people have the 'capacity to conceive the truth being told them by any man worthy of credit [*da uomo degno di fede è detto loro vero*], and doe easily submit'.[723] A 'great and worthy personage [*uomo grave*]' can 'appease and quiet the rage of the multitude', for 'nothing restraines the fury of a multitude inraged, as the reverence of some grave man [*uomo grave e di autorità*] comming among them' who brings them back to an understanding of where their actual good lies.[724]

This is in contrast to a prince, who is not as good a judge of character and can be 'drawne aside by his owne passions, which are greater in them, then in the

[721] Machiavelli 1636, p. 499.
[722] Machiavelli 1636, p. 22.
[723] Machiavelli 1636, p. 22. It is of note that Dacres adds the reference to the 'discreet orator': '*E quando queste opinioni fossero false e' vi è il rimedio delle concioni, che surga qualche uomo bene, che, orando, dimostri loro come ei s'ingannano*'.
[724] Machiavelli 1636, p. 213.

people' without the remedy of counsel.[725] In Chapter 58 of Book I, Machiavelli argues that, whereas the prince will prove obstinate to good counsel, the people will submit: 'a good man [*un uomo buono*] may easily have the meanes to perswade with a licentious and tumultuous people, and so reduce them to reason But to a mischeivous Prince no man can speake, nor is there any other remedy but the sword.'[726] Counsel has far more likelihood of success given to a people than to a prince. Just as a prince 'should be advertised thereof by some of his councellours [*chi lo consigliasse*]', so to the people ought to have the same failsafe, in the case that they too might err.[727] He concludes that 'when [the people] can be advised [*consigliati*], as Princes are, they runne into fewer errours, then Princes'.[728]

What about the suspicions Machiavelli had about self-interested counsellors? Machiavelli suggests that even this problem is resolved in the republic, and he gives a number of reasons as to why. First, just as with every member of the republic, the counsellor's interests are likely to be in line with those of the whole, without the need for bribery. He is, after all, a *cittadino*, and thus will be just as likely as any other citizen to want to bring about the maintenance of liberty within the republic. It is true, Machiavelli suggests in his chapter on conspiracies, that the familiars of a prince should not be trusted, for 'a Prince should be more jealous of those, to whom he hath afforded more favours', but no equivalent warning is given regarding the counsellors of the people.[729]

This may be related to a second point: this counsellor is an orator, whose words and character will be judged by the people more perceptively than the prince,

[725] Machiavelli 1636, p. 232.
[726] Machiavelli 1636, pp. 236-7.
[727] Machiavelli 1636, p. 603.
[728] Machiavelli 1636, p. 604.
[729] Machiavelli 1636, p. 459.

as Machiavelli had established in Chapter 34 of Book III. We must as well consider Machiavelli's dedication to the rhetorical writings of Quintilian. As we may recall, for Quintilian, the good orator is by definition a good man, and hence would not be likely to lead the people astray.[730] Machiavelli seems to assume the same in the *Discourses* – the figure in question is an *uomo buono*, an *uomo grave*, an *uomo degno di fede*. The orator will not convince the people unless his words and character are reflective of truth and worth. The people will only be persuaded by someone who has their own interests at heart. Both 'those who advise a Republique and they that Councell a Prince [*che quegli che consigliano una republica, e quegli che consigliano uno principe*]' hold similar positions, but it is only the former who will avoid the two problems Machiavelli had set out in *The Prince*.[731]

This turn to the people as the proper recipient of counsel, avoiding self-interested counsellors and obstinate princes, is reflected in the historical literature of the period. The first such example comes with the 1563 publication of John Foxe's *Actes and Monuments*.[732] Foxe intended his work to be read by as wide an audience as possible, simultaneously offering its lessons to the monarch and to the people. In regards to the first, Foxe, like Chillester, dedicates his work to Elizabeth and writes – in his address to the Christian reader – that he 'thinks I have good cause to wish, that like as other subiectes, even also Kings and Princes, which commonly delite in

[730] Quintilian 2001, vol. 1, p. 57. Garver 1987, p. 148 also points out that in *The Discourses* 'the relevant moral and intellectual qualities are dimensions of rhetorical excellence'.
[731] Machiavelli 1636, p. 607.
[732] For Foxe as historian see Collinson, 'John Foxe as Historian' (accessed 5 Jan 2012).

heroicall stories, would diligently peruse such monumentes of Martyrs, and lay them alwayes in sight, not alonely to read, but to follow'.[733]

Foxe's intention that his history be read and followed by his prince is made even clearer by the marker cuts throughout.[734] The first is a presentation scene which is drawn into the initial capital C of his dedication to Elizabeth (Figure 15). Beyond the anti-papal sentiment it expresses – Elizabeth's throne rests atop the prostrate pope – it makes a very clear statement about Foxe's beliefs that his work should be read and followed by monarchs. In this image, Foxe, with two other men – probably John Day and Thomas Norton – presents the queen with his work, a reflection of the three wise men of the Bible.[735]

This image is echoed in the opening woodcut of the second volume of the 1583 edition, which figures Henry at the centre of a flutter of activity (Figure 16).[736] Like Elizabeth, his throne is atop the fallen pope, who in this scene is assisted by his struggling ministers. Also like his daughter, Henry figures in a presentation scene. To Henry's right stand Cramner and Cromwell, along with two unnamed Protestant figures (Henry ignores the sneering Catholics on his left). A book is being passed between Cramner and the king, although in which direction it is difficult to determine.[737] Given its relationship with the image of Elizabeth and Foxe, one would certainly be persuaded to think that it is Cramner who is passing

[733] Foxe 1570, fo. iii[r].
[734] See Aston and Ingram 1997, p. 125.
[735] King 1989, pp. 155-6; Aston and Igram 1997, pp. 125-8.
[736] The image replaces the 1570 woodcut, identical to that employed in Hall 1548 (Figure 13). See King 1989, pp. 157-8; Aston and Ingram 1997, p. 129.
[737] It has been suggested that this image is either meant to portray Henry VIII presenting his ministers with the 1534 Act of Succession or the assembled Protestant counsellors presenting the king with the 1535 Coverdale Bible; see the discussion in Hageman 1979, pp. 36-42.

the text to Henry, placing it in the tradition of presentation scenes, and highlighting the role of Henry's counsellors in the suppression of the pope.

This role is emphasised in the text itself – a call to action for counsellors of the Elizabethan reign, a message for Elizabeth to ensure that she follows only the counsel of the godly and a reminder to the people to remain wary of those about the prince. Counsel for Foxe has great influence and sway over a monarch, both for good and bad. He writes of Henry VIII that while the godly counsel of Cramner and Cromwell 'was about him, and could be heard, he did much good' but 'when sinister and wicked councillors under subtle and crafty pretences had gotten ever the foot in, thrusting truth and verity out of the prince's ears, how much religion and all good things went prosperously forward before, so much on the contrary side all revolted backwards again'.[738] Counsellors are also the determining force behind Mary's evil acts. Whereas Hall and Grafton suggest that Mary's actions came about because of her failure to listen to counsel, Foxe's presentation of Mary stresses exactly the opposite. It is Stephen Gardiner and Edmund Bonner who are responsible for the atrocities of Mary's reign; her major flaw is her credulity, not her cruelty.[739] Elizabeth must take the positive lessons from her father, not the negative lessons of her sister and figure herself, as Foxe has her figured, as the recipient of godly advice.[740]

[738] Foxe 1583, p. 1135.
[739] Aston, 'The Illustrations: Books 10-12' (accessed 22 Aug 2013); Loades, 'Foxe and Queen Mary' (accessed 6 Jan 2012).
[740] The printer John Day was also involved in the production of *Gorboduc* by Thomas Norton and Thomas Sackville (discussed below) which carried the same lessons of the importance of monarch who heeds good counsel; Evenden, 'Biography of John Day' (accessed 22 Aug 2013).

Despite this attention on Elizabeth, Foxe's attempts to cater to a wider audience through the *Actes and Monuments* cannot be ignored.[741] These are also primarily expressed through the woodcuts throughout the work. Although the use of woodcuts in print texts of the age was widespread, in few other works are they so vividly presented, indicating their purpose in communicating the lessons of the text to an illiterate audience.[742] The inclusion of woodcuts increases in the 1570 edition, suggesting that Foxe and his printer – John Day – were increasingly interested in expanding the 'readership' of *Actes*.[743] These woodcuts use easily-recognisable iconography in order to communicate the lessons of the text in a language more widely understood.[744]

This 1570 edition also received the full support of Elizabeth's privy council, who were very pleased with what it said about how the government of England should be run.[745] The privy council, headed by Day's former patron William Cecil, wrote to the archbishops of York and Canterbury as well as the bishop of London in order to ensure the wide exposure of the *Actes and Monuments*.[746] Such a history, they write, is 'very profitable to bring hir majesties subiectes to good opinion, understanding, and dere liking of the present government of thes realme by trewe rehersall and conference of tymes past'.[747] They make the unprecedented request that the *Actes* 'be had in all churches, halles or... otherwise as to your wisdoms shall

[741] Aston and Ingram 1997, pp. 66-7.
[742] Aston, 'The Illustrations' (accessed 22 Aug 2013).
[743] Aston and Igram 1997, p. 79; Aston, 'The Illustrations' (accessed 22 Aug 2013).
[744] Aston and Igram 1997, pp. 66-131; Aston, 'The Illustrations' (accessed 22 Aug 2013).
[745] Cecil appears to have been very pleased with the first edition as well, as it was most likely he who granted the Prebend of Shipton to Foxe in 1563; Freeman 'John Foxe: a Biography' (accessed 22 Aug 2013).
[746] Evenden, 'Biography of John Day' (accessed 22 Aug 2013); Evenden and Freeman 2004, pp. 1288-1307.
[747] Quoted in Evenden and Freeman 2004, p. 1292.

seme metest, so as yt may be made publicque and come to the hands and knowledge of all hir majesties good subiectes generally'.[748] There was no question in the mind of Elizabethan councillors that Foxe's history was intended for and ought to be read by the masses, and they fully supported the lessons that it contained.

The suggestion that Foxe was attempting to present his history to a wider audience than just the monarch or her counsellors is further substantiated by the examination of other historical texts of the period which take the same approach. For example, although the translation of Spanish humanist Pedro Mexia's *The Foreste or Collection of Histories* by Thomas Fortescue is dedicated to a member of the queen's council, Fortescue writes in his letter to the reader that his intention was 'to profite... chiefly the lesse learned'.[749] The lessons *The Foreste* contains are largely private matters, but when Mexia does address political questions, such as 'What daunger it is to murmer againste Princes', his focus is on the perspective and role of the people, not the monarch.[750] However, as this chapter heading suggests, despite their place as the recipients of his history, Mexia does not suggest that the people ought to actively participate in counselling their monarch, quite the contrary. From history the people are to learn that their role is to remain silent and patient, as 'cruell Kinges and Blouddy tyrannes are the Ministers of God' and should be endured.[751]

A different model of the people's relationship with history, and politics, is presented by Raphael Holinshed in his 1577 *Chronicles of England, Scotlande, and*

[748] Quoted in Evenden and Freeman 2004, p. 1292; for the 'unprecedented' nature of this request see Evenden and Freeman 2004, pp. 1304-5.
[749] Mexia 1571, sig. a, iv[r]; see Pallister 1984, pp. 3-8.
[750] Mexia 1571, fo. 50[v].
[751] Mexia 1571, fo. 42[v].

Ireland.[752] Although dedicated, once again, to a counsellor – Burghley – Holinshed does not connect the content or purpose of his history with Burghley's role as counsellor but appeals to him only in a bid to avoid censorship. In this, Holinshed failed, for both the 1577 and 1587 editions of the Chronicle underwent censorship by the privy council, as it contained 'sondry thinges which [the council] wish had bene better considered... that concern the State, and are not therfore meete to be published in such sorte as they are delivered'.[753] It would seem then that the privy council was not the intended audience of whatever counsel might be contained in the *Chronicle*, for it certainly did not cater to its interests.

Instead, it has been suggested that in his *Chronicles*, as in the *Actes and Monuments* and Fortescue's translation of Mexia, Holinshed had a wider audience in mind.[754] Unlike these other two texts, however, the emphasis in the *Chronicles* is not only on its lessons for the reading public, but its readerships' role in delivering the gathered counsel to their prince.[755] This is especially true for Elizabeth, as opposed to her (male) predecessors. In speaking of Henry VII, for example, Holinshed praises counsellors such as Reginald Bray and Cardinal Morton over the people for their role in admonishing and counselling the king. Of Bray he writes: 'If any thing had beene done amysse, contrarie to lawe and equitie, hee woulde after an humble sorte plainely blame the King, and giue him good aduertisement, that he should not onelye refourme the same, but also bee more circumspect in any other the lyke case'.[756] Morton was 'of the same vertue and faythfull plainnesse' with his

[752] As Zaller 2002, p. 371 points out, Holinshed's *Chronicles* was in fact the product of several hands. For simplicity's sake, however, I will be referring to the author simply as Holinshed.
[753] Quoted by Clegg, 'Raphael Holinshed' *ODNB*.
[754] Zaller 2002, p. 376.
[755] Zaller 2002, pp. 376-9.
[756] Holinshed 1577, p. 1458.

king.[757] Thus 'these two perso[n]s were refrainers of y^{e} kings vnbrydeled libertie', as proper counsellors of the humanist tradition should be.[758] The people, in this section, are actually greatly misguided, as they 'iudged and reported, that the counsayle of those two worthie personages, corupted y^{e} kings cleane and immaculate consience'.[759]

In treating Elizabeth, however, Holinshed places great store and importance in the counsel of the people. He gives an elaborate description of Elizabeth's coronation and the various pageants presented to her, emphasising particularly the counsel that each display had for the young queen. The last – Elizabeth as Deborah – encouraged Elizabeth to always take counsel from her people and Holinshed notes that as 'the ground of this last pageant before had set before hir graces eyes the flourishing and desolute states of a common weale, shee by this be put in remembrace to consult for the worthie gouernment of hir people, considering God oftentymes sent women nobly to rule among men... and that it behoueth both men and women so ruling to vse aduise of good counsaile'.[760] It is the counsel of the people represented in these displays, and it is the counsel of the people – educated by histories such as Holinshed's – to which she must listen.

Holinshed makes clear, however, that such counsel has to occur within the strictures of the counsel/command distinction articulated by Hall and Felippe. He details a scene very similar to that of Hall's – in this case a petition from parliament regarding Elizabeth's marriage. Elizabeth tells the representatives that she 'doe lyke' the 'maner' of their counsel and she 'take[s] it in good part', as 'it is simple,

[757] Holinshed 1577, p. 1458.
[758] Holinshed 1577, p. 1458.
[759] Holinshed 1577, p. 1458.
[760] Holinshed 1577, p. 1774. For more on the significance of the comparison with the Biblical queen Deborah see McLaren 1999; Hoak 2002, pp. 74-88.

and contayneth no lymitation of place or person' – they have counselled within their bounds – but she also takes this opportunity to issue a warning regarding the division between counsel and command.[761] Like Hall's description of Henry's encounter with the representatives of his people, Elizabeth tells them that if they overstepped themselves by attempting to command or force her, she 'must haue mislyked it verie much, and thought in you a verie great presumption, being vnfitte and altogither vnmeete, to require them that may commaunde, or those appoynt, whose partes are to desire or such to binde and limitte, whose duties are to obey: or take vpon you to draw my loue to your lykings, or to frame my wil to your fancies'.[762] Elizabeth includes any attempts to 'draw [her] loue to [their] likings, or to frame [her] will to [their] fancies' as equally inappropriate as attempts to bind her, echoing Felippe's equation of persuasion with force, on the grounds that they are just as bad as (if not worse than) attempts to command the prince. Importantly, Elizabeth ends with a promise to provide them with an heir, a promise that Holinshed may have wanted to remind the people of in the context of the waning decades of the sixteenth century.

The people are once again awarded a role in counsel by the publication, and repeated republication, of the *Mirror for Magistrates*. In this case, their role is to watch and provide advice not just to the monarch but to counsellors themselves. Originally published in 1559, the *Mirror* was continually added to by various authors over the following two decades, reaching a height in the 1570s following the reprinting of the original volume in 1571.[763] The 'chiefest ende' of the book, in

[761] Holinshed 1577, p. 1777.
[762] Holinshed 1577, p. 1777.
[763] The original work was published with authorship attributed to William Baldwin in 1559, the same volume being published again in 1563 and 1571. Baldwin also published a 'last part' of the *Mirror* in 1574, which was reprinted a year later and in

all its various forms, is to instruct the monarch and other nobles in wisdom and virtue, by way of a revival of the *de casibus* form we encountered in Part I.[764] However, despite the dedication to 'All the nobilitie, and all other in office' by most of the authors publishing under the name of the *Mirror*, the emphasis, in comparison to Lydgate's publication of the *Fall of Princes*, is not on the counsel presented to princes or nobles, but rather on the 'commentaries' and discussions between the authors that frame the tragedies.[765] This, it has been suggested, transforms the purpose of the *Mirror* from a didactic address aimed at those in power to a dialogue amongst the people about the nature of power itself.[766] The counsel offered in the book, due to its multivocal authorship, could be, and often is, contradictory, emphasising not the counsel itself, but the very act of counselling.[767]

This opening of counsel to the larger reading public was based partly on a belief about the contingent nature of political truth. Just as Machiavelli had emphasised in the *Discourses* that the people would be better able to adapt to changing times, the *Mirror* demonstrates that different contexts call for different counsel, and that such an open forum is the best way to accommodate such variability.[768] As there are no universal rules for political action, the nobility must be constantly changing their behaviour, based in large part on counsel provided by

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1578. Also in 1574, John Higgins produced a 'first part' to the *Mirror*, which had a successful run, republished again in 1575, 1578 and then again in 1610, 1619 and 1620. In 1578, Thomas Blenerhasset's 'second part', purportedly intended only as an exercise to be read by a friend, was published while Blenerhasset was abroad. That same year, another 'last part' was published by Richard Niccols, and a year later Anthony Munday addressed his 'principall part' to the Earl of Oxford.

[764] *Mirror* 1960, p. 65.

[765] *Mirror* 1960, p. 63; see Winston 2004, pp. 381-400.

[766] Winston 2004, p. 382.

[767] This 'alter[s] the meaning of the advice in each tragedy' of the *Mirror*, 'turning the individually definitive and committed pieces of counsel into a series of strategically adopted positions'; Winston 2004, pp. 392-3.

[768] Winston 2004, p. 397.

the people. This is understood to take place on a public stage, in front of a spectator public, actively conversant and ready to comment on any failure on the part of the nobles to reform.

These themes, and their implications for the expansion of the historical/political role of the people, are also present in Anne Dowriche's *The French Historie* of 1589. Wife of a Church of England clergyman, Dowriche uses her text to place the onus of a political role of spectatorship and counsel on the Protestant multitude, due to the untrustworthiness of traditional counsellor-figures who have adopted Machiavellian tactics and are, in the most crucial event of the history, represented by a weak queen (in this case the Queen Mother Catherine de' Medici).[769] Given the failure of both counsellors and their female ruler, the (godly) people are left as the only legitimate source of good counsel.[770] Dowriche establishes these themes in her address to the reader, writing that her 'onelie purpose in collecting & framing this worke was to edifie, comfort and stirre vp the godlie mindes vnto care, watchfulnesse, zeale & feruertnesse'.[771] It is the people who must intervene against evil policies, and specifically evil counsellors.

The devil is an active character in her history, working primarily through orators and counsellors. He gives roles to a number of political actors, including the queen mother, instructing them that 'if force will not preuaile' then 'by flatterie' they must accomplish their goals, echoing the relationship between force and counsel criticised by Felippe.[772] The devil's flattering policies 'strike the Princes

[769] See Martin 1999, pp. 69, 75-81 for the characterisation of Catherine de Medici as 'an ambitious Machiavel'.
[770] See Suzuki 2009, pp. 174-93.
[771] Dowriche 1589, sig. A, 3^{v}.
[772] Dowriche 1589, fo. 4^{r}.

throne', for, as Dowriche points out in the margin, 'Princes are many times abused by lying Parasites'.[773]

It is clear that Dowriche had Machiavellianism in mind when she wrote of the devil's strategies. Aside from the popular association his name had with the devil, Dowriche explicitly refers to Gentillet's re-articulation of Machiavelli in her third section.[774] In this segment the themes of counsel are emphasised even further, as the queen mother, servant to the devil, admits that force has indeed failed, and so they must, as the devil had originally set out, have recourse to flattery to 'take in hand these Princes to subuart'.[775] The strategy? Pure Machiavellianism. Dowriche notes in the margin that 'The queen mother was a good scholer of that diuel of Florence, Machiauel, of whom she learned manie bad lessons'.[776] She makes an oration to the king and 'other trustie mates' setting out the plan, based on the summary of Machiavelli by Gentillet. Her words are 'demure and sage', yet she plants 'a bloodie plot', further emphasising the growing gap between rhetoric and virtuous speech in the post-Machiavellian period.[777]

Dowriche's marginal notes throughout her oration are drawn from Gentillet's treatise against Machiavelli, noting the 'lessons' they contain, such as 'A Prince must imitate the natures of a Foxe and a Lion... when occasion is offered'.[778] Occasion plays a large part in the Queen Mother's oration, as it does for Machiavelli; her speech is framed by an urging to seize the moment, to 'take the profered time', for 'This is the onelie time this matter to dispatch; But being fled,

[773] Dowriche 1589, fos. 5^{v}, 6^{r}.
[774] Martin 1999, p. 76.
[775] Dowriche 1589, fo. 18^{v}.
[776] Dowriche 1589, fo. 23^{v}.
[777] Dowriche 1589, fos. 23^{r}, 23^{v}.
[778] Dowriche 1589, fo. 23^{v}. See Martin 1997, pp. 40-2; Martin 1999, pp. 70-1.

these birds are not so easie for to catch'.[779] Her oration is successful in swaying those assembled, resulting in the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of thousands of Dowriche's Protestant protagonists. Dowriche's history is a warning to the people to take the opportunity to intervene if such events occur again.

These themes, emphasising the value of history for the people, continue into the seventeenth century, becoming coupled with the idea that the people have a right of ownership over their history and the lessons that it contains. John Clapham, former clerk to Lord Burghley, expresses a wish in his preface to the 1602 *Historie of England*, that 'wee [Englishmen] might haue one continued History'.[780] He dispenses with the usual praise of historical writings; such commendation would be redundant, as 'the Proems of *Historical* Bookes are already filled with discourses of the profitable vse that may be made of them', but notes especially, as Blundeville and others had done, that the examples found in histories are 'much more auaileable to the reforming of manners, then bare rules and precepts'.[781] The lessons of history are more easily learned by the majority of Englishmen than philosophical principles. He emphasises as well that if Englishmen should learn of history, it ought to be their own history, for 'there is no Historie so fitte for Englishmen, as the very Historie of *England*'.[782]

A similar sentiment is expressed by the French Calvinist and historian Jean Serres, whose history is translated by Edward Grimston as *A general iuentorie of the history of France* in 1607, and who, like Clapham, directly addresses his countrymen. He introduces his subject and its audience by way of a treatise

[779] Dowriche 1589, fos. 23^{v}, 24^{r}.
[780] Clapham 1602, sig. A, 3^{r}.
[781] Clapham 1602, sig. A, 3^{v}.
[782] Clapham 1602, sig. A, 3^{v}.

'tovching the vse of this his Inuentorie'.[783] In the first few lines he repeatedly emphasises that history and its lessons are for all men, not a select few. He tells his readers that 'Historie is the Theatre of mans life' in which 'all may learne one common lesson' through its examples.[784] History thus 'inuites all men to view, heare, and conceiue' these examples, 'offring her selfe to all'.[785] He quotes the Ciceronian praise of the purpose and use of history, noting especially its application to statecraft. However, even here, Serres wants to make clear that this particular purpose for history is not restricted to those who have a role in the governance of the state, but rather all men who live within it: 'in the generall Historie of all Nations, euery man is bound to be more perticularly informed of that which toucheth himselfe, and instructed in the managing of the State, vnder which he is borne'.[786] He justifies his history of France on these grounds, seeking to instruct his countrymen on the political lessons applicable to their context, based on a history of their own country.

In particular, Serres goes on to say, this instruction is necessary to curb the influence of detrimental forces in their state, especially those around the throne, recalling Dowriche's lessons in her history of France. 'Too often' Serres writes, 'the negligence of our Kings hath... brought our Royall Diadem into danger' because they 'suffered their Seruants to command absolutely'.[787] Again, the distinction between counsel and command is highlighted; the conflation of which has endangered the great nation of France repeatedly: 'Wee haue seene the Crowne of Kings in their minorities, set to sale by their Tutors, who became murtherers, and

[783] Serres 1607, sig. A, 1[r].
[784] Serres 1607, sig. A, 1[r].
[785] Serres 1607, sig. A, 1[r].
[786] Serres 1607, sig. A, 1[r].
[787] Serres 1607, sig. A, 1[v].

of Regents, Theeues, making themselues Kings: We haue seene a King in his non-age become madde, gouerned by the passions of Men and Women, holding the chiefe degrees in state'.[788] It is to the united spectators of such events, his '*Countrymen*... whome your History is directed'.[789] History is the property of the French people, because it is they who have been, and are, invested in it. They have 'the chiefe interest in the estate' of their country, and Serres makes clear that their own turbulent recent history gives them an even greater right to the lessons that history as a whole contains.[790] Thus the 'Example rightly represented in the Historie of our Ancestors, serues vs now as a good guide' in the context of 'our inciuill warres, which... hath suckt (euen to the marrowe) all the vigour of this Estate'.[791]

The culmination of such thought is presented both visually and in written form in Walter Raleigh's *History of the World*, first published in 1614 and reprinted repeatedly throughout the seventeenth century. Raleigh's frontispiece (Figure 17) illustrates for the reader the Ciceronian importance of history shared with all men. History brings the knowledge of the world forward, conquering the effects of death and oblivion. By standing between *veritas* and *experientia*, history outshines them both in her presentation of the globe, which is supported both by *fama bona* and *fama mala*, who between them proclaim *providentia*, depicted as an all-seeing eye.

There is no dedicatory epistle to Raleigh's work, for he claims that he originally composed his history with the intention of presenting it to Prince Henry, who had died only two years before. It is now 'left to the world without a Maister',

[788] Serres 1607, sig. A, 2^{r}. Similar sentiments are expressed in Bacon 1605, fo. 12^{v}.
[789] Serres 1607, sig. A, 2^{r}.
[790] Serres 1607, sig. A, 2^{r}.
[791] Serres 1607, sig. A, 2^{r}.

and so to the world it is given.[792] He repeats the lesson from his frontispiece that history 'hath triumphed ouer time' by taking hold of it and that 'In a word, wee may gather out of History a policy no lesse wise than eternall'.[793] Note here that Raleigh, like Serres, sees the venture of learning from history as a public one; it is the 'wee' who receives the lessons of history. The author does not present his work to a single sovereign or counsellor, as in the presentation scenes of earlier works. Instead, history stands triumphant, offering the prudence gleaned from history to all.

[792] Raleigh 1614, sig. E, 4^{v}. Beer 1994, pp. 432-63 suggests that Raleigh's history was never meant to be given to the late prince, but that he uses this purported original dedication to legitimate the publication of his intentionally 'public text'.
[793] Raleigh 1614, sig. C, 3^{v}; A, 2^{r}.

Chapter 6: Counsel and the Theatre of Politics

Following from the presentation of history as the 'theatre' of life, this chapter explores how the competing discourses of counsel – orthodox humanist and Machiavellian – played out in the context of the reigns of the late Tudor monarchs: Edward VI, Mary I and Elizabeth I, particularly regarding the institutionalisation of counsel, portrayals of contemporary counsellors and the representation of counsel in theatre. From this exploration, a number of themes emerge. First, institutionalised council, whether through a 'council of state' or parliament, is presented throughout the latter half of the sixteenth century as an answer to weaknesses of reason rooted in the age and/or gender of the ruler. This, second, puts pressure on the already dubious reputation of the counsellor, a critique often expressed in a rejection of 'Machiavellian' counsel, wherein 'policy' is preferred over honest and godly advice. Finally, these concerns for the role of the counsellor are expressed in three plays in the latter half of the sixteenth century – *Republica*, *Gorboduc* and, especially, *Hamlet* – the last of which poignantly expresses the subtle lessons of the treatises, histories and other sixteenth-century portrayals of counsel: *optimi consiliarii mortui* – the best counsellor is a dead one.

I. Interregnum and the Council of State

Although the increasing roles of the privy council and parliament have been noted in scholarship on each of the three reigns which make up the later Tudor period, little work has been done in order to unravel the 'literature of English conciliarism' that runs through them.[794] In order to understand this trend, and its associated

[794] Alford 1998, p. 210. See Collinson 1994; Guy 1995a; Alford 2004; McLaren 2004; Colclough 2005; Hunt 2009, pp. 557-72. Alford 1998, p. 210 suggests that

themes, it is important to understand that all three regimes can be, and were, understood as presenting a 'species of interregnum' to which a council was the given answer.[795]

The recourse to a council as a way to solve dynastic instability in the reigns of Henry VIII's children is set out as early as Henry's will, in which he also makes the important connection between counsel and marriage as essential to legitimate rule.[796] Henry's will establishes an effective 'council of regency', giving 'full Powre and Authorite unto our said Counsaillours that they... may make, devise and ordeyn what thing soever they... shall, during the Minoritie aforsayd of our sayd Sonne think meet, necessary or convenient'.[797] Edward is to be 'ordred and ruled both in his marriage and also in ordering of thaffaires of the Realme as well outward as inward and also in all his own priuate affayres and in giving of offices of charge by thadvise and counsail of our right entierly beloved Counsaillours'.[798] It is they who have the 'the gouvernement of... all our Realmes, Dominions and Subgects and of all the affayres public and private'.[799] They are awarded full and unchallengeable sovereignty, for the 'thing's [sic] devised made or odeyned by them... shall and may laufully' be executed 'by their discretions... In as large and ample maner as if we had or did expresse unto them by a more sp'iall Commission under our great Seale of Englande every particuler cause'.[800] In short, they alone rule with the authority of the king of England.

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this trend is traceable to the 1530s and the work of Elyot and Starkey. See also Mayer 1988, pp. 201-27.

[795] McLaren 2004, p. 87; see Alford 1998, p. 115.

[796] Recall the connection between marriage and counsel set out in Grafton 1562.

[797] Ives 1992, p. 801; Henry VIII (1816 [1547]), p. 751; see Ives, pp. 779-804.

[798] Henry VIII (1816 [1547]), p. 750.

[799] Henry VIII (1816 [1547]), pp. 750, 751.

[800] Henry VIII (1816 [1547]), p. 751.

Although Henry first sets out that this is to be the case until Edward 'shall have fully accompleted the eightenth yeir of his age', he later gives a second condition for the termination of this conciliar rule: 'until our sayde sonne and heyre shalbe bestowed and maryed by their advise'.[801] Of course this ambiguity never mattered, the rule of this council lasted only eight weeks, and Edward never reached the age of eighteen, but it remains a rather interesting question whether this second limit on his sovereignty would have stood if he had come to the age of majority without marrying. Such a counter-factual question serves to demonstrate the important link between counsel and marriage; if Edward was to be released from the rule of the privy council only upon his marriage, then it is clear that he would *have* to marry according to their advice, and that their choice of his bride would constitute an important aspect of his right to rule.

This condition is explicitly expressed in the case of Henry's daughters, Mary and Elizabeth. Henry, in establishing the order of the succession to the crown, notes that Mary would inherit after Edward and his heirs 'upon condition that... [she] shall not mary no take any personne to her husbande w'out the assent and consent of the pryvey consaillours and others appoincted by us to be of counsail', and the same condition is placed upon Elizabeth.[802] To act in opposition is to sacrifice the right to the throne: 'if our sayd Doughter mary doo mary w'out the consent and agreement of the pryvey counsaillours and others appoincted by us to be of the counsail to our sayd sonne... the sayde imperial croun and other the premiss's shall holly remain be and cum to our sayd Doughter Elizabeth... as though our sayd doughter Mary wer thenne dead'.[803] Only by the advice and

[801] Henry VIII (1816 [1547]), pp. 750, 751.
[802] Henry VIII (1816 [1547]), p. 747.
[803] Henry VIII (1816 [1547]), p. 748.

consent of the privy council can the heirs of Henry VIII be married and still maintain their right to rule.

Of course, as mentioned, this institution only lasted eight weeks before the rise of Somerset as protector and effective ruler of Edward and England. That being said, more often than not the official propaganda legitimising the young king's reign still played on the image of his being 'ruled' by the counsel of those older and wiser than he, as we have already seen in the histories and associated woodcuts.[804] The importance of the council and parliament in the reign of Edward VI set important precedents for the reigns of his sisters.[805] After all, many of the same counsellors who bore 'rule' during the reign of Edward VI were also the counsellors to Mary and subsequently Elizabeth.[806]

It is thus no surprise that with the accession of Mary I, a lone female ruler of England, counsel was once again seen as the best way to 'bridle' the passions of a ruler who could not be trusted to bridle herself.[807] The solution of conciliar rule was proposed at two specific points in Mary's reign, both when she ruled without the alterative bridling element of a husband: first, upon her accession and second, after she had been married to Philip II of Spain, upon Philip's departure. In August of 1553, when Mary, having successfully put down the opposition posed by her competitor for the throne, sought to be proclaimed queen in her own right, the council, in the words of the imperial ambassador of the time, 'were now of opinion

[804] See McLaren 2004, pp. 15-6 for the image of Edward as a counselled Josiah.
[805] See Hoak 2002, p. 74; Hunt 2009, pp. 563-4.
[806] For the language of 'rule' of counsellors, see McLaren 2002, p. 42.
[807] For example, in 1558, the protestant clergyman Christopher Goodman, writing in opposition to the rule of Mary in his *How Svperior Powers Oght* [sic] *to be Obeyd*, suggested that the 'Counsellors... office is to brydle the affectio[n]s of their Prince a[n]d Gouuernours, in geui[n]g such counsele as might promote the glorie of God, a[n]d the welthe of their co[n]trie' (p. 34). As we saw in the chapter above, Foxe and others had also laid the blame for the atrocities of Mary's reign not upon her but her counsellors. See Loades, 'Foxe and Queen Mary' (accessed 6 Jan 2012).

that Parliament should be held before the coronation to avoid the likelihood of trouble'.[808] This flew in the face of every tradition regarding the coronation of a new monarch, in that it sought to demonstrate Mary's subordination under the authority of parliament, not the other way around.[809] As it was the privy council which called the parliament, this proposal placed Mary at the bottom of a chain of command topped by the council. This, like Henry's will, was doomed to failure; Mary rejected the proposal outright, but it remained as a legacy, denoting not only the strength of the Edwardian conciliar political culture, but bequeathing a legacy of a 'headless parliament' at the command of the privy council.[810]

Once Mary had chosen a husband, fears abated somewhat as to the unbridled nature of this female monarch.[811] However, Philip's physical proximity to the helm of the state was necessary for such assurances, for when this was absent, an institutionalised council once again was proposed to fill the power vacuum. Before departing from England in 1555, Philip established a 'select council' to represent and replace him in the governance of England. This institution was established to be a permanent presence at court, reporting its proceedings to Philip three times a week, communicating with other councillors weekly, and even taking the place of the privy council in Mary's consultations.[812]

These measures left a lasting legacy of the need to 'conquer' a queen through counsel. The queen's legitimacy as a ruler came to be seen as founded on her incorporation through three interrelated marriages: to the crown, to a prince and

[808] Quoted in Hunt 2009, p. 562.
[809] Hunt 2009, pp. 563-4. For Mary's privy council see Hoak 1986, pp. 87-115.
[810] Hunt 2009, p. 564.
[811] Redworth 1997, p. 597. Records show that Philip, despite the restrictions placed upon him by statute, played an active role in the governance of England, attending privy council meetings twice weekly and playing a personal role in determinations of office; see Redworth 1997, pp. 597-613.
[812] See Redworth 1997, pp. 601-2.

to the 'body of the realm' through 'queen-in-parliament'.[813] We see the same themes played out in the much longer reign of her sister, Elizabeth.[814] Unlike Mary, who only acquiesced to conciliar rule in the form of her husband's select council late in her reign, Elizabeth's rule demonstrated an opposite tendency, beginning with a powerful privy council who saw their role as limiting and controlling the prerogative of the ruler and ending with a severe reduction of conciliar control and a markedly imperial rule by Elizabeth.[815]

The move toward conciliar rule in the first part of her reign was led by William Cecil, Lord Burghley, who in 1563, drawing on the precedents of the previous fifteen years, drafted a 'clause' for a bill to be put before parliament in the event of Elizabeth's death and the 'vacation and interreigne' that would follow.[816] Burghley establishes that it is 'very necessary beside the ordynary government of the Realme' there should remain after Elizabeth's death 'a Counsell of estate' which is 'usually named a privee Counsell'.[817] This council is awarded the governance of all things domestic and international, spiritual and temporal until a new monarch is found. Notably, Burghley makes clear this council is instituted by parliament, which also has the power to dissolve it once the new monarch is 'declared'. Parliament is awarded the power to both transfer royal imperial power to the council as well as to 'find' and 'declare' a new successor.[818] This clause

[813] McLaren 2004, pp. 5, 103, 237.
[814] McLaren 2002, pp. 99-100.
[815] Alford 1998, p. 3.
[816] Alford 1998, pp. 7, 112, 110, 210.
[817] Transcribed in Alford 1998, p. 225. Blundeville had also made the connection between the 'counsell of the state' and the 'priuie counsell' in his 1570 translation of Ceriol.
[818] Alford 1998, p. 112.

endured, revived in the 'Elizabethan Exclusion Crisis' of the 1580s, when further proposals were made for 'headless conciliar government'.[819]

Of course, such visions were never actualised; sovereignty remained invested in the queen, or rather the queen-in-parliament. However, these conciliar proposals serve to emphasise the importance placed on counsel in the context of 'weaker' Tudor monarchs. Machiavellian counsellors, feared in the court of an adult male prince, become a paramount concern in the Edwardian, Marian and Elizabethan polities.

II. Counsellors and Machiavels

This concern for the counsellor's ability to exert his influence over a weak prince is exacerbated by the employment of Machiavellian ideas and strategies by several leading counsellors. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the relationship between the ends of *utile* and *honestum* is reconceptualised as a tension between 'policy' and 'religion', between the concerns of state and God's word.

For instance, William Thomas, writing to Edward VI in the 1550s, suggests to the young prince that in cases of relations with other (devious) princes, 'policie is no vice' and 'crafte' and 'subtiltie' are 'rather honourable than otherwise'.[820] He expands this view in a discourse entitled 'My private opinion tooching your Ma[ties] outward affaires at this present', also written for the young prince. He notes here that an understanding of 'outward affaires' has been neglected in the counsel of the prince because it has only recently become important: 'Tyme was in the daies of your father... this astate being dradde of all our neighbours needed not to esteeme any of them more than itself was esteemed', but because England now

[819] Collinson 1994, pp. 43, 42.
[820] Thomas 1774, pp. 139, 143.

finds herself ‘hate and contempned of them all’, the relations between nations must be further examined and new counsels presented.[821]

There are two remedies that Thomas suggests could aid their position internationally: ‘either friendship to helpe us, or tyme to make ourselfes stronge’, but as there are no allies in whom they can truly place their trust, Thomas suggests that the only remaining solution is to turn ‘unto tyme to see howe much we may wynne thereof’.[822] Because Edward does not have the resources either to win nor to purchase time, his only choice is to ‘worke by policie’, in other words, to put the ‘two puissante princes’ of France and Spain ‘in hope of thinges that we meane not, and thereby wynne tyme both to provide us of mooney and to order our men’.[823] He contrasts this ‘policie’ with Godliness, writing that ‘albeit that our quarrel is in God, and God our quarrel... yet forasmuch as wickednesse raigneth in the midst of us, like as we shulde not mistrust the goodnesse of God, so ought we neither to neglect that policie that may helpe us’.[824] As long as Edward can ‘looke for none other, but whan so ever his tyme serveth’ then he shall be successful in his endeavours.[825]

Thomas uses Machiavelli overtly in his counsel, but we see such language creeping into the writings of other counsellors with less explicitly Machiavellian tendencies. For example, we may turn to the influential adviser and political writer, Thomas Smith, who also served as a clerk to the privy council under Edward VI and was appointed secretary of state in 1548. However, as he had associated himself with Somerset, his influence waned with that of the duke, and it was not

[821] Thomas 1774, p. 180.
[822] Thomas 1774, pp. 180, 181.
[823] Thomas 1774, pp. 181, 183.
[824] Thomas 1774, p. 184.
[825] Thomas 1774, p. 189.

until 1571 that he was appointed to the privy council and in 1572 restored to the position of secretary of state. Even while lacking an official position within the council, however, Smith continued to give his political advice, shaping it according to the conventions of the age.[826] For example, in his *Orations for and against the Queen's marriage* of 1561, Smith examines three positions on the young queen's marriage, concluding that the queen should marry and, furthermore, that she should marry an Englishman.[827]

Like Thomas, Smith establishes the division between *utile* and *honestum* in political counsel: 'Two things [are] appointed to be had in election, if the one be honest, th'other dishonest'.[828] However, what is honest varies according to the 'circumstances of time and place, person and occasion'.[829] Thus the arguments for the honest life of chastity can be rejected, as 'this is not so simply granted... that the sole life is the better, no, though it be the harder; but according as the circumstances be'.[830] In the case of the queen, it is in fact marriage, not chastity, which is the more honourable course. His correspondence shows the same attention to the factors of circumstance in determining proper political action. For example, in 1572, Smith writes to Lord Burghley that he had 'moved the Quene's Majesty' in regards to her

[826] His 1549 *Discourse of the Commonweal of this Realm of England*, had justified such extra-conciliar counsel: 'albeit I am not of the King's Council, to whom the reformation and consideration [of the Commonwealth] does chiefly belong' he is 'a member of the same Commonweal and called to be one of the Common House' (1929, p. 10) and in his *De republica Anglorum* written in the 1560s, Smith defines tyranny as rule 'without the aduise and consent of the people' (1583, p. 6).
[827] This view is the one which remains uncontested at the end of the dialogue, suggesting it is the argument of the work, for 'For even as when in a heap of sand or mould there is espied a bright thing like metal, by sifting of it and washing it, will come to a nearer guess, and by farther travail, be tried whether it be gold or no', 'where wise persons dissent one from another, the truth appeareth, and the best way is chosen' (Smith 1820, p. 208). For the *Oration* as an example of sixteenth-century rhetorical practices see Peltonen 2012, pp. 116-17.
[828] Smith 1820, p. 196.
[829] Smith 1820, p. 197.
[830] Smith 1820, p. 197.

intervention in Scotland, rejecting her suggestion that she delay: 'I shewed her Majestie that it was but a protracting of tyme'.[831] The time to act was upon them, for 'Now, the French being thoroughly occupied, is the best tyme to do that enterprise which is to be done'.[832]

Burghley too demonstrates the same concerns in his own correspondence, most clearly expressed in the instructions to his son, Robert Cecil, on the art of counselling Elizabeth. In a letter of 1593, Burghley notes that 'the rule of christian philosophie consisteth in difference betwixt *utile* and *honestum*', which of the two honesty 'were to be preferred with more constancy'.[833] However, one must also take into account that 'in private men's causes *cretisare cum cretensi*' – 'to deceive among deceivers' – 'is allowable' and so he 'beginne[s] to wander before I dare affirm anything'.[834] One cannot make a decision based on an evaluation of the honour of an action alone, as it cannot always be guaranteed to be the best course.

Burghley, like Thomas, notes that this results in a tension between policy and the word of God. In his role of counsellor, he tells Robert Cecil in 1595, he has always held his course 'in such matters as I differ in opinion from her Majesty'.[835] Burghley writes that in such cases he 'will not change my opinion by affirming the contrary, for that were to offend God, to whome I am sworn first, but as a servant I will obey her Majestie's commandment'.[836] As the queen is God's minister on

[831] Smith to Burghley 1838 [1572], p. 459.
[832] Smith to Burghley 1838 [1572], p. 459.
[833] Burghley to Cecil 1838 [1593], p. 425.
[834] Burghley to Cecil 1838 [1593], p. 425.
[835] Burghley to Cecil 1838 [1595], p. 457. This is evidenced by his refusal in 1559 to administer a policy of Elizabeth's which he had counselled against; see Alford 1998, p. 70.
[836] Burghley to Cecil 1838 [1595], p. 457. Note the connection such sentiment has to Thomas More's last words as reported by the Paris Account: 'He then besought them earnestly to pray to God to give the King good counsel, protesting that he died his good servant, and God's first' in Wegemar and Smith 2004, p. 355.

earth, 'it shall be God's will to have her commandments obeyed, after that I have performed my duty as counsellor'.[837] He concludes that he is 'in a mixture of divinitie and policy, preferring in policy her Majesty before all others on earth, and in divynitie the King of heaven above all betwixt alpha and omega'.[838]

Counsellors' attempts to balance the concerns of religion and policy, couched in the language of variable circumstance, were dangerous as they hovered on the edge of the oft-criticised view of Machiavellianism. Even these critics, however, found themselves making recourse to Machiavellian theories or ideas, demonstrating how thoroughly intertwined they had become with the English views of counsel in the sixteenth century.[839]

The definition of Machiavellianism is most clearly given by the 1571 *Treatise of Treasons*: 'a Machiauellian State & Regime[n]t' is 'where Religion is put behind in the seco[n]d & last place: wher y^{t} ciuil Policie... is preferred before it'; this is 'a Machiauellian defined'.[840] The author does not seek to criticise Elizabeth, but like others we shall see, writes against the *real* power behind the throne – her counsellors, in particular two unnamed men (probably Leicester and

[837] Burghley to Cecil 1838 [1595], p. 457.
[838] Burghley to Cecil 1838 [1595], p. 457.
[839] Despite the importance of Machiavellianism in the period, much of the work on the political culture of the sixteenth century gives it only passing mention. Guy 1995a, p. 69 references 'Machiavellian manoeuvres' in the negotiation of Elizabeth's marriages; Alford 1998, p. 211 notes that Philip Sidney had read Machiavelli while travelling in Italy; McLaren 1999, pp. 91-6 treats Stephen Gardiner's 'Machiavellian Treatise'; Alford 2004, p. 23 mentions the connection between the works of William Thomas and *The Prince*; Alford 2008, a biography of William Cecil, does not mention Machiavelli at all, and Alford 2012, p. 13 makes only brief reference to the accusation of Machiavellianism.
[840] *Treatise of Treasons* 1572, sig. a, 5^{r}. Although this text is usually attributed to the Scottish bishop and humanist John Leslie, Beckett 2002, pp. 163-93 demonstrates convincingly that this was most likely not the case, although Leslie may have been involved in a collaborative effort with a number of other authors.

Burghley) to whom he attributes 'what so euer of importance commeth foorth vnder [Elizabeth], or hath bene sene in her time'.[841] Prioritising policy over religion and using the rhetorical arts of persuasion, these counsellors have transgressed the line between counsel and command: 'of these two men, I say, and of none other, am I to be vnderstanden in this Treatise, when I vse any terme, that may seeme to touche Authoritie: bycause I meane none other Authority, then of them two only'.[842]

The power of these counsellors is drawn from the weakness of rule presented by the queen's gender. Speaking of 'the chief of these two Machiauellians', the *Treatise*'s author suggests that even before Elizabeth came to the throne, he, 'finding that he had a yong Ladie in hand, that was vnexpert in matters of State', had worked his way into her trust and also introduced to her counsel his 'confederate', the second counsellor in question.[843] Returning to the important relationship between counsel and marriage, these problems may have been averted if the queen had married, but as it was, this was 'the state and condition, in which your Prince, a yong Ladie, and sole Virgin, without help of Husband, entered & was setled in her Crowne and Dominion, & toke to her seruice this couple of Counsailers'.[844]

The *Treatise* advises the queen that she ought to free herself from such influences, for 'wisedome (I wene) yea and Machiauell him self' would recommend that she ought to 'cast both them and their Counselles, out of her credit and Courte'.[845] Here, the author may be making reference to Chapter XXIII of *The Prince*, in which Machiavelli treats the case of a monarch whose own wisdom is

[841] *Treatise of Treasons* 1572, sig. a, 7^{v}.
[842] *Treatise of Treasons* 1572, sig. a, 8^{r}.
[843] *Treatise of Treasons* 1572, fos. 86^{v}, 86^{r}.
[844] *Treatise of Treasons* 1572, fo. 87^{r}.
[845] *Treatise of Treasons* 1572, fos. 169^{v}, 171^{r-v}.

not enough to rule over his counsellors, in England's case a woman without prudence to guide her. Such a prince, Machiavelli suggests, can rule well if he finds one 'wholly to direct and governe him, who himselfe were a very wise man [*prudentissimo*]'.[846] However, this counsellor 'in a short time would deprive him of his State' and overthrow him (or, in this case, her), so it is necessary for a prince to be on guard against him.[847] Even the author of the *Treatise* is forced to suggest that Elizabeth take a Machiavellian approach to counsel, suspecting all those who surround her and trusting none.

Such issues, and their relationship to marriage and counsel, are also expressed in the controversial *Discoverie of a Gaping Gvlf* written in 1579 by John Stubbe, a Protestant writer and member of Lincoln's Inn.[848] This tract on the proposed French marriage, for which Stubbe would be condemned to lose his hand, begins by reproaching those who – like the Machiavellian counsellors of the *Treatise of Treasons* – place profit before honesty: 'In all deliberations of most private actions, the very heathen are wont first to consider honesty and then profit', but there is a 'strange Christianity of some men in our age, who in their state consultations have not so much respect to honesty as they had to profit'.[849] These counsellors are 'not Satan in body of a serpent, but the old serpent in the shape of a man, whose sting is in his mouth, and who doth his endeavour to seduce our Eve'.[850] Stubbe reminds his readers that these pernicious counsellors are even more worrying in England's present state of female rule, 'because [our Eve] is also our

[846] Machiavelli 1640, p. 194.
[847] Machiavelli 1640, p. 194.
[848] See Mears 2001, pp. 629-59.
[849] Stubbe 1968 [1579], p. 3; see Peltonen 2012, pp. 117-27.
[850] Stubbe 1968 [1579], p. 3.

Adam and sovereign lord or lordly lady of this land, it is so much more dangerous'.[851]

Although concerned with negotiations over the French marriage in particular, Stubbe makes clear from the outset that the tract is in fact about counsel in general.[852] The '*gaping gulf*' of the title, in which '*England is Like to be Swallowed*' refers directly to the deficit of good counsel in the English court:

> some English mouths professing Christ are also persuaders of the [marriage]... alas, this ship of unhappy load hath among us and of ourselves (I would, not in prince's court) those who with all their might and main help to hale it in, and... our own men walk on this shore and lay to their shoulders with fastened lines and cables to draw it in. *This is our mischief, this is the swallowing gulf of our bottomless destruction*; else might we think ourselves impregnable.[853]

His main piece of advice to Elizabeth, therefore, is not just to refuse the proposed marriage, but also to patch up this 'gulf' in England's defences. He addresses Elizabeth directly: 'we instantly beseech you, to keep this sin far from you by admitting no counsel that may bring it near to you... [and to] stop your Majesty's ears against those sorcerers and their enchanting counsels'.[854] In particular, he warns her against the types of counsellors the *Treatise of Treasons* had identified, who 'use the word of God with as little conscience as they do Machiavelli, picking out of both indifferently what may serve their turns'.[855] Like the author of the *Treatise* and Machiavelli, he accepts that it is the prince who must be prudent enough to control his counsellors, not the other way around, and so he prays that

[851] Stubbe 1968 [1579], pp. 3-4.
[852] This is clear on his title page, where below his title he includes Psalm 20:9: 'Saue Lord, let the King here vs in the day that we call'.
[853] Stubbe 1968 [1579], p. 4; emphasis added.
[854] Stubbe 1986 [1579], p. 30.
[855] Stubbe 1986 [1579], p. 12.

she be given a 'principle spirit' to 'sift counsels that you may smell a flatterer from a loyal counsellor, prove all and approve the best'.[856]

The recourse to Machiavellianism as a way to counter Machiavels is most clearly seen in *Leicester's Commonwealth*, which began circulating in 1584.[857] Written in reply to Burghley's *True Execution of Justice in England*, which condemns the treasonous nature of the Catholic population of England, this anonymous dialogue puts forward the argument that the far greater threat to England comes from closer to the crown, namely the ambitious Earl of Leicester, whose influence 'hath done more hurt to his commonwealth than if he had murdered many thousands of her subjects or betrayed whole armies to the professed enemy'.[858] The dialogue's participants agree with the premise of Burghley's *True Execution*, that there is a 'degree' of treason which 'want[s] but occasion or ability to break into the second [degree]'; in other words all it lacks is the right moment to be put into execution.[859] However, there is a 'cause or circumstance [which] may stay' the Catholics from such treason 'when they shall have ability and opportunity': the fear of servitude to other countries.[860] Leicester's treason, on the other hand, lacks only opportunity – the queen's death – an event which he himself could orchestrate and which is, in the end, inevitable.

In general, the author writes, there is a danger posed by any counsellor who crosses the line between counsel and command, for it 'it cannot be but prejudicial and exceeding dangerous unto our noble prince and realm that any one man

[856] Stubbe 1986 [1579], p. 30.
[857] Originally circulated with the title *The Copy of a Letter Written by a Master of Art of Cambridge*, it almost immediately became known as *Leicester's Commonwealth*; see Peck 1985, pp. 3-5.
[858] *Leicester's Commonwealth* 1985 [1584], p. 79; see Peck 1985, p. 5.
[859] *Leicester's Commonwealth* 1985 [1584], p. 68.
[860] *Leicester's Commonwealth* 1985 [1584], p. 68.

whatsoever... should grow to so absolute authority and commandry in the Court'.[861] Playing on the idea that the prince ought to be 'bridled' by good counsel, he suggests that such a man 'cast[s] nets and chains and invisible bands about that person whom most of all he pretendeth to serve, [and] he shutteth up his prince in a prison most sure, though sweet and senseless', while other counsellors watch on silently.[862] Echoing Boaistuau, the main speaker of the dialogue comments on how 'many even of the best and faithfullest subjects of the land do yield to the present time and do keep silence in some matters that otherwise they would take it for duty to utter'.[863] Leicester, on the other hand, will use time to his advantage, for having learned from 'Seignor Machiavel my Lord's counsellor', Leicester waits until the moment when 'occasion serve[s]' to move against the queen; 'Such is the variable policy of men that serve the time, or rather that serve themselves of all times, for their purposes'.[864]

Notably, the solution proposed in *Leicester's Commonwealth* is to adopt the same attitude to time and expediency as the traitorous Leicester. Traditional justice is too confining, for it waits until the treasonous act has been committed. Instead, one must accept the use of pre-emptive justice; it may not be honourable, but it is necessary to the safety and well being of the state: 'Perhaps the consultation of this affair is not what were convenient but what is expedient: not what ought to be done in justice, but what may be done in safety'.[865] The typical demands of justice must be dispensed with in the name of expediency. Thus, although the author remarks

[861] *Leicester's Commonwealth* 1985 [1584], p. 93.
[862] *Leicester's Commonwealth* 1985 [1584], p. 93.
[863] *Leicester's Commonwealth* 1985 [1584], p. 99. Recall [Boaistuau] 1571, p. 4: 'Bookes do always franckly & with all libertie admonish vs of those things which our Friends (commonly giuing place to time) do suppresse and keepe in silence'.
[864] *Leicester's Commonwealth* 1985 [1584], pp. 132, 154.
[865] *Leicester's Commonwealth* 1985 [1584], p. 192.

against Leicester's use of Machiavelli, he is forced to accept that the only way to fight fire is with fire – to pre-empt Machiavellianism by using it first.[866]

III. Counsel and the Elizabethan Theatre

The role of counsel in bringing about the destruction of the kingdom was vividly performed on the late Tudor stage – particularly in the plays *Respublica*, *Gorboduc* and *Hamlet*. *Respublica* is an anonymous work in the tradition of the morality plays explored in Chapter 3, which once again highlights the use of *paradiastole* amongst court counsellors. Performed in 1553, it features a lone queen – presumably representing Mary I – who is led astray by counsellors who have changed their names from vices to virtues – Insolence to Authority, Oppression to Reformation, Adulation to Honesty and, importantly, Avarice to Policy – in order to gain the queen's trust and rule through her.[867] Avarice/Policy takes the lead, using kairotic timeliness to introduce the others into the queen's circle: 'Wherever I fynde hir a tyme convenient,| I shall saie and dooe that maie bee expedient!'[868] Respublica is wholly tricked by their schemes, and when the true nature of her counsellors is at last revealed, Respublica can only exclaim 'what creature woulde suspicion have had| That my late administraters had been men so bad?| Or who woulde have thowght theim counterfaictes to have been| That had harde theeir woordes and their countenaunce seen?'[869] Although the vices, with the notable exception of

[866] Philip Sidney points out this recourse to Machiavelli in his *Defense of Leicester* written against *Leicester's Commonwealth*: '[only] when [the author of the *Commonwealth*] plays the "statist," wringing very unluckily some of Machiavel's axioms to serve his purpose, then indeed he triumphs'; Sidney 1985 [1584], p. 254.
[867] Hunt 2009, p. 570.
[868] *Respublica* 1972, p. 240. Although anonymous, *Respublica* is commonly attributed to the prominent playwright Nicholas Udall; see the 1952 edition published by the Early English Text Society, edited by W. W. Greg.
[869] *Respublica* 1972, p. 252.

Adulation/Honesty, are thrown out of the court, Respublica must lean on other virtuous counsellors to preserve her state. This play, ending with a prayer for the good governance of both queen and council, simultaneously offers a critique of counsel, while noting its important place within the court of a female monarch.[870]

The 1565 courtly play *Gorboduc* has also been recognised as presenting powerful counsel to the queen in regard to the crafty manipulations of counsellors, although emphasis is more often put on the messages that it has concerning the succession.[871] Certainly, this element cannot be ignored; King Gorboduc lets Britain fall to ruin because of the division resulting from his inability to choose a single heir to his throne. However, this is in the context of a string of failures of counsel throughout the course of the play.[872]

The king, in his decision to divide the kingdom of Britain, is introduced in Act I Scene 1 by the queen, Videna, as being immoveable to counsel: he 'Hath so firmely fired his vnmoued mynde| That plains & praiers can no whit auaile'.[873] Rather than being counselled by his advisers, Gorboduc will persuade them to accept his plan: 'He wyll endeuour to procure assent| Of all his Counsell to his fonde deuise'.[874] The failure of counsel bears the blame for the entire outcome of the play, for with the council 'restest all, but if they fayle therof,| And if the ende bringe forthe an euyll successe| On them and theirs the mischeife shall befall'.[875]

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[870] Hunt 2009, p. 570: 'Crucially, Respublica has to recognize her dependency on the men of governance – her councillors.'
[871] See Alford 1998, pp. 100-3.
[872] Thus, rather than suggesting as Alford 1998, p. 103 does that *Gorbodoc* 'places counsel in the context of succession', I would argue that this play places the succession crisis in the context of the evaluation of royal counsel, in the same way that Smith's *Oracion* or Stubbe's *Gaping Gulf* use marriage as one way of treating larger questions of counsel in the Elizabethan court.
[873] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. A, iiii^{r}.
[874] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. A, iiii^{r}.
[875] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. A, iiii^{r}.

Such a disasterous end will always come about, the queen suggests, 'When Lordes and trusted Rulers vnder kynges| To please the present fancie of the Prince,| With wrong transpose the course of gouernance'.[876]

The queen proves to be correct, for in the next scene Gorboduc presents his plan to his counsellors: Arostus, who praises it, Philander, who presents a small amendment to it, and Eubulus, the truest counsellor (literally 'good counsel' in the Greek), who speaks frankly against it.[877] Gorboduc too emphasises that in the counsellors' hands rests the well being of the state, encouraging them to speak 'Lest as the blame of succedynge thinges| Shall light on you'.[878] Nevertheless, even after the warnings of Philander and Eubulus, Gorboduc declares that he will go along with his intended plan, adding only that he will 'joyne to eyther of my sonnes| Some one of those whose longe approued faith| And wisedome tryed may well assure my harte: That mynyng fraude shall finde no way to crept| Into their fensed eares with graue aduise'.[879]

After this failure of counsel in Act I, the attention shifts to the counsel given to the young princes, now rulers in their own right. This is reinforced by a dumb show which precedes the second act. A king, flanked by his nobles and sat in a chair of state is presented with a 'Cuppe... of wyne in a glasse' by a 'graue and aged Gentilman', which he refuses.[880] Next, a 'braue and lustie yong Gentelman' presents the king with a 'Cup of Golde filled w[t] poison' which the king accepts and drinks, immediately falling down dead.[881] The print edition of the play gives the meaning of the dumb show, equating the glass cup with 'a faithfull Counsellour

[876] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. A, iiii^{r}.
[877] Pincombe 2003, p. 40.
[878] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. A, v^{r}.
[879] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. B, ii^{r}.
[880] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. B, iii^{r}.
[881] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. B, iii^{r}.

[who] holdeth no treason, but is playne & open, ne yeldeth to any vndiscrete affection, but giueth holsome Counsell, whiche the yll aduised Prince refuseth'.[882] The golden cup, on the other hand, 'betoketh flattery'.[883] The dumb show is a precursor to the action in the second act, as the destruction of the king shown foreshadows the downfall of Gorboduc's sons, Ferrex and Porrex, 'who refusing the holesome aduise of graue Counsellours, credited these yong Paracites, & brought themselues death and destruction thereby'.[884]

This is played out in the second act, in which Dordan, the good counsellor to Ferrex, realising that his prince will follow the advice of the 'parasite', Hermon, cries 'O that the Secretaries wise aduise| Had erst ben harde', for now it is too late for good counsel to intervene: 'traiterous councell now will wherle about| The youthfull heads of these vnskilfull kinges'.[885] Gorboduc's refusal to accept the advice of Eubulus begins a chain reaction, resulting in the powerlessness of even the best counsel to stand in the way of the realm's destruction: 'Whan kinges... wyll neglect the rede,| Of best aduise, and yelde to pleasing tales... Succeeding heapes of plagues shall teache to late| To learne the mischiefes of misguyding state'.[886] Despite the importance of succession in this play, it is counsel that is at the source of the destruction of Gorboduc's line, and the kingdom of Britain.

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[882] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. B, iii^{r-v}.
[883] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. B, iii^{v}.
[884] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. B, iii^{v}. A manuscript account of the performance of the play in the Inner Temple in early 1562 suggests that at this showing, the dumb show preceding the second act 'declared... that men refused the certen and tooke the uncerten, whereby was ment that yt was better for the Quene to marye with the L[ord]. R[obert]. [Dudley] knowen then w[t] the K. of *Sweden*', probably because of insertions to the text made by Dudley himself, which not only forwarded his marital suit, but also neutralised the potential critique of his own role as the 'lustie yong Gentelman' in the dumb show; Pincombe 2003, p. 40. In such a case, the older counsellor, and perhaps Eubulus himself, may have been representations of Cecil; Pincombe 2003, p. 40.
[885] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. B, vii^{r}.
[886] Norton and Sackville 1565, sig. C, i^{r}.

The greatest statement of the suspicion of counsellors in the Elizabethan period comes with Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. Poised at the turn of the century, *Hamlet* brings together many of the themes growing throughout the sixteenth century discourses of counsel in a resounding statement of the fallibility of counsel in the court of kings. By analysing four of the courtier figures presented in *Hamlet* – Osric, Rosencrantz, Guildenstern and Polonius[887] – in this context, the critique of the Elizabethan counsellor becomes clear. Although Osric, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are clear representations of flatterers, it is Polonius who is presented as the most pernicious. He is also the only character in the play identified as a 'Counsaylor', and therefore his role cannot be properly understood outside of the context of the discourses of counsel we have been exploring.[888]

Polonius makes his first appearance to the audience in the role of the 'good counsellor' according to the orthodox humanist discourse, advising Laertes on his conduct in France in standard, albeit tedious, tropes. However, when the audience next sees Polonius shortly thereafter, he has all the skills of a master 'Machiavel' and applies them in spying on his son. Polonius is presented in such a dual role throughout the play, recalling the attempts on the part of Elizabethan counsellors to bring together the orthodox humanist and Machiavellian strategies of counsel in

[887] I have chosen to use the modern versions of the names for clarity. Note that the Q2 *Hamlet* gives Rosencrantz and Guildenstern as 'Rosencraus' and 'Guyldersterne' and Osric as 'Osricke'.

[888] Hamlet identifies Polonius as 'this Counsayler' (Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 2580, p. 176) and he is given in the stage direction to as 'Counsaile: as Polonius' (tln. 177, p. 24). Alvis 2000, Hadfield 2005 and Armitage, Condron and Fitzmaurice 2009 have recently drawn attention to the ways in which Shakespeare can be read within the context of the history of political thought. Notably, Curtis 2009, pp. 44-63 argues that Shakespeare had an extensive knowledge of classical and humanist writers on politics, as well as rhetoric and history. It is no surprise then that as Shrank 2009, pp. 101-18 (on the sonnets) and Colclough 2009 pp. 217-33 (on *Julius Caesar*) have shown, the question of the efficacy of these subjects to the question of political counsel appear in a number of his texts. However, this perspective has not, as of yet, been applied to a study of *Hamlet*.

counselling the monarch.[889] These attempts are shown to fail in Hamlet, for Polonius's role as the orthodox humanist ideal of the counsellor is a comical failure, whereas his skill as a Machiavel is a notably destructive and disturbing facet of such a trusted counsellor. In other words, Polonius is a bad 'good counsellor' and a good 'bad counsellor', with no ability to successfully balance the roles, forcing both Hamlet and the audience to conclude that Polonius is better off dead.

The four courtiers in question are all presented as flatterers who are willing to change their opinions and dispositions according to those of the person in power. To understand Shakespeare's deliberate portrayal of them as such, it is worth turning again to Plutarch's 'How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend', published in English in 1603.[890] Plutarch encourages his reader to 'make triall of him' he suspects to be a flatterer.[891] The first such test seeks to discover 'whether there be an uniforme equalitie in all his intentions and actions or no?' for 'a flatterer... hath no one permanent seat in his maners and be haviour' and is 'variable and changing alwaies from one form to another'.[892] The translation of Plutarch's work at the turn of the century collides with the Machiavellian discourse, which, as we saw, accepted as one of its primary tenets the need to vary with time and circumstance.

The character of Hamlet, educated in the *studia humanitatis* in Wittenberg, would have been well versed in Plutarch's text, so it comes as no surprise that

[889] Although Fisher 1990, p. 46 notes that 'in the careers of at least Gabriel Harvey and Francis Bacon the two interests were found together' this conclusion only leads him to ask 'so what?' We might respond by asserting that this intersection says something important about the discourse of counsel as presented in *Hamlet*.
[890] Although not published in English until 1603, Plutarch's essay was widely read and circulated and there is no question that Shakespeare and his audience would have been familiar with the text, even if through its quotation in other sources; see Evans 2001, pp. 1-41.
[891] Plutarch 1603, p. 85.
[892] Plutarch 1603, p. 88.

Hamlet applies Plutarch's test to the courtiers in his midst. He makes trial of Polonius in Act III Scene 2:

> Ham. Do you see yonder clowd that's almost in shape of a Camel?
> Pol: By'th masse and tis, like a Camell indeed.
> Ham: Mee thinks it is like a Wezell.
> Pol: It is backt like a Wezell.
> Ham: Or like a Whale.
> Pol: Very like a Whale.[893]

Although comical, Hamlet's test of Polonius reveals him instantly as a flatterer, 'applying his actions wholly to the humor of another... never simple, uniforme, nor like himselfe'.[894] Polonius's variability, although striking, is minimal compared that of Osric, to whom Hamlet applies his test in Act V. Osric's oscillations are from one extreme to its complete opposite:

> Cour: I thanke your Lordship, it is very hot.
> Ham: No belieue me, tis very cold, the wind is Northerly.
> Cour: It is indefferent cold my Lord indeed.
> Ham: But yet me thinkes it is very sully and hot, or my complection.
> Cour: Exceedingly my Lord, it is very soultery[895]

Both courtiers fail Hamlet's test for flattery by drastically altering their opinions according to Hamlet's changing opinions. Hamlet notes that 'the drossy age dotes on' such men, who have who have 'the tune of the time' and thus develop an outward 'habit of incounter' which allows them to carry through 'the most prophane and trennowed opinions'.[896] Like the 'Machiavellian' counsellors we have encountered, such men suit their actions, opinions and outward appearances to the times.

Although not given the same test by Hamlet, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are also presented in such a light. It is in their very names, ('Rossencraft' and

[893] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 2247-53, pp. 154, 156 (odd pages contain F1 text).
[894] Plutarch 1603, p. 88.
[895] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 3599-605, p. 248.
[896] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 3652, 3653, 3656, p. 254.

'Gilderstone' in the 1603 'First Quarto') and as such their very natures, to give a rosy colour to craftiness and to gild the stone.[897] Their willingness to submit to the machinations of Claudius against their old school friend marks them as an even more dangerous form of flatterer than the sycophantic but harmless Osric. For while Osric might be a proficient flatterer, he is certainly no skilled manipulator; Hamlet has no trouble seeing through his attempts to play upon his pride. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, on the other hand, are far more crafty; they, as Plutarch warned, have 'by way of imitation' worked their way into Hamlet's trust: 'the flatterer, while he doth imitate and counterfeit others, doth entice and draw them, as it were, with a pipe or call, into his net, and so beguileth them'.[898] Despite their skill, Hamlet eventually does recognise his 'friends' as precisely such flatterers: 'Why looke you now how vnwoorthy a thing you make of me, you would play vpon mee, you would seeme to know my stops, you would plucke out the hart of my mistery... do you think I am easier to be plaid on then a pipe[?]'[899] Hamlet has read his Plutarch well.

Even their bringing the Players to court, as much as Hamlet is able to turn it to his profit, betrays their pernicious role, for as Plutarch warns, the flatterer 'windeth himself into favour by meanes of pleasure, and wholy is imploied to procure mirth and delight', for his only aim 'is alwaies to devise, prepare and confect, as it were, some play or sport, some action and speech, with pleasure and to do pleasure'.[900] Thus instead of trying to help Hamlet, Rosencrantz and

[897] Hamlet makes reference to Rosencrantz's name when he tells the pair that their 'modesties haue not craft enough to cullour' their looks; Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 1326-7, p. 98.
[898] Plutarch 1603, p. 88.
[899] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 2234-41, p. 154.
[900] Plutarch 1603, pp. 86, 91.

Guildenstern seek to distract him, in the hope that such distraction will afford them the opportunity to accomplish the king's will.

Such men, despite being far more dangerous and troublesome than a 'water-fly' such as Osric, are still not the type of flatterer most to be feared, for although they meddle in the affairs of kings and princes, they only serve as instruments to the fancies of those above them and have no machinations of their own.[901] As Hamlet correctly identifies, these men are no more than a 'spunge... that sokes vp the Kings countenaunce, his rewards, his| authorities, but such Officers doe the King best seruice in the end, he| keepes them like an [ape] in the corner of his iaw, first mouth'd to be| last swallowed, when hee needs what you haue gleand, it is but squeesing| you, and spunge you shall be dry againe'; they themselves have little substance and no grand design.[902]

The flatterer, however, who is in Plutarch's estimation 'so hard and yet needfull to beward of', is he 'who seemeth none such, and professeth nothing lesse than to flatter', who 'for the most part sober he is enough' but loves to 'bee a curious Polypragmon; he will have an oare in every boat, and thinks he is to intermedle in all matters; he hath a minde to be privie and partie in all deepe secrets; and in one word he carrieth himselfe like a grave Tragedian, and not as a Comicall or Satyricall player, and under that vision and habit he counterfeiteth a friend'.[903] Enter Polonius.[904]

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[901] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 3588, p. 248.
[902] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 2654-60, p. 180.
[903] Plutarch 1603, p. 86.
[904] Although much work has been done on Polonius's name, position and contemporary analogues, little attention has been paid to his role of as a counsellor in the context of the contemporary literature; see Bennett 1953, pp. 3-9; Churchward 1997, pp. 221-38; Oakes 1999, pp. 154-61; Kliman 2002, pp. 5-7. Bałuk-Ulewiczowa 2009, p. 183 acknowledges that Polonius's character was most

Polonius is first introduced as a trusted counsellor and as a loving father, loath to see his son leave his side.[905] When we next see Polonius, he continues to play such a role, imparting to Laertes well-meaning, if long-winded, precepts to guide his conduct. Here, Polonius is the quintessential orthodox humanist counsellor, although his lack of brevity and sense of timing in speech marks him as a very poor one indeed.[906]

As well as being familiar through a number of more contemporary sources, most of this advice to Laertes is drawn from Isocrates's *Ad Demonicum*, used a handbook for Elizabethan school children.[907] Regardless of whether such advice would thus be taken seriously or not, the *timing* of the advice is clearly poorly chosen, a lesson which is further emphasised by the source material itself. It is in this text that Isocrates gives his much-cited dictates for kairotic speech: 'Choose two moments only for speaking, the one when you know the subject well, the other when it is necessary to speak about it. These are the only occasions on which speech is better than silence; on all others it is better to be silent than to speak'.[908] The irony of this when applied to Polonius's own oration here and throughout the

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likely drawn from the class of books – what she calls the *speculum aulici* – which included Gośliczki *De optimo senatore*.

[905] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 228-9, p. 26.

[906] See Fisher 1990, pp. 37-47 for Polonius as humanist, Cardullo 2011 for Polonius's lack of brevity and delay of action. See also the debates in *Shakespeare Quarterly* in the 1950s on Polonius's instructions to his son: Bennett 1953, pp. 3-9; McGlinchee 1955, pp. 362-4; Bennett 1956, pp. 275-6; Hunter 1957, pp. 501-6; Davis 1958, pp. 85-6. Perhaps it is worth concluding these debates with the observation in Hunter 1957, p. 506 that regardless of whether the precepts are initially farcical or serious, eventually their 'disproportion becomes obvious' and the audience realises their 'inadequacy'.

[907] Bennett 1953, pp. 3-9.

[908] Isocrates 1980, 1:41.

play would be clear to Shakespeare's audience, given their familiarity with the text.[909]

His advice to Reynaldo is equally lengthy, so much so that it causes him, comically, to lose his place. However, this speech, coming quickly on the heels of his instructions to Laertes, reveals a disturbing second side to Polonius. Having just finished instructing his son in the precepts which should guide his life, Polonius is willing to use whatever deceitful means necessary to ensure that Laertes is following his advice. Reynaldo is to use 'What forgeries you please' to discover Laertes's actions, the examples of which shock his servant.[910] But Polonius has thought his method through, and tells him that:

> Your bait of falshood take this carpe of truth,
> And thus doe we of wisedome, and of reach,
> With windlesses, and with assaies of bias,
> By indirections find directions out[911]

Thus Hamlet's later identification of Polonius as a 'fishmonger' is indeed apt.[912] Polonius fishes out the 'carpe of truth' with the 'bait of falsehood', selling it on where it can fetch the highest price.[913]

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[909] Knowing and seizing *kairos* is a persistent problem for many of the characters in the play, especially Hamlet himself; see Baumlin and Baumlin 2002, pp. 165-86.
[910] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 911, p. 68.
[911] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 955-8, p. 72.
[912] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 1211; see Shaaber 1971, pp. 179-81; Jofen 1972, pp. 126-7.
[913] We can also look to the use of 'Fishmonger' in the longest of Erasmus colloquies, which details the dialogue between a butcher and a fishmonger. The declared purpose of the dialogue is to 'treat of human Constitutions' which some 'prefer... before divine Laws' while still others 'abuse Institutions both human and divine, to Gain and Tyranny'. The two men agree that the religious peace and uniformity of the world would be possible without the 'worst of Men', who 'take Advantage of the Opportunity'. Notably, the butcher prompts the fishmonger to declare what he would do if 'you shall be *Caesar*', following which butcher commends him, noting that he has 'played *Caesars* part very finely'; Erasmus 1997, pp. 675-762.

Of course, Polonius does not, as Hamlet would have him, 'play foole no where but in's owne house' but rather in the courts of king as well, where we once again see the dual identities of Polonius as orthodox humanist and Machiavellian at work. Paralleling his instructions to Laertes, his speech to Claudius and Gertrude regarding the cause of Hamlet's madness is a travesty of the rhetorical discipline, punctuated by Gertrude's 'more matter with lesse art' and his own response that he 'vse no art at all', which he repeats two lines down, and his opening: 'breuitie is the soule of wit'.[914]

However, once again, this is not all there is to Polonius, for he ends by suggesting a plot whereby he and the king may spy on Hamlet. Such plans to observe Hamlet, first with Ophelia and later with Gertrude, recall the contemporary imagery of counsellors who hide their true intentions and motives behind 'painted words', just as women paint their faces to hide their ugliness.[915] Shakespeare takes such imagery literally, twice placing the plotting Polonius behind not only veils, but behind the women in Hamlet's life. This is made explicit in this first scheme to overhear Hamlet with Ophelia. Having decided that he will 'loose [his] daughter' upon him, Polonius advises her to appear reading a book, as this will 'cullour' her 'lowliness', telling her 'Tis too much proou'd, that with deuotions visage| And pious action, we doe sugar ore| The deuill himselfe'.[916] Although Polonius is simply instructing Ophelia in the art of deception, as he had done Reynaldo, the listening Claudius takes the words to heart and echoes them: 'O tis too true,| The harlots

[914] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 1123, 1124, 1117, p. 82; see Cardullo 2011.
[915] Recall Montaigne 1603, p. 166: 'Those that mask and paint women, commit not so foule a fault [as orators]; for, it is no great losse, though a man see them not, as they were naturally borne and vnpainted: Whereas these professe to deceive and beguile, not our eyes, but our judgement; and to bastardize and corrupt the essence of things.'
[916] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 1696, 1697-1700, p. 120.

cheeke beautied with plastring art,| Is not more ougly to the thing that helps it,| Then is my deede to the most painted word', equating the art of beautification of women with the art of rhetoric in the hiding of ill deeds.[917] Hamlet too repeats the trope in his chiding of Ophelia in the same scene: 'the power of beautie will sooner transforme honestie| from what it is to a bawde' and again 'I haue heard of your paintings well enough, God hath giuen you one face, and you make your selfes another'.[918] Polonius, as Claudius had done, uses paradiastolic redescription to paint over his plotting, although it does not deceive Hamlet.

Polonius's dissembling nature not only brings about his own death, but also serves to justify it. Although Claudius would send Hamlet straight to England, Polonius insists that he first observe the conversation between Hamlet and Gertrude. He once again hides himself behind woman (queen) and veil (arras), which leads to his misidentification and his death at Hamlet's hand. It also confirms his identity as the worst kind of flatterer according to Plutarch: 'As for him, who (like as the Pourcuttle fish stretcheth out his clawes like branches) reacheth as farre as to the secret chambers and cabinets of women, with his busie intermedling, with his calumniations and malicious demeanors, such a one is savage, fell, intractable and dangerous to be approched.'[919] Hamlet, upon killing Polonius, establishes that it is his plotting and dissimulating nature which lies at the heart of his destruction – 'Thou wretched, rash, intruding foole farwell|... Thou find'st to be too busie is some danger'.[920] Driving home the idea that *optimi conciliarii mortui*, Hamlet notes how it is only in death that Polonius last achieves the skills most to be esteemed in a counsellor: 'this Counsayler| Is now most still, most secret, and most graue| Who

[917] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 1701-5, pp. 120, 122.
[918] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 1766-8, p. 124.
[919] Plutarch 1603, p. 99.
[920] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 2413-15, p. 164.

was in life a most foolish prating knaue'.[921] The counsellor suffers his demise at the hands of Hamlet.

[921] Shakespeare 1991 [1604/5], tln. 2580-2, 176.

Part III: Reason of State, 1603-1651

Chapter 7: The Language of Reason of State

As we have seen, by the latter half of the sixteenth century the Machiavellian challenge to the orthodox humanist discourse of counsel had developed into a fully articulated tradition. This does not mean that the orthodox discourse fades away, quite the contrary. In this chapter we shall be exploring one of the foremost answers to the Machiavellian challenge, articulated through an engagement with the vocabulary of reason of state.

The phrase 'reason of state' cannot be said to have any definitive or uncontested meaning in the early modern period.[922] We can, however, explore its use in two early seventeenth-century conciliar discourses.[923] The first is the 'Machiavellian' tradition that we have already explored. This is reason of state as associated with the tenets of Machiavellian counsel to princes, particularly the dissociation of *utile* and *honestum*, which becomes rearticulated – as we saw in Chapter 6 – as a tension between 'policy' and the law of God. However, little direct evidence of this Machiavellian reason of state exists; our knowledge of it proceeds almost entirely from the critiques which make up the second discourse of reason of state, the focus of this chapter.[924]

This second tradition seeks to advance 'true' reason of state against the Machiavellian variant. Primarily articulated by Jesuit writers, this view suggests that true reason of state and policy are not in contradiction to divine law, for

[922] See Höpfl 2002, p. 211; Malcolm 2007, p. 105; Condren 2011, p. 13.
[923] Malcolm 2007, p. 98.
[924] As Höpfl 2002, p. 211 points out, it was in fact those writing in opposition to this utility-based reason of state 'who *constructed* the identity "reason of state" for others as well as for themselves', and thus, as he suggests in 2011, p. 95, 'the confrontation between "Anti-Machiavellians" and "Machiavellians" was in considerable measure a rhetorical ploy'.

following God's law is in fact what is beneficial to the state.[925] In other words, these writers sought to undo the Machiavellian separation of *utile* and *honestum*, restoring the Ciceronian ends of counsel, by reconciling the state's advantage with religious concerns. Their willingness, however, to engage with concepts and terminology borrowed from their opponents, and to make their arguments for *honestum* from a concern for *utile*, mark their work as fundamentally different from that of Cicero and the orthodox humanists and closer to the 'false' reason of state they were attempting to discredit.

I. Policy

We have already seen some of the ways in which the idea of 'policy' became opposed to religion and morality in the sixteenth century. To counter this tendency, many authors used this vocabulary in an attempt to remoralise political deliberation, by defining two distinct types of policy.[926] The first was the original, prescribed by God, which was lawful and honest, and by these means brought about profit. The other was a perversion of the term, associated with Machiavellians who redescribed it as a willingness to counsel a prince towards whatever means necessary to achieve profit. For example, Barnabe Rich, a soldier and social critic, writes in his 1606 *Faultes, faultes, and nothing else but faultes* that there is policy 'that is legittimate, first begotten by *Wit*, and then fostered by *Honestie*' which is 'not to be neglected'.[927] However, there is also a type 'which more respecteth profit than it

[925] See Höpfl 2002, pp. 211-37.
[926] This idea is also in Cornwallis 1610, sig. Ee, 7^{v}-8^{r}: 'policie conducted by vertue, I thinke the life of Gouernment, without which a common-wealth can no more liue, then a bodie without a soule' as opposed to 'policie (as it is commonly taken and vsed) [which] is no more certaine nor profitable, then a Farmers drawing all his Councell from a Kalendar'.
[927] Rich 1606, p. 45.

doth the souereign Pollicie prescribed by Gods law'.[928] This 'worldly Policie' will 'do litle good, but to the end to doe a great deale of harme; for Pollicie and Profite haue euer marched arme in arme in one ranke'.[929] He echoes Cicero in writing that 'Profite being diuorced from Honestie, begetteth but a bastardly progenie, and it is a very dangerous doctrine, to teach that Profite may be separated from *honestie*'.[930] However, it is not honesty but profit, for Rich, that has the first consideration, for 'All *Policie*... is to be reiected, that tendeth not to publique profite'.[931] So he concludes that 'there is not a more pestilent thing then this plague of *policy*, which diuides it selfe from the policie prescribed by the rule of Gods word' and he condemns the '*Politician*' who has 'but a *Mammon* for his God, and *Machiuell* for his ghostly father'.[932]

Perhaps the clearest expression of this tension is given by Christopher Lever, a religious writer educated at Cambridge, in his 1608 *Heauen and Earth, Religion and Policy*, which takes as its central tenet that 'the best Policy is Religion'.[933] He too identifies two types of policy, for 'the generall name of Policie (like the double face of *Ianus*) respecteth two seueral obiects; the better hath regardful eie to honesty, and lawfull warrent onely, the other beholdeth all things with indifferent eie, not respecting lawfulnes, but conueniency in euery practise'.[934] It is this latter definition which is the 'common vnderstanding of Policie' whereby 'the name of lawfull Policie doth often times receiue much iniury'.[935]

[928] Rich 1606, p. 45.
[929] Rich 1606, p. 45.
[930] Rich 1606, p. 45.
[931] Rich 1606, p. 45.
[932] Rich 1606, pp. 45, 46.
[933] Lever 1608, p. 1.
[934] Lever 1608, p. 8.
[935] Lever 1608, p. 10.

Lever repeats these ideas and applies them directly to the role of counsel in *The historie of the defendors of the catholique faith*, published in 1627: the 'practise of euill men is in common construction *Pollicie*, whereby the name of *Pollicie* doth receiue much wrong by their grosse and senceless understanding it'.[936] For Lever, it is the aims of political counsel which give a normative ascription to this neutral term: 'Pollicie may be either good or bad according to the end'.[937] He demonstrates this through a history of the English Reformation and the roles of each of the monarchs – from Henry VIII to James I – in bringing about religious change in England, provided for the instruction of King Charles.

Counsel plays a prominent role in this text, for Lever notes that Henry VIII was 'ruled by perswasion and not by Iudgement', especially of that 'Matchiuellike' and 'great Polititian' Stephen Gardiner.[938] The same fate befalls Edward VI, who ought to have kept in mind that 'It is a *Pollitique* wisedome in a Prince to suspect the sincerity of al such state aduise, that hath principall reference to the aduancement of such Counsellors'.[939] A similar lesson applies in the case of Mary I, whose only fault was the 'two [sic] much credit she gaue to euill counsel', chiefly that of Bonner and Gardiner, whose 'Counsell was wicked pollicie, but no

[936] Lever 1627, p. 39.
[937] Lever 1627, p. 39.
[938] Lever 1627, p. 66. This is clear even on the frontispiece, which contains an image parallel to that in Foxe 1579 of Henry trampling the pope, surrounded by his counsellors (Figure 18). Unlike that of Foxe, however, here the book between Cramner and Henry is identified; it is clear that it is the 1535 Cloverdale Bible (and note once again the pointed fingers of Henry's counsellors). Given the similarities between Lever's account and that of Foxe, as well as the similarities between the two images, this suggests that Haller 1963, p. 173 was right in arguing that the book in question in Foxe's woodcut (see Figure 16) is also the 1535 Bible, being given by Cramner to Henry, and counters that of Hageman 1979, pp. 36-7 who identifies it as the Act of Succession of 1534. This also confirms Haller's assertion that the motion in the scene is from Cramner to Henry, rather than Henry to Cramner, further emphasising the role of counsel, strongly present in both Foxe and Lever's texts.
[939] Lever 1627, p. 186.

pietie'.[940] He treats her marriage to Philip II according to these requirements, concluding that it was 'neither *Poilitique* [sic] nor *Holy*', the latter because it brought her closer to the pope, the former because it was 'very hurtfull for our Nation, ayming directly at the vtter ouerthrow of the *English Monarchie*'.[941] He concludes his discussion of Mary by declaring:

> The Queenes error in these proceedings, was to receiue her *State* instructions, from such Counsellors as did labour onely to frame her to their owne designes, not regarding the publike benefit of the *State*. For doubtlesse had the Queene bene ordered by her *Pollitique State*, or by any one Counsellor in the *State* of honourable quallity, she had not giuen so much of her title and Maiestie to *Rome* and *Spaine* as by the perswasion of her Clergie Counsell she did.[942]

It is Elizabeth I who is able to resist the counsel of such men and establish England as a truly Christian state. Lever here makes the distinction between 'gouernment meerely pollitique', where the two pulls of '*Religion* and *Pollicie* are two diuers (or rather in full opposition) and that (many times) in the practise of State is commendable which in the iudgement of Religion is most damnable' and 'Christian *States*' where policy is a 'seruant to the worke of holinesse, and iudged by the sentence of true Religion' and thus religion and policy are reconciled.[943] Elizabeth's reign is a moment of transition between these two types, for Elizabeth was forced to make a choice between religion and policy, faced with 'certaine considerations, which in respect of Pollicie might haue diswaded the Queene from reforming the State of Religion'.[944] Her alteration of religion was 'in the wisedome

[940] Lever 1627, pp. 195, 198.
[941] Lever 1627, p. 214.
[942] Lever 1627, p. 223.
[943] Lever 1627, pp. 237-8.
[944] Lever 1627, p. 271.

of State' very dangerous; however, her choice created a Christian state in England, wherein policy would not diverge from religion.[945]

II. Reason of State

Lever uses the language of 'wisedome of State' in his history in order to describe those counsels which lead to the well-being of the state, and can either stand in unity with, or opposition to, divine law. It is very probable that by this he had in mind the vocabulary of 'reason of state'.[946] In order to understand this idea and its role in political counsel, one must begin with Giovanni Botero's *Ragione di Stato*, originally published in Italian in 1589. In his dedication to Wolf Dietrich von Raitenau, the Prince-bishop of Salzburg (given as Wolfgang Theodoric in the text), Botero notes with astonishment that reason of state is 'a constant subject of discussion' in the 'courts of kings and great princes'.[947] His shock is caused by the fact that this concept severs the connection between *honestum* and *utile*, placing

[945] Lever 1627, p. 273.

[946] The Italian *ragione di stato* was not always translated as *reason* of state. For instance, Richard Etherington's translation of *ragione di stato* is 'Iudgement of State' in the opening passages of his *Abstract of* Boterus della Ragione di Stato, produced between 1617 and 1625 (Sl. MS. 1065; see Appendix B). As no contemporary English print translation of the *Ragione* exists, I will be relying on Etherington's *Abstract* to supplement my reading of the 1956 Waley and Waley edition. The Italian indicated in square brackets is drawn from the 1598 edition of the text (the last that Botero himself edited), except where it differs from the original 1589, which I have noted.

[947] Botero 1956, p. xiii. Botero's choice of dedicatee may have had to do with Raitenau's political policies, which highlight the tension between divinity and state interests. Less than a year before Botero dates his dedicatory, Raitenau had expelled the Lutherans from Salzburg, but had chosen to grant exemptions to those whose industry supported the economic well-being of the state. Botero seems to support such a compromise, for he criticises the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in *Ragione* (1956, p. 146) on the grounds that it weakened the state and praises Raitenau for being able to combine the 'solicitude of the shepherd with the gravity of the prince' so that one cannot judge whether he is better suited to the 'rank of prince or prelate' (1956, p. xiv). See Strauss 1959, pp. 35-7 for the policies of Raitenau; see Birely 1990, pp. 48, 67 for Botero's treatment of the expulsion of the Jews.

emphasis on the latter.[948] This division is founded on the reading of two writers: Machiavelli, who 'bases his Reason of State on lack of conscience', and Tacitus, whose exemplar, Tiberius, 'justified his cruelty and tyranny by an inhuman *lex maiestatis*'.[949] Both, for Botero, erred in assuming that reason of state could be achieved by practices that were in opposition to honesty and God's law.[950]

Botero makes explicit that his goal is to rectify this mistake in the 'policy [*gouerni*] and counsel [*consigli*] of princes'.[951] Such rectification, however, does not mean that he disagrees with the Machiavellian idea that the preservation of the state should be the ultimate goal of such policy and counsel, but rather suggests that the means by which this preservation will come about will be in line with *honestum*. He writes in his dedicatory epistle that 'The very beasts possess a natural instinct which turns them towards useful [*vtili*] things and away from harmful ones: shall then the light of reason and dictates of conscience, bestowed upon man to enable him to distinguish good [*bene*] from evil [*male*], be obscured in affairs of state [*affair publici*], mute in matters of importance?'[952] The 'light of reason' and 'dictates of conscience' – reason of state and God's word – should and will be united in the achievement of *utile*.[953] The end of the political for Botero, as for Machiavelli, therefore, remains profit, but this profit can only be achieved through means which are in line with *honestum*.[954]

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[948] Botero 1956, p. xiv.
[949] Botero 1956, p. xiii.
[950] Botero's intention in uniting *honestum* and *utile* was noted by some of his earliest commentators, such as Apollinare de' Calderini who, writing in 1597, praised him for having 'so accommodated morality [*honestà*], justice, and obligation with the advantage [*profito*] of the prince'; quoted in Bireley 1990, p. 46.
[951] Botero 1956, p. xiv; note that these terms are plural in the Italian.
[952] Botero 1956, p. xiv.
[953] Botero 1956, p. xiv.
[954] Etherington provides an abridgement of this epistle under the heading 'Law of State and Conscience one': 'Some haue grounded their reason in litle conscience.

Botero defines reason of state as 'the knowledge [*notitia*]' of such means by which a state, a 'stable rule over a people', may be 'founded, preserved and extended'.[955] Reason of state is not the end of the political – this remains the security of the state – but rather the knowledge of the means by which to reach this end. As for Machiavelli, this rests in the achievement of *virtù* and the maintenance of the prince's reputation.[956] For Botero, however, *virtù* remains connected with the classical virtues, reputation serving to connect this *virtù* to the good of the state. In Chapter 8, Botero notes that the most important element of a state's preservation is the 'tranquillity of the subjects', best gained by establishing the prince's *riputatione* among the people.[957] As the people only give the right of governance to those who are 'known for their valour and outstanding qualities [*virtù*]', *virtù* is essential to maintaining stable governance over a people: 'the foundation [*fondamento principale*] upon which every State is built is the obedience of the subjects to their prince, and this in turn is founded upon his outstanding excellence [*l'eminenza della virtù del Principe*]'.[958]

Some haue mantled their tyranny with a cloke of barbarous lawe of Ma[jes][tie], and yet both accounted famous Statists or Idœaes of State, as though there were one law of State another of conscience: when as such as take away consciences Iurisdiction more in publique then in priuate thinges haue neither Soule nor God' (Sl. MS 1065, fo. 5[r]).

[955] Botero 1956, p. 1. It is unclear if *notitia* here carries the meaning of knowledge as a set of rules or principles, akin to a science, or rather a general awareness. Its relation to 'intelligence' and 'news' in the period suggests a connection to the knowledge of contemporary affairs, which Botero and others emphasise in relation to reason of state (see Chapter 8). Etherington renders this passage 'Iudgement of state is a notive of meane actions to found, conserue and enlarge gouernment or dominyons' (Sl. MS 1065, fo. 5[r]). Although no dictionary entry exists for 'notive', it is probably related to 'notition' meaning 'knowledge, information, intelligence'.

[956] Note that the translation of *virtù* by Waley and Waley 1956 obscures this important connection to Machiavelli.

[957] Botero 1956, p. 12.

[958] Botero 1956, pp. 12, 13-14. Etherington retains the essence of this passage: 'Reputation... [is] desireable in Prynces, for that the foundations of euery State, is

In Chapter 11 Botero provides his explanation of this crucial term.[959] Whereas Machiavelli had dissociated *virtù* from the classical taxonomy of virtues, Botero reiterates this connection, placing the classical virtues into three categories.[960] In the first are those virtues which inspire love among the people and are associated with justice and liberality, such as *humanità*, *cortesia* and *clemenza*. Although Botero provides a lengthy treatment of both justice and liberality in the chapters that follow, he makes it clear that they are of lesser importance when it comes to political leadership, for they are more likely to inspire love than *riputatione*, and it is the latter which will ensure the security of the state. It is the second category of virtues which inspire the reputation of the prince, and thus are more important. These include *fortezza*, military and political skills, *constanza*, *il vigour dell'animo* and *la prontezza dell'ingengo*, summarised under the headings of prudence and valour.[961] The final category contains temperance and religion, which support the achievement of the other virtues.

Despite his declared attention to the *consegli* of princes, Botero says little about the role of the counsellor in relation to reason of state. As with the Machiavellian tradition, it is to the Anglophone discourse that we need to turn to see these continental ideas directly applied to the role and figure of the political counsellor.

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the obedience of y^{e} Subiect to the Superior, w^{ch} is grounded vpon the eminency of the vertue of the Prynce' (Sl. MS 1065, fo. 6^{v}).

[959] See Bireley 1990, p. 54.

[960] Botero's list of the key virtues is almost identical to the four cardinal virtues, with the substitution of liberality for temperance, which is removed from the list of principle virtues and placed alongside religion in the third category. This may have to do with Machiavelli's specific treatment of liberality in Chapter XVI of *The Prince*.

[961] Etherington: 'Reputation by fortitude, Art military, policye, constancy, vigor of mynde, readines of witt, w^{ch} are reduced to prudence and valour' (Sl. MS 1065, fo. 6^{v}).

The English priest and (after 1614) Jesuit Thomas Fitzherbert takes the anti-Machiavellian discourses of policy and reason of state and translates them into 'general rules or aduises no lesse pious then politic, for the instructio[n] of such as desire to mannage affairs of state', especially those 'aduanced by his princes fauor to be of his *Councel*'.[962] He addresses Machiavellians as political counsellors, who have failed in their duty to give advice in line with both God's law and reason of state.

Fitzherbert's purpose is to undo the work of 'Politikes', such as Machiavelli, who remove from 'policy' all consideration of 'conscience & religion' and thus 'preuert the order of nature it selfe'.[963] As with Botero, it is an objection to the justification of unconscionable action based on the claim that '*reason of state required it*' that moves Fitzherbert to compose 'some discourse concerning the necessarie concurrance of the reason of state with conscience and religion'.[964]

Although his argument is based, for the most part, on the direct intervention of God's justice in the outcome of man's affairs, Fitzherbert does acknowledge that even when this consideration is removed, Machiavellian counsel still fails to ensure the good of the prince, because it does not maintain the prince's reputation. In addressing his young statist, Fitzherbert writes that there are three things 'which a councellour ought to consider to his prince': conscience, reputation and 'commodity'.[965] First establishing that 'any thing which is offensiue to God' cannot possibly 'be good for state', Fitzherbert suggests that 'beside that it is euident inough in true reason of state, that although there were no danger at al of Gods wrath, yet these and such other Macchiauillian policies, are not only insufficient to

[962] Fitzherbert 1606, pp. 304, 318.
[963] Fitzherbert 1606, sig. E, 2[r].
[964] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 36.
[965] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 331.

preuent or remedy the inconueniences which wicked princes incurre by the hatred of men, but also doe many times encrease their dangers'.[966] Even if God is taken out of the equation, the damage done to a prince's reputation by embracing Machiavellian policies ensures his downfall. Thus whether one is concerned for the prince's conscience, reputation or commodity, the advice ought to be the same:

> Therfore I conclude that whereas commodity, conscience and reputation, are to be respected in al deliberations concerning princes affairs, conscience ought euer to predominate, and to serue for the touchstone and rule, as wel of reputation as of temporal commodities; and therein a councellour shal wel discharge his duty, if in al his consultations he hold the knowne axiome of Cicero for his ground, to wit, that *Nihil est vtile quod non sit honestum. Nothing is profitable which is not honest*.[967]

Fitzherbert revives the Ciceronian unification of *utile* and *honestum* based on a consideration of reason of state in the role of the counsellor.

He drives this point home in a subsequent chapter by considering 'for the furder instruction of a young statist... whether a princes state can be assured by wicked policy'.[968] He addresses this question 'by reason of state, without the consideration of Gods iustice'.[969] Once again, it is reputation that does the work of connecting Machiavellian practices with the downfall of the prince, for 'wickednes in a prince, maketh him hateful to his subiects and consequently endangereth his estate'.[970] There is no such thing as being 'securely wicked'.[971] Machiavellians 'doe most absurdly endanger their princes' and thus the entire state 'by their wicked counsel' for one cannot 'separate the peril of the commonwelth, from the peril of

[966] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 335.
[967] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 362.
[968] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 381.
[969] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 381.
[970] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 381.
[971] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 381.

the prince'.[972] It is reason of state that, rather than justifying Machiavellian principles, serves to discredit them: 'the absurdity of *Macchiauel*, is most manifest in true reason of state, seeing that in councelling princes to wickednes and tiranny, vpon confidence of humane force and policy, he exposeth them to an assured danger, and doth not geue them any assured or probable remedy but rather heapeth danger vpon danger'.[973] Machiavellians fail as counsellors as they do not preserve the life of prince or state.

It has been suggested that Fitzherbert modelled his argument on that of his 'friend and mentor', the Jesuit Robert Persons, who had applied the language of reason of state to the question of religion in England in his 1593 *Newes from Spayne and Holland*.[974] In the second half of this work, Persons turns to 'considerations of State' in the question of 'whether the present gouerment of Inglish affayres, setting a side al regard of partiality to religion: were in it selfe and according to reason, experience and law of pollicy to be account wise and prudent'.[975] This is applied directly to the question of counsel, for the question comes down to 'whether such as chiefly managed [English affairs], and namely the lord Burley, were in truth a wise ma[n] or no?'[976] The discussants decide that he was *not* wise, because 'his councelles... semed scarse defensable, not only for lack of iustice or co[n]science' but also because 'euen in nature of humane wisdome and pollycy set downe by Machauel him selfe, or by any other of lesse conscience then he, they seemed erronio[u]s'.[977] Persons demonstrates that it is 'a great ouersight in

[972] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 382.
[973] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 402.
[974] See Höpfl 2011, pp. 94, 96.
[975] Persons 1593, pp. 21, 22.
[976] Persons 1593, p. 22.
[977] Persons 1593, p. 22.

reason of state' for Elizabeth to have made 'so vniuersal a change of religion'.[978] He suggests that it was Elizabeth's counsellors, primarily Burghley and Nicholas Bacon, who swayed her to such a decision by using 'reasons and arguments of state... against both her owne inclination, and the opinio[n]s of the rest of her principal counsellors'.[979]

The issue is taken up by another Catholic writer, Benjamin Carier, in *A Treatise* of 1614, who suggests that reason of state did in fact force Elizabeth to restore the Protestant religion. As it was 'in policie necessarie for [Elizabeth], who was the daughter of King HENRY the eight by ANNE BOLEINE, borne with the contempt of Rome' to restore the Protestant church, so it 'were necessary in reason of State' for her 'to continue the Doctrine of Diuision'.[980] Carier admits that if the 'same reason of State, which there was in the beginning, & continued all Queene ELIZABETHS daies' still applied under James I, 'there is as little hope now that your Maiesty should hearken vnto reconciliation'.[981] However, there is no longer any disparity between reason of state and the Catholic religion, as James's claim is not dependent on the marriage of Henry VIII to Anne Boleyn, and so Carier 'doe finde as little cause of holding out in reason of State, as I doe in truth of Doctrine'.[982] Reason of state, for Persons and Carier, can have the power to override concerns of right religion. For Carier, these reasons have disappeared with the accession of the Stuarts, and Catholicism can be restored, bringing policy back into alignment with religion.

[978] Persons 1593, p. 22.
[979] Persons 1593, p. 22.
[980] Carier 1614, p. 32.
[981] Carier 1614, pp. 32, 30.
[982] Carier 1614, p. 30.

III. Interests

Both Persons and Fitzherbert ascribe the deviation from true reason of state to the personal motives of evil counsellors. Even Machiavelli himself, Fitzherbert suggests, was guilty of this; he argues that Machiavelli *intentionally* counselled against true reason of state in order to overthrow the Medici regime.[983] Thus Fitzherbert underlines his requirement that counsellors should be free from 'passion, and particular affection', or else they too will put forward advice that will bring about their own designs and not the good of the prince.[984]

Botero, too, writes against the conflict caused by counsellors' individual ambitions; however, in doing so he employs a different and influential vocabulary, for he tells his addressee to 'Admit to your counsels [*consiglio di Stato*] no one who owes allegiance to another ruler, for he whose interest [*interesse*] lies elsewhere cannot give you an unbiased opinion', as 'interest enters in many and subtle ways into the consultation of princes'.[985] He makes reference to the idea of 'interest' in a different sense in the same chapter: 'It should be taken for certain that in the decisions made by princes interest will always override every other argument'.[986] Thus, there are, for Botero, two kinds of interest: the prince's interest, which ought

[983] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 412: 'some Florentines of no meane iudgement [Machiavelli's] owne cuntrymen, and frends, who in their ordinary discourses concerning his pollicies, doe not stick to confesse that he him selfe knew theym to be contrary to true reason of state, and pernicious to princes, & that neuerthelesse desiring to ouerthrow those of the house of the *Medices* which opprest the commonwelth of *Florence* in his tyme, he published his pestilent doctrin, hoping that they wold embrace it & ruine theymselues by the practise therof, wherby the state of *Florence* might returne to the ould *Democracy* or popular gouernment wher in it had continued many yeres before.'
[984] Fitzherbert 1606, p. 327.
[985] Botero 1956, p. 46. This 'maxim of prudence' is missing from Etherington's *Abstract*.
[986] Botero 1956, p. 46.

to be the aim of the counsellor, and those other private interests which may interfere with it.[987]

Taking first these other 'particular' interests of the counsellor, during the course of the seventeenth century, a concern emerges for how such motives may cloud the judgment of the counsellor. For example, in *Of Wisdome,* translated in 1608, the Catholic theologian Pierre Charron adds to the requirements of 'honesty, and sufficiency' in counsellors 'a third, and that is, that neither they nor their neerest and inward friends haue any particular interest in the business'.[988] Fray Juan de Santa Maria, another Jesuit writer, also expresses this sentiment in his *Policie vnveiled,* first published in English in 1632. He notes that a king must have about him 'iust, prudent, & dis-interessed persons, to aduise them'.[989] Such disinterest consists in an 'vnderstanding... tearme[d] the Will' which is 'free and dis-incumbranced of affection, or particular passions, as well in asking, as giuing Counsaile'.[990] If this is the case, Santa Maria suggests, it will produce a unity of opinion in the council, 'and if this vnitie be not amongst them, it is to be imagined, that they loue not so much the King and State, as their owne priuate interest'.[991] The prince must therefore consider his counsellors' 'affections, naturall inclinations, passions, ambitions, desires, and the like', for all are inclined to 'tread in one and the same steps... of their owne black and fowle Interest'.[992]

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[987] Botero 1956, p. 41. Etherington here does not translate *interesse* as 'interest', but as 'reputation': 'Hold as a thinge resolued for a Prynce not to deale in deliberation or trust wth any that hath not y^{e} foundation of reputation' (Sl. MS 1065, fo. 11^{v}).
[988] Charron 1608, p. 324.
[989] Santa Maria 1650 [1632], p. 55.
[990] Santa Maria 1650 [1632], p. 64.
[991] Santa Maria 1650 [1632], p. 129.
[992] Santa Maria 1650 [1632], p. 271. Santa Maria concludes based on this that 'Princes ought to peruse Histories' for 'Onely Histories, without feare or dread, speake plaine language to Kings' (1650 [1632], p. 273).

This concern with interest is expressed in the continued publication of works in the advice-to-counsellors genre that we first encountered in Chapter 4. *The counsellor of estate*, written by the French administrator and diplomat Philippe de Béthune in 1633, and translated by Edward Grimston a year later, combines the work of several noted authors, including Bartolome Felippe, Justus Lipsius and Botero, in addressing the office of the counsellor. In his chapter on 'the setling of a Councell of Estate, and of the quallities and number of Councellors' Béthune adds Botero's language of interest to Felippe's account of the qualities of counsellors, stating that 'it is likewise certayne, that in affaires where we haue no interest, we iudge much better, then when as we put our interest in Ballance with our opinions in Councells'.[993]

Béthune uses the metaphor of gamblers to demonstrate this point, writing that 'he that lookes ouer Gamesters, and is not possest neyther with the hope of gayne, nor the feare of losse, will giue a better iudgment of the carriage of the game then he that playes' and so likewise 'he that in Councell hath not any feare to lose his Estate, and who brings neyther affection nor passion, will alwayes take the most honourable party'.[994] He makes clear that this 'affection' and 'passion' is synonymous with interest, for 'he which hath any interest preuented by his owne opinion and feare, will willingley incline to that side by the which he thinks to saue himselfe'.[995] Notably, Béthune's metaphor of the 'gamester' suggests that it is actually those outside the game – those watching the stage-play of politics – who have the least interest and judge best, although he does not explicitly make this point. He does, however, question how likely it is that such disinterested

[993] Béthune 1634, pp. 55, 59.
[994] Béthune 1634, p. 59.
[995] Béthune 1634, p. 59.

counsellors are to be found, for he writes that 'the Councellors of Princes are accompanied with iealousie one against another; and tending all to one end, they finde out many times publique Councels, and make them serue to their owne priuate interests'.[996] Thus it is the prince who must outwit his own counsellors, even by spying on them, as the Grand Seignior, who views his counsellors through a secret window in the council chamber 'by the which (without being seene) he may heare all that is spoken and past in his Councell'.[997]

Turning to the second type of interest – that of the state – Béthune makes reference to it via his translation of Botero's first maxim of prudence: 'A Prince may easily iudge by himself what may be the deliberation of all others of his condition. Interest is the part and reason which preuailes, and makes the resolutions, bend to that side where it shewes it selfe: And therefore he must neither trust to Friendship, alliance, league, nor any other Bond, if there be no interest'.[998] This idea had already appeared in Anglophone discourse in 1606, with the translation of René de Lucinge's *The beginning, continuance, and decay of estates*. A diplomat like Béthune and acquaintance of Botero, Lucinge draws heavily on the *Ragione*, applying reason of state to contemporary politics in an analysis of European relations with the Turkish Empire.[999]

Interest plays an important role in this work, for Lucinge, first having established that the Ottomans gained their great empire via Machiavellian means, in his final book seeks to discover whether their state will soon fall, and in particular

[996] Béthune 1634, pp. 67-8.
[997] Béthune 1634, pp. 8. Béthune also repeats the distinction between counsel and command made by Felippe and others, writing 'in regard of the Councels power, it ought onely to consist in giuing Councell, and not to command, Commandment being inseparable with the Souereignty' (1634, p. 64).
[998] Béthune 1634, p. 261.
[999] See Baldini 2004, pp. 259-73.

asks 'Why the leagues amongst Christian Princes are commonly of small effect[?]'[1000] He begins by establishing that 'all the actions of Princes are vndertaken for two principal causes, honor and profit'; however, as it is usually profit which is given the primary regard – 'the consideration of honor often masqueth vnder the pretence or good of their affairs' – he agrees with Botero that the better approach is to 'only meddle with profit' which he 'tearme[s] interest'.[1001] Although interest is a 'common maske for all faces', there is not a single interest but a multiplicity of them amongst the princes in Christendom when it comes to the Turkish empire – some are driven by necessity to engage in a war against them, others have no interest whatsoever – and so they cannot be united against them.[1002] To argue for the conquest of the Turks from interest would require that all princes see 'great profit or interest in such an enterprise'.[1003] As this is not the case, there is an 'impossibilitie of establishing a league... vnlesse wee can minister some remedy to the diuersities of this interest and profit'.[1004] His only suggestion is that 'the league be contracted at leisure, in a time of peace' so that *none* of the princes have a particular interest in the enterprise, and are thus able to turn to 'the glory of God with a free hart, and an vndaunted magnanimitie'.[1005] As long as interest remains a

[1000] Lucinge 1606, p. 133.
[1001] Lucinge 1606, p. 133. Botero had also associated interest explicitly with profit in his original edition of *Ragione*, although it is removed from the 1598 edition. In his discussion of *consegli*, he defines prudence as 'a virtue whose function is to seek and find convenient means to bring about a given end' according to 'what is honest [*honesto*] rather than what is useful [*utile*]' and distinguishes this from astuteness (*astute*), which has the same function, but 'takes nothing into account but interest [*interesse*]'. It seems likely that Botero removes this passage as contradicting his argument that honesty, utility and the state's interest are all one. Lucinge, however, probably would have read an edition which still contained this passage; see Baldini 2004, pp. 259-73.
[1002] Lucinge 1606, p. 133.
[1003] Lucinge 1606, p. 134.
[1004] Lucinge 1606, p. 135.
[1005] Lucinge 1606, p. 139.

consideration for any of the princes, however, such a godly endeavour is impossible.

By 1640, this discourse is fully developed and expressed through the translation of Henri, Duc de Rohan's *A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States of Christendome*. He opens his work with the resounding statement that 'The PRINCES command the *People*, & the *Interest* commands the *Princes*. The knowledge of this Interest is as much more raised above that of Princes actions, as they themselves are above the *People*'.[1006] Interest is also elevated above counsel, for 'The *Prince* may deceive himselfe, his *Councell* may be corrupted, but the Interest alone can never faile'.[1007] If this true interest is not discovered, it is either because 'the *Prince* hath not well understood it, or else for that it was disguised by the corruption of his *Ministers*'.[1008]

In his second part, he notes how 'the ill successes that have happened' in Christendome 'proceeded not from any other cause, then the neglecting of the said *interest*'.[1009] In '*matter of State*' one must be guided not by '*inordinate* desires', '*violent passions*' nor '*superstitious opinions*' but rather by 'proper interest guided by reason alone'.[1010] Interest replaces *honestum* as that which is guided by reason and is thus the proper end of the political counsellor.

Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac, a French epistolary writer, directly connects this state interest with the proper ends of counsel in his *Prince*, composed in eulogistic praise of Louis XIII in 1631, and translated into English in 1648.[1011] Writing against those who 'mingle God among their passions, who ingage him in

[1006] Rohan 1640, p. 1.
[1007] Rohan 1640, p. 1.
[1008] Rohan 1640, p. 1.
[1009] Rohan 1640, p. 38.
[1010] Rohan 1640, pp. 38-9.
[1011] See Watter 1957, pp. 215-47.

their Interests, and who employ him upon all occasions', Balzac echoes Rohan's assessment that true interest is driven by reason as a counter to the passions.[1012] It is what leads us to honest action, for 'we must be honest men of necessity and out of Interest, when we cannot be by Inclination nor will; since evill is as unprofitable as dishonest'.[1013] He praises Louis's clemency as it demonstrates that 'he moves only by the line of Reason... [and] that the Interest of his State retain in him this day, the place of the passions of his soul'.[1014]

Importantly, following interest can also lead to the withdrawal of mercy, such as in the case of the traitor who 'mingled his own Interests with those of the State' so that 'none but the King could separate them'.[1015] This man's death was 'excusable severity' as it was used 'to divert misfortunes which threaten the state'.[1016] He uses this example of mingled interests to praise 'that punctuall and scrupulous Justice' which preventatively prosecutes crimes before they take place.[1017] This 'extream right' would be 'extream injustice' if prudence did not 'ease Justice in many things' such as this.[1018] For 'Justice is exercised only upon the Actions of men, but *Prudence* hath a right over their thoughts, and secretest Intention... she respects the publicke Interest'.[1019] Prudence leads one to uncover the state's true interest, which can serve to justify the overthrow of justice.

[1012] Balzac 1648, p. 60.
[1013] Balzac 1648, p. 239. This is paralleled in Balzac's *Aristippe*, first published in French in 1658: 'Our reason must not withdraw itself from our immediate interests and the business at hand'; quoted in Watter 1957, p. 216.
[1014] Balzac 1648, p. 82.
[1015] Balzac 1648, p. 147.
[1016] Balzac 1648, pp. 151, 152.
[1017] Balzac 1648, p. 153.
[1018] Balzac 1648, p. 153.
[1019] Balzac 1648, p. 154.

Balzac applies the pre-emptive defence of state interest to the question of the '*Monster*' of Europe: the Spanish 'design of the Universall *Monarchie*'.[1020] This 'monster' is a perversion of the relationship between counsel and command, for Balzac 'accuse[s] that Counsel which fights against the good nature of the *Prince*, which will command its own Master; and this is the *Monster* of which I speak'.[1021] It is 'at the[ir] perswasion' that the 'Emperour himself so wise and vertuous' has plotted against his fellow Christian princes, so that the actions of Spain are 'but a part of the Actions and Thoughts of this *Monster*'.[1022] The Spanish Council of State embraces 'Machiavellian' counsels: 'that Truth of it self is not better than falsehood, and that we ought to measure the value of the one and of the other, by the profit which comes from them' and that 'vertue may be sometimes dangerous, but its appearance alwayes necessary'.[1023] These counsellors have 'renounce[d] all hope of *Paradice* for the smallest Interest' and have 'give[n] certain vices the names of vertues, which are neer unto them'.[1024]

Like Lucinge, he seeks to discover if the interests of the European states are in accord in combating this corrupt conciliar monster. He notes, for example, that the King of England, 'Now that he is rid of that Importunate, who traversed all his good designes' – the Duke of Buckingham[1025] – will certainly join, for he 'wil not abandon a cause in the which besides the reasons of State which are common to him with us, his Honor and his Conscience will ingage him'.[1026] He will follow 'his

[1020] Balzac 1648, pp. 175, 174.
[1021] Balzac 1648, p. 175.
[1022] Balzac 1648, pp. 179-80, 183.
[1023] Balzac 1648, p. 188.
[1024] Balzac 1648, pp. 198, 235.
[1025] Executed in 1628, the same year that the manuscript edition of *Le Prince* was sent to Cardinal Richelieu and two years before its first publication.
[1026] Balzac 1648, p. 311.

first Inclinations, and his true Interests', which are to join with the Italians.[1027] He is 'an *Italian* by the Mothers side, and consequently interessed in the present affaires, not only by honour and consideration of State, but also out of a naturall Inclination and Piety'.[1028] Having been freed from the contrary counsel of Buckingham, Charles I is able to follow his and England's true interests in warring against the Spanish monster.

Not every writer, however, was so willing to trust in the guidance of interest, associating it instead with the dangerous attributes of the false reason of state condemned by the Jesuit writers. These themes are present in the work of Italian satirist Trajano Boccalini, translated as *The New-Found Politicke* by William Vaughn in 1626, but better-known as the *News-sheet from Parnassus*. In this piece, Boccalini takes particular aim at those who espouse Machiavellian reason of state as well as those like Lucinge, Rohan and Balzac who are willing to see the state's interest as the guiding star of the political counsellor. The book opens with a discussion of the 'publick Shop in *Parnassus*' which has been set up by the 'Corporations of *Politicians*', selling various tools of their trade, for instance, playing on the idea of redescription, 'most excellent Pencils for those *Princes*, who in their vrgent occasions, are often enforced to paint white for black vnto their people'.[1029] Also sold in this shop are 'certain *Compasses*... of the pure interesse of the most fine *reputation*'.[1030] These compasses 'measure a mans owne proper actions' far better than those of 'fantasticke conceit, of self-will, or of meere interresse'.[1031]

[1027] Balzac 1648, p. 312.
[1028] Balzac 1648, p. 318.
[1029] Boccalini 1626, pp. 1, 2.
[1030] Boccalini 1626, p. 4.
[1031] Boccalini 1626, p. 4.

'Interresse' receives a resounding critique in the *Newsheet*. In Boccalini's allegory of the flight of Fidelity from Parnassus, Fidelity states that it is 'that infamous Interesse', which 'tyrannizeth ouer the minds of all the best Nations', that has 'banished me from out the heart of men, which in former times were wholly mine'.[1032] The metaphor of the compass returns again in Boccalini's analysis of Spain, in which he writes that 'they who measuring all the Actions and proceeding of those which reigne among Princes, by the onely compasse of priuate interesse, doe seldome admit any manner of piety towards God, much lesse of charity towards men' and that Spain knows well 'how vnder her rich robe of cloth of gold to paliate her priuate interesse, be it neuer so diabolicall'.[1033] The country is in trouble, however, as 'the ministers and officers of Spaine are continually interessed in their priuate profit'.[1034]

Following this analysis of the ministers of Spain, Boccalini treats those 'seruants, that with their prodigious ambition, and artificial tricks (altogether diabolical) vndertake to rule and gouerne their Lord and Master' and who 'are without charity towards their Princes welfare, or priuate interesse' in favour of their own.[1035] Courtiers, Boccalini notes, are forced to navigate the changing seas of the prince's 'priuate interesse, and self-passion' while also attempting to steer the 'course of their priuate passions towards their owne interesse or self-respects'.[1036] It is satirically suggested in one passage that the best way to combat the self-interest of such counsellor-figures is to adopt the German method 'of excessiue quaffing of

[1032] Boccalini 1626, pp. 9-10.
[1033] Boccalini 1626, pp. 65, 72.
[1034] Boccalini 1626, p. 93.
[1035] Boccalini 1626, pp. 93, 95.
[1036] Boccalini 1626, p. 41.

Wine'.[1037] Counsellors in Germany, 'did most exquisitely well aduise & counsell their country... by means of the good store of wine that they had drunk, hauing therein drowned all priuate interesses'.[1038] Boccalini ends this discussion with a quotation from Tacitus's *Germania*: '*Deliberant, dum fingere nesciunt; constiuunt, dum errare nonpossant* [sic]' – 'They deliberate when they have no power to dissemble; they resolve when error is impossible'.[1039]

This reference to Tacitus may be read with irony, given what Boccalini has to say about this author elsewhere in his work. As has been established, and as Botero notes, Tacitus was a foundational author in the reason of state discourse.[1040] Boccalini identifies him as 'the chief standard-bearer of all famous *Historians*, the Father of all humane wisdome, the Oracle of perfect reason of *State*, and absolute Master of *Politicians*', a encomium more biting than praising, for 'to obserue and obey the rules of *Tacitus*', princes 'act, and daily perpetrate deeds, that by the vgliest Deuils of hell, are deemed most abhominable'.[1041] Boccalini's Apollo declares that 'all moderne Policie is but the trash of... *Tacitus*' and that he is a 'sublime *Pedagogue* to instruct others in that most villanous doctrine to smother and suppresse the conceits and meanings of a true-meaning heart, and yet to speake with a false-lying tongue'.[1042] It is he who has provided the instructions for how to use the 'tools' for sale in the politicians' shop: 'how with the pensill of false pretences, to pourtray blacke for white... and with the pernitious compasse of priuate interesse to measure loue, hate, trust, faith, honestie, and each humane or

[1037] Boccalini 1626, p. 51.
[1038] Boccalini 1626, p. 51.
[1039] Boccalini 1626, p. 53.
[1040] Tuck 1993; Condren 2011, pp. 19-20.
[1041] Boccalini 1626, pp. 16, 19.
[1042] Boccalini 1626, pp. 27, 18.

morall vertue'.[1043] In other words, with the consideration of interests taken into account, Boccalini suggests that there may be reason to mistrust even the counsel of the dead.

[1043] Boccalini 1626, p. 17.

Chapter 8: Observation, Travel and Secrets of State

The introduction of the discourse of reason of state is intimately connected with a change in views regarding the knowledge and skills required of the political counsellor. We have already seen, in Chapter 5, that many writers replace the orthodox humanist emphasis on rhetorical technique with a preference for the political knowledge gleaned from histories, based on suspicions of the rhetorically-adept counsellor. In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this reliance on history too finds critics, and is rejected by many in favour of political knowledge drawn from contemporary external affairs, provided by the first-hand observations of travellers.[1044] This is based not only on a suspicion of the biases of historians, who are held to have their own interests, but also on the importance placed on comparative state discourse and the knowledge of state secrets to the determination of reason of state. Just as we saw the people positioned as the recipients of histories in Chapter 5, here too we see that by the middle of the period the revelation of state secrets becomes a matter for the populace as a whole, and that the people – through parliament – begin to replace the counsellor in the discovery and relation of such intelligence.

[1044] As Grafton 2007, p. 299 notes, this was in many ways an extension of the earlier shift away from rhetorical ornamentation in history: 'The artists of history, as we have seen, recognized travel – properly conducted – as a powerful source of information. But if information acquired by modern, trained observers through direct experience mattered so much, and if all information looked more or less the same once it had been salted away in notebooks and then pulled out again to spice a modern treatise, why should past experience that happened to be found in books trump it?'; see Popper 2012, p. 5.

I. The Rejection of Histories

History, of course, does not cease to be an important source for political counsel for many writers; Tacitus in particular was foundational during this period.[1045] The historian Richard Baker dedicates his 1642 translation of Virgilio Malvezzi's *Discovrses Upon Cornelius Tacitus* to Lord Viscount Saye, a member of the privy council, as such ideas were 'most fit to be presented to Counsellours of State' and Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac's *The Prince* adds the language of interest to the oft-cited lesson that the best counsel to a prince comes from the dead: history presents 'sincere counsels, which are not suspected of flattery, nor proceed from passion, in which there enters no particular Interest'.[1046]

Other writers, however, instead suggest that historians were just as likely to flatter as a living counsellor. Barnabe Rich, for example, writing against the Machiavellian turn in his *Faultes faults* of 1606, notes that although the '*Historiographers*... office is as well to record faults, as worthie Acts', many 'Historiographers flatter'.[1047] If one examines their works, it becomes clear that they have 'so powdered their writings, with such varietie of discourse, as he is but a single-soald reader that cannot perceiue they haue flattered'.[1048] Historians, Rich contends, are just as likely to paint and powder their writings as rhetoricians.

The rejection of history's presentation of the naked truth was, for many writers, a strategy to discredit Machiavelli's political authority. This connection is made explicit by William Struthers, a minister in the Church of Scotland. In his *Looking glasse for princes and people*, published in 1632, Struthers sets out three

[1045] Tuck 1993.
[1046] Malvezzi 1642, n.p.; Balzac 1648, p. 111. Although, as we shall see, both Malvezzi and Balzac amend these statements about history significantly.
[1047] Rich 1606, p. 38.
[1048] Rich 1606, p. 38.

kinds of kings: '*Gods King*: *Machiavells Tyrant*: And the *Pop*[*e*]*s Vassall*'.[1049] God's King accredits God and the people with the establishment of his power, is religiously disposed, governs according to the counsel of the wise and accounts his people as free men. By contrast, Machiavelli's Tyrant is willing to use whatever means necessary to attain to the crown, only *appears* to be religious, trusts in his own wit above the counsel of others and enslaves his people.[1050] Struthers suggests that '*Machiavells godlesse direction*' in crafting this tyrant was not his own, but gleaned from his study of history.[1051] Machiavelli was 'not so much the *inventer* as a *polisher*', for 'the pieces of that policie lay scattered in Histories' and he but 'put them together'.[1052] For Struthers, Machiavelli himself is the sort of flattering historian that Rich criticises for his treatment of 'his darling', Cesare Borgia, learning such practices from his study of other historians, primarily Tacitus.[1053]

Despite writing in praise of Tacitus, the Italian humanist and diplomat Virgilio Malvezzi details in his *Discourses* the corruptions common to historians, connecting this theme with the language of interests. Malvezzi writes that historians have most difficulty with the 'persons interessed' in their histories, 'which are either Princes, or Common-wealths'.[1054] Historians, like counsellors, face the greatest challenge 'under a wicked Prince' for 'either conceiling his vices, he shewes himselfe a manifest flatterer, and no wise Historian... or else writing the

[1049] Struthers 1632, p. 90.
[1050] The Pope's Vassal has the same characteristics as Machiavelli's Tyrant, but acts according to the will of the pope.
[1051] Struthers 1632, p. 93.
[1052] Struthers 1632, p. 93.
[1053] Struthers 1632, p. 94. This idea had been advanced by Fitzherbert 1606, who suggestes that Machiavelli distorted history by not relating the failings and fall of Cesare Borgia in order to bring down the de' Medici regime (p. 27).
[1054] Malvezzi 1642, p. 68.

truth, he shal in so doing, make his owne grave'.[1055] History is just as susceptible to the manipulations of clever writers and the pressures of self-interest as any other source of counsel and as a result not as reliable as many would have it be.

Malvezzi seeks to determine what kind of historian is 'most worthy to be credited', those who write of times past or those who write of present events – both of whom he describes as 'historians' – taking into consideration as well the difference between those who write as witnesses and those who use the accounts of others.[1056] He concludes that it is 'historians' of present events who are most credible, as in 'writing of their owne time, they are not tied to stand to the bookes of others, who never agree with one another'.[1057] Unlike many of the travel-writers we shall encounter, Malvezzi suggests that it is this present historian who relies on accounts, rather than having witnessed the event himself, who will be the most reliable; for although 'it appeares there is more credit to be given to an Historian that writes of his owne time, and of those things at which he hath himselfe been present', he who writes of events he did not witness will be 'voyd of those affections, which make Historians speake lesse truth'.[1058] Thus for Malvezzi it is the historian of contemporary affairs, who was not present at the events that he relates, who is the most reliable source; historians who speak of present events which they witnessed themselves are second-most credible, and it is the historian of past events who is the least trusted to relate the truth.

Malvezzi drives this point home in his own history of present events – *The Pourtract of the Politicke Christian-favourite*, translated in 1647. In this piece he provides an account of the life of Count Gaspar de Guzmán, Duke of Olivares. As

[1055] Malvezzi 1642, p. 69.
[1056] Malvezzi 1642, p. 77.
[1057] Malvezzi 1642, p. 77.
[1058] Malvezzi 1642, p. 77.

Guzmán was still alive at the time of its composition, 'the book is not yet finished', containing 'not All that the Duke hath done, nor all that hee will doe'.[1059] It is, thus, very much a present history, and Malvezzi explicitly positions himself as the historian most to be credited, noting that what he writes is 'onelie a little that I came to heare of', not that which he was present at himself.[1060] Thus his 'actions are without policies' for he is 'without interest' in the affairs he relates.[1061]

The main body of the work echoes these themes, further discrediting the verity of histories of past events. In his 'State Maxims, and Polliticall observations on the actions of Count Olivares', Malvezzi notes especially that 'the relation of things past, is like the painting of a picture, and some oddes there is, in relating things past, and present'.[1062] Like many painters, historians opt for flattery in their portrayal of their subject: 'the Actions of Predecessours that they may be praised, require no more then to bee flourishingly related' and so, like a portrait, 'if they be but master-like painted, no consideration is had, whether the Actions be true' for, being in the past (and as 'the space of an hundred yeares, is the bredth of the channell of the river of forgetfulesse'), no one can determine for certain whether or not they occurred as reported.[1063] Instead, he concludes that 'it is profitable to Register the egregious performances of men in being', rather than those in the past.[1064]

[1059] Malvezzi 1647, sig. A, 8^{r}.
[1060] Malvezzi 1647, sig. A, 8^{r-v}.
[1061] Malvezzi 1647, sig. A, 5^{r}.
[1062] Malvezzi 1647, n.p. 'Odds' here having the meaning of 'The amount by which one number or quantity differs from another, or by which one thing exceeds or surpasses, or falls short of or below another; amount in excess or defect; difference'.
[1063] Malvezzi 1647, pp. 3-4,
[1064] Malvezzi 1647, p. 3.

Crucially, Malvezzi uses this distrust of historical accounts to mount an attack on Machiavelli. He goes a step further than Struthers had, not simply accusing Machiavelli of being a flattering historian, but criticising him for using history at all in his political writings. '*Machiavell*', he writes, was 'deceived in believing, that the helpe of history did consist in the making use of example; and from this errour, as from the Root, come all his failings in policy'.[1065] He counters the argument that 'If men are desirous to know the learning of the Ancients, they should likewise desire to imitate their actions', suggesting that '*Nicholas Machiavel*... would have men have recourse to Ancient rather than Modern Writers'.[1066] He reports that Machiavelli 'said, that if we make use of the learnings of the Antient, for Physick, if of their Lawes for judgment... why should be we not serve out turnes likewise with them by imitation of their Actions' and declares himself of 'a contrary opinion' for 'though men be not changed in their Species, yet they are changed in their actions' and so their manners.[1067] One must turn to the present, not to the past, to guide our choices and actions: 'As in Astrologie, the observation that is nearest, is least false, so in pollicy, is that example, which is most moderne'.[1068] He who, like Machiavelli (or Malvezzi's interpretation of Machiavelli), 'believes that after he hath read a laudable example of our Predecessours, that he is able by and by, to put it in practice, is deceived; he should have need first to change all the world'.[1069]

The use of historical example, Malvezzi contends, does not properly take into account the workings of chance and fortune: 'Many examples are required to

[1065] Malvezzi 1647, p. 93.
[1066] Malvezzi 1647, p. 89.
[1067] Malvezzi 1647, pp. 89-90.
[1068] Malvezzi 1647, p. 91.
[1069] Malvezzi 1647, p. 92.

make a rule; many of them are dangerous, as being not from prudence, but from fortune'.[1070] The attempt to form rules for action from historical study is undermined by the variable of fortune in history. He does not wish to suggest that history be done away with altogether – 'I blame not by this the reading of history, for I commend it' – but rather the way that it is used.[1071] He suggests that just as 'Statues are no use to Sculptours, but for good delineation' and not for imitation, 'So Histories are little helpfull to Polititians, but only for the setling of a good judgement. *For they are not to operate according to the examples, but according to the judgement that they have raised upon the reading of the examples*'.[1072] In other words, those in politics should use histories to sharpen their prudence – their ability to discern truth from falsehood – rather than to adopt rules or lessons. For this former task, the biases of historians and the influences of fortune are perfectly suited.

This potential use for histories, not as a source of counsel but as an important exercise in prudence, is best seen through the paradox, a genre popular in the early seventeenth century to which Malvezzi himself was a contributor.[1073] An especially apt example comes from the essayist, William Cornwallis, whom we encountered in Chapter 6. In his 'Prayse of King Richard the Third', published in 1616 as part of his *Essayes of Certaine Paradoxes*, Cornwallis uses the same events detailed in Thomas More's history to praise and defend Richard III according to Machiavellian reason of state principles, highlighting the ways in which history can be manipulated according to the interests of the historian.

[1070] Malvezzi 1647, sig. A, 6[r].
[1071] Malvezzi 1647, p. 93.
[1072] Malvezzi 1647, p. 94.
[1073] See Condren 1987, pp. 6-7.

Describing Richard as a 'wronged prince', Cornwallis suggests that Richard's actions, wicked as they may have been, were founded in a justifiable desire for self-preservation and the maintenance of the state. Richard was 'iealous of his own preservation, of the safety of the Commonweale, and of the ancient Nobilitie' and so 'with great reason and iustice he executed them, whom, if he had suffered to liue, were likely enough to haue beene the destruction of him, it, and them'.[1074] These motives are especially evident in Richard's most condemned act, the murder of the princes in the tower. Richard, by 'depriuing them of their liues, freed the people from dissention' and so Cornwallis asks 'how could hee demonstrate his loue more amptly, then to aduenture his soule for [the people's] quiet?'[1075] Rather than being driven by blind ambition, Richard realised that 'there was no safety, but in Souereigntie' and so he had to claim the crown, or risk his own life and the well-being of England.[1076]

Historians, Cornwallis suggests, have redescribed the virtues in Richard's possession as vices: 'His Humility they terme secret pride: his Liberality, Prodigality; his Valour, cruetlie and bloudthirstinesse'.[1077] Turning to the execution of the Duke of Buckingham, Cornwallis declares that 'had this been the action of some other Prince, it had been good, iust, necessary; but being his, it is censured the contrary; so that sinne is not sinne, nor vertue accounted vertue, by their owne natures or effect, but are made vertues or vices, by the loue or hate that is borne to the committer'.[1078] It is not the actions of Richard, but rather the 'vanitie of these

[1074] Cornwallis 1616, sig. B, 1[r]; B, 3[v].
[1075] Cornwallis 1616, sig. B, 4[v].
[1076] Cornwallis 1616, sig. B, 4[r].
[1077] Cornwallis 1616, sig. C, 3[v].
[1078] Cornwallis 1616, sig. D, 3[v].

Croniclers' which is to be blamed.[1079] Historians have warped the truth of the events, as 'their malice [is] greater then either their truth, or their iudgement', and Cornwallis concludes (with more than a hint of sarcasm) that nevertheless 'they are *Historians*, and must be beleeued'.[1080] Histories cannot be used as credible sources for counsel, as they are just as susceptible to the paradiastolic practices of rhetoricians as any other source.

II. Observation and Travel

If the examples of the past cannot be trusted, from where ought counsel to be drawn? Certainly Malvezzi points us in the right direction – observation of *present* events is best, whether this comes from eyewitnesses or collected accounts. The clearest answer, however, is provided by Botero himself, although not in the *Ragione di Stato*. The *Ragione* had no contemporary English print translation; however, Botero's widely read *Relationi universali* was translated by the essayist Robert Johnson in 1601, going through six editions in the years from 1601 to 1616, followed by a further edition in 1630.[1081] Johnson took great liberty with Botero's

[1079] Cornwallis 1616, sig. D, 1^{v}.
[1080] Cornwallis 1616, sig. B, 4^{v}.
[1081] Shackleton 1948, p. 405:
(1) 1601 *The Travellers Breviat, or an Historical Description of the most famous Kingdoms in the World*. Pp. 180. Dedication signed 'Robert Iohnson'.
(2) 1601 *The Worlde, or an Historical Description of the most famous Kingdoms and Commonweales therein*. Pp. 222. Dedication signed 'I.R.'
(3) 1603 *Historical Description of the most famous Kingdoms and Commonweales in the Worlde*. Pp. 268. Dedication signed 'I.R.'
(4) 1608 *Relations of the most famous Kingdoms and Common-weales*.... Pp. 330. Dedication signed 'R.I.'
(5) 1611 *Relations of the most famous Kingdoms and Common-weales*.... [same title as 1608] Pp. 437. Dedication signed 'Rob. Ihonson'.
(6) 1616 *Relations of the most famous Kingdoms and Common-weales*.... Pp. 437. Dedication signed 'Rob. Iohson'.
One can see how Johnson consistently built upon his original text – beginning with a tract of 180 pages, to one of 437 pages in its final formulation. Notably, Johnson

text and each edition was different, as he constantly amended and added to the work, keeping it up-to-date with the changing times.[1082]

Johnson's first edition, *The Travellers Breviat, OR An historicall description of the most famous kingdoms in the World*, directly translates Botero's survey of the most powerful nations of the world from the *Relationi*. It is 'a generall description of the World', and little else. In the same year, however, Johnson also published an extended edition of the text, *The Worlde*, adding the details of countries not included in the first. This version also contained a new introductory section taken from Botero's *Relationi*: 'Of the World, and the greatest Princes therein', which explains to the reader that it is not enough to know 'those occurances which daily passe in the world' – as was contained in the first edition – but in order to deserve 'the commendation of wit and iudgement' one must be able to determine 'the true reasons, whereby one kingdome or state becommeth greater than other'.[1083] Both Botero and Johnson understood that the *Relationi* contained the source material necessary for determining reason of state, which is why Johnson felt it had to be kept up-to-date.

The 1611 and 1616 editions most clearly outline how the knowledge contained in the *Relationi* was to inform reason of state, replacing both moral philosophy and the reliance on histories. In 1611 Johnson added a section, 'Of

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never credits Botero, nor any of his other sources in his text. Those behind the 1630 edition of the text – *Relations of the most famous kingdomes and common-wealths thorowout the world discoursing of their situations, religions, languages, manners, customes, strengths, greatnesse, and policies* – are not identified, but it was certainly not Johnson. See Fitzmaurice 2007, pp. 791-5 for the few details known about Johnson's life, especially his involvement with the Virginia and Bermuda Companies.

[1082] As Fitzmaurice 2007, p. 794 suggests, Johnson's editions are 'translation[s] only in the most liberal sense' and ought to be seen as political treatises in their own right.

[1083] Botero 1601, p. 1.

Observation', which opens the first book of the text. Here, he makes clear the subject matter of the work, and its relationship to the overall purpose:

> Being to relate of the *Customes*, *Manners*, and *Potencies* of *Nations* and great *Princes*; my Scope shall neyther be, to trouble your Readings with such obsolete Authors, as are to be accounted verie ancient (for of these Themes they were ignorant, by reason of indiscouerie:) Neyther *will I wholly refer you to Histories*, because their Caueats being infinite; some are growne out of vse, some are temporarie, some opposite, and others mutable; eyther of themselues, or by the pleasure of Princes; whereof no profitable vse can be expected.[1084]

With this, Johnson rejects outright the two sources of counsel we encountered in Parts I and II: classical philosophy and history. Instead, he wishes 'to lay downe some few obseruations' in order to make clear 'the reasons, which giue occasions to one Prince to excell another'.[1085]

Such observation is of two kinds, Johnson suggests. The first is 'stable and are never changed', describing the character and behaviour of men according to their climate and place on the globe.[1086] For this he borrows not from Botero, but from Jean Bodin. In his *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (which had no contemporary English translation), Bodin establishes that there is good reason to 'impugn history, or to withhold agreement' for 'those who ought to have had the highest standards' have not always 'had regard for truth and trustworthiness' and so we find 'disagreement among historians' and even that they 'contradict themselves'.[1087] To determine which histories are to be trusted, and how best to interpret them, Bodin seeks to 'make some generalizations as to the nature of all peoples or at least of the better known, so that we can test the truth of histories by

[1084] Botero 1611, p. 1.
[1085] Botero 1611, p. 1.
[1086] Bodin 1945, p. 110.
[1087] Bodin 1945, p. 110.

just standards'.[1088] These generalisations cannot be learned from classical or historical sources, for on this 'the ancients could write nothing' and so they were forced to judge 'by inferences of probability', rather than fact.[1089]

Johnson repeats these ideas in his *Essaies, or rather Imperfect offers,* first published in 1601, with further editions in 1607 and 1613. In his seventh essay, 'Of Hystories', he first commends the profit of reading history, and especially those of a Tacitean nature, for they contain 'most necessarie thinges, that can be warned vs'.[1090] However, like Bodin and later Malvezzi, he also cautions regarding the application of history, for such knowledge 'only enformes a likelyhoode' and so to 'gouerne our counselles by it' requires 'a concurrance of the same reasons, not onelie in generall, but also in particularities'.[1091] Thus the use of history is dependent on observation, for 'In making iudgement of Historie, and consideratelie applying it to our present interestes, wee must speciallie regard the dispositions of the agentes, and diligentlie remarke how they are affected in minde'.[1092]

The 'seco[n]d branch of Obseruation' given in Johnson's translation of the *Relationi* is not constant like the first, but is just as important in determining action, especially political action.[1093] This is the knowledge of 'the greatest Princes and Potentates, which at this day sway the world', the section taken from Botero which Johnson had included since the second edition in 1601.[1094] The key to achieving this knowledge is given by Johnson in the seventh, and final, added chapter to *Of Obseruation*: 'Of Trauell'. Here, Johnson once again discredits the use of ancient

[1088] Bodin 1945, p. 110.
[1089] Bodin 1945, p. 110.
[1090] Johnson 1601, sig. C, 8^{v}.
[1091] Johnson 1601, sig. D, 5^{r}.
[1092] Johnson 1601, sig. D, 5^{r}.
[1093] Botero 1611, p. 14.
[1094] Botero 1611, p. 14.

knowledge, replacing it with first-hand observation of other states. As tradition is 'A Sandy foundation either in matter of Science, or Conscience', there is 'nothing fitter' than travel for 'the bettering of our vnderstanding', both by 'hauing a conference with the wiser sort in all sorts of learning, as by the Eie-sight of those things, which otherwise a man cannot attain vnto but by Tradition'.[1095] Rather than Botero or Bodin, Johnson is here quoting from Robert Dallington's *Method for Trauell* of 1605, in which he notes that, for any traveller, 'the end of his *Trauell* is his ripening in knowledge; and the end of his knowledge is the seruice of his countrie' which is 'done by *Preseruation* of himself and *Obseruation* of what he heares and sees in his trauelling'.[1096] Once again these ideas are also evident in Johnson's essays, which include a section 'Of Trauell', in which he sets out that 'this obseruation' gleaned from travel is 'most powerfull to inspire vs with ciuill wisedome, and inable our iudgement for any actiue employment'.[1097]

The connection between the knowledge gained by travel and 'ciuill wisedome' is brought out most clearly by the editors of the 1630 version of the text. Not making any distinction between Botero's work and that amended from Bodin and Dallington or written by Johnson himself, the editors write that 'Our Author deserves rather to bee numbred among the Politicians, than amongst the Historians or *Geographers*'.[1098] They expand upon Johnson's argument in 'Of Obseruation', noting that the 'Observations, Rules, and Caveats' of 'obsolete Authors' are 'nothing so certaine as ours of these lightsomer times' and were 'neither so pleasant

[1095] Botero 1611, p. 23.
[1096] Dallington 1605, sig. B, 1^{r}.
[1097] Johnson 1601, sig. E, 3^{r}.
[1098] Botero 1630, p. A, 3^{v}; Shackleton 1948, p. 408. It is this oversight which may have led to the neglect of Johnson's work, even in modern scholarship; see Fitzmaurice 2007, p. 795.

nor so useful as these more assured & more moderne Relations'.[1099] The constant flux of political affairs has made past knowledge redundant, for 'Time and the Warres have altered much since *Aristotle* and *Ptolomies* dayes; whose Rules and Observations have since growne partly out of use; and beene partly bettered'.[1100] Although 'tis true' that knowledge alone cannot advance a state, 'yet... by observing of some naturall and casuall advantages' – the two types of observation laid out by Johnson – one can learn to 'make a small towne to become a great Citie, and to sowe greatnesse to posteritie'.[1101]

Johnson's suggestions regarding the importance of travel for political counsel were certainly not isolated, but rather reflected a larger shift in the discourse at the turn of the century.[1102] Although the making and recording of pilgrimages had been popular since the middle ages, travel in a 'secular spirit' becomes widespread towards the middle of the sixteenth century, with the first 'travel reports' available from the Elizabethan period onward.[1103] Although classified in the genus of *historia*, travel writing marked a divergence from histories based on its relation of

[1099] Botero 1630, p. 1.
[1100] Botero 1630, p. 1.
[1101] Botero 1630, p. 21.
[1102] See Hadfield 1998, pp. 1-2, 12, 36, 59; Hadfield 2001, p. 13; O'Callaghan 2007, pp. 85-103.
[1103] Stagl 1995, pp. 62; see also Stagle 1995 pp. 49, 51; Hadfield 2001, p. 12; Hulme and Youngs 2002, p. 30. For Francis Bacon, too, the purpose behind this genre was rooted in the importance of observation: 'It is a strange thing', he remarks in his essay 'Of Trauaile', 'that in Sea voyages, where there is nothing to be seene... Men should make Diaries; But in *Land-Travaile*, wherein so much is to be Observed, for the most part they omit it; As if Chance, were fitter to be registered, then Observation'; Bacon 1625, pp. 100-1. It should be noted that my account of the importance of travel and travel writing in this period suggests a slightly earlier date for an analysis of the 'grand tour' than that of Chaney 2000, which suggests that it became popular in the 1660s.

eyewitness accounts.[1104] Travellers acted as the 'eyes' of the prince, informing him better than any other kind of counsellor – living or dead.[1105]

The idea that counsel could be gleaned from the writings of travellers is articulated as early as 1578 by William Bourne's *Treasure for traueilers*. Although primarily a text describing the instruments of navigation, the mathematician Bourne also outlines for his readers the purpose of travel. As 'euery gentleman' ought to 'defend the common weale, or els to profyt it some otherway... as well in their counsel, and also in their acts and deeds', so travellers are 'very necessary members in the common weale' for they are able 'to geue iudgement by his owne Countrie of other' – to compare the elements of the state in much the way that Botero's *Relationi* does.[1106] Such knowledge is 'very necessarie to bee knowne vnto to nobilitie' in order to 'prouide them selues, and their Countrie for their better safetie'.[1107]

Thomas Palmer's *Essay of the meanes how to make our trauailes, into forraine countries, the more profitable and honourable* of 1606, an imitation of Theodor Zwinger's *Methodus apodemica* of 1577, repeats this sentiment in the address to the reader. He tells his audience that 'of all voluntarie Commendable actions that of trauailing into forraine States... is the most behoueable & to be regarded in this Common-weale'.[1108] Palmer, a courtier and member of the king's privy chamber, dedicates his work to the young Prince Henry, who despite having a great interest in the affairs of other countries, was limited by his station and unable to travel, thus relying on others to bring him the information essential to his training

[1104] Hadfield 1998, p. 12; Hulme and Youngs 2002, pp. 3-4; see the difficulty of ascribing the term 'genre' to this literature in Sherman 2002, p. 30.
[1105] O'Callaghan 2007, pp. 85-103.
[1106] Bourne 1578, iii^{r}.
[1107] Bourne 1578, iii^{v}.
[1108] Palmer 1606, A, 1^{r}.

for rule.[1109] Palmer seeks to demonstrate to him 'the means how to make the trauailes of other men... somewhat more profitable and honorable' to him.[1110]

In the second part of the essay, which details 'what is meete' for these purposes 'in the *interim* of trauaile', Palmer relates that the 'sixt and last generall duetie which is the very point which euery Trauailer ought to lay his witts about' is 'To get knowledge for the bettering of himselfe and his Countrie'.[1111] Such knowledge is 'the meanes whereon all policie is grownded' and the 'vtensils, and materialls of States men'.[1112] The acquisition of this wisdom marks the difference between 'the home States man... & the compleate Trauailer' for the former 'is fed by aduertisements only, and is ledde by other mens eyes'.[1113] Drawing on the critique of philosophy we have already seen, Palmer suggests that such a difference is like that between the soldier, who has real experience, and the theorist, 'whose booke rules, in accidentall things, faile many times as in particular motions'.[1114] Direct observation is the key: 'For, the eye hath a more perfect sense in iudgement then the eare'.[1115]

The idea that the traveller serves as the 'eyes' of the prince is fully articulated by the early decades of the seventeenth century. For instance, in speaking of the famous traveller and diplomat Robert Shirley in the 1625 edition of his popular *Pilgrims*, Samuel Purchas, a clergyman and member of the Virginia company, notes that Shirley sees with 'Eyes more then of a Traueller', for he was

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[1109] O'Callaghan 2007, pp. 85, 87, 89. Palmer was likely well aware of Henry's desire to travel, given that his son, Roger, was the prince's cup-bearer; O'Callaghan 2007, p. 101 fn. 1.
[1110] Palmer 1606, A, 2^{v}.
[1111] Palmer 1606, pp. 52-3.
[1112] Palmer 1606, p. 53.
[1113] Palmer 1606, p. 53.
[1114] Palmer 1606, p. 53.
[1115] Palmer 1606, p. 53.

'Himselfe... the Eyes of a mightie Monarch, which in his person visited so many Countries, Cities, and Courts'.[1116] Although Purchas had dedicated his original 1613 edition to the Archbishop of Canterbury, emphasising the religious lessons that could be taken from his work, this 1625 edition was dedicated to Prince Charles, and Purchas, like Botero, is more interested in highlighting '*Things humane*' such as the 'various Nations, Persons, Shapes, Colours, Habits, Rites, Religions, Complexions, Conditions, Politike and Oeconomike Customes... and other remarkeable Varieties of Men and humane Affaires'.[1117] In so doing, he is keen to emphasise that he has framed his work 'by a New way of Eye-euidence' and thus he has set out his compilation 'more amply and cetainly [sic] then any Collector euer hath done'.[1118] He elevates eye-witness reports above both history and philosophy, noting that the travellers' accounts which his volume contains are set out 'not by one preferring Methodically to deliver the Historie of Nature according to rules of Art, nor Philosophically to discusse and dispute; but as in way of Discourse, by each Traveller relating what is the kind he hath seen'.[1119]

It is worth noting that travellers were not universally acknowledged to be good sources of advice, either because of their potential for falsity or because of the corrupted morals they may have picked up along the way. William Parry, who had accompanied Robert Shirley's brother Anthony on his travels, notes in his 1601 edition of *The trauels of Anthony Sherley*, that the idea that '*Trauellers may lie by authority*' had already become 'prouerbiall speech' by the turn of the century, and so he makes clear that he gives the 'true relation of what mine eies saw... contenting

[1116] Purchas 1625, p. 1806. I am indebted to Kurosh Meshkat for his helpful suggestions regarding the travels of the Shirley brothers.
[1117] Purchas 1625, sig. 5^{v}.
[1118] Purchas 1625, sig. 3^{r}, 5^{v}.
[1119] Purchas 1625, sig. 4^{v}.

my selfe with the conscience of the truth'.[1120] Although some 'entiteling themselues Trauellers' do indeed 'take authoritie to vtter lies in England', there is no question that 'many honest and true Trauellers, speaking the truth... are concluded liers for their labour'.[1121] Parry uses the allegory of the cave to explain away accusations of falsity, for 'how could a man, from his birth confined in a dungeon or lightlesse Caue, be brought to conceiue, or beleeue the glorie and great magnificence of the visible, celestiall, and terrestriall globes'?[1122] Robert Devereux repeats the same metaphor in the preface to his *Profitable instructions describing what speciall obseruations are to be taken by trauellers* of 1633. Arguing against those who have 'lately maintained... That the best travailing is in maps and good Authors', he suggests that such a view is a 'pleasing opinion for solitary prisoners, who may thus travell ouer the world, though confined to a dungeon'.[1123] This 'sedentary Traueller' only passes for a wise man if he 'converseth either with dead men by reading; or by writing, with men absent', but as soon as he must 'enter on the stage of publike imployment' it becomes clear that he is 'vnfit for Action'.[1124] Just as the philosopher had been the ideal figure to provide political counsel for the orthodox humanists in the light of his knowledge of moral philosophy, so now does the traveller take his place on the political stage because of his better understanding of world affairs.

Devereux's 'sedentary Traueller' is 'innocent', for he has escaped the 'corruptions' that are risked by travel, 'but withall is Ignorant' of the knowledge

[1120] Parry 1601, p. 2.
[1121] Parry 1601, pp. 1-2.
[1122] Parry 1601, p. 2.
[1123] Devereux 1633, n.p.
[1124] Devereux 1633, n.p.

essential for governance.[1125] The traveller and writer Fynes Moryson had made this trade-off between innocence and experience clear in his *Itinerary* of 1617, emphasising that it had more to do with the original condition of the traveller than the influence of travel itself, for 'if an Asse at *Rome* doe soiourne, An Asse he shall from thence returne'.[1126] Nevertheless, for Moryson, such an ass is still better advanced than those 'graue Vniuersity men' who are 'sharpe sighted in the Schooles' and yet are 'often reputed idiots in the practice of worldly affaires'.[1127] Those who 'discourage the affects of these great rewards' to be gained from travel 'are not vnlike the Sophisters, who perswade that blindnesse, deafenesse, and the priuations of other senses, are not to be numbred among euils, because we see many vnpleasing things, often heare that which offendeth the eares, and for one good smell draw in twenty ill sauors'.[1128] It is such opinions, Moryson suggests, that has led to travellers being denied their rightful place as informants to 'Counsellours of States, and Peeres of Realmes', who instead 'desire to haue dull and slothful companions, then those that are wise and ambitious'.[1129] Thus he intends to 'write especially in this place to the Humanist', meaning 'him that affects the knowledge of State affaires, Histories, Cosmography and the like'.[1130]

These themes are brought together in the popular *Coryat's Crudities*, first published in 1611.[1131] Dedicated to Prince Henry, the prince sponsored the book, and his copy is still extant in the British Library. Thomas Coryate, a traveller and

[1125] See O'Callaghan 2007, p. 88.
[1126] Moryson 1617, p. 3.
[1127] Moryson 1617, p. 3.
[1128] Moryson 1617, p. 8.
[1129] Moryson 1617, p. 8.
[1130] Moryson 1617, p. 9.
[1131] Hadfield 1998, p. 59 labels this text 'the first self-consciously styled work of English travel writing'. For the novelty of this work see Hadfield 1998, pp. 59-66; O'Callaghan 2007, pp. 86-7, 93.

unofficial jester in the prince's court, writes in his address that he was encouraged 'to present these my silly Obseruations' by the hope that they would spur 'many noble and generose yong Gallants' of Henry's court 'to trauell into forraine countries', enriching themselves 'partly with the obseruations, and partly with the languages' of the regions that they visit, 'seeing thereby they will be made fit to doe your Highnesse and their Country the better seruice'.[1132] Coryate uses the important vocabulary of observation throughout this dedication, playing on its relation to the language of travel in his sign-off: 'By him that trauelleth no lesse in all humble and dutifull obseruance to your HIGHNESSE then he did to Venice and the parts abouementioned, Your Highenesse poore Obseruer, Thomas Coryate, Peregrine of Odcombe'.[1133]

Before relating his travels to Henry, Coryate includes an oration from the German philosopher Hermann Kirchner, 'That young men ought to Trauell', in which Kirchner argues that 'there can be no nearer way to the attayning of true wisedome and all experience of a ciuill life, no speedier way to aspire to the gouernement of a Commonweale... then trauell'.[1134] Knowledge cannot be gleaned from the 'mute sounds of books', but rather 'we must go unto those learned men, know & search for many things, and gather many things by our eye and sight'.[1135] Kirchner suggests that all sciences, especially history, are predicated on such observation, declaring:

> For good God, what Historiographer can you exemplify vnto me, of what credite, knowledge, or experience soeuer he was, that hath not for the most part beene personally present at those matters, which hee hath thought good to commit... that hath not with his owne eyes seene those places whereof he maketh a description to others, that hath not

[1132] Coryate 1611, sig. a, 4^{v}-5^{r}; see O'Callaghan 2007, p. 86.
[1133] Coryate 1611, sig. b, 1^{v}.
[1134] Coryate 1611, sig. B, 1^{r}; B, 2^{r}.
[1135] Coryate 1611, sig. B, 3^{r}; see O'Callaghan 2007, p. 90.

> obserued the manners and behauior of those men, who he eyther praiseth or dispraiseth?[1136]

The knowledge gleaned from travel 'doth impart farre greater benefits to Common-weales' than simply to the traveller himself.[1137] There is no one more suited to be 'aduanced to the sterne of a Common weale' then such a traveller.[1138] Kirchner goes as far as to combine this figure with that of Plato's philosopher-king, asserting that 'surely this is the man whom *Plato* doth call a Philosopher, who before hee came to the administration of the Common-weale, disputed not at home in his halfe-mooned chaire... but, which by trauersing the Common-weales of many Nations, hath searched out all the wayes and meanes that pertaine to a ciuill life, and the gouerning of a humane society'.[1139] Combining this with the language of reason of state, Kirchner suggests that it is such a one who will know 'what doth weaken, disipate and ouerthrow a Kingdome, and what again doth strengthen, establish & preserue it'.[1140] 'O happy that Common-weale', he declares, 'which hath from aboue gotten some such ruler'.[1141] However, in those kingdoms where God has not been so kind to institute this travelling-philosopher as king, then this figure ought to be the counsellor, as 'what other Counsellor can a Prince chuse himselfe [?]... For this Counsellor is like that opticke Glasse, wherein not onely the space of three or tenne miles, but also of a whole Prouince, yea and of the whole world it selfe may be represented'.[1142]

But what observations ought this traveller-counsellor to impart? Palmer's 1606 work makes clear that 'the publike and reuealed gouernment' – such as the

[1136] Coryate 1611, sig. B, 3^{r-v}.
[1137] Coryate 1611, sig. B, 8^{r}.
[1138] Coryate 1611, sig. B, 8^{r}.
[1139] Coryate 1611, sig. B, 8^{r}.
[1140] Coryate 1611, sig. C, 1^{r}.
[1141] Coryate 1611, sig. B, 8^{v}.
[1142] Coryate 1611, sig. C, 2^{r}.

details of states contained in Botero's *Relationi* – is the knowledge which 'properly' belongs to the traveller.[1143] That being said, it remains a 'point of knowledge' for the traveller to pry into the '*Secretes* of the State' where he travels.[1144] Palmer suggests that this knowledge of state secrets is 'the singular point that ennobleth a Trauailer aboue the home-politician' and forms 'the foundatio[n]s of momentall policies'.[1145] As Béthune writes, 'euery Prince [has] the like interest, to know what is done with his Neighbour', and so he must understand not only 'the ground of Estates', but also 'the designes'.[1146]

III. Most Secret Instructions

The idea that the keeping and uncovering of secrets was one of the most important elements of statecraft was strongly associated with Tacitism, and had been outlined in Botero's *Ragione*.[1147] As Etherington's abridged translation makes clear, 'There is nothing more necessary in matter of state then Secrecy', which is why the prince must have the ability to dissemble, for 'the better to keep secret any thing is to learne the art of dissimulation. to seeme not to reguard, esteame or know that w^{ch} you regard esteame and know & to do one thinge by another'.[1148] Quoting the popular maxim of Louis XI, Etherington repeats that 'the great arte of raigning [is] y^{e} arte of dissimulation'.[1149]

[1143] Palmer 1606, p. 110.
[1144] Palmer 1606, p. 114.
[1145] Palmer 1606, pp. 110, 114; Hadfield 2001, p. 13.
[1146] Béthune 1634, p. 224.
[1147] See Tuck 1993, pp. 31-64; Malcolm 2007, p. 99; Snyder 2009, pp. 106-58.
[1148] Sl. MS 1065, fo. 13^{v}.
[1149] Sl. MS 1065, fo. 13^{v}.

Counsellors in particular, Béthune suggests, ought 'aboue all things' to be 'required to be secret' and so they, like princes, must know how to dissimulate.[1150] Santa Maria, in his *Policie Vnveiled*, notes too that it is to 'Ministers, and Secretaries of State... [that] secrecie more properly belongs', a fact which is clear even in their titles, 'for out of that obligation which they haue to be secret, they are called Secretatries, and are the Archiues and Cabinets of the secrets of the King, and the kingdom'.[1151] With them and their secrecy rests the security of the kingdom, so kings must be wary of 'the[ir] disclosing of secrets, either out of their respect to such and such persons, or for their particular Interests, or out of the weakenesse of a slippery tongue'.[1152] He ends with an exhortation to such persons: 'Let Priuie-Counsellours (I say) and Secretaries of State, bridle their tongues; If not, let Kings, if they can, restraine them'.[1153] The importance of secrets of state furthers the Machiavellian inversion of the traditional model of counsel, with princes bridling and controlling their counsellors, rather than the reverse.

Boccalini's satire, *News-sheet from Parnassus*, details how this emphasis on state secrets has changed not only the role of the prince and his counsellors, but of the people as well, for the lessons of Tacitus, intended 'onely for the benefit of Princes', have been 'imbraced and cherished with such insatiate greedinesse, by priuate and meane subiects' who 'shew not themselues more cunning in any profession than of State policy'.[1154] The publication and proliferation of Tacitus's work has fundamentally altered the political environment: '*Tacitus* with the seditious argument of his *Annals*, and of his Histories, hath framed a kinde of

[1150] Béthune 1634, p. 61.
[1151] Santa Maria 1650 [1632], p. 322.
[1152] Santa Maria 1650 [1632], pp. 325-6.
[1153] Santa Maria 1650 [1632], p. 326.
[1154] Boccalini 1626, p. 20.

spectacles, that work most pernitious effects for Princes', for 'being put vpon the noses of silly and simple people, they so refine and sharpen their sight, as they make them see and prie into the most hidden and secret thoughts of others', including princes.[1155] Importantly, although the people ought not to be allowed these 'spectacles', they are to be retained by 'Secretaries, and vnto Priuy Counsellors of States to Princes' so that they might 'facilitate vnto them the good and vpright gouernment of the people'.[1156] Counsellors have the crucial role of manipulating both truth and falsehood in the negotiation of good government and reason of state.

The counsellor's role in advising, and keeping, state secrets is demonstrated and usurped in a set of popular texts of the 1620s known as the *secretissima instructio* works. These texts purport to be missives written to the Elector Palatine, Frederick V, from his counsellor, advising him on his present position, possible actions and the probable outcomes. They open up the discourse between counsellors and princes in a partly-factual, partly-imagined propagandistic genre, drawing on the reason of state tradition to fuel the suspicions of princes and people in an environment of deception and dissimulation.[1157] In so doing, both counsellor and prince are presented in a negative light, and the communication between them made all the more dubious for its secretive nature.[1158]

There are three known texts within this genre, all anonymous: the first published in 1620, the second in 1622 and the third probably written in the summer

[1155] Boccalini 1626, p. 29.
[1156] Boccalini 1626, p. 32.
[1157] Malcolm 2007, pp. 34, 32.
[1158] In this way it is interesting to compare these works with the *Secreta secretorum*, also a fictional account of secret letters between a counsellor and his prince.

of 1626.[1159] Although never published in English, two of the *secretissima* texts – the first, the *Secretissima instructio*, and the third, the *Altera secretissima instructio* – were translated into English and circulated in manuscript form. The *Altera* is a longer, more detailed and more sophisticated text, but both follow the same basic outline. They begin with an appeal to the prince from the writer that he accept his counsel. In the *Secretissima*, the counsellor places himself in a position of authority over his prince, describing himself as the prince's 'most faithfull tutor' as well as his 'maistor' who will minister to him 'secret, but serious Councells'.[1160] The writer of the *Altera* takes an even stronger position, demanding 'That you will beleeue me I deserue, not aske' for 'you owe it me'.[1161]

The advice given is couched in the air of suspicion and dissimulation surrounding reason of state. As the author of the *Altera* writes, 'Neuer aske' what the cause of the variation and infidelity of princes might be, for it is always 'the great cause, cause of causes, *Reason of State*'.[1162] Frederick is not to trust any of his friends, who will vary allegiance based on changing circumstances, with only their interests to guide them. In order to counter this, both writers counsel Frederick that he too must adopt such stratagems and plots, or be destroyed. If 'By force, the way is barred' the author of the *Altera* writes, the Elector Palatine has only recourse to 'Prayers and Fraud... When y^{e} Lions skin is worne out, put on the Foxes case'.[1163] Frederick has two tools at his disposal: 'wise Counterfeiting and dissembling; and

[1159] Malcolm 2007, pp. 31, 45, 58.
[1160] Sl. MS 3938, fo. 2^{r} (see Appendix C).
[1161] *Altera* 2007, p. 128.
[1162] *Altera* 2007, p. 144.
[1163] *Altera* 2007, p. 174. It is a point of interest how closely these texts parallel the counsel that William Thomas had given the young Edward VI almost seventy years before, but it is not clear that there is any connection between the two.

speedie execution'.[1164] The first he has used effectively thus far, but his credit has run out, and so it is 'best to proceed wth the other pollicy... I meane Celeritie'.[1165] Frederick must move quickly in order to act in 'due tyme', before circumstances change.

It is worth noting that this language of occasion – drawn we shall remember from *kairos* – remains an essential part of the tradition of reason of state. Botero makes the knowledge of kairotic timing one of his maxims of prudence in his *Ragione*, instructing his prince to 'Learn to recognise the critical moment [*occasione*] in war and affairs and to seize opportunities [*opportunità*] as they appear'.[1166] He defines the kairotic moment as 'a certain point of time [*periodo di tempo*] when a fortunate combination of circumstances [*concorso di circonstanze*] favours some piece of business, which both before and after that moment would be most difficult: this is opportunity, and it is of supreme importance'.[1167] His two key virtues, valour and prudence, are placed under this skill of knowing occasion, for 'Might and cunning are of little avail if they are not aided and guided by opportunity'.[1168] Botero's last maxim, before the chapter 'Of Secrecy', notes that this knowledge of occasion must also govern counsel, as it 'must depend largely

[1164] Sl. MS 3938, fo. 16^{r}.
[1165] Sl. MS 3938, fo. 17^{v}.
[1166] Botero 1956, p. 46.
[1167] Botero 1956, p. 46.
[1168] Botero 1956, p. 46. See the translation by Etherington: 'Study to know the occasion of the imprese in hand, & embrace the fitt opportunity nothing being of more moment. opportunity being no other thinge, saue onely a period of tyme, wherein there is the concourse of circumstances w^{ch} maketh the busines easie' (Sl. MS fo. 12^{r}) and Johnson's translation of the *Relationi*: 'opportunitie is a meeting and concurring of diuerse circumstances, which at one instant do make a matter very easie, which at another time, those circumstances being *ouerslipped*, it will be impossible, or very hard, to bring into effect' (Botero 1601, p. 9).

upon circumstance [*opportunità*] and opportunities [*occasioni*], which are continually changing'.[1169]

Returning to the discussion of opportunity in the *Secretissima*, the counsellor tells Frederick that the other princes of Europe will not hesitate to seize occasion – 'Doe yo^{u} thinke the *Turke* would refuse so faire an oportunity' to move against him 'if it were offered?' – and so Frederick must be willing to do the same.[1170] Echoing Machiavelli and other writers on occasion, the counsellor advises Frederick that there is 'at this present affaire occasion w^{ch} offereth it self vnto' him, and if he does not take it, it will be too late.[1171] The same emphasis on seizing occasion is expressed, in much stronger terms, by the author of the *Altera*: 'Nothing distresses me more', he tells Frederick, 'I am torn apart in my mind, I am shattered by pain at the thought that we may lose this opportunity [*occasio*]; if those things pass us fruitlessly, I shall hang myself'.[1172] The language of *kairos* is once again presented as fundamental to the sinister urgings of a dubious counsellor-figure.

Although there were only three *secretissima instructio* texts, similar propagandistic writings were prevalent in the period, so much so that Boccalini parodies the genre, while also partially engaging with it, in his *Newsheet*, describing the 'letters intercepted, and taken from a Currier, dispatched by some Princes to the Lake of *Auerno*' by which 'the common people come to know, that the rancors and hatreds now raigning among diuers Nations, are occasioned and stirred vp by the artificers of their Princes'.[1173] The most prolific English writer within this genre was Thomas

[1169] Botero 1956, p. 46.
[1170] Sl. MS 3938, fo. 4^{v}.
[1171] Sl. MS 3938, fo. 24^{r}.
[1172] *Altera* 2007, p. 190.
[1173] Boccalini 1626, p. 61; see Malcolm 2007, pp. 32, 34.

Scott, whose anonymously published pamphlets created such a stir in England that he spent most of his literary career in exile on the continent, until his assassination in 1626.[1174]

Scott was fully aware of the tradition with which he was engaging, as he spent the early 1620s producing a translation of selections of Boccalini's *Newsheet*, published in 1622. He comments on both the difficulties encountered in publishing such tracts, and the necessity that they be circulated, in his added preface and postscripts. In the preface he plays the role of reluctant translator, noting that 'the truest and securest precepts of Policie are those, which either are drawen from the prudent resolutions, or vnaduised errors of great Princes in the deliberations of their most important affaires'.[1175] To publish such deliberations abroad would be to elicit the 'infinite displeasure' of the prince in question, as Scott well knew.[1176] These '*Advertisements* from *Pernassus*' then, as they show 'the actions, interests, true ends, and defects of many Princes, not very iust, coming to be censured, touched, discovered, and noted' run the same risk, and so the preface-writer claims to have determined to 'keepe them from the Presse' and to 'hide my Writings' so that they 'may be published to the world at such time as they cannot giue distaste to any one'.[1177]

Scott counters this view in his closing letter from the 'poste of Pernassus to *the Reader*', providing a fictional account of how these secret deliberations were published.[1178] He writes that 'these Papers comming by chance into my hands' he

[1174] See Peltonen 1995, p. 231.
[1175] Boccalini 1622, p. 3.
[1176] Boccalini 1622, p. 3.
[1177] Boccalini 1622, pp. 3-4.
[1178] Boccalini 1622, sig. M, 3^{r}.

had thought it 'best to communicate them' and 'judged them fit for all eyes'.[1179] Acknowledging that he considered it may be better 'to be silent, and keepe these Papers from flying abroad, for feare of having my owne wings clipt', in the end he determined that he ought not to 'be guilty of so much cowardize, as to reserve myself' and 'to conceale what God hath sent into my hands... for the generall information and benefit of all Christendome'.[1180] Scott uses the *News-sheet* to turn himself into a secular martyr for his revelation of secret political counsels.[1181]

His most famous work is *Vox Populi, or Newes from Spayne*, also his first published pamphlet, written in Scotland and printed in London in 1620. This work too blends fiction and fact by presenting an imagined meeting of Spanish councillors, convincing enough that many readers took it as a genuine piece of political intelligence, prompting Scott's flight to the Netherlands. The main figure of *Vox Populi* is the Spanish ambassador to Britain, Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Count of Gondomar. Scott uses him to highlight the devious practices of the Spanish, specifically of its ambassadors and counsellors.[1182]

Vox Populi offers counsel to James I by highlighting the advantages that Gondomar thinks Spain has against Britain. For example, Gondomar tells his fellow counsellors that James 'extreamly hunts after peace' and that the English 'haue no patience to temporize and dissemble' like the Spanish and so are less suspicious of the plots of the Spaniards, as well as being less likely to move against them.[1183] Scott repeats this distinction between the natures of the English and the Spanish in his sequel, *The second part of Vox populi, or Gondomar appearing in the likenes of*

[1179] Boccalini 1622, sig. M, 3^{r}.
[1180] Boccalini 1622, sig. M, 3^{r}-4^{v}.
[1181] See Peltonen 1995, p. 238.
[1182] For an account of the literary and political traditions of anti-Hispanism in the generation before Scott see Sanchez 2004.
[1183] Scott 1620, sig. B, 1^{v}; B, 3^{r}; see Peltonen 1995, p. 257.

Matchiauell, published four years later. In this text, he draws on Bodin and Botero to establish that the Spanish, as they are in the south and thus 'neere to the Sunne', are 'more crafty, politique, and religious', whereas the English in the north, 'howsoeuer goodlier in person', are 'plaine simple' and therefore more easily deceived. Scott works to make the English, and James I specifically, aware of the plots of which their innocence makes them ignorant.[1184] Like the writers of the *secretissima* texts, Scott presses James towards a course of action which combines dissimulation and 'temporizing' as these are the tactics which his enemies employ.[1185]

Spain, in addition to being adept at dissimulation, is presented in both these works as a state willing at all times to 'followe opportunity close at the heels', for Gondomar's 'very many faithfull and fast friends in *England*' are willing to move against the English, as soon as 'time and occasion be offered'.[1186] Scott brings out these themes of time and opportunity most clearly in his *Experimental discoverie of Spanish practises*, written in 1623, in which he argues in favour of a timely war against the Spanish. The text begins with an address from the publisher to the reader, which notes that, although the text is not yet complete, 'because (as we say in the prouerb) *Delayes are dangerous*, specially in matters of moment' he has 'presumed to publish it as it is'.[1187] Although peace is to be preferred to war in most cases, 'yet for that the time agreeing with the necessity', Britain must go to war with Spain.[1188] Spain has 'faire opportunityes offered vnto the greatnesse of his

[1184] Scott 1624b, p. 12.
[1185] 'Temporizing' is often used in such works, as is the noun 'temporizer', and carries the meaning of suiting one's actions to the time or occasion, often either to seize an occasion, or (more often) to delay until occasion arises.
[1186] Scott 1624b, pp. 45, 8.
[1187] Scott 1623, sig. A, 1^{v}.
[1188] Scott 1623, p. 1.

desire' and no 'opportunitie... would he let slip for the accomplishment thereof'.[1189] There is 'no people' who can 'readier finde the occasion, or sooner take, or resolue it, when it is offred' than the Spanish.[1190] James must emulate the Spanish and 'make a warre with your enemie, whilst you haue the aduantage in your hands'.[1191] He is 'now of more power then any of his Predecessours' and Spain has gone into decline.[1192] Danger must be prevented 'in a conuenient season' for 'opportunitie doth not attend upon Captaines and Councellours pleasures, but sheweth it self on a suddaine; and if not imbraced, passeth away without returning'.[1193]

In a work published in the same year as the second *Vox Populi*, *The Belgick souldier warre was a blessing*, Scott continues to emphasise these themes, encouraging the English, like the Spanish, to consider the issues of time and opportunity, namely 'Whether we haue sufficient occasion or no, to fall out with *Spaine*'.[1194] Such a question is precisely the type which must be referred to 'the State, or Councell of Warre' whose role it is to 'decide these things'.[1195] The council, however, has been filled with Spanish 'time seruers' and 'temporising parasites', such as the papists and 'Hispanolised English', who stand in the way of Britain seizing the occasion to move against Spain.[1196] It will not be the council who opposes Spanish plots in England.

Returning to the *Vox Populi* texts, here too Scott is keen to offer counsel on the pernicious effects of Spanish temporising practices, specifically in relation to

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[1189] Scott 1623, p. 1.
[1190] Scott 1623, p. 6.
[1191] Scott 1623, p. 3.
[1192] Scott 1623, p. 47.
[1193] Scott 1623, pp. 4, 6. There is a close connection between the themes of this text and Chapter XXVI of Machiavelli's *The Prince*, as well as Isocrates's *Panegyricus*.
[1194] Scott 1624a, sig. A, 3^{v}.
[1195] Scott 1624a, sig. A, 3^{v}.
[1196] Scott 1624a, sig. A, 2^{v}; A, 3^{r}.

the respective positions of James, his counsellors and parliament.[1197] Gondomar in the first *Vox Populi* claims that 'one of the principle services' he has done to aid the Spanish cause against England is to have worked 'such a dislike betwixt the King and the lower house' that 'the King will never indure Parliament againe'.[1198] James will 'rather suffer absolute want then receive conditionall relief from his subjects'.[1199] In 1620, when *Vox Populi* was published, parliament had not sat since the eight-week 'addled parliament' of 1614. As Gondomar makes clear, this has put James in a vulnerable position, for 'levying of subsidies and taskes have been the onely use princes haue made of such assemblies'.[1200] As it is 'unlikely there should ever be a Parliament' it is 'impossible that the Kings debts should be payed, his wants sufficiently repaired' except by the marriage to Spain, which is but a 'cover for much intelligence'.[1201] This has also stopped Britain building their defences and furnishing their navy, weakening them against a possible attack by Spain.

The suspension of parliament has been achieved, Gondomar suggests, by an English counsellor – 'that honourable Earle and admirable Engine' who was 'a sure servant to us and the catholike cause while he lived'.[1202] It is not just he, however,

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[1197] See Peltonen 1995, pp. 238, 257.
[1198] Scott 1620, sig. B, 3^{r}.
[1199] Scott 1620, sig. B, 3^{r}.
[1200] Scott 1620, sig. B, 3^{v}.
[1201] Scott 1620, sig. B, 1^{v}.
[1202] Scott 1620, sig. B, 3^{r}. The obvious candidate for this 'honorable earl' might be the Earl of Buckingham (not the *Duke* of Buckingham until 1623), who was often accused of being an enemy of parliament. However, he was still alive in 1620, and Scott, especially in the second *Vox Populi*, goes to great lengths to defend him against the accusation of standing in opposition to parliament (although such protestations need not be sincere). Instead, Gondomar is most likely referring to Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton, who had died in 1614. He secretly converted to Catholicism in that year with the help of Gondomar himself and openly declared himself an active supporter of the Spanish match. He wrote to the Spanish ambassador with the details of his advice to James I in regard to parliament, declaring that that his advice to the king against the calling of parliament was 'in

who stands in the way of the remedy of parliament, for 'there are so many about' the king, 'who blow this cole fearing their owne stakes, if a Parliament should inquire into their actions'.[1203] Although there are those 'who preserve the priviledge of subjects against soveraign invasion' and who 'call for the course of the common lawe', the 'lawe proper to their nation', the 'tyme servers cry the lawes down and cry up the prerogative'.[1204] In doing so they 'prey upon the subject by suites and exactions' and 'procure themselves much suspition... & hate'.[1205] Scott paints a clear picture of enmity between the favourite counsellors of the king – who follow their own interests – and the parliament, holding up the latter as the mainstay of the state.

The second *Vox Populi* deals even more specifically with these parliamentary and conciliar themes. Published in 1624, it takes place during the 'happy parliament' of 1624-1625. This parliament is greatly praised by Scott, and is placed as the primary cause of the 'tempestuous times' faced by the Spanish.[1206] In particular, the 'now-present parliament' of England has uncovered 'in all treatises for the space of these two hundred yeares' how '*Spaine* hath dealt with the English, *fide punica*' to 'serue her necessities for the present'.[1207] In other words, it is the parliament who has fulfilled the role of discovering the secret plans and machinations of the Spanish, which Scott had detailed in the first *Vox Populi*. As a result, this parliament is chief of 'the mischeifes' facing the Spanish, for the king has 'wholy referred himselfe' to it, 'not onely for the examination and redresse of

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keeping with the good of Christianity and the advantage and service of Spain'; quoted in Redworth *ODNB* online.
[1203] Scott 1620, sig. B, 3^{r}.
[1204] Scott 1620, sig. B, 3^{v}.
[1205] Scott 1620, sig. B, 3^{v}.
[1206] Scott 1624b, p. 3.
[1207] Scott 1624b, pp. 13-14.

all abuses and misdemeanors at home, but for the discussing and searching into all plots and practices of other abroad, that may seeme any way to preiudice the quiet and well gouerned estate of his Kingdomes, without interposition or mediation'.[1208] In this way, 'the King and people goe all on and together, with that alacrity and constancy, in prouiding for the good estate of the Kingdome, as the like hath no beene seene these nany [sic] yeeares'.[1209] This parliament, Gondomar suspects, will persecute their Catholic agents, weakening their cause and intelligence in England. The work ends with an address 'TO THE ILLVSTRIOVS MAGNIFIQUE AND GRAVE Assembly of the High Court of Parliament in England'.[1210] Calling them 'the Most Honorable, Great, and Graue *Senate*', Scott encourages them to view 'as in a little glasse' the 'effect of a seauen yeares Treaty with Spaine'.[1211] In Scott's work, it is the parliament, *against* James's counsellors, who 'may plainly see' the plots and practices of the devious Spanish and make steps to oppose them. Parliament fulfils the role which had been given to the counsellor in the reason of state tradition.

[1208] Scott 1624b, p. 24.
[1209] Scott 1624b, p. 24.
[1210] Scott 1624b, p. 59.
[1211] Scott 1624b, p. 59.

Chapter 9: Counsel and Command in the English Civil War

Having examined developments in the discourses of counsel from the early Tudor period to the mid-seventeenth century, this final chapter will consider how these theories were employed by both sides in the debates surrounding the English Civil War. This conflict was largely concerned with questions about the proper location of sovereignty; however, underlying these claims were arguments about the nature, and proper source, of counsel. By looking at the debates of the civil war from the perspective of the discourses of counsel, two conclusions can be drawn. First, it becomes clear how both sides understood the importance of counsel for competing claims about sovereignty. Second, we see how this connection between advice and sovereignty – or counsel and command – leads to the devaluing of the early-modern discourses of counsel in the face of a modern politics of sovereignty.

These themes are best explored through the works of two of the most influential political writers of the revolutionary period: Henry Parker and Thomas Hobbes.[1212] Both directly address the issues of counsel and command, Parker from the parliamentarian side, Hobbes as an opponent of parliament.[1213] Both were also counsellors in their own right, Parker as an adviser to the people, Hobbes to the future Charles II.[1214] Placing their views on counsel, politics and sovereignty in

[1212] Mendle 1995, p. 1.

[1213] It may be going too far to say that Hobbes consistently put forward a royalist argument, but he was certainly not in favour of parliamentary sovereignty; see Fukuda 1997; Lukac de Stier 1997, pp. 51-67; Skinner 2002b, pp. 287-9; Malcolm 2012a, pp. 13-72.

[1214] For Parker's role as a 'public privado' who 'fashioned his concept of parliament (or more generally, government) in his own image, the image of a counsellor' see Mendle 1995. Although Hobbes too wrote for a large public audience, especially in *Leviathan* (see Skinner 1996, p. 426), he also wrote for an audience of one: the future Charles II. Hobbes had been Charles's tutor in the late 1640s, although at the time was at pains to make clear that his position was to teach 'mathematics, not politics' as the prince was 'too young' to learn Hobbes's views on politics; quoted in Malcolm 2012a, p. 52. However, as Hobbes's political

dialogue reflects their conscious orientation as opposing political forces in the 1640s and early 1650s; Parker's theory of parliamentary sovereignty was built on conciliar foundations which Hobbes vehemently overthrows in *Leviathan*.[1215]

I. Parliament and Counsel

As early as the first tract that can be plausibly attributed to him, the *Divine and Politike Observations* of 1638, Parker embraces the orthodox humanist model of counsel in order to demonstrate its necessity in governing a prince.[1216] Figuring himself as the 'translator' of the piece, Parker explains to the reader that 'great Princes can hardly see any thing, but in such shape as it is represented to them by such of their Courtiers or Councellors as they are pleased to trust', which is why he has 'adventured to translate in English the foresaid Observations'.[1217] Observation

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science was rooted in a view of mathematics, as we shall see, his tuition of the prince cannot be wholly divorced from this view. Moreover, his objections that the prince was too young for political instruction were raised in 1646, when Charles was the sixteen-year-old Prince of Wales, but by the time *Leviathan* was presented to Charles in 1651, he was twenty-one and the proclaimed king of Scotland, as well as claimant to the throne of England. Thus, the suggestion (made by Malcolm 2012a p. 55) that Hobbes 'envisaged himself as some sort of political adviser to the Prince' can be supported contextually, as well as textually, and the very formation of *Leviathan* placed in a context of counsel to Charles: 'a rather speculative account may be offered of the origins of [*Leviathan*]... At some point during the first year of Hobbes's tuition of Prince Charles, after various conversations in which the Prince had asked him to express his opinions about psychological and political matters, Hobbes conceived the idea of writing an English-language text for the Prince's benefit' (Malcolm 2012a, p. 58). For Charles's copy of *Leviathan* see Hobbes 1996, pp. li-lvi; Malcolm 2012a, pp. 197-209. Hobbes had also written as adviser to Charles's father in the early 1640s; see Malcolm 2012b, pp. 145-60.

[1215] Mendle 1995, p. 167; see Fukuda 1997, pp. 52-3; Skinner 2002c, p. 205; Malcolm 2012a, p. 23.

[1216] Mendle 1995, pp. 8-10.

[1217] [Parker] 1638, n.p. The king's dependence on counsel is a theme that runs throughout his *oeuvre*, repeated in his *Jus Populi* of 1644: 'the Major part of Kings are so farre from being the best Judges, the profoundest Statesmen, the most excellent soldiers, that when they so value themselves they prove commonly most wilfull, and fatall to themselves and others; and that they ever govern best, when they most relye upon the abilities of other good Counsellors and Ministers' (pp. 9-

was, as we saw in in the previous chapter, one of the foundational concepts for the reason of state writers, especially in relation to the role of the counsellor, and Parker, later known as the 'Observator', draws explicitly on this tradition in his works.[1218] *Divine and Politike Observations* also first establishes his important tri-partite definition of parliament; parliament is the 'honourable Court', the 'representative body of the Kingdome' as well as 'his Majesties most faithfull and least corruptible counsell', although it does not substantiate this last claim.[1219]

It is in his later texts that Parker sets out three fundamental reasons why parliament is the superior source of counsel for the king. These ideas first emerge in Parker's response to the 1638 ship-money test case, *The case of the shipmony briefly discoursed*, published two years after the event. Unlike other writers on the topic, Parker does not oppose the invocation of necessity and reason of state to justify the tax, but rather the *king's* invocation of it.[1220] The reason is counsel. Parker writes that one must accept that 'Kings may be bad', and it is in fact 'more probable and naturall, that evill may be expected from good Princes, than good from bad', and so it is that they must receive the best possible counsel.[1221] Although this has been a recurrent theme, first articulated as the Aristotelian rejection of Plato's philosopher-king, Parker's suggestion that it is parliament which is the best source of this counsel is far more radical. He provides 'three things wherein

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10). See also Parliament 1642, p. 15: 'The Wisdome of this State hath intrusted the Houses of Parliament with a power to supply what shall be wanting on the part of the Prince'.

[1218] See also [Parker] 1641a, p. 43: 'Temporall Counsellors... in State affairs' are 'good spectacalls'. For Parker's commitment to the idea of 'observation' see Mendle 1995, pp. 9-10, 34. For 'the Observator' see Mendle 1995, pp. 2, 90.

[1219] [Parker] 1638, p. 13. See also [Parker] 1641a, p. 52: 'Parliaments, which are the grand Courts and Counsells of Kingdomes'; [Parker] 1641b: 'the best, and highest of all Counsells, *viz*. Parliaments'; [Parker] 1643b, p. 17: parliament is 'the Common Counsell of all the Land'. See Mendle 1995, pp. 9, 76.

[1220] See Mendle 1995, pp. 37-8, 43-8.

[1221] [Parker] 1640, p. 22; see Mendle 1995, p. 47.

parliaments excell all other Councells whatsoever', which he refines and repeats in his later texts of 1642 – *Some few observations* and *Observations upon some of His Majesties late answers and expresses*.[1222] Both texts respond to the issues surrounding the Militia Ordinance of 1642 and the growing sense of 'emergency' in English political culture, and both use the superiority of parliament as an advisory body to argue that parliament should not only step into the 'conciliar breach' left by the growing ineffectiveness of the privy council, but also take control of the king's arbitrary sovereign power.[1223]

Parker's reasons for parliament's superior conciliar authority, as given in *Some few observations*, are: 'first... [that] they must in probabilitie be more knowing then any other privadoes; Secondly, in regard of their publike interest, they are more responsible then any other, and lesse to be complayned of in case of errour. Thirdly, they have no private interest to deprave them, nothing can square with the Common Councell but the common good'.[1224] It is worth detailing the case Parker makes for each of these, as they bring together the argument from prudence, which had been running through the discourses of counsel for millennia, with the emerging seventeenth-century language of interest.

II. Prudence and Counsel

The first element Parker addresses in making his case is prudence, which as we have seen remained the quintessential virtue of the counsellor even into the seventeenth century. For Parker, this prudential counsel is best found in parliament. As he writes in *Shipmony*, 'For wisedome, no advice can bee given so prudent, so

[1222] [Parker] 1640, p. 35. Note once again the use of 'observation' in the titles of these texts.
[1223] Mendle 1995, pp. 75-85.
[1224] [Parker] 1642c, p. 5.

profound, so universally comprehending, from any other author' than parliament.[1225] The prudence of parliament is so profound, he establishes in his *Discovrse concerning Puritans* a year later, that it issues 'infallible avisoes' which 'are now in all well-governed Countries, the very Oracles of all Policy, and Law', and thus a prince cannot be deceived that is ruled by them.[1226]

Parliament's role as representative of the kingdom and the people lies at the foundation of its prudential abilities. It is 'incredible' he writes in *Shipmony*, that 'an inconsiderable number of Privadoes should see or knowe more then whole Kingdomes'.[1227] Parliament is able to bring together the collective prudence of the kingdom as a whole, as he suggests in *Some few observations*: '[T]hat which is the judgement of the major part in Parliament is the judgement of the whole Kingdome' and thus it 'is more vigorous, and sacred, and unquestionable, and further beyond all appeal, then that which is the judgement of the King alone, without all Councell' or even 'of the King, with any other inferiour Clandestine Councell'.[1228] He supports this view in *Observations* with reference to a popular classical (and, specifically, Aristotelian) metaphor: 'I think every mans heart tels

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[1225] [Parker] 1640, p. 35.

[1226] [Parker] 1641a, p. 52; see Mendle 1995, pp. 53-61. The idea of 'avisoes' brings together the role of giving advice with the communication of secrets of state, referring both to an item of intelligence or news as well as a piece of advice.

[1227] [Parker] 1640, p. 35. See also Parliament 1642, p. 22: 'we still desire and hope that his Majesty will not be guided by his own understanding... to which he shall be advised by the Wisdome of both Houses of Parliament; which are the Eyes in this Politique Body'. 'Privado' was the popular (and originally Spanish) term for a favourite of the prince, often associated with the Buckingham circle, and almost always used pejoratively; see Mendle 1995, pp. 11-13.

[1228] [Parker] 1640c, p. 9. This is not just the collective judgment of those sitting in parliament at any given time, however, but a collective memory and prudence, as Parker alludes to in writing against the Leveller John Lilburne. Lilburne's 'exceeding defective, and insufficient' knowledge and judgement ought to bow to the 'Authority of so many Parliaments' and 'the prudence of so many ages', as should all royalists ([Parker] 1650, p. 10).

him, that in all publique Consultations, the many eyes of so many choyce Gentlemen out of all parts, see more then fewer'.[1229]

In marked contrast, Hobbes not only contests the suggestion that parliament will provide more prudent advice, but rejects the notion of prudence as the quintessential virtue of political counsel altogether.[1230] His definition of prudence remains consistent with that of previous writers: 'Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the event therefore one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions... Which kind of thoughts, is called *Foresight*, and *Prudence*'.[1231] It pertains to the connection between ends and means, and is thus 'When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what designe they may conduce unto'.[1232] As one might expect, such knowledge is determined 'by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another'.[1233]

It is here that Hobbes levels his critique. If prudence is simply learning from experience, it is an equal and naturally innate attribute, the differences in men arising only from their variable experience, not any difference in ability: 'For

[1229] [Parker] 1642a, p. 11. Parker's opponent John Spelman responds to this analogy by suggesting that 'in the body natural a very few members (that is none but the eyes) have the sense of seeing, but all the members have the sense of feeling, so in Communities all have the sence of enjoying good, or suffering evill: but very few the faculty of discerning the cause and means of either' (1643b, p. 19).
[1230] Skinner 1996, p. 259-62. This is in addition to Hobbes's contestation of Parker's notion of representation, which has been treated at length by a number of historians, and so I will not be addressing it here; see Tuck 1993, p. 328; Skinner 2002c, pp. 181-208; Malcolm 2012a, pp. 15-16.
[1231] Hobbes 2012, p. 42.
[1232] Hobbes 2012, p. 108.
[1233] Hobbes 2012, p. 42.

Prudence, is but Experience, which equall time, equally bestowes on all men'.[1234] Furthermore, it is not a quality to be extolled, for it is not inherently rational or distinctively human, nor does it lead to the 'infallible' results Parker had attributed to the prudence and knowledge of parliament, for 'though it be called Prudence, when the event answereth our Expectation; yet in it its nature, it is but Presumption'.[1235] As he had declared in *Elements of Law*, written in 1640, 'PRUDENCE is nothing else but conjecture from experience' and 'Experience concludeth nothing universally'.[1236] In the end, the 'best Prophet' is in fact only 'the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at'.[1237]

True philosophy, Hobbes explains, is '*the Knowledge acquired by Reasoning*', not by prudence.[1238] The key to this is science, defined as 'the knowledge of Consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another: by which, out of what we presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time'; it is how we observe 'like causes' in order to 'produce the like effects', and thus usurps the place of prudence in achieving the ends of our designs. Science involves the generation of rules which predict outcomes, and Hobbes's project is to generate a moral and civil science analogous to those of figures (geometry) and motion (physics).[1239] Although, as he points out, prudence is often synonymous with wisdom (as it is in Parker's work), science is *true* wisdom,

[1234] Hobbes 2012, p. 188.
[1235] Hobbes 2012, p. 44.
[1236] Hobbes 1969, p. 16.
[1237] Hobbes 2012, p. 44.
[1238] Hobbes 2012, p. 1052.
[1239] See Malcolm 2002, pp. 146-52.

and ‘as much Experience is *Prudence*, so, is much Science, *Sapience’*. It is the latter, he explains, which is ‘infallible’, whereas the former, simply ‘useful’.[1240]

It is clear for Hobbes, then, that science, not prudence, will provide the best sort of counsel – personal or political. When deliberating on an action, Hobbes writes, ‘the Appetites and Aversions are raised by foresight and the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the actions whereof we Deliberate’.[1241] He who can best connect the ‘chain of consequences’ is most able to determine what actions are conducive to his appetites: ‘so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himself; and is able when he will, to give the best counsell unto others’.[1242] Although presented here as two options, it is clear that when it comes to counsel reason once again trumps experience; it is ‘Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes’ which ‘disposeth, or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others’.[1243] The office of a counsellor is ‘when an action comes into deliberation... to make manifest the consequences of it’, which is more assuredly done by reason than by prudence.[1244]

This is especially the case, Hobbes maintains, in politics. There is a ‘skill of making, and maintaining Commonwealths’, which ‘consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not... on Practise onely’.[1245] Certainly,

[1240] Hobbes 2012, p. 76. It should be clear, that although Hobbes calls the conclusions drawn from science ‘infallible’, this is meant in the sense of *likely* being true, for he notes elsewhere that ‘No Discourse whatsoever, can End in knowledge of Fact’ (2012, p. 98) and that science is ‘conditionall Knowledge’ (2012, p. 100).
[1241] Hobbes 2012, p. 94.
[1242] Hobbes 2012, p. 94.
[1243] Hobbes 2012, p. 156.
[1244] Hobbes 2012, p. 406.
[1245] Hobbes 2012, p. 322; see also Hobbes 2012, p. 546. Note that in the Latin edition of 1668, Hobbes uses the term ‘*Scientia*’ not ‘*ars*’ for the ‘skill’ required

experience plays a helpful role in counsel, but it ought to be paired with scientific study of the rules: '*No man is presumed to be a good Counsellour, but in such Businesse, as he hath not onely been much versed in, but hath also much meditated on, and considered*'.[1246] Counsel requires both experience *and* science, which he separates into two fields of requisite knowledge. Knowledge of 'the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour' is 'not to be attained without study' and thus falls under science; knowledge of 'Strength, Commodities, Places... the inclinations, and designes of all Nations that may any way annoy them' – which we may recognise as the content of Botero's reason of state – is 'not attained to, without much experience'.[1247] This experience, he later explains, is gathered from '*Intelligences, and Letters*' and the like, such as those which the *secretissima* literature sought to emulate.[1248] This experiential knowledge in political counsel is limited, however, by scientific rule-based knowledge: 'all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule'.[1249] It is only when 'there is no Rule' that he who 'hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the best Judgement, and is the best Counsellour'.[1250] Prudence is adequate until one is introduced to Hobbesian civil science.

The question becomes, what sciences ought the political counsellor to be versed in? As we saw, Hobbes suggested that three elements make up the

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(2012, p. 323). As has been well established by Skinner 1996, Hobbes also rejects the humanist contention that moral philosophy might provide the basis for political decision making; see Hobbes 1969, p.66; Hobbes 2012, pp. 1052-97.

[1246] Hobbes 2012, p. 406.

[1247] Hobbes 2012, p. 406.

[1248] Hobbes 2012, p. 408. Hobbes himself translated the *Altera* into English, as Malcolm 2007 shows.

[1249] Hobbes 2012, p. 406.

[1250] Hobbes 2012, p. 408.

knowledge to be gained through science: 'the disposition of Man-kind', 'the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour' and 'the Rights of Government'.[1251] If we look to the Ramist chart of the sciences included in Chapter 9 of *Leviathan*, we see that the 'disposition of Man-Kind', or the 'Consequences from the Qualities of *Men*', becomes divided into two further questions, the 'Consequences from the *Passions* of Men', which is 'ETHIQUES', and 'Consequences from *Speech*'.[1252] This, in turn, becomes further subdivided into disciplines including poetry, rhetoric, logic and 'The *Science* of JUST and UNIUST', which also covers Hobbes's insistence that the counsellor understand 'the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour'.[1253]

It seems clear, however, that although the counsellor ought to have *knowledge* of disciplines such as ethics and rhetoric, this is not so that he can use them in the communication of his counsel, as it was for the early humanists, but simply in predicting outcomes; they form part of the 'disposition of Man-Kind', not the skill-set of the counsellor. This is perhaps best demonstrated in his own counsel, intended for Charles I in late 1643 or 1644.[1254] Here, he seeks to use knowledge of the situation of other states – namely the Scots and the Swedes – to predict future events and consequences. He combines this with an understanding of the passions of men – specifically the Earl of Warwick – to attempt to predict his reaction to a carefully crafted proposal, drawing on the earl's reputation and the promise of honours and rewards to convince him to abandon the parliamentarian cause. Although he suggests that Warwick be subject to persuasive speech and rhetorical arguments, he does not use them himself in his proposal, which is devoid of

[1251] Hobbes 2012, p. 406.
[1252] Hobbes 2012, p. 131; see Skinner 2002c; Malcolm 2012a, pp. 141-5.
[1253] Hobbes 2012, p. 131.
[1254] Presented in Malcolm 2012b, pp. 146-7

rhetorical structure – such as an introductory passage establishing the writer's *ethos*.[1255]

Regarding 'the Rights of Government', the final aspect of the scientific knowledge which the political counsellor ought to be versed in, Hobbes is quite clear. 'CIVILL PHILOSOPHY' is defined as the 'Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies' and is wholly distinct from natural philosophy, which is 'Consequences from the Accidents of Bodies Naturall' and includes the above-mentioned categories of ethics and rhetoric.[1256] When it comes to civil science, there are only two parts, first 'Consequences from the *Institution* of COMMON-WEALTHS, to the *Rights*, and the *Duties* of the *Body Politique*, or *Soveraign*' and 'Consequences from the same, to the *Duty*, and *Right* of the *Subjects*'.[1257] Civil science is a topic dealing solely with the duties and rights of sovereignty and of obedience. It is, in short, a science of sovereignty, which is wholly contained in *Leviathan*.[1258]

There is no reason, Hobbes insists, to assume that any class or group has a better grasp of this science of politics than any other.[1259] 'Good Counsell' Hobbes writes, 'comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of State'.[1260] Nor is there

[1255] Malcolm 2012b, p. 157; see Skinner 1996, pp. 127-32. Compare to the Elizabethan letters of advice analysed in Mack 2004, pp. 176-214.
[1256] Hobbes 2012, p. 130. In the Latin of 1668, there is no mention of the science of justice, and civil philosophy is included among the sciences attained by contemplation of the disposition of man: '*Ex contemplatione denique Hominis & Facultatum ejus oriuntur Scientiae* Ethica, Logica, Rhetorica, & *tandem* Politica sive *Philosophia Civilis*' (2012, p. 129).
[1257] Hobbes 2012, p. 130.
[1258] Note that Hobbes excludes history completely from the consideration of philosophers, as it is 'The Register of *Knowledge of Fact*' and no part of the knowledge of consequences (2012, p. 124).
[1259] See Malcolm 2012a, p. 157.
[1260] Hobbes 2012, p. 546.

any reason to expect it more of parliament. As he writes following the civil war, in *Behemoth*, the lords were 'no more skilful in the Publick affairs than the Knights and Burgesses' and both houses were 'prudent and able men as any in the Land, in the business of their Private Estates, which requires nothing but diligence, and a Natural Wit to govern them; but *for the Government of a Common-wealth neither Wit, nor Prudence, nor Diligence is enough, without infallible Rules, and the true Science of Equity and Justice*'.[1261] It is not sufficient, he tells us in *Leviathan*, 'onely to be lookers on' in politics.[1262] Being the 'Observator' is not enough.

III. Interests and Counsel

Parker's second reason for the superior counsel of parliament is its consistency with the interest of state: 'in regard of their publike interest, they are more responsible then any other', which must be considered in conjunction with Parker's third factor, the avoidance of the taint of private interest: 'thirdly, they have no private interest to deprave them, nothing can square with the common Councell but the common good'.[1263] Drawing on the writings that we examined in Chapter 7, Parker makes clear that it is only the parliament that will be able to assess and represent the public interest successfully in the political arena. As he writes in *The case of shipmony*: 'the common body can effect nothing but the common good, because nothing else can bee commodious for them'.[1264] By 1642, he had integrated the language of 'interest' to this appraisal, as he does in *Some few observations* and *Observations*: the counsel of parliament is superior because of 'the great interest the Parliament

[1261] Hobbes 1679, pp. 69-70.
[1262] Hobbes 2012, p. 546.
[1263] [Parker] 1642c, p. 5.
[1264] [Parker] 1640, p. 36; see also [Parker] 1641a, p. 53.

has in common justice and tranquillity'.[1265] Although the king too may have such an interest, Parker makes clear that he 'is not so much interessed in it as themselves'.[1266] Parliament, he writes, 'does not deny the King a true-reall Interest' but affirms that 'the State hath an Interest Paramount' above it, which is represented in the parliament.[1267] He that 'confesses, That the King hath a true and perfect interest in the Kingdom' must also accept 'That the Kingdom hath a more worthy and transcendent interest in it self'.[1268] In fact, it is one of the two primary functions of parliaments 'not to be attained to by other meanes' that 'the interest of the people might be satisfied', the second being that 'Kings might the better be counsailed'.[1269]

In addition, parliament accurately understands and follows the public interest because they, in contrast with the counsellors who surround the king, have no private interests to distract them from it.[1270] Already in *Divine and politike observations* of 1638, Parker writes that 'Courtiers or Councellors' of princes 'often have private ends or interest for disguysing truths unto them' and he repeats the theme in his *Discovrse* three years later: 'Individualls may have many particular ends, severed from the Princes or the States... and have judgement beside apt to be

[1265] [Parker] 1642a, p. 11.
[1266] [Parker] 1642a, p. 13.
[1267] [Parker] 1642a, p. 33. This is because, for Parker, parliament virtually (in the sense of being a portrait or a picture) represents the state, even *is* the state. This is opposed to Hobbes, who sees the sovereign as the representative of the state (not requiring the sense of virtual representation, but rather authorship); see Skinner 2005, pp. 155-84.
[1268] [Parker] 1642c, p. 9.
[1269] [Parker] 1642a, p. 5.
[1270] In *The case of Shipmony*, Parker's third reason for the superiority of parliament's counsel is not the element of private interest, but rather its effectiveness: 'because the hearts of the people doe not goe along with any other, as with that' (1640, p. 38), a factor which he compounds in the 1642 *Some few observations* with his second point concerning public interest.

darkened by their owne severall interests and passions'.[1271] By his *Observations* in 1642, he can declare it 'a maxime... grounded in Nature, and never till this Parliament withstood' that 'a community can have no private ends to mislead it'.[1272] The very 'composition of Parliaments... takes away all jealousies' so that there is no vying for position or fuelling of ambition.[1273]

Parker's royalist opponents did not agree, and well before Hobbes penned *Leviathan*, strong objections were being raised to Parker's view of interest. A critique of Parker's argument for parliament's superior understanding of the state's interest can be found in an anonymous response to Parker's *Observations*, entitled *Certain Materiall Considerations*, published in 1642. The author notes that 'The King and Subjects are mutuall' and so the king's interest is equal to his subjects', and *stronger* than any individual's interest in the state: 'his interest in them is of an higher Alloy, and more noble'.[1274]

Nor did Parker's opponents accept the idea that private interest plays no part in parliamentary assemblies. John Spelman, writing against Parker in 1643, concedes 'That Communities are lesse subject to private ends and affections then particular men are' but suggests that 'it is also true, that they are not absolutely free from them, and when they fall into them, they are more fatally violent and dangerous'.[1275] James Maxwell's lengthy response to Parker of 1644 – *Sancro-sancta regum majestas* – goes even further than Spelman's in challenging the contention that parliament is free from private interest, and comes close to

[1271] [Parker] 1638, n.p.; [Parker] 1641, p. 53.
[1272] [Parker] 1642a, p. 22.
[1273] [Parker] 1642a, p. 23.
[1274] *Certain Materiall Considerations* 1642, p. 11.
[1275] [Spelman] 1643b, p. 18; see Mendle 1995, pp. 105-7.

Hobbes's own analysis of the outbreak of the Civil War.[1276] He notes how 'subtle factious Spirits have great Advantages to work on the People and their weak Understandings' and so 'from those Inconveniences of Government' which aggravate the people, they 'take occasion to press upon the weake sort (which is most numerous) the present Inconveniences, shew them their Interest' and incite them to rebellion.[1277] These '*Achitophels, Absaloms,* and *Sheba's*' – popular allusions to corrupt counsellors – blur the line between public and private interest in order 'to bring this happy Change about'.[1278] This can be accomplished because 'Communities [are] subject to dangerous inclinations from private Incitements' and 'Representatives [are] subject to mis-leading Factions, and ambitions of private ends'.[1279] Thus it is that '*Communities*, or their *Representative* bodies, are... molested or transported with corrupt judgments and affections for private ends'.[1280] It is the counsellors to the people who are to blame as they 'have a mighty Zeal and Care of their own Honour and Wealth' and intend all their persuasions 'for themselves and what concerneth their private'.[1281]

Hobbes's view of the political landscape is much like the one provided by writers such as Maxwell. For Hobbes, it is not the counsel of the individual which bears the taint of private interest, but rather that of the multitude. Before moving on to the complete statement of these ideas in *Leviathan*, it is worth taking a moment to notice their generation in some of Hobbes's earlier works. For instance, in some of

[1276] Mendle 1995, pp. 123-6.
[1277] Maxwell 1689 [1644], pp. 241-2.
[1278] Maxwell 1689 [1644], p. 242.
[1279] Maxwell 1689 [1644], p. 246. I have changed this passage from a series of rhetorical questions to positive statements for sake of clarity.
[1280] Maxwell 1689 [1644], p. 246.
[1281] Maxwell 1689 [1644], p. 289.

the earliest essays attributed to him, contained in the 1620 *Horae Subseciuae* compiled by his student William Cavendish, Hobbes addresses the complex relationship between public and private interests in public figures.[1282] In 'A Discovrse vpon the Beginning of Tacitvs', Hobbes notes that 'Companions in such [public] affairs can seldom be content, that all counsels, nay almost that any, should tend to the other's profit, so constant is every man to his own ends'.[1283] In his 'Discovrse of Rome', his contribution to the genre of travel writing, he notes that 'To prepare a man fit for both [action and counsel], nothing so much prevailes, as a hard and weary life, such an agitation will not permit idlenesse, nor the minde to settle too much vpon priuate ends, which being so, could neuer be aptly applyed for Publique'.[1284] This difficult lifestyle is essential, he suggests, because a man 'can neuer haue sufficiency, nor will to preuaile for the publique, once being confined to his own particular *interest*, and looking no further'.[1285]

For these reasons, even in these early works, Hobbes prescribes a monarchical, rather than an assembly-based political system. This is perhaps clearest in his 'Of the *Life* and *History* of *Thucydides*', which accompanied his 1629 translation of *The Peloponnesian War*. He suggests that '[Thucydides] least of all liked the Democracy', providing the same reasons that would later appear in *Leviathan*, most notably 'the emulation and contention of the Demagogues... the

[1282] See Skinner 1996, pp. 254-5; Skinner 2002c, pp. 46, 55, 62; Hobbes 2005, pp. 3-22.
[1283] [Hobbes] 1620, pp. 253-4; Skinner 2002c, p. 62 notes that this essay falls into the humanist category of the *genus deliberativum*, offering advice 'about how political leaders should conduct themselves if they wish to obtain honour and advantage'.
[1284] [Hobbes] 1620, p. 335.
[1285] [Hobbes] 1620, p. 336; emphasis added. Hobbes, like many of the travel writers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries emphasises the *direct* nature of the knowledge he communicates, noting that he does not 'goe beyond mine owne knowledge' and only 'set[s] downe my obseruations' (1620, p. 329-30).

inconstancy of Resolutions, caused by the diuersity of ends, and power of Rhetoric in the Orators'.[1286] This theme is also presented in the frontispiece to the work, which contrasts a council-scene of '*ὀi aristoi*' with a scene of demagoguery in '*ὀi polloi*' (Figure 19).

The same systems are juxtaposed, using the language of interests, in *Leviathan*'s '*Comparison of Monarchy, with Soveraign Assemblies*'. Hobbes notes that 'whosoeuer beareth the Person of the people, or is one of the Assembly that bears it, beareth also his own naturall Person' and although he 'be carefull in his politique Person to procure the common interest' he cannot help but also 'to procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and friends'.[1287] When, inevitably, 'the publique interest chance to crosse the private' Hobbes suggests that such a person 'preferrs the private', as 'the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason'.[1288] Regarding sovereign power, 'in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique' and so the monarch's preference for private interest will not have the same disastrous consequences.[1289]

But what about counsel? Hobbes, in dealing with the '*Differences of fit and unfit Counsellours*', begins by reiterating the importance of experience and science in counsel: 'to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the place of Memory and Mentall Discourse'.[1290] However, 'with this resemblance...

[1286] Thucydides 1629, fo. 2^{v}-2, a^{r}. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes gives six reasons for the superiority of monarchy: (1) the 'common interest', (2) the quality and secrecy of the counsel, (3) (in)constancy of resolution, (4) (dis)agreement, (5) favourites and flatterers and (6) usurpation (by regents) (2012, pp. 289-94). All but the issue of secrecy appears in this passage of his introduction to *The Peloponnesian War*.
[1287] Hobbes 2012, p. 289.
[1288] Hobbes 2012, p. 289.
[1289] Hobbes 2012, p. 289.
[1290] Hobbes 2012, p. 404.

there is one dissimiltude joyned, of great importance'.[1291] Whereas for a man, 'the naturall objects of sense... work upon him without passion, or interest of their own', the same cannot be said of counsellors, who 'may have, and often have, their particular ends, and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull'.[1292] It is based on this that Hobbes sets down 'for the first condition of a good Counsellour, *That his Ends, and Interest, be not inconsistent with the Ends and Interest of him he Counselleth*'.[1293]

In order to ensure that private interest is not interfering with the public, Hobbes gives a prescription completely at odds with that of Parker: 'a man is better Counselled by hearing [counsellors] apart, then in an Assembly'.[1294] He provides a number of reasons for this argument, the most important being that in an assembly the voice of one will soon drown out or determine all other voices, and this single voice will almost always be that of one whose interests are not aligned with the public: 'in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique, and these their Interest make Passionate, and Passion Eloquent, and Eloquence draws others into the same advice'.[1295] Because interests are associated with the passions, and the passions drive eloquence, the most eloquent and persuasive will be the speaker with the most private interest.[1296] It is better, Hobbes suggests, to have no counsel at all, than to take the advice of a

[1291] Hobbes 2012, p. 404.
[1292] Hobbes 2012, p. 404.
[1293] Hobbes 2012, p. 404; see also Hobbes 2012, p. 546. The Latin edition of 1668 is more concerned with a specifically political application than the English, for in place of 'and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull' the Latin reads '*nec semper cum scopo Civitatis congruentem*' and where it reads '*Ends and Interest of him he Counselleth*' the Latin gives: '*Finibus & Bono publico'* (2012, pp. 404, 405).
[1294] Hobbes 2012, p. 408; Latin: '*Monarchae cui Consiliarii sunt, audire illos satiùs est seorsim unumquemque*' (2012, p. 409).
[1295] Hobbes 2012, p. 408.
[1296] See Skinner 1996, pp. 334-73.

multitude in assembly.[1297] Countering the Aristotelian metaphor employed by Parker, Hobbes admits that 'although it be true, that many eys see more than one; yet it is not to be understood of many Counsellours', for 'many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit'.[1298]

IV. Crisis, Counsel and Command

One of the most important elements in the discussion of counsel in the civil war period is the sense of crisis which pervades it. We have seen how the language of occasion – drawn from the idea of a kairotic period of time outside the usual prescriptions of chronological time – developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into a potentially dangerous tool for overriding traditional views of authority and morality, inseparable from the role of the counsellor. Another layer is added to this connection by the recognition on the part of Parker and Hobbes, among others, that there are those within the public sphere who are not counselling in the way that they ought, with pernicious effects. This results in a situation of crisis for both writers, whereby it is clear that sovereign authority *must* be gathered into a single source divorced from such privately interested counsel. In so doing, these writers turn a crisis of counsel into an argument about the location and mechanisms of sovereignty, devaluing the place of counsel in the political realm.

For Parker, the crisis exists in the tension and antagonism between a parliament which holds the public interest and the 'Court-flatters and time-serving

[1297] Here Hobbes uncharacteristically employs a simile – comparing the relationship of counselled and counsellor to firsts and seconds in a tennis match. Not only does Hobbes retain this analogy in the Latin edition, but he includes '*concilium comparatum ludo pilae*' in his index; Hobbes 2012, pp. 410, 412, 1253.
[1298] Hobbes 2012, p. 412. Hobbes thus brings the emerging science of optics, and specifically perspective and lines of sight, to bear on his consideration of counsel and politics; see Clark 2007.

Projectors' who would like nothing more than to do away with the counsel of parliament altogether.[1299] This is a natural antagonism, Parker suggests in *Some few observations*; parliament is 'odious to Court parasites' and their machinations, and so it is 'no wonder that the Kings *Favorites* and *Followers* hate Parliaments'.[1300] These figures work against parliament, and thereby against the true interests of the state, by 'perswading [the king] first to withdraw himself from his parliament, and then to call away the Members of both Houses'.[1301]

More concerning than this is these counsellors' use of the logic of reason of state and necessity. As we have seen, Parker accepts 'That the King ought to have aid of his subjects in time of danger, and common aid in case of common danger' as being 'laid down for a ground, and agreed upon by all sides'.[1302] Such emergency powers are not limited by the ordinary concerns of either *utile* or *honestum*; they are given 'out of necessity, not honour or benefit' and are essential to the proper functioning and survival of the commonwealth.[1303] The issue for Parker is the ability to recognise and declare such crises, for kings, due to 'ill counsell', may 'pretend danger causlesly' in order to do away with the legal

[1299] [Parker] 1641a, pp. 58-9.
[1300] [Parker] 1642c, pp. 10, 14. We can see here Parker's debt to Thomas Scott.
[1301] [Parker] 1643c, p. 5. The antagonism between parliamentary counsel and that of the privy councillors is recognised even by Parker's opponents, who see the latter as protecting the king against the power of parliament. For instance John Spelman, writing in 1643, suggests that the law 'allowed unto the King the power to sweare unto himself a Bodie of Counsell of State... faithfully to advise him in his Government, that he may neither do nor receive wrong, especially not in Parliament' (1643a, p. 12). Spelman notes that the 'providence of the Law' has provided the king with the ability to 'at His owne discretion sweare unto Himselfe a body of Councell to advise Him', otherwise the king 'should be left all alone to advise and dispute His Right against all the wisedome and sollicitation of the numerous body of the Subject' (1643b, p. 10).
[1302] [Parker] 1640, p. 2. For the connection between the ship-money debates and the languages of necessity and reason of state see Mendle 1995, p. 43; Baldwin 2004, p. 638.
[1303] [Parker] 1640, p. 12.

constraints on their power, constraints in place to protect the people from the 'jealousies' of precisely these 'flatterers' about the king.[1304] Parker suggests that this is the case with regard to ship-money and demands that, in addition to the reversal of the judgement, 'some dishonourable penalty may bee imposed upon those Iudges which ill advised the King herein'.[1305]

Parker had alluded to this removal of ill counsel in the epigraph of *Divine and politike observations*: '*Take away the wicked from before the King, and his Throne shall be established in Righteousnesse*', and it formed one of the fundamental demands of the parliamentarians in the early 1640s, as well as underlying the justification of the Militia Ordinance in 1642.[1306] The argument that parliament ought to take up arms to remove the king's counsellors, however, broke through the fundamental barrier between counsel and command, and many recognised it. As Parker records in *Observations* in 1642, the king's response to parliament was to reiterate this fundamental distinction: '*the Lords and Commons... Commission and trust... is to be Counsellors, not commanders*'.[1307]

Parker agrees that the maintenance of the boundary between sovereignty and counsel is indeed the 'ordinary course' in English politics, and he reinforces this traditional distinction in reference to spiritual counsel in his 1641 *True grounds of ecclesiasticall regiment*. Using the example of Peter and Nero, Parker writes that

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[1304] [Parker] 1640, pp. 23, 25.
[1305] [Parker] 1640, p. 47.
[1306] [Parker] 1638, p. 62; [Parker] 1642a, p. 30. The first two of Parliament's *Nineteen Propositions* of 1642 reflect this concern: 'I. That the Lords, and others of our Majesties Privie Councell... may be put from your Privie Councell... excepting such as shall be approved of by both Houses of Parliament... II. That the great Affairs of the Kingdome may not be Concluded or Transacted by the Advice of private men... but that such Matters as concern the Publick, and are proper for the high Court of Parliament which is your Majesties great and supreme Councell, may be Debated, Resolved, and Transacted onely in Parliament, and not elsewhere' (Charles I 1642, p. 2).
[1307] [Parker] 1642a, p. 6.

‘If *Nero* forbid *Peter* to preach, contradicting God herein, whose power is still transcendent, this prohibition binds not *Peter*, but if *Nero* use the Sword hereupon against *Peter*, this sword is irresistible’.[1308] This is because the sword – command – must always come above persuasion and counsel: ‘The use of power is not to intreat, or perswade only, for these may be done without power, but to command, and commands are vaine without compulsion, and they which may not compell, may not command, and they which cannot command, may not meddle at all except to intreat or perswade’.[1309] Whomsoever uses compulsion to enforce their words has gone beyond counsel into the realm of command, for ‘if *Peter* may doe more then perswade *Nero*, the Scepter is *Peters* not *Neroes*’.[1310] Parker writes that ‘whethersoever the power of commanding rests, it cannot rest in both, the Scepter cannot be shared, independence cannot be divided’.[1311] Parker makes clear that ‘that power which is proper, must include not only a right of commanding, but also an effectuall vertue of forcing obedience to its commands, and of subjecting and reducing such, as shall not render themselves obedient’.[1312] Parker knew very well the line between counsel and command when he crossed it.

Doing away with this ‘ordinary course’ of politics can be justified, however, according to the language of necessity and emergency. As he writes in *Observations*, there is a ‘Crisis of seducement’ in the king’s ‘preferring private advise before publike’.[1313] In such an instance, the ‘ordinary course cannot be taken

[1308] [Parker] 1641b, p. 23.
[1309] [Parker] 1641b, pp. 23-4.
[1310] [Parker] 1641b, p. 25.
[1311] [Parker] 1641b, p. 24.
[1312] [Parker] 1641b, p. 24.
[1313] [Parker] 1642a, p. 30. The 1641 *Answer to the Lord* Digbies *Speech in the House of Commons*, most likely written by Parker (see Mendle 1995, pp. 73-4) had already established that counsel, even when not executed, could constitute treason

for the preventing of publike mischiefes' and so 'any extraordinary course that is for that purpose the most effectuall, may justly be taken'.[1314] In other words, 'if the King will not joyne with the people, the people may without disloyalty save themselves'.[1315] This involves, first and foremost, as in *The case of shipmony*, moving against the pernicious counsellors of the king: 'if Kings be so inclineable to follow private advise rather then publique... then they may destroy their best subjects at pleasure, and all Charters and Lawes of publike safetie and freedome are voyd' and so 'there must be some Court to judge of that seducement, and some authoritie to inforce that iudgement, and that Court and Authoritie must bee the Parliament'.[1316] One may detect a weakness in the argument here – if there is a crisis of counsel, parliament should be given the authority to determine if there is a crisis of counsel – but it does the work that Parker needs it to, supporting the claim that parliament's 'Councell [is] of honour and power about all other, and when it is unjustly rejected, by a King seduced, and abused by private flatterers, to the danger of the Commonwealth, it assumes a right to judge of that danger, and to prevent it'.[1317]

This involves control of the militia, as Parker makes clear in his *Political catechism* of 1643, a response to the king's retaliation against the *Nineteen Propositions*. Here he reiterates the dangers of self-interested counsellors – the 'most Pernicious Instruments... of *Faction* and *Division*' – against the interests of state and the superiority of parliament – the 'Great Councel of State'.[1318] These

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(pp. 12-13), an argument with its roots in Elizabethan works which we have already explored, such as *Leicesters Commonwealth*.

[1314] [Parker] 1642a, p. 16.
[1315] [Parker] 1642a, p. 16.
[1316] [Parker] 1642a, p. 30.
[1317] [Parker] 1642a, p. 29.
[1318] [Parker] 1643c, p. 5.

counsellors have, as forewarned in *Shipmony*, used 'the Name of *publick necessity*' to move against their 'Enemies' in parliament and, Parker insists, it is parliament which ought 'to be *Trusted*' in such cases to declare such trickery.[1319] The step Parker takes in *Political catechism* is to note that such theoretical juridical power also translates into concrete military power: 'The Power of both Houses is by Law to raise Arms if need be, for the apprehending of Delinquents'.[1320] In such a case, 'the two Houses have Power by the Law to raise not only the *Posse Comitatus* of those Counties where such Delinquents are, to apprehend them, but also the *Posse Regni*, the Power of the whole Kingdom if need be'.[1321] In the name of 'their own and the Kingdoms safety' the two houses of parliament 'have Legal Power to *command* the People to this purpose' which is the 'Punishment of *Delinquents*, and for the *Prevention* and *Restraint* of the power of Tyranny'.[1322]

In *The contra-replicant*, also written in 1643, Parker articulates these arguments for parliament's extra-legal action in the language of reason of state and counsel. He reiterates that 'Lawes ayme at *Iustice*, [and] Reason of state aimes at *safety*' and thus the latter 'goes beyond all particular formes and pacts, and looks rather to the being, then well-being of a State... by emergent Counsels, and

[1319] [Parker] 1643c, p. 8.
[1320] [Parker] 1643c, p. 10.
[1321] [Parker] 1643c, p. 10.
[1322] [Parker] 1643c, pp. 11-12; emphasis added to 'command', other emphasis original. The same argument is advanced in *A Nest of Persidious Vipers*, published anonymously in 1644: 'The law allowes rather to kill, then by killed' and so just as '*David* is guiltlesse' for taking up arms against Saul and his 'Evill Counsellors' so too the parliament has the right to defend itself against the same (p. 8). Parker had laid the foundations for such an argument in *Some few observations* in which he writes that because the king 'is now seduced by wicked Councell, and therefore rejects [parliament's] requests, to the danger of the State', the members of parliament 'conceive there is a power in them to secure the State without [the king's] concurrence... At other times, when the Kings are not seduced, [parliament] ought to do nothing without [kings'] consent' (1642c, p. 13).

unwritten resolutions'.[1323] As 'The Parliament is... better regulated and qualified for consultation' than any other body, it is also better able to take the necessary powers dictated by reason of state and to be given 'a kind of a dictatorian power'.[1324] Therefore, '*To deny the Parliaments recourse to reason of State in these miserable times of warre and danger* [*is*] *to deny them self-defence*'.[1325] Parliament must 'make us of an arbitrary power according to reason of state' rather than 'confin[ing] themselves to meere expedients of Law'.[1326] Such arbitrary power is 'only dangerous in one men or in a few men' but not in parliament, and so 'To have then an arbitrary power placed in the Peers and Comm[ons] is naturall and expedient at all times, but the very use of this arbitrary power, according to reason of state, and warlick [sic] policy in times of generall distresse is absolutely necessary and inevitable'.[1327]

It is worth noting that Parker's astute opponents recognised clearly that his line of reasoning turned an argument for counsel into one of sovereign command, and they state the case more overtly than Parker ever dared to do. For instance, John Spelman in his *Review of the Observations* of 1643 notes that Parker transgresses the line between counsel and command by supporting the parliament's right to enforce their advice. He has no qualm with Parker's argument that parliament is an important source of counsel, he 'grant[s] it behoovefull for the King to hearken to His Parliament'; however, he makes it clear that 'we must not understand it so behoovefull, that there should be inevitable necessity laid upon Him that He should follow whatsoever they advise', for to do so would be to

[1323] [Parker] 1643a, pp. 18-19.
[1324] [Parker] 1643a, p. 19.
[1325] [Parker] 1643a, p. 19.
[1326] [Parker] 1643a, p. 29.
[1327] [Parker] 1643a, p. 29.

'overthrow the fundamentall Law & frame of Parliaments'.[1328] It would suggest that 'The Soveraignty (against all our Oathes and expressions to the contrary) is not in the King but in the people' and 'His will, his understanding, and his power... is all subjected to the body of the very Subject'.[1329] In other words, if counsel becomes command, as Parker suggests, 'there is really nothing but a meer popular assembly, not of Subjects but Soveraignes... we are but a Republic'.[1330]

Hobbes responds to the argument for conciliar sovereignty articulated by Parker and highlighted by Spelman by reinforcing the division between the ideas of command and counsel. He lays out three criteria – with another added in *Leviathan* – by which one can distinguish between the two: the beneficiary of the counselled action, what reason or justification is given, and whether or not the counsel is understood to be obligatory. The first, the question of benefit, touches very closely on Hobbes's theory of interest which we have already explored. Already in *De Cive* he marks one of the differences between counsel and law as being that '*Counsell* is directed to his end that receives it, *Law*, to his that *gives* it'.[1331] In Chapter 15 of *Leviathan*, primarily concerned with the distinction between counsel and command, Hobbes makes clear that whereas in giving command all is done for the speaker's 'own Benefit', in counsel, the speaker 'deduceth his reasons' according to the 'benefit that arriveth by it to whom he saith it' and thus it 'pretendeth only (whatsoever he intendeth) the good to him, to whom he giveth it'.[1332] He most abhors what he calls 'exhortation' – '*Counsell vehemently pressed*' – for it is

[1328] [Spelman] 1643, p. 16.
[1329] [Spelman] 1643, p. 17.
[1330] [Spelman] 1643, p. 17.
[1331] Hobbes 1651, p. 211.
[1332] Hobbes 2012, p. 398.

'directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour'.[1333]

The second criterion – the justification of the counsel – follows from this, and is drawn from Hobbes's rejection of prudence in favour of scientific reasoning. Whereas a command need only be justified by '*the will of the Commander*', counsel requires further justification.[1334] In *The Elements of Law*, Hobbes suggests that counsel ought always to be given in 'provisive' language, 'as for example, If this be done or not done, this will follow'; counsel must always 'give the reason of the action it adviseth to'.[1335] It demands reasoning on the consequences of actions, which in the case of politics, as we have already seen, requires knowledge of the 'rules' of civil science. When it comes to counsel, 'the expression is Do, because it is best', whereas in law it is 'Do, because I have a right to compel you; or Do, because I say Do'.[1336]

This issue of compulsion – the third criterion – is central for Hobbes, addressing precisely the transgression that Parker and the parliamentarians make in seeking to enforce their counsels regarding the 'privados' of Charles I. This concern first emerges in *The Elements of Law*, in which Hobbes makes clear that 'the counsel of a man is no law to him that is counselled'.[1337] If it were – 'if to counsellours there should be given a right to have their counsel followed' – then they would be 'no more counsellours, but masters of them whom they counsel; and

[1333] Hobbes 2012, p. 402.
[1334] Hobbes 1651, p. 210; see Hobbes 2012, p. 398.
[1335] Hobbes 1969, pp. 185, 186.
[1336] Hobbes 1969, p. 186. Here we see Hobbes's debt to Felippe 1589, pp. 70-1: 'that they which giue a man counsell, and make him acquainted with the reasons which mooue them to giue such counsell... doo not bind, or by any necessitie force him to whom the counsell is giuen, to follow their counsell: but they that will commaund, will haue y^{t} doone which they commaund'.
[1337] Hobbes 1969, p. 186.

their counsels no more counsels, but laws'.[1338] It is a mistake that 'men usually call counselling, by the name of governing' and only do so because they envy those who are called to counsel, a reason that he would later give as a cause of the civil war.[1339] *De Cive* repeats these lessons. Those who 'lesse seriously consider the force of words' tend to 'confound Law with *Counsell*' by thinking that 'it is the duty of Monarchs not onely to give ear to their *Counsellours*, but also to obey them'.[1340]

It is in Chapter 25 of *Leviathan* – 'Of *COUNSELL*' – that Hobbes fully develops these ideas. Although the opening marginal note reads '*Counsell what*', Hobbes, uncharacteristically, does not begin this chapter with a definition, but rather opens by railing, as he had in *De Cive*, against those who have conflated the definitions of counsel and command: 'How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of Counsels, and Commands'.[1341] This arises from 'the Imperative manner of speaking in them both', a reference to his treatment of the types of speech in Chapter 6, in which he had made clear that 'all Passions may be expressed' either '*Indicatively*; as *I love*, *I fear*, *I joy*, *I deliberate*, *I will*, *I*

[1338] Hobbes 1969, p. 186. This is almost a direct quotation from Béthune 1634, p. 64: 'in Estates, whereas Councellors commaund that which they Councell, they may not onely be termed Councellors but Souereignes'. Notably, Juan de Santa Maria had condemned those counsellors as being 'like vnto that great *Leuiathan*, or huge Whale in the Sea' who 'cloath themselues with the Kings royall command, as with a garment, and beare themselues too insolently-high vpon the Title of their Offices; and vnder colour and zeale to the seruice of their Kings, will make themselues their Tutors, Masters of their libertie, Lords, ouer their vassalls, and sole Commanders of the whole Kingdome' (1650 [1632], p. 138).
[1339] Hobbes 1969, p. 186; see Hobbes 1679, p. 164.
[1340] Hobbes 1651, p. 210.
[1341] Hobbes 2012, p. 398. The confusion between these types of speech, Hobbes suggests, is not one of mere ignorance, but based on the interests of those making the judgement, for those who 'mistake sometimes the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that Command' do it 'according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would inferre, or actions they approve' (2012, p. 398).

command',[1342] '*Subjunctively*', which is proper to 'Deliberation' and 'differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words; but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars' or, finally, '*Imperative*[*ly*]; as *Do this, forebeare that*'.[1343] This last, Hobbes marks, is the language of '*Command*' otherwise it is '*Prayer*, or els *Counsell*'.[1344] Whereas in *The Elements of Law* Hobbes had kept imperative speech separate from the 'provisive' speech of counsel, in *Leviathan* he acknowledges the common practice of stating both imperatively, 'for the words *Doe this*, are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of him that giveth Counsell'.[1345]

In Chapter 25 he once again repeats the distinctions between counsel and command based on the intended beneficiary and justification of the advice, before coming to the issue of obligation: 'that a man may be obliged to so what he is Commanded... But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled'.[1346] However, in *Leviathan*, this becomes merely an extension of the idea that 'Command is directed to a mans own benefit, and Counsell to the benefit of another man'.[1347] In place of this, Hobbes adds another distinguishing element: 'that no man can pretend to be of another mans Counsell'.[1348] For Hobbes in 1651 even pressing the right to give counsel is to cross the boundary between counsel and command. Part of this rests on the sovereign's control of the secrets of state, required for experiential knowledge; its acquisition requires 'hav[ing] seen the archives of the commonwealth' and so 'they who are not called to Counsell, can have no good

[1342] Notably, 'I command' is left out of the Latin edition of 1668; Hobbes may have wanted to distinguish it from imperative speech.
[1343] Hobbes 2012, p. 94.
[1344] Hobbes 2012, p. 94.
[1345] Hobbes 2012, p. 398.
[1346] Hobbes 2012, p. 400.
[1347] Hobbes 2012, p. 398.
[1348] Hobbes 2012, p. 400.

Counsell in such cases to obtrude'.[1349] Hobbes's contention, however, goes even further than this practical consideration. In *The Elements of Law*, the proscription against uninvited counsel is one of the fundamental Laws of Nature: 'That no man obtrude or press his advice or counsell to any man that declareth himself unwilling to hear the same' because 'there may often be just cause to suspect the counsellor' and so it is a 'breach of peace' and 'against the law of nature to obtrude it'.[1350] He abandons this as a law of nature in *Leviathan*, but revives it in marking the distinction between counsel and command.[1351]

In *Leviathan* Hobbes also introduces a third category – exhortation – in addition to counsel and command.[1352] He that exhorts, like he that commands, 'doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth' and so does not 'tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning'.[1353] Instead, he appeals to the 'common Passions, and opinions of men' for his reasons, making use of 'Similtudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory' in order 'to perswade the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advice'.[1354] This is a pointed and

[1349] Hobbes 2012, p. 408. The MS copy held in the British Library (MS Egerton 1910), widely held to be the presentation copy given to Charles II, reads 'they who are not called to Counsell in such cases can have no good Counsell to obtrude' and here, as well as at a number of points in this section on the requirements of counsel, text has been added, and then crossed out, probably in Hobbes's own hand. The original text is rendered illegible by such corrections. See Hobbes 1996, pp. li-lvi; Malcolm 2012a, pp. 197-208.
[1350] Hobbes 1969, pp. 91-2.
[1351] Hobbes's pressing of the difference between counsel and command may have to do with the connection between counsel and deliberation, and the latter's literal meaning of 'putting an end to the *Liberty* we had of doing, or omitting'; counsellors ought not to deprive anyone, especially the sovereign, of his liberty (2012, p. 92).
[1352] Hobbes 2012, p. 400. We see Hobbes's debt to Felippe's category of 'perswasion' here; see Felippe 1589, pp. 70-1.
[1353] Hobbes 2012, p. 400.
[1354] Hobbes 2012, p. 400. By 'metaphor', Hobbes is referring to the figure of *paradiastole*, defined in his own brief of Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric* produced in 1637: 'He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his *Metaphor* from somewhat that is better. As for Example, let him call a *Crime*, as *Error*. On the

deliberate attack not only on humanist neo-classical rhetoric, but also on public privadoes such as Parker, as 'the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely, where a man is to speak to a Multitude because when the Speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously'.[1355] Such men, 'are corrupt Counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest' for, as he explains in the Latin edition, 'men are generally more vehement in their own interests than in those of others'.[1356] If it is parliament which can be accused of crossing the line between counsel and command in pressing both the obligation and right of their counsel, it is Parker and his fellow public counsellors who are to blame for exhorting them to do so.

Counsel, from parliament and from its counsellors, emerges even more strongly as the causal factor in the outbreak of the civil war in Hobbes's later accounts. In *A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws*, written in the late 1660s, the Philosopher and the Student agree that a king who 'will not Consult with the Lords of Parliament and hear the Complaints and Informations of the Commons... sinneth against God'.[1357] However, under no circumstances can he be 'Compell'd to do any thing by his Subjects by Arms, and Force'.[1358] In fact, the Philosopher makes clear that a king has a right to, and often ought to, 'neglect such advice', for instance 'if the Lords and Commons should Advise him to restore those Laws Spiritual, which in Queen *Maries* time were in

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other side, when hee would make the worst of it, let him draw his *Metaphor* from somewhat worse, as, calling *Error, Crime*' (p. 156); Aristotle 1926, pp. 355-7; see Skinner 2002b, p. 273.

[1355] Hobbes 2012, p. 402; see Skinner 1996.

[1356] '*homines in suis plerumque rebus vehementiores sint, quam in alienis*' (Hobbes 2012, p. 403). The English is more lengthy and convoluted on this point.

[1357] Hobbes 2005, p. 26.

[1358] Hobbes 2005, p. 26.

Force'.[1359] The same is repeated in *Behemoth*, also a dialogue, in which Hobbes notes that men who distinguished themselves according to their military valour were often marked out to be members of the king's council, and so 'Kings of *England* did upon every great occasion call them together by the name of Discreet and Wise men of the Kingdom, and hear their Councils'.[1360] Although such men – the Lords – 'gave him Council when he requir'd it' they 'had no Right to make War upon him, if he did not follow it'.[1361] As to the commons, the speakers in the dialogue doubt that they 'were part of the King's Council at all' nor were they (as Parker would have them) 'Judges over other men'.[1362] Hobbes suggests that he cannot find evidence that 'the end of their summoning was to give advice' at all, but rather 'in case they had any Petitions for Redress of Grievances' to be given to the king.[1363] This statement closely echoes the closing passage of Hobbes's treatment of the choice of counsellors in *Leviathan*, in which he writes that 'The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations... is to be taken from the generall informations, and complaints of the people of each Province', as long as that stands not 'in derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveriagnty', for without these 'the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist'.[1364] The best counsel, then, is simply the expression of petitions or grievances, only voiced when it does not interfere in any way with the operation of sovereign power.

So what do Hobbes and Parker leave us with in terms of a mid-seventeenth century discourse of counsel? For Parker, although he seems to embrace the orthodox

[1359] Hobbes 2005, p. 26.
[1360] Hobbes 1679, p. 77.
[1361] Hobbes 1679, pp. 77, 78.
[1362] Hobbes 1679, p. 78.
[1363] Hobbes 1679, p. 78.
[1364] Hobbes 2012, p. 548.

humanist model of counsel, the conciliar role of parliament gives way to a sovereign one whenever the king can be said to be 'seduced' by private counsel, in other words, when the king does not follow parliament's advice. This obligatory parliamentary counsel, as his opponents point out, crosses the line between counsel and command, placing the latter in the hands of parliament, and reducing counsel to nothing more than a cover for sovereign power. Counsel, in Parker's model, becomes command.

Hobbes's attempts to rebuild the distinction between these two concepts are, at least in part, a response to Parker and the events of the 1640s. In reconstructing the barrier between counsel and command, however, Hobbes buries the former beneath the latter. Rejecting the humanist model of counsel built on the persuasive power of rhetoric, the Machiavellian model built on history as well as the reason of state model built on direct experience, he denies any political body a right to give advice, completely subjecting counsel to the will of the sovereign. The figure of the counsellor had emerged with the Aristotelian separation of the philosopher and the king. It ends with their reincorporation into the modern state.

Conclusion

I have argued that the Anglophone discourse of counsel disappears at the end of the English Civil War. What, then, is to be gained by studying it? I should like to end by suggesting two answers. The first is purely historical, and arises from a recent move in Tudor political history towards highlighting figures on the peripheries of personal monarchical power – particularly counsellors.[1365] Many of the resulting works have been biographical in nature, although efforts have been made to embed such scholarship within a wider understanding of political networks and culture, an endeavour to which my own study is intended as a contribution.

For example, Alexandra Gadja's recent work on the Earl of Essex declares that it is 'not a biographical work' but an attempt to 'deepen our understanding of the earl's career by thematic analysis of the expression of political and religious ideas'.[1366] Gadja notes how recent scholarship on Elizabethan England has focused upon the 'governing elites' who expressed 'their own visions... of how commonwealth and church should be governed'.[1367] Her own work aims to use 'the example of Essex's career... as a prism through which many aspects of the culture of late Elizabethan politics are refracted with colour and clarity'.[1368] My research supports this microcosmic approach by taking a broader view of the frameworks within which figures close to the throne operated in early modern England. By

[1365] See MacCulloch 1996; Worden 1996; Jardine and Stewart 1998; Elliott and Brockliss, eds 1999 – especially Hammer, pp. 38-53; Levy Peck, pp. 54-70; Croft, pp. 81-95 within that volume – Guy 2000; Adams, ed. 2002; Loades 2008; Loades 2009; and within the last year: Alford 2012; Bridgen 2012; Gadja 2012; Hadfield 2012; Maginn 2012; Rampling 2012, pp. 432-6; Loades 2013 [forthcoming]. We might think, too, of the recent interest in 'new diplomatic history', see Fletcher and DeSilva 2010, pp. 505-12. Interestingly, this trend has not yet extended into Stuart political history; perhaps a study such as this will promote interest in these figures into the early seventeenth century.
[1366] Gadja 2012, p. 9.
[1367] Gadja 2012, p. 14.
[1368] Gadja 2012, p. 12.

bringing both perspectives together, a fuller picture of the political culture of the period can be constructed.

My second reason for considering it important to focus on political advisers is the recent increase of interest in such figures in contemporary political life. Scholars of public administration now suggest that such advisers – the 'people who live in the dark' – have been overshadowed by a concern for the institutions and structures of parliament and state, and that they are only lately receiving adequate attention.[1369] Particularly 'special advisers', 'political advisers' or 'minders', who take a more personal and informal role, have returned to prominence in public service analysis.[1370] Confronted with a lack of research on the history of such figures, scholars have attempted to rebuild an understanding of their roles and duties in historical perspective, usually with reference to sixteenth century discourse.[1371] This parallel is apt; contemporary advisers have a duty to 'speak truth to power',[1372] to 'counterbalance and offset the defects and limitations of their bosses',[1373] to participate in a 'court culture'[1374] and to 'bind'[1375] rulers – language and roles with clear connections to the discourse I have examined above.

Attempts to make historical connections, however, have been shallow and under-researched.[1376] For instance, Laugharne's 1993 study traces the use of

[1369] Peters and Barker 1993, p. 1; Blick 2004.
[1370] See Walter 1986, p. 2; Weller 1987, pp. 149-57; Blick 2004; Gains and Stoker 2011, pp. 485-98.
[1371] See Goldhamer 1978; Walter 1986, pp. 30-4; Blick 2004, p. 30; Lynn Jr. 2006, p. 44; Burnham and Pyper 2008, p. 6.
[1372] Bromell 2010, p. 58.
[1373] Dror 1987, p. 188.
[1374] Walter 1986, pp. 3-12.
[1375] Dror 1987, p. 203.
[1376] See Dror 1987, p. 186, who declares that 'key features of relations between rulers and advisers have not changed very much' since their evolution 5000 years ago, and so he adopts 'a general theoretical approach to the subject, rejecting historicism'.

specialist advisory committees to the early middle ages, through to developments in sixteenth-century political administration.[1377] Although this is an interesting suggestion, little analysis of this historical precedent is actually given, and it fails to incorporate the methodological move outlined in my introduction – the turn away from Eltonian institutional histories and towards an understanding of political cultures, languages and theories. References which do incorporate the beliefs of political thinkers – such as those of Machiavelli[1378] and Bacon[1379] – are given without any contextual consideration or engagement with the text as a whole. My hope is that my own study may contribute to a more historically-informed understanding of the role that informal advice can play in public and political life.[1380]

A move away from an exclusive or predominant concern for the institutional mechanisms of sovereignty – both historically and in contemporary political analysis – yields insights that have not yet received sufficient attention. Perhaps the most important lesson is that such a shift in perspective need not present a threat to institutional structures and the workings of sovereign power, but rather works to support them.[1381] Historically, the discourse of counsel stands as a counterpart to sovereignty, mitigating personal flaws and institutional inflexibilities. The 'monarchy of counsel' was built upon an understanding of the

[1377] Laugharne 1993, pp. 21-2.
[1378] Chabal 1993, p. 51.
[1379] Walter 1986, pp. 3, 8.
[1380] My forthcoming work for inclusion in the volume *The European Public Servant: A Shared Administrative Identity?* will attempt to draw such connections; Paul 2014a.
[1381] See Bartelson 2001 for the critique of state sovereignty that has arisen out of the shift towards a concern for informal networks of governance. A similar critique of parliamentary democracy has also been raised of late; see Alonso, Keans and Merkel, eds. 2011. I have attempted to answer some of these critiques in historical perspective in Paul 2012, pp. 36-54. See the collection of essays in Kalmo and Skinner 2010.

relative importance of both components. My hope is that this study has furthered the appreciation of the relationship between counsel and command, with indications toward both historical and contemporary significance.

Appendix A - Figures

Figure 1

[Removed for copyright purposes]

University College Oxford MS 85 in Ferster, Judith (1996). *Fictions of Advice: The Literature and Politics of Counsel in Late Medieval England*, Philadelphia, p. 42.

Figure 2

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Boccaccio, Giovanni (1527). *The Fall of Pri*[*n*]*ces*, trans. John Lydgate, London, frontispiece.

Figure 3

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Boccaccio, Giovanni (1527). *The Fall of Pri*[*n*]*ces*, trans. John Lydgate, London, n.p.

Figure 4

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Boccaccio, Giovanni (1527). *The Fall of Pri*[*n*]*ces*, trans. John Lydgate, London, sig. Dd, i^{r}.

Figure 5

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Alciato, Andrea (1531). ‘In senatum boni principis’ in *Emblematum Liber*, Augsburg, sig. D, 1^{v}.

Figure 6

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Alciato, Andrea (1534) ‘In senatum boni principis’ in *Emblematum libellus*, Paris, p. 63.

Figure 7

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Alciato, Andrea (1550). ‘In senatum boni principis’ in *Emblemata*, Lyon, p. 157.

Figure 8

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Natura breuium (1494), London, frontispiece.

Figure 9

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Salomon and Marcolphus (1492), Antwerp, frontispiece.

Figure 10

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Salomon and Marcolphus (1529), London, frontispiece.

Figure 11

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Here begynneth a lytell treatyse for to lerne Englysshe and Frensshe (1497), London, frontispiece.

Figure 12

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Hall, Edward (1548). *The vnion of the two noble and illustre famelies of Lancastre* [*and*] *Yorke*, London, frontispiece.

Figure 13

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Hall, Edward (1548). *The vnion of the two noble and illustre famelies of Lancastre* [*and*] *Yorke*, London, fo. XXX, v^{v}.

Figure 14

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Boissard, Jean Jacques (1588). ‘L’Occasion’ in *Emblemes latins*, Metz, p. 60.

Figure 15

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Foxe, John (1563). *Actes and Monuments*, London, sig. B, i^{r}.

Figure 16

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Foxe, John (1583). *Actes and Monuments*, London, p. 799.

Figure 17

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Raleigh, Walter (1614). *The History of the World*, London, frontispiece.

Figure 18

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Lever, Christopher (1627). *The historie of the defendors of the catholique faith*, London, frontispiece.

Figure 19

[Removed for copyright purposes]

Thucydides (1629). *Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre*, trans. Thomas Hobbes, London, frontispiece.

Appendix B – Transcription of Sloane MS 1065

Introduction:

What follows is a transcript of the first and second books of Richard Etherington's *Abstract* of Giovanni Botero's *Ragione di Stato* (Sl. MS 1065). Etherington also gives an abridgement of the remaining eight books of Botero's text, as well his own *Adiunct of Conservation of the State*; however, I have limited my transcription to the books quoted from above.

The text is dedicated to Sir Henry Hobart, who served as Chancellor to Prince Charles as well as Chief Justice of Common Pleas from 1613 until his death in 1625. The dedication to Hobart dates the writing of the text between his appointment (or more likely his reappointment in April 1617) and the death of James I, 27 March 1625.

Sir Richard Etherington was the eldest son of Thomas Etherington (d. 1589) and his wife Margery (or Margaret) Middlewood, daughter of William Middlewood.[1382] He was a prominent member of Lincoln's Inn in the 1580s; he acted as Master of the Revels on the 2 November 1587 and was called to the bar accession day (13 May) 1591.[1383] It is at Lincoln's Inn that he may have first met Hobart, who was called to the bar in 1584. Both men were knighted in 1603, but thereafter their fortunes diverged dramatically. Etherington was appointed receiver of Pickering in 1606, but later that year was accused by Sir John Edmondes of emblezzling profits of the manorial courts and 'seek[ing] by all sinister ways to possess himself of [Edmondes's] interests'.[1384] In 1609 Etherington lost all but his own manor of Ebberston.[1385] He was outlawed for debt in 1621, and Ebberton was seized by the Crown.[1386] It seems likely that the MS below was composed sometime after 1621, in an appeal from Etherington to gain favour with his powerful acquaintance.

[1382] Page, ed. 1923 (accessed 3 April 2013).
[1383] *Records of the Honorable Society of Lincoln's Inn, The* 1896, pp. 6, 20.
[1384] Healy 2010 (accessed 3 April 2013).
[1385] Page, ed. 1923 (accessed 3 April 2013).
[1386] Page, ed. 1923 (accessed 3 April 2013).

Conventions:

Abbreviations and Contractions: I have expanded contractions and abbreviations using square brackets, excepting 'y^{r}' for 'your', 'y^{e}' for 'the', 'y^{t}' for 'that', 'w^{th}' for 'with' and 'w^{ch}' for 'which'. I have retained the use of superscript throughout.

Additions/Deletions: I have indicated additions with carets (eg. ^example^) and deletions by striking through the passage (eg. ~~example~~). I have not indicated additions or deletions by a later hand, as these are few and minor.

Foliation: I have used the folio numbers given, excluding the blank unmarked pages added before the first noted folio. A later hand has added a second set of folio numbers, beginning from the 'First Book of State' (fo. 4^{r}); I have ignored these.

Italics: I have used italics only where the script changes, usually to indicate a proper name or a foreign-language quotation. As this is a subtle change in most cases, I have used my discretion and not added italics to quotations where the script does not appear to change.

Paragraphs: I have added space between significant paragraph breaks for clarity of reading and to accommodate the extensive marginalia.

[fo. 1r]

An Abstract of *Boterus della*
Ragione di Stato

With an *Adiunct of Conser-*
vation of the
State

[fo. 1v – blank]

[fo. 2r]

To the Right Hono[ra]ble S[i]r Henry Hobart
kn[igh]t and Baronet, Cheife Iustice of his
Ma[jes]ties Courte of Common Pleas, and
Chauncellor to the most excellent
Prince Charles.

The Communitie of Blood in the noble fabrique of man Gods Plenary and perfect Pattarne and Resemblaunce of a goodly Cittie Common-wealth or society all Composed of Reciprocall respect each part to other should begett an affection in all of all necessary trauell for publique Conserue. which was the first motiue that in some few stolne howers from necessaries I endeavoured to attire a straunger *Bosterus* after our Country guise teaching him our Country language contracting all the Chapters of his ten seuerall Bookes in his treatise *Della Ragione Di Stato* into one, extracting as the marrow of his Bookes his seuerall politiqe positions and placing in the margent his painfull collected examples therof so many as well could be placed.

therein on purpose leauing out Invectiues against some States Charitably extenuating them as not straunge that a Straunger to them should erre in opinion to mainteyne that wherin he was

bred, and fed his wellbeing and mainteynance proceeding from the mainteynance therof. yet therefore did not I thinke fitt to neglect so much good as was therin learnedly and painfully couched for some such intermingle of ill *Dij odere Curiosum* and there is an excellent Refraine in Spanish *Adonde se halla la miel, no Falsa Hiel.*

Full litle hony, Hony-Bee should make:
If for each bitter tast, It flower forsake.

This Booke, If best vse be made therof (in my poore [fo. 2^{v}] opinion) bringeth hony to the quiet Hive of the Common-wealth wherin the Causes of the diseases of the Common-wealth are Curiously enquired of: exterior and interior and thervnto applyed their suerall Respectiue Cures, therby politiquely provyding Harbour and quiet repose for Religion & Religious excercises And for that there is not *Nisi a natura pessime Informatus* which will not thinke of some worthy thing in the Common-wealth *Deserunt Rempublica qui nihil operum in eam Conferunt*. Thus warranted to this Translation I onely adde an Adiunt hastely by me collected which though as a silly abhortiue not worthy the paper written (the reason giuen by a graue Philosopher why he did not write) yet well may it serue for a foyle or Counterfeit to adde grace and lustre to a work more worthy.

Now my much worthily honoured Lo[rd] trewly noble in nobility of minde exceeding noblenes in blood as much as trewth presumption, manifestation likelyhood, noblenes in blood being a spurre to noblenes of mynde, But *Expressi est maior virtus quam taciti* And this noblenes of minde springs out of trew noble Blood, Education, Learning, experience and other honest Causes. Honestie being the fairest Flower in Hono:^{rs} garland. which cannot be without prudence to know what is honest Iustice to doe it, temperance in the manner of doing it, and fortitude to darre to doe it, *Cuiq*[*uibus] dignitati*

nulla Dignitas comparari potest, without which *generosi* becomes *degeneres* These and yo[r] ordinary respective Humanitie to all and yo[r] speciall vndeserued fauour allready receiued by mee did move and embolden me to offer this meane [fo. 3[r]] Translation and Adiunct to yo[r] graue and learned Censure and Correction presenting a litle guift, out of a great desire as a Demonstration of affection which neither can showe nor hide itselfe. which with my best seruice, shall euer attend

Yo[r] Lo[rdshi][pps] Commaund

Ric[hard] Etherington

[fo. 3[v] – blank]

[fo. 4[r]]

THE FIRST Booke
Of State, The causes of
Ruyne and Conseruation
thereof.

Lawe of State and Conscience one.

Some haue grounded their reason in litle conscience. Some haue mantled their tyranny with a cloke of barbarous lawe of Ma[jes][tie], and yet both accounted famous Statists or Idœaes of State, as though there were one law of State another of conscience: when as such as take away consciences Iurisdiction more in publique then in priuate thinges haue neither Soule nor God.

Machiauell.

Tyberius Cæsar.

State.

State is a firme or established gouernment ouer people.

Iudgement of State.

Iudgement of State is a notive of meane actions to found, conserue and enlarge gouerments or dominyons.

Dominyon is either naturall or acquired.

Dominyon
- Naturall. Naturall by election or succession.
- Acquired. Acquired is by Conquest by force money's or otherwise.

Dominyon by Conquest are the worse qualited the more resisted before Conquest. And the Subiects the worse qualited the further they are from the truth. Iewes and Turkes

Dominyons naturall and acquired are litle meane or greate.

[fo. 4v]

Dominyon
- Litle. Litle dominyons are not able to defend them-selues — Ragugia, Luca.
- Meane. The Meane or midle, not to litle nor to great hath most meanes to conserue it selfe. — Venice, Bohemia, Millaine, Flaunders.
- Great. The great or eminent breedeth Ielousy in others, thereby combyneinge against it: and is more subiect to the interior causes of ruyne, vices, w^ch most abound where most people are. Likewise his greatnes breedeth dangerous security, and like ^ripe^ fruites bringeth out of it selfe, wormes to deuoure it selfe. — The great Turke, the King of Spaine. The interior causes of ruyne are best showne in the Romaynes who therby euen in their heigh suffered shipwracke. So came Spaine Conquered by the Moores. Constantinople by the Turkes.

So that dominyons w^ch exceed the limites of mediocrity exceed the limites of security, hauing a great Body and small or weake Nerues for his necessary motion or gouerment. And therefore it once being disordered is not to be reduced as dominyons in mediocrity may be.

Dominyons also are vnited or disunited.

Dominyon
- Vnited. Vnited such as haue their body & members contynue and lye together w^ch are safest, saue onely from interior causes of ruyne, vice there more abounding.
- Disunited. Disunited, where one of them may conueniently relieue th'other, are no lesse safe but rather harder to be Conquered & freer from contagion from one to th'other by reason of distance and seuerall customes of y^e Country. — As Spain by reason so many Kingdomes & portes of their freindship & co[m]maund that by Sea each may relieue other.

Causes of ruyne of the State.
- Interior. The causes of the ruyne of the State as in all other naturall
- Exterior. thinges are interior and exterior.

[fo. 5r]

Interior. The Interior, is excesse and corruption of the first quality as cruelty & luxurye, being ye ruyne of the reputation of the Prince, and so by consequence of the State. And it is a question disputable whether luxury or cruelty in a Prynce be the greater ruyne of the state. So likewise enuy, discorde, the fury of the people, popularity of ye Lordes, ambition or want of witt in the Prynce, be inward causes of ruyne of the State.

By these both the King & Decem viri were cast out of Rome & the Moores brought into Spaine.

Demetrius King of Macedon and Pirhus King of Epirus in Greece embraceing more then they could contayne.

Exterior. The Exterior causes are deceit or trechery or power of the enemy, wch are lesse dangerous then th'other for that seldome or neuer a Kingdome is ruynated by exterior enemy if not first corrupted by interior.

The Romaynes by power Conquered the Macedons, the Barbarians the Romaines.

More glorious to Conserue then to Conquer. It is more glorious and truly noble to conserue then to enlarge the state. for that all things naturally are dayly changing, like the Moone, to wch they are subiect, force & strength are giuen to many, wisedome (by wch conseruation of the state) to fewe. The conseruor of the state fighteth against exterior and interior enemy, th'enlarger or Conqueror onely against the'exterior. And yet ordinarily the Conqueror hath more esteame, then the conseruor. The reason is, for that his trauell is more manifest, and runneth wth a greater currant of rumors.

The Lacedemonians pu[n]nisht such as lost in battell their sheild not their Sworde.

Fabius Maximus being called the shield of the common wealth was of more esteame then Marcus Marcellus who was called the sworde of ye Common wealth.

Cause of foundation & conseruation of ye state is the Prynces. Reputation. Love. As all things naturall are conserued by such meanes, as they are first produced by. So the cause of foundation & conseruation of dominyons are the same: which are Reputation and Loue of the Prynce. [fo. 5v]

Reputation greater than Loue. In Election of Prynces reputation hath greater force then Loue, and reputation is grounded vpon vertue, but loue contenteth it selfe wth a meaner degree: Reputation being not content but wth ye highest, whereunto whoe atteyneth is more esteamed then loued; wch esteame if vpon Religion or piety grounded, it is called Reuerence, if vpon art politique, or military, Reputation,

The Romaynes neuer committed busines to silly or giddy headed fauorits but to ripe yeares of reputation & experience.

The excellency of Camillus in remaunding the School maister and Scholers. Fabricus the Phisition Traytor, Scipio the goodliest creature to her husband vntoucht & Scipio therfore held of the Spanyard as a God come downe from heauen.

in both a diuine excellency, desireable in Prynces, for that the foundations of euery State, is the obedience of y^{e} Subiect to the Superior, w^{ch} is grounded vpon the eminency of the vertue of the Prynce some of them begetteth loue, some esteame.

Begetters of Loue:
- Iustice.
- Liberality.

Loue is begott by Humanity, Curtesy, Clemency & other inferior vertues, w^{ch} may be reduced to Iustice, and Liberality.

Parents of Reputation:
- Prudence.
- Valour.

Reputation by fortitude, Art military, policye, constancy, vigor of mynde, readines of witt, w^{ch} are reduced to prudence and valour.

Christ confirmed his Church wth Charity, w^{ch} now waxing cold, Iustice must add necessary heat ther'unto; Iustice being y^{e} foundation & establishment of common concord and peace amongst y^{e} people.

Luis. 12. put of his hatt to the gallowes, saying he was king by the execution of iustice. The King of Egipt swore his maiestrates not to obey his co[m]maund vnless iust. So the King of Fraunce his letters vnles they were thought reasonable were not to be obeyed.

Iustice betwene:
- Prince & Subiect.
- Subiect & Subiect.

Iustice is either betwene Prynce and Subiect, or Subiect & Subiect.

Betwene Prynce and Subiect.

In iustice to the Subiect from his Soueraigne, the Subiect is bound to his Soueraigne (being his defender) to his [fo. 6^{r}] vtmost power. And the King must be wary in dispending the reuenewes of the Crowne; being the sweat and blood of his Subiects, for if the Prynce herein be vaine and not iust (vanity haying no measure) he falleth into disorder & needes, and to redeeme him selfe casteth himselfe headlong into all iniquity; and the people being ouer burthened, leaue their Country, or reuolt from odedience.

Caligula haying spent all, fell to rapyne and all cruelty.

Salomon haying spent much vainly, fell to impositions, and the people not able to beare them, rebelled against his Sonne Roboam.

Likewise the Prynce must be iust in distributing profitts, offices, honours & fauours, distributing them to worthy & deseruing Subiects, nothing being more preiudiciall to a King then to conferre such, more for fauour then meritt, for that besides the wrong herein done to Vertue it selfe; the Subiects of better partes and meritts, much disdaining, turnes disobedient,

Such vnworthy & excessuye fauor was bestowed on Spenser by E.2. The like in Ric.2. tyme. The like by Francis duke of Britaine to his fauorite Peter Laudoic therby brought so to be distressed y^{t} he was forced to deliuer him to be straungled.

murmurers, & such as should obey (scorning such vnworthy superiority) reuolts from due obedience. to their Soueraigne. at the least y^e^ Courte groweth full of factions, the Citty full of rancor, and y^e^ whole Kingdome full of dissention. The King in a Laborinth not k^n^owing how to gett out.

The like in Naples by Iohn.2. to his fauorite Alopo and Caracciolo.

Betwene Subiect & Subiect.

In Iustice betwene Subiect & Subiect, the Prynces care must first be to meet w^th^ fraudes of all kindes w^ch^ are the pest of the kingdome, and amongst all, the Prynce hath more need to looke into the mischeife of Vsury then all the rest, for that the riches of a Prince dependes of the faculty's [fo. 6^v^]
and abilityes of all his perticuer Subiects, consisting in Waires, Traffique reall vpon the profitts of the Land, or Maryne by transportation, either from home or homewarde, and vpon the perticuler industry of euery Subiect; none of w^ch^ the vsurer vseth, but stealth away the treasure of the land into some few perticuler mens hands, and decayeth all trades at home & Traffique abroad, and banisheth publique reuenewe; Customes and duties to the Prynce, euery one of any substance turning Vsurer, louing gaine without paine, and so gett into their hand all the money's where w^th^ all Trades at home and Traffique abroad should be mainteyned, which should enrich the Cominalty infinitly and sufficiently, and in mediocrity euery perticuler person. As the common wealth of Venice doth shew vs, being famous and rich moderately in euery particuler, & infinit rich in the generall, by reason of their reall trade and traffique; when as Genoa (also in Italy) by reason of their common traffique, cheifly by echange of money's they are infinitly rich in some few perticulers, & extreame poore and miserable in ^their^ publique reuenewe.

Luis.12. was for his care ouer his subiects called father.

Athens & Rome were brought to great misery by vsury.

The King of Fraunce oft hath banished the Italian bankards or lumbards.

Asia therby twise giuen ouer into the hand of Methridate with great bloodshed of the Romaines being first by vsuryes consumed as though by the monster Harpia.

Great comendations it was to Solon in Athens Cucullo in Asia, Cæsar in Spaine to banish or at least moderate vsury.

For redresse wher'in, and infinite other common greiuances, seing that y^e^ Prince cannot doe all in his owne person. It is fitt

Iustice requireth. { Election of good Officers. / Keeping them good.

he should haue a great care in election of good officers & in keeping them good.

[fo. 7r]

Election of good Officers.

Therefore he must choose men of integrity of life, of science, and of necessarie practise for their places. Arguments of vertue are illustrious deedes proceeding of extraordinary goodnes, obliginge the doer not to doe things vnworthy his already worthily acquired fame.

Alexander Seuerus the Emperor, long before he made any magistrate, published his name to heare what report would be made of him.

And common good fame bringeth Credit or Reputation to the place and seldome is deceiued in common esteame. Likewise already had experience in graue affayres breeds iudgment in things to come.

The Lacedemonians named all the competitors in a publique meeting, & choose that man that had the greatest applause of the people.

A good co[m]mendor is modesty, w^ch^ is knowne by moderation of mynd, w^ch^ is knowne by vniformity of life. from whence cannot but be expected reguler carriage. So liberality for that one truly liberall will hardly ^be^ enduced to doe uniustly.

Younge yeares are full of vehement passion not fitt for gouerment.

The Romaines neuer ^made^ choyse of younge yearers for Officers.

Necessity swayeth the poore, couetousness y^e^ rich. therfore the inwarde goodnes and inclination is to be respected, w^ch^ directeth both hand & harte of rich and poore.

Th´ancient lawe-giuers held the poore officers to be subiect to extortion.

Homebred Iudges are easily transported w^th^ y^e^ interest of Allyes and freindes: and Strangers many tymes to vphold themselues, leane to much to great personages, therefore the best is neither a stranger altogether, nor of the same place, where he is to be Iudge, but of some other place where the factions of that Country (when he serueth) can noe way swaye.

In diuers Cittyes in Italy where factions were forayne Iudges. Marcus Aurelius and Phillip the faire King of Fraunce would haue none Iudges where they were borne.

[fo. 7v]

He that selleth offices maketh the[i]ues. for the buyer entereth therunto, not as into a feild of thrones and weedes, but as into a fruitfull possession that will yeald abounding profitt.

Nero his rule, *nihil in penatibus sius ve nale nihil ambition peruium.*

In Rome that was capitall.

In Carthage Honors & offices were gott with guiftes.

Keeping of good officers good.

Good officers may turne bad, and of doues become crowes: And nothing doth more discouer the inward man, then

magistracy. The best way to ensure their integrity is well to reward them; that they haue no need to intend other things then their place, and to leaue to their iudgement as fewe things as may be. for that the iugdement of man is subiect to passion, and where it is free to iudge as it listeth, commonly it vseth not fitting diligence, neither to vnderstand the cause nor the lawes.

The King of Chyna prouides for his officers all fitting things for their profit & honour.

In Egipt the Statues of the Iudges were wthout hand, and the President with eyes fixed vpon the earth.

Also somtymes sharp demonstrations must be made vpon some corrupt Iudge, one example restraining many.

Cambise king of Assiria tooke the skinne of from a faulty Iudge liueing & there withall couered the Tribunall.

Many Iudges or assistants are chargeable therefore some haue vsed secret spies, some vse vistors, some to visitt themselyes in fit tyme & places: for that to see & heare wth other mens eyes or eares is dangerous, and it is a question whether it were better to be deafe, then to heare all.

Cosmio the Duke of Tuscania vsed spies.

Aritperto king of Lombardy vsed to goe disguised to hear what was spoken of himself & his magistrates

Ludouicus .12. informed himself of all things of such as by chance or vpon some busines came to him, writeing all in bookes.

In execution of Iustice. { vniformity. / Expedition.

In execution of iustice vniformity & expedition must be cheifely respected.

Vniformity

For that it sufficeth not that they hold the ballance of iustice straight if they giue grace where punishment is merited, w^{ch} properly belonges to the Prynce, the Iudge [fo. 8^{r}]
being onely to mitigate the rigor of y^{e} lawe: and to giue pardon to a fault that hath noe excuse of ignorance, nor iust greife, is not grace but iniquity.

Expedition.

Also the Prynce must haue speciall care y^{t} delayes be cut of, the poore suitor many tym's spending more in charges then the principall: and therefore it is a Pryncely worke to appoint woorthy honoured & fit men to take course for cutting of all delayes.

Iulius Cæsar gaue the charge to excellent men for selecting y^{e} cheif ciuill lawes.

So did Alaricus king of the Gothes.

So Iustinian[us] th'Emperor. Vespasian gaue authority to worthy men to doe su[m]mary iustice in Sweathland at the 2. hearing diffinitiue sente[n]ce.

The multitude of Doctors daylie writing, doe much hurt, for truth is not to be enquired of by multitude of authors but of reason it selfe.

In Italy an old order y^{t} euery one should be his owne proctor and aduocate, and if vnfitt his nearest kindred or els a tutor giuen him by the Senate.

The King of Spayne writt to the Senate of Millayne that it should be a thing of acceptable seruice if any could propose a short forme for expedition of iustice.

Princely liberality in { Com[m]iseration of miseries. / Promotion of vertues.

Princely liberality is best showen in commiserating misery's & promouing of vertues.

The Hebreues hold almes y^e^ conseruatrix of their families & the mainteyner of their greatnes.

Com[m]iseration of miseries.

Commiserating miseries either in p[er]ticuler or generall but especially in generall for that publique desasters are the proper matter & best occasion, that can be presented to a Prynce to gaine the mynd's & harts of y^e^ Subiects. which though it be remediles, let there be showen a feeling of their greife, and if a perticuler Subiect would or could releiue it, it is fitt y^e^ Prynce should first doe it, being not safe that the Comminality should be so deeply obliged to a priuate Subiect.

Robert king of Fraunce here w^th^ all established his Kingdome releiuing .1000. poore, to follow the courte to pray for him.

Luis .9. ordinarily releiued .120. poore.

The Duke of Sauoye also his recreation to feed and cloth y^e^ poore.

[fo. 8^v^]

Also it is great wi[n]ning of Subiects loue, not to spare his owne, before he doe a greiuance to the Common wealth.

The king of the Iewes in th'extreame dearth wore haire clothes vpon his shoulders.

Cassius lost his life w^th^ others for larges of corne in y^e^ tyme of dearth to the poore.

Marcus Aurelius made an outcry for sale of all his ~~gold~~ plate & iewells, & with y^e^ money therfore receiued mainteyned y^e^ warres.

Promotion of vertues.

Likewise Pryncely liberality is it, to promote vertues, to giue fauours to witts, entertayne Artes, make Sciences flourish, bring lustre to Religion, the supreame Splendor and ornament of State.

Herew^th^all Carolus Magnus got his name.

Iustinian, th'Emperor Constantyne both vnlearned yet w^th^ fauour of learning were famous.

So Otto .3. but a young man.

So Alphonsus of Aragon. Mathias Caruinus king of Hungary all great patrons of learning.

Aduises in liberalitye.

It is not true liberality to giue to y^e^ vnworthy, for besides the ill bestowing thereof, it is a wronge to y^e^ worthy & to vertue it self, and forceth Subiects to forsake vertue, & betake them to such vnworthy fauoured courses, as they see rewarded w^th^ the bounty onely due to vertue. Likewise i[m]moderate guift's are not Pryncely liberality, nor cannot hold out vnles the Prynce will streatch out his hand where it should not be: neither is it prouident liberality, to giue all at once w^ch^ he meaneth to giue, but by litles, thereby the receyuor still resisting bound, w^th^ a hope of receyuing more, for that euen as the shower w^ch^ softly & slowly falleth doth continue longest, & better bath's y^e^

Basilius Macedom Emperor for that his auncestor had ill bestowed the reuenewe caused proclamation for restitution.

Nero in 14 yeares gaue aboue .50,000. crownes all recalled by Galla.

ground and deeper entereth in thereunto. So liberality vsed in measure doth better begett and conserue beneuolence of his w^{ch} doth receyue it; & wthout doubt it is better to giue moderately to many, or to all if it were possible, then profusely to fewe; for that greater & more Pryncely is the vertue, the more generall it is, and more like the Sunne, which giueth comportement and dispense of his light to all.

[fo. 9^{r}]

THE SECOND BOOKE, OF THE ADIVNCT'S OF Reputation.

Th'adiunct's of reputation — Prudence. Valour.

Thus passing ouer Iustice and liberality as specyall meanes to wynne loue, necessary to Prynces: let vs proceed to the adiunctes of reputation to a Prynce no lesse necessary, w^{ch} are Prudence & Valour, two Pilasters where vpon euery good gouerment hath his foundation. Th'one for th'eye of y^{e} Prynce, th'other for his hand, otherwise both blynd & impotent. Th'one subministreth Councell th'other force; th'one commaundeth, th'other executeth, th'one discouereth the difficulty of the imprese th'other breaketh through it, th'one designeth th'other incarnateth th'affayres. Th'one refineth y^{e} iudgement th'other corrob^or^ateth y^{e} hart, but it is fittest to handle them seuerally.

Refiners of Prudence. — Science. Experience.

Refiners of Prudence are Science & experience fit also to be handled seuerally.

Science.

To none it is more conuenient to knowe more then to a Prynce, Philosophy morall to giue knowledge of passion common to all; Politique, to temper and second those passions and th'effects wth y^{e} rules of good gouerment, knowledge Military, Poeticall, Geometricall, Mechanicall to serue himselfe iudiciously ouer. such as professe them Rhetoricke is likewise

For the Mechanickes Iulius Cæsar was excellent. So in Eloquence Pericles thundered in his discourses.

not to be forgotten: for that Eloquence is the moderatrix of the mynd, tempereth the Commonwealth and manageth the people, [fo. 9^{v}]

Augustus had facility.

Tyberius waight and obscurity in his speaches.

w^{ch} none can haue wthout knowledge of naturall Philosophy. To come by all w^{ch}, the best way is for the Prynce to haue still about him men of euery profession singuler, as Mathematicians, Philosophers, Orators, Captaynes and Souldiers; by whom dayly in few wordes and houres he may learne that, which he could not in Schooles in many moneth's. In perticuler nothing is more necessary for a Prynce to know, then the inclination and humors of his Subiects. w^{ch} best are knowne by the scyte of the Country age, fortune and education, all saue y^{e} first sufficiently handled in Aristotle in his Rhetoriques.

Caligula eloquent, yet somtyme wandring in his speaches.

Claudius excellent in speach premeditate.

Alphonsus king of Naples vsed to say a Prynce vles learned is an asse crowned.

Charles the great and Charles the wise & Traiane Emperors all generally wise.

As in euery other thinge the good consisteth in the midle, so is it in the scyte of the vniuerse, Therefore Aristotle saith that people twixt the north and south are the best qualitied of witt and carriage, and aptest to gouerne.

The Assiryans, Meedes, Persians, Turkes, Greekes, Romaynes, Fraunce, Spaine.

The Northern people not in the extreame part of the North, are Stout, great bodyes full of blood and vigor open, constant, merry wthout crafte, subiect to Bacchus. The Southern are subtil, sharp witted, inconstant, melancholique not stout drawing neerer y^{e} nature of the foxe then the lyon, subiect to Venus.

The Transiluians, Poles, Danes, Scotch and English people.

The meridionall people are giuen to Speculation, gouerning by [fo. 10^{r}] Religion and Superstition. Astrology and Magicke had there first their beginning.

The Saracens, the king of Morocco and Fessa. The great Negro, Prester Iohn which as it were would haue him adorned of his people neuer showeing them any part of his body but his feet.

The people in th'extreame Northren and Southern partes are of litle body, and of ill fashion or carriage; in th'one of them fleagme abounding, in th'other melancholy.

Th'eastern people are tractable of goodly great personage. People towards th'east & South subtile & of close carriage. Towards the North & West more open & simple. The people inhabiting where great stormy windes are turbulent, & where

quiet ayre, sweetly conditioned. In mounteynous places they pertake more of the Sauage feirce & cruell.

In Valley's more effeminate, in barren Countryes industrious, in fruitfull Countryes delicate & idle.

The Marityne people by reason of great conuerse & practise wth strangers are wilye & aduantagious, and therefore Plynie calleth y^{e} Sea, Improbitatis magistrum. And lastly the peopled mediterraine are sincere, loyall & easy to be contented.

Experience.

There is nothing ~~more~~ ^so^ necessary to giue perfection to Prudence, & by it well to mannage the Commonwealth, as experience the mother ~~y^{e} mother~~ of prudence. for that many things seemeth in Chamber discourse, to be grounded vpon reason, w^{ch} put forward cometh to no effect: many things seem easie to effect, w^{ch} practise teacheth to be impossible.

[fo. 10^{v}]

This experience is of two sortes, by our selfe or by others, liuing or dead; and the largest feild to learne experience in, is by the dead, in reading written histories, the largest Theatre imaginable where is to be learned all things at other men's cost and damages.

Lucullus a pryme Captaine onely by reading histories.

Mahomet .2. the first called great Turke alway's had a booke of histories in his hand.

Alexander magnus and Iulius Cæsar became like them in affection of mynde.

And Poetry, as it were a liueing and liuely experience of things, is not to be neglected, w^{ch} so liuely point's out fictions, that is breed's imitation; and handling of heroicall actions excellently by a good poet, will incite any Prynce to affections & actions heroique, but fly the impudique and scurril poets w^{ch} teach roguery not vertue.

Alexander the great found great delight in Homer.

And Ferdinando the Marques of Pescara in reading in his young yeares the Romaine histories was so enflamed with glory that he became a famous Captaine.

Principles of Prudence.

Hold as a thinge resolued for a Prynce not to deale in deliberation or trust wth any that hath not y^{e} foundation of reputation.

At the first meet y^{e} begining of ills wth fitt prouision: for disorder in tyme encreaseth and getteth strength.

But if ill exceed thy force vse tyme for a meanes, for he that hath tyme hath life.

Doe not thinke in any pointe of deliberation to salue all sores, for in all best orders some disorder is conioyned.

Yet doe not neglect the least disorder that can be helped: for that all ills beginne by litles.

Consent not to put in Councell matters of nouelty.

By noueltyes the ruyne of Fraunce & Flaunders th'one by Iasper di collingi to Francis .2. th'other presented to the Duke of Parmaes Lady.

[fo. 11^{r}]

Doe not embrace to many impreses of importance at once. Chi multo abraccia. poco stringe: he w^{ch} embraceth much, claspeth litle.

In Conquests make good footing: Tacit[us] commends to .P. Ostarius, Destinationis certum, ne noya moliretur, nisi prioribus firmatis.

In the first yeare of the prynces raigne doe no nouelty.

Ladisloa the sonne of Charles y^{e} king of Naples in his first yeare being called to Hungary dangered all, not hauing first setled him in his owne kingdome.

Shoulder not one more potent, and suffer not too many broyles to come vpon the at one tyme. Ne Hercules contra duos. dissemble iniuryes beyond thy power to remedy, or offences w^{ch} thou canst not correct. for in insuperable tempests, best is to strike Sayle and to giue way vnto tyme.

The Romaines & Turkes followed this rule.

Phillip king of Macedon excelling herein.

There is nothing more vnworthy a wise Prynce, then to committ himselfe to fortune or chance.

Immotum aduertus eos sermones fixumq[ue] Tiberio fuit non omittere caput rerum neq[ue], in casum dare.

Make no suddaine violent change w^{ch} neuer produceth durable effect. the Cæsars perpetuall Dictators first became Tribunes, then Prynces and lastly Emperors and absolute patrons of y^{e} Commonwealth.

So Cart[us] Marsellus aspiring to the crowne of Fraunce being but Steward of the house did not first vsurpe y^{e} name of king but Prince of the nobility of Fraunce. And so his sonne Pepin came easily to the Kingdome.

Being ready to any imprese deferr not. Nocuit semper deferre paratis.

Alwayes preferr old before new and quiet before trouble.

Vse no absolute power, where ordinary power will serue, Th'one is Kinglike, th'other Tyrantlike.

In bookes Prynces may see many worthy secrets w^{ch} none dare tell them.

[fo. 11^{v}]

Breake not wth the Commonwealth being powerfull, but wth great aduantage & secured of the victory.

Breake not wth the Church, for it will alwayes seem impious & not likely to come to good effect.

In election of Officers, let officers alwayes be like to the place for that the superior scorneth the seruice and y^{e} inferior is not able to vndergoe it.

Tiberius alwayes obserued this.

Continue not in warres wth thy neighbours, for that will make them Souldiers & dangerous neighbours. for so was Agesilaus paid home wth the Thebanes.

The Turkes policyes alwayes in warres, And so hath old Souldiers neuer continuing warres in any one place, or maketh any old souldiers but his owne.

Much lesse continue warres wth thy Subiects, especyallie naturall Subiects, w^{ch} still by warres waxe worse. at the first none being so shameles or malepart to rebell. but once if they embrew their sword in blood, and put of the vaile of iust proceedings, they make generall reuolte.

Sigismond in Bohemia the king of Spayne in Flaunders a good example herein.

So Alexander y^{e} great king of y^{e} Iewes after six yeares warres with his Subiects & 50,000 persons slayne nothing would content them but his blood.

Doe not so trust to peace, vtterly to dismisse armes; for that disarmed peace is the weakest peace, more dangerous then warres.

Constantine th'Emperor securing himself of peace for his tyme, dismist his lymitary soldiers and opened the gate into y^{e} whole Empire to the Barbarians.

Speedy and nimble dispatch of busines, is of far more importance, then force; th'one striketh at vnawares, th'other is foreseen. Th'one first disordereth th'enemy and then breaketh through them, being far easier to disorder, then to breake through.

Cæsar began his warre with 300 horse & 5000 foot & wth inestimable dexterity tooke away opportunity from his enemy to make head & in 70 dayes was possest of whole Italy.

The greater busines is conduced to good end wth long perseuerance rather then wth present force, being easier wth Occasion [fo. 12^{r}] and tyme first to weaken & then to cast downe then violently at y^{e} first to force all.

Study to know the occasion of the imprese in hand, & embrace the fitt opportunity nothing being of of more moment. opportunity being no other thinge, saue onely a period of tyme, wherein there is the concourse of circumstances w^{ch} maketh the busines easie. *Temporibus sapienter vtens.*

Philip king of Macedon so serued himselfe with the discord of Greece.

So Amurath king of y^e^ Turkes enlarged his Empire in Europe by discord of y^e^ Prynces of Greece.

Committ no busines of importance to him w^ch^ disliketh of it, for that the will cannot be effectuall, where there is no inclination in vnderstandinge.

Consult maturely, but prescribe not y^e^ manner of th'execution, w^ch^ dependeth vpon the opportunity & occasions present, and to lymit such execution is to intricate th'executioner and to creple and lame the busines. Therfore are needfull wise Councell, stout actes: *Consultare sente, consulta exequi festinanier*. which cannot be done where the Commission is curiously straitened.

Thinke not to auoyd dangers w^th^ flying, for ^they^ then follow the; encounter then and then they flye the.

Take heed of shewing any perticularity more to the Nobles, then to the Comminality. for that therby of a Prynce of all, thou shalt become a head but of a part.

Trust him not w^ch^ either is or thinketh himself wronged by the, for that the desire of reuenge is vehement, and will awake in his tyme.

A Iust example was y^t^ of the Count Iulian and Charles of Burbon.

[fo. 13^v^]

Because Officers neere or about the King will still help themselues: the King should make account of the absent, w^ch^ ordinarily are at greater charge & trauell then th'other.

Be not directly opposite to a multitude w^ch^ w^th^ great difficulty is ouercome & w^th^ great losse of loue: but good maryner like take y^e^ wynd in the flanke when you cannot haue it in the poope, and make showe to will & giue that freely: w^ch^ cannot be held or hindered, *Scelara impetu, bona consilia mora valescunt*.

Secrecy. There is nothing more necessary in matter of state then Secrecy, making easy the execution of things desseigned; as also the managing of it from the begining: like to couert & secret vndermynes w^ch^ haue admirable effect otherwise bring danger.

The way to keep secret, is not to imparte but that is me^e^nt, in things w^{ch} the Prynce in his owne iudgement is able to resolue. but if it be to be perticipated then to few and to such as by nature are secretly desposed and of great warynes.

Merellus answered one desirous to know a secret: that if he thought his shirt knew of it he would cast it in to fire & burne it.

The same answere was made by Peter of Aragon to Martin the .4. in the like occasion.

And the better to keep secret any thing is to learne the art of dissimulation. to seeme not to reguard, esteame or know that w^{ch} you do regard esteame and know & to do one thinge by another.

Luis .11. king of France held the great arte of raigning to be y^{e} arte of dissimulation.

Alway's take heed to show any passion, or in any passion to shew any signes of the mynd or affection: and in passion of anger especially be watchfull not to let fall any word of threatening w^{ch} is th'armes of y^{e} threatened.

Alphonso Duke of Calabrio onely by threatening, stirred vp rebellion. Francis Dorso being threatned by Ieronimo Riario kild him in his chamber.

[fo. 13^{r}]

To much nimblenes & vivacity of witt in Councell is not to be followed. they in their curious limitation are ^lyk^ y^{e} Germane clocke, where in, the more curious arte, the sooner they are disordered. for matter of state are of so great moment, that they cannot endure to be grounded vpon Atomes or minute sutleties.

The venetians lesse subtle then y^{e} Florentynes, & the Lacedemonians then th'Athenians, eyer had better successe in matter of Councell.

Likwise neither the grand or magnificall councells are to be embraced, whose fruites comonly are shame & da[m]mage, whose councell is onely of great apparance but of no substance.

Antiocus y^{e} great in magnificall burialls of the Macedons in the arres betwene K. Philip & Q. Flaminius is a fitt example.

Much lesse regard huge vaste councell, embraceing vnmeasurable proiects, w^{ch} neither the Prynces money, life or force can supplye.

Such was ordinarily the thought's of Maximilian .1. and Leo .10.

Also desseignes of great darring or too much boldnes are dangerous, whose end comonly is misery and desperation.

In stead of those, follow Councell well grounded mature & least subiect to accident. Yet in Conquest or seruice to enlarge y^{e} Kingdome, hazard sometyme must be made to shew stoutnes, for he that hazards nothing gets nothinge: otherwise it is in conseruation of kindomes, where slow & surest Counsellors are fittest whem as in endeuors of Conquest nimblenes & viuacitye in Counsell are to be embraced. Councell cannot be too cautelous in deliberation, except in

things presently vrginge, nor to bold in execution. Doe not easily giue credit or likeing to new inuentions, not warrented by experience, nor make reckoning of engines w^{ch} neuer see warres.

[fo. 13^{v}]

Noueltyes.

Nouelty's in Gouerments are hatefull and if attempted it must be by insensible litles, imitatinge nature in her gentle passe from her extremity of cold to extremity of heat, and so contrary and all by litles insensible by the pleasant interpose of the spring and fall.

Alcibides saith it is the securest life to be content wth lawes & customes although meanly good.

Saule after he was chosen & anoynted king liued as a priuate man onely to escape enuie and emulation.

August[us] Cæsar to palliate the nouelty of principality would not be called Emperor or king but by the name of Tribune. *Proprium Tiberio scelera nuper reperta, priscis verbis oblegere*.

Valour consisteth in.
- Prudence.
- Vigor of minde.

Valour consisteth of prudence & vigor of mynde, which two being vnited produce admirable operation.

Valour is of far more value and force to conserue the state then potency, as the descendents from Conqueror inheriting there powers and forces but not their vertues in many perticulers from tyme to tyme shew and make manifest.

Valour proceedeth from the.
- Mynde.
- Body.
- Forces.

This valour as it consisteth of stoutnes or vigor of mynde, proceed's partly from the mynd, partly from the body & partly from th'exterior forces.

Of which although that which proceed's from the mynde be more excellent, co[m]maunding th'infirme body. yet ordinarily a body ill complexioned & infirme, interreth and maketh grosse y^{e} best part of y^{e} mynd. Therefore in a Prynce is required a personage well composed of complexion sound & lusty.

Th'art of.
- Perseruing health.
- Encreasing health.

To which end nature must be helpt with arte conseruing and encreasinge health.

Preseruing health. Conseruinge of health is sobriety & moderation in dyet, the contrary filleth [fo. 14^{r}] the body wth ill humors & crudity begetting gouty and other wearisome maladyes.

Likewise continency, whose contrary weakneth man and beast in spirite and nerues, hasteneth old age, darkneth the sight and openeth a thousand gates to goute, dropsie, and death.

Encreasing health. Health is encreased best by exercise: best whereof such as awaketh and nimbleth euery part of the body.

Galene commendes y^{e} ball, and hunting.

And to encrease health and to make it stout the body must be acquainted wth heates and coldes, hunger, thirst, and watching, water and wyne, & wth all the varietyes of life: for so is health best assured ready and able for all accidents & encounters.

And how soeuer if y^{e} body cannot be made stronge but still continue infirme: The vigor of mynd must help to susteyne the counterpoise of the body in all his infirmityes.

A worthy example of Charles the .5. soe ill affected with goute, that he could not hold his foot in any Stirrop but in a swadlin lynnen band & yet kept feild all awinter in snowe and myre.

How reputation may be.
- Mainteyned.
- Encreased.

And thus hauing learned the way to reputation vertue prudence & valour, it is fit to see how reputation may be maynteyned & encreased.

First rather warily couer weaknes & impotency then defence it, for that such defence many tymes doth more descouer it.

It also addeth to reputation to make shew of best forces without ostentation.

Alfonso king of Aragon excellent herein.

So more deedes then wordes: for that Prynces workes should not be wordes.

So grauity & solidarity in speaches, wthout vant or brauery, & promise of lesse then he can.

Scipio Africanus admirable herein. So vespasian of whom is said *in ipso nihil tumidu[s] arrogans, aut in nouis nouum*.

[fo. 14^{v}]

Fly amplification and hyperbolicall speaches w^{ch} take away the credit of the speaker and argue litle experience in the busines.

It proceedeth of constancy & iudgement to mainteyne thy worde.

Duke of Parma famous herein.

Be constant in aduersity w^{ch} sheweth stoutnes of harte & valour, and moderate in prosperity w^{ch} sheweth a mynd superior to fortune.

The Romaines in y^{e} warre againt Antiochus so conditioned before victory as though they had conquered & after as though they had not.

Take not in hand any thinge aboue thy force, and enter not into any thinge where thou canst not securely come honorablye out.

The Spanyard so wary they will as it were neyer willingly lose a pawne.

Send not out to base or meane impreses w^{ch} are no way like to bringe out reputation.

Let thy vnderstanding be great, especially in thy beginings for thereof the rest is iudged. *Nel principio consista la meta*.

Such was Scipio his imprese of Carthage in the begining of his gouerment in Spaine.

Hauing put thy selfe into a busines, easily leaue it not of, therin showeing litle iudgement in enteringe into it, and lesse spirit in leaueing it.

Be not a dependant of a Councell or fellowe worker wth others, for that is to constitute a Superior, & to discouer incapacity and weaknes.

Professe nothinge but that w^{ch} is seemly for a Prynce.

Vse secrecy w^{ch} maketh the God like, and keepeth thy Subiects alwayes suspecting & expectinge great desseignes.

vniformity in life & actions, and inuariable maner of Gouerment is cælestiall gouernor like and diuine.

Galba th'Emperor wanted it.

[fo. 15^{r}]

Suffer not thinges belonging to thy selfe to be managed but by excellent persons.

None was allowed to picture Alexander y^{e} great but Apelles. Augustus Cæsar scorned to heare his name handled but of greatest wits with highest stile.

Entreat not of matters of moment by meane Subiects, base or weake, whose basenes doth vilifye the busines.

Be not familiar wth any, especially with pratlers

Make store of thy selfe, not showinge thy selfe vpon euery occasion: but in great occasions & then in state seemly for a Prynce. *Continuus aspectus minus verendos magnos homines ipsa facietate facit*.

Delight not in garments light, but graue, not pompeous but moderate.

Fly extremity either in headlong, or to slowe falling into busines, but maturely & moderately, rather slowe w^{ch} hath a

resemblance of prudence, then precipitate which hath a plaine semblance of temeritye, contrary to reputation.

Seuerity before pleasant blithnes is preferrd in a Prynce.

All thing concerninge a Prynce must be excellently & pryncely done with due circumstance.

Paulus Emelius no lesse renowned by feasting y^e^ Grecian ambassader then in taking of y^e^ king of Persia.

Let him shew in euery thinge magnificence, spending largely in honoured things y^t^ is either belonginge to God, the good of y^e^ Co[m]monwealth ~~and~~ ^or^ extraordinary occurrents.

Likewise magnanimity, great w^th^ the great, humanity with his like, makeing more account of verity then opinyon & whatsoeuer proceedeth from him let it be great, compleat, excellent or at least far extraordinary.

[fo. 15^v^]

Let him not take impreses many, but fewe excellent and glorious.

In all his actions let there be represented something high and heroique.

Scipio Africanus and Alfonsus king of Naples excellent herein.

Let him be assured to keep on foot obedience and dependencye of his Subiect in things of importance.

Let him not communicate any thinge that concerneth his greatnes, maiesty or superiority.

Sit summæ seueritatis et munificentie

The king of India & Iapon being old retyred themselues renowncing state. So Charles .5. th'Emperor.

Old age often tymes diminisheth reputation.

Let him be out of doubt that reputation depends not of seeminge, but of being.

How Prynces became called.

Great. Prynces haue been called great, by reason of the greatnes of the state vnited to the Crowne: or by greatnes of th'imprese done by them in peace or warres, which is esteamed great either for th'importance thereof or for that it is the first tyme of vndertaking.

Wise. So haue they been called wise for any study, arte, or learninge.

Religion.

Of vertues aforementioned y^e^ supporters.

But y^e^ vertues afore remembered, parents or pilasters of loue or reputation, cannot long stand w^th^out these two supporters; Religion & Temperance: for y^t^ the Co[m]monwealth is a vyne w^ch^ cannot flourish or bring out his fruit w^th^out fauourable & Cælestiall influence & humane industry cherishing it & dressing it from his superfluityes.

Aristotle councelled the Tyrant by all meanes to seeme religious, his Subiects thereby thinking they shall not vniustly be dealt withall, & with very chary to offend him w^ch^ they thinke is beloued of God.

Religion procureth maintenance of states by supernaturall helpe of the grace of God.

Temperance. Temperance with holding out the ill extremes and cherishing of the onely good meane.

[fo. 16^r^]

Therefore Prynces first of all ought to humble themselyes before God, and to acknowledge as from him all gouerment & obedience done to them beinge here appointed by hym as his vice-regents for a tyme, and the higher they are placed the more they ought to humble themselues before God and not to put hand to any thinge but such as they are assured of to be warranted by Gods lawe.

And to that end whatsoeuer matter of importance they should cause it first to be hammered in the forge of good conscience by learned Deuines.

Fardinande of Aragon & Issabella of Spaine alwayes left to their Captaines as p[ar]te of their co[m]mission to attempt nothing before the religious and the Bishopps were first acquainted therewithall.

Such a Prynce so humbled and good in y^e^ sight of God is many tymes the cause of the prosperity of the people: Such a Prynce will reforme his people with good lawes & put best order in thinges of religion and diuyne worshippe: for that religion is the mother of all vertues of obedience of y^e^ Subiects, of fortitude in all dangers, and redines in any thing that concerneth the Commonwealth, and doth not onely bring the people to subiect their bodyes, & facultyes whatsoeuer, and bynde their handes but eyen their hearts and thoughts, so that willingly they suffer any thinge before disturbance of the peace of the land. And nothing more disobligeth the Subiect from obedience to y^e^ Prynce then when any thinge is prest contrary to the lawe of

The Romaines attempted nothing without the first approbation of their Southsayers & not before some pacification first made of their Gods anger or reconciliation of fauour or giueing of thankes for benefits already receiued.

The Turkes doe nothing but first consultation had with their mutflies.

nature or the lawe of God: So that people religious wthout all question liue far more obedient to y^{e} Prynce then those y^{t} are gouerned by chance.

[fol 16^{v}]

Dissimulation.
Extreames of religion.
Superstition.

And therefore the Prynce must haue especiall care to auoyde the extreames of religion: Dissimulation & Superstition which cannot hold out, and discouered vtterly discredits the doer.

Truelie religious.

Therefore against dissimulation let him be trulye religious, and wise against superstition; for God is trueth, and in trueth & cleannes of spirit wilbe worshipped.

To which end let the Prynce prouide store of worthy teachers, not such as flourish in words like entertainors of Gusse, but such as auoide such blushles carriage in so diuine a seruice, breathing and as it were infuleing in the mynde of the hearers spirit and trueth, preaching Christ crucified and no themselues.

Let him also prouide for the ministers, that they be not contemptible poore, or beggerly, w^{ch} greatly debaseth religion to the common people.

Let him vse magnificence in the fabrique of the Church, and thinke it more estimable for a Christian Prynce to repaire th'ancient Churches then to build new, w^{ch} many tymes is done out of vanity.

Miscislaus king of Polonia greatly encreased Christian faith there with, founding & endowing Churches & adoreing diuine worship. Dauid was magnificent in the fabrique of y^{e} Temple & much bettered y^{e} seruice of the Tabernacle.

And for that there is no true wisedome wthout temperance it is fit to learne some lessons of temperance.

Religion is the mother, and temperance the Nurse of vertue: for that wthout Temperance prudence is blynd, fortitude weake, Iustice corrupted, and euery [fo. 17^{r}] good looseth his vigor.

Temperance in.
Gluttony.
Delicacy.

Gluttony, sleep and idle downbeds abandons out of y^{e} world whatsoeuer is honest and generous.

Indigestion stupifieth the witt, taketh away strength and shorteneth life.

Delicacy hatcheth effeminacy, goeth beyond equality, parallelleth superiority in magnificence both at table, dyet &

Delicacy entered into Rome with the triumph of Scipio & Manlius & from hand to hand so spred abrod this delicate poison y^{t} Rome vtterly therby came to ruine.

apparell: yea men are so far ouergone in euery vanity that they cannot content themselues wth their owne reuenewes & estate, but will streatch out their hands euen to holy and sacred thinges.

So Portugale ruynate by delicacy from India.

Cato said long will that City continue where a fish is sold deerer then an oxe.

Seneca Couiuoru[s] et vestium luxuria ægræ ciuitatis indiciæ.

Thus falleth the priuate & so ruynateth the publique, and wanting the foundation, downe goeth the state: for of that nature is mans greatnes that in the very height it breeds & bringes foorth wormes of delight Rust & canker of sensualityes which by litle and litle consumeth it and bringeth all to ruyne.

August[us] Cæsar gaue Edict for moderating excesse in building.

But cheifly and first to be remedied and reformed is the pride and pompe of women who are so apt to corrupt men, and men so apt to be corrupted by them that few men haye any rule at all, or are maisters of their wiues, but ^with^ their lubricity & lasciuiousnes are by them in their substance quite consumed.

Domitian[us] his sonne forbad purple & pearle & such like.

Remedies for pride of women in attyre to.

- Forbid.
- Impose.

For remedy whereof there are two wayes, either to forbid stuffe cloth or ornaments of great price to be worne, or els to charge them wth so high imposition, that none [fo. 17^{v}] great personages can afforde to giue the price thereof. otherwise these and especially pearles, stones, fumes, and other things that are far fett from strange & forraigne places, will steale out of the Kingdome the greatest quantity of gold and silver of the land, and onely for a gentle fauor or a litle pratle of foolish women, mens coffers must be exhausted and there estate quite ouerturned.

Forbidden in Portugal and Genes.

Appendix C – Transcription of Sloane MS 3938

Introduction:

What follows is a full transcription of the English translation of the first *Secretissima instructio*, originally published in Latin in 1620 and followed by two others in 1622 and 1626.[1387] One of Europe's most widely read propagandistic works, its author has never been determined, nor does the translator identify himself. The extant MS itself has neither dedication nor preface, and the title page was added at a later date. It is also difficult to date the manuscript, although it is likely that it followed fairly closely on the heels of the publication of the Latin original.

Conventions:

Abbreviations and Contractions: I have expanded contractions and abbreviations using square brackets, excepting 'y^{e}' for 'the', 'wth' for 'with' and 'w^{ch}' for 'which'. I have retained the use of superscript throughout.

Additions/Deletions: I have indicated additions with carets (eg. ^example^) and deletions by striking through the passage (eg. ~~example~~). Additions by a later hand are indicated by carets and italicised text (eg. ^*example*^).

Foliation: I have used the folio numbers given, excluding the blank unmarked pages added before the first noted folio.

Illegible Text: The single example of illegible text has been indicated by square brackets and ellipses.

Italics: I have used italics where the script changes, usually to indicate a proper name, or a foreign-language translation.

[1387] Malcolm 2007, p. 30.

[fo. 1r]

^Advice to Frederick 5th Elector
Palatine, who was chosen King
of Bohemia ano 1619. And
Afterwards dethroned.

He marryd Elizabeth: Daughter to James 1st King
of Great Brittain, by whom he had
3. sons. Charles Robert & Edward

Charles succeeded his Father in ye Electorate.
Robert was created D. of Cumberland in Englland.
Edward marryd to ye Princess Ann of Mantua &
*dyd att Paris in 1663. leaving 3 Daughters.^*

[fo. 1v – blank]

[fo. 2r]

1: Most gratious Prince, and most beloued puple receave from your most faithfull tutor, a well experinced Souldior and most profound statesman, these noe vulgar lessons: by keepinge of them you shall preserue your selfe: by these the kingdomes of *Brittannie* are united, Holland defended, and the kinges of Fraunce kept in their office, by these you shall bridle the *Emperour*, nay you your selfe shall be *Emperour*: heare therefore your Tutor, your maistor, your follower, whose health dependes upon your safetie, minnistringe unto you secret, but serious Councells: From a Child you have learned the difference twixt Councell and Flattorie. But you must be Carefull to keepe those secretts of state close from other men, for if your Enemies shall come to the knowledge thereof, then are you undone.

[fo. 2v]

2: The dice are Cast, you have passed *Rubicon*, you must hould on your purpose; your maiestie may now fall downe headlonge from the toppe, come downe you cannot. It is not fitt that he wch oppresses his equalls, should find amongest his

equalls: either all, even those that are yo^{ur} helpers to this greatnes, must be suppressed, or all must be lost: All *Alexanders* progenie were slaine by *Alexanders* Captaines: Consider these things well and yo^{u} will aske yo^{ur} histriographer.

3: As ever in any kingdome, then in yo^{urs}, it is a much greater vertue to keepe that yo^{u} have gotten, then to gett: I say greater, for without any labour of yo^{urs}, onely by the Craft and wilinesse of yo^{ur} freindes, all thinges are brought unto yo^{ur} hands. In a word, were it lawefull in these hidden mistories to confesse soe much, yo^{u} are become a kinge by mistakinge or error. But now that yo^{u} haue taken it upon yo^{u}, yo^{u} must defend it wth all the strength yo^{u} can make either of yo^{ur} selfe or by freinds. Recken from the tyme of *Julius Cesar* unto *Fardinand*, and yo^{u} shall finde that amongst one hundreth that [fo. 3^{r}] haue usurped kingedomes, there are not foure that haue not lost them againe, and perished wth theire whole family. Amongest great kindes, few liue out their tyme: Amongest 50: *Emperours*, finde three, that haue not yeelded up their bloud to Enuie and hatred. Amongest the *Bohemian* kindes, two onely haue ruled without Rebellion Bee yo^{u} afraid of these, whose place yo^{u} now hould yo^{u} haue drawen yo^{ur} sword against the *Emperour*: feare not onely the *Emperours*, but euery mans sword. Whosoeuer Contemmes his owne life is maister of yo^{urs}: yea whosoeuer shall kill yo^{u}, will glory in the act, as though he had done it upon a theefe or a Robber: Take warninge therefore from me, learne magnificence from Courtiers, and the hazard yo^{u} ru[n]ne from the dead, and I wish yo^{u} may know all these thinges by readinge, not by experience.

4: In this present affayre of yo^{urs}, yo^{u} are to Consider three sorts of men: yo^{ur} open Enemies, yo^{ur} true frindes and faigned frindes, or close Enemies, both w^{ch} we recken as newtralls.

[fo. 3^{v}]

5: Yo^{ur} open Enemies are, the howse of *Austria*, the *Pope*, the *Italians*, and such as honestly and without dissimulation adheare unto them: For defence against these Enemies, yo^{u} will be putt to a great and dayly expence, yo^{u} will haue need of expert and faithfull Captaynes, and a perpetuall warre, because all these are in

their power, they may be often oue^r^come but slowlie Conquered: yo^{u} know *Hanuball* victorius in three great, and some smaller battayles and yett at length ouercome in warre, lost all those glories wth a little poyson.

6: Yo^{u} cannot of yo^{ur} selfe equall yo^{ur} open Enemies in riches and strength, and therfore yo^{u} must pray in aid of Confederates, wherin there are many daungers: First that they be not greiued wth expences: Secondly that they dispaire not of Recompence: Thirdly that they be not discouraged by any misfortune: Fourthly that they disagree not amongest themselues: Fiftly that they be not engaged in another warre: Sixtly that yo^{ur} greatnes draw not on their Enuies: Last of [fo. 4^{r}] last of [sic] all, least upon any occasion fallinge of difference amongest themselues, and their purposes being contrarie, they forsake yo^{u}: yo^{ur} Countrey of *Germany* hath taught yo^{u} those thinges by example in the tyme of *Charles* 5: when the Princes betrayed the Cittizens. It is therfore worthie your Considerac[i]on how to make yo^{ur} selfe equall to yo^{ur} enemies.

7: Neither would I onely haue yo^{u} to Consider the present power of yo^{ur} Enemies, but even that also, wth extreame daunger and desperac[i]on may bringe to passe and procure: A stout ^hart^ though vanquished can neuer want weapons. What if *Fardinand, Leopold, Charles,* and others be put to extreames: what if they passe ouer their Rights to the *Venetians*: what if they deliuer *Lusatia, Silesia, Morauia*, to the nobles of *Poland* or to that kingedome: what if they offer their Right, I say not to Spayne, or Fraunce but to any other. What if by force of a league they take aid heretofore wilingly offered from [fo. 4^{v}] the *Turke*, from whome yo^{u} and *Gabor* haue desired help, doe yo^{u} thinke the Turke would refuse so faire an oportunity: what if the Spainiard make peace wth the Turke: what if they sell *Istria, Carniola,* and *Carinthia,* to the *Venetians*: Therfore be not secure, beinge Conquero^{ur} yo^{u} shall be strooke when yo^{u} looke not for a blow; men in miserie are verie industrious, great men shall neuer want Co[m]misserac[i]on nor the afflicted helpe: But why doe I loose my selfe? yo^{u} shall receaue a blow from those yo^{u} least suspect.

8: Consider likewise yo^{u} haue but few freindes: yo^{ur} father in law, yo^{ur} weife, the Duke of *Bullion*, some kinsmen, a brother, (if they be had in esteeme) are yo^{ur}

frindes, the rest follow yo^{ur} Fortunes, and are frindes to their owne hope and preferment, whom unlesse yo^{u} satisfie and that fully, yo^{u} shall finde Traito^{urs} and Runawayes.

9: But to take a more p[ar]ticuler vein of yo^{ur} Freinds. The *Bohemians* are in noe sort yo^{ur} frindes, that [fo. 5^{r}] is more true then credible, and that yo^{u} shall finde when yo^{u} examine their Act[i]ons: First they chose yo^{u} kinge, not out of respect to yo^{u} hono^{ur} but out of necessitie, and when both *Saxonie* and *Bauaria* had refused them, and there was a great dispute amongst them, whether they should proferre *Saxonie* against his will or *Gabriell*: Then they determined to be free, after the maner of *Holland* and the *Venetians*, anon they preposed an *Heluelian* Republique, but standinge doubtfull betwene Dukes and kinges, when they perceaued the *Princes* would yeild them noe aid in an example soe pernitious, when they considered likewise, that wthout a kinge they could haue noe voice in the elecc[i]on of the *Emperour*, upon better aduise they to draw in aides to them selues by a ceremoniall coronation:
Thirdly, now they show a more manifest signe of their hatred against yo^{u}, when they put upon yo^{u} such condic[i]ons of gouerninge, as moderat lords would scarce impose upon their slaues: yo^{u} are constrained to sweare to all their present and future Actes and decrees: if yo^{u} refuse, they are yo^{ur} Accusors, witnesses, Iudges, p[er]aduenture yo^{ur} [fo. 5^{v}] hangmen or breakneks: yo^{u} cann wage noe warre appoint noe Souldio^{urs} without their consent, they will without yo^{u}, and against yo^{u}, yo^{u} can haue noe howses of munition, the will: To conclud, yo^{u} are enforced to subscribe the Actes of their *Senate* though it be to yo^{ur} owne disgrace, yea against yo^{ur} owne saftie, w^{ch} unlesse yo^{u} yeald unto, yo^{u} shall be noe kinge: neither be yo^{u} caried wth fayre word and flatterie, counterfaintinge and ostentation doth more affect in businesses of this nature then truth and freindshippe: cosenage had need of many vayles, least it be found out: Learne their natures, amidst theire cuppes and their surfests they consult, and are very swift and speedie in effectinge their consultations *Bohemia* was euer a Stepmother to kinges of its owne nation, then hope not to finde it a mother to yo^{u} a straunger: while it feares other *Princes* and hopes in yo^{u}, it will be at some quiett, when it begins to feare, or leaues of hope in yo^{u}, it will returne to its nature and inclinat[i]on.

10: Seinge therfore the *Bohemians* are by nature cruell, fierce, and stubborne, in their councells abrupt, suddaine in their execuc[i]on, yo^{u} shall doe [fo. 6^{r}] well as yett not to thinke yo^{ur} selfe their kinge nor them yo^{ur} subiectes: Thinke yo^{ur} selfe a tree, not fastened in the earth wth yo^{ur} owne rootes but supported wth diuerse Forkes and Proppes, wherof many may very easily be cutt downe and broken of: consider that noe power canne be of continuance, that is not borne up and grounded on its owne strength: yo^{ur} government cannot be durable but by consent of freinds, but that consent is very uncertaine and lasts but a moment: This shall yo^{u} finde true, when they need not feare the howse of *Austria*, when yo^{u} shall demaund tribute of them and decree punishments against them: yea the *Lutherans* and *Hussites* will publiquely neglect yo^{u}, and respect *Saxonie* as the defender of their libtertie; nay there are some that haue deemed it fitt yo^{u} should be crowned and killed, as *Cicero* said of *Augustus* that he was to be praysed and taken away: doe not yo^{u} any thinge for w^{ch} yo^{u} may be taken away.

11: That yo^{u} may clearly see these thinges looke upon yo^{ur} cosen *Maurice* and the *Hollanders*: none within the memorie of man did euer beare [fo. 6^{v}] armes for his countrey wth greater daunger, or better successe then *Maurice*, noe man more gratious or better beloued of the cittizens: for what haue they not both said and done when they entertayned him triumphinge? what haue they not giuen and promised him, nay proffered him publiquely their naked virgins: Notwithstandinge all this, had he not brought to passe his mischeuious plott, he had bene now but a dead carkasse and Barneuelt should haue raigned. The cause is the deadly strife betwene libertie and kindome: The same case is now in *Bohemia*; yo^{u} desire to be a kinge absolutely, and not in appearance and that they should all become yo^{ur} subiects, they desire to be most free, and that the kinge should haue power to doe nothinge but what likes them. Whilest therefore they require immoderate lib[er]ty and to domineere ouer their kinges, yo^{u} ^expect^ obedience from them not by entreatie but co[m]maund; it cannot be but fact[i]on and quarrell should arise amongest yo^{u}, as now we see in the Lowcountreys where all thynges are tried, neither is there any power found equall to the hatred of the multitude: Therefore it were better to bringe all the Lowcountreys into servitude, then to hould [fo. 7^{r}] them by soe vncertayne and doubtfull governm^{ent},

w^ch course now is happily begune, by chaunginge the magistrates ancordinge to the condicion of the Tymes.

12: I come to yo^ur other freindes, w^ch yo^u will hardlie finde to be soe, if yo^u shall iudge the Bohemians to be none. *Gabor* of *Transiluania* is noe frinde of yo^urs, but out of his hatred and feare of the *Emperour*, hath entred into league w^th yo^u, that whiles hee thrusts yo^u vpon daungers, he may enioy and defend *Hungaria*: He likewise affected the kingdome of *Bohemia*, but when his hopes fayled him, he grew angrie that he could not share w^th yo^u in that pray, but as speedily as he came, what he lett goe against his will, he will endevo^ur to recover w^th all his power: he makes his braggs that yo^u were made a kinge by his ^meanes^ and expects recompence: he knowes well that he cannot defend *Hungarie* against the *Turkes*, *Tartars*, *venetians*, *Pollands* and the *Hungarians* themselues, but by the helpe of other kingdomes and Provinces: And therfore he supposes not without reason *Bohemia* and the dominions ther unto belonginge to be necessarie for his crowne. And sithens the nobilitie or states of *Bohemia* [fo. 7^r] doe challenge to themselues the right of electinge a kinge, it will be now great difficultie for *Gabor* by flattorie and faire words, to bringe them to his opinion, and then will he doe to yo^u as yo^u have done to *Fardinand*, and he to the howse of *Austria*: yea if the *Emperour* will give him *Hungarie* in fee, vnlesse he hath lest his ould woont, he will be ready w^th all his forces to restore *Bohemia* to the howse of *Austria*.

Much lesse can yo^u esteeme the *Turke* yo^ur faithfull friende; hee will sitt still and w^th a great deale of pleasure looke vpon yo^ur quarells: Both the conquero^ur and the conquered shall be his prey: soe the Rammes contend the woolfe lookinge on and gapinge to devoure them: soe the cockes fight wilest the *Eagle* reioyces. It is an axiome of the *Turkes*, to hould frindshippe w^th no christian but for profitt sake: Turne ouer all the annalles and histories, and yo^u shall finde he never aydes any in the warres whom he did not bringe into miserable servitude and slaverie, he measures his faith onely by his faine and profitt. He hath longe sought to wynne *Hungarie* with the expence of many mens lives [fo. 8^r] and much wealth. but what he could never by force obtayne, processe of tyme may purchase him freely w^thout bloud or charge: he possesses *Hungarie* by his faithfull vassall,

receaved tribute from him; he hath power to bringe an Army into *Morauia*, *Bohemia* and *Silesia*, and if he doe itt not soddenly yet yo^{u} will ever be afraid of it, and must ever expect it, for *Gab~~riell~~^or^* by his helpe gott Transiluania, and by his power enioyes Hungarie. The Basshaes have an Army ready at his call to take citties for caution and pledge, as they did Lippa in *Transiluania*: And can yo^{u} hope that the *Turke* will not hould on his vsuall custome? why hath he soe daungerously, treacherously and cruelly, disquieted the gouernment of *Germany*, if yo^{u} thinke he will now suffer yo^{u} to reigne in quietnes.

But suppose he keepe his promise, yet ought not yo^{u} to trust him; because hitherto he never help his Fayth with any man. Therefore those Embasages w^{ch} in part yo^{u} have already sent to *Constantinople*, in part are now p[re]paringe, and the great guifts wherwith yo^{u} hope to demerite the *Turkes*, and tokens of yo^{ur} subiection, but noe assurance of yo^{ur} securitie. This also is a most miserable thinge, that [fo. 8^{v}] whensoever it shall please him to breake his faith, yo^{ur} kingdome must fall into his handes: or if hee call yo^{u} to his highnes court, yo^{u} must presently goe. If he co[m]maund yo^{u} to ioyne yo^{ur} forces wth his against any christian Prince, yo^{u} will be forced to doe itt: as also yo^{ur} *Gabor* did, some two yeares past, sendinge his Army against the *Polonian*, vnder the conduct of *Schender Bassa*. Neither should it seeme strange vnto yo^{u} if the *Turke* breake his faith (to say nothinge of *Gabor*) sith yo^{u} yo^{ur} selfe, for the winninge of a kingdome have soe many wayes broken yo^{ur} oth and promise, and left sufficient Testimonie therof against yo^{ur} selfe. And I am perswaded when yo^{u} and *Gab~~riell~~^or^* shall thinke yo^{ur} selues most happy: yo^{u} shall find the *Turke* yo^{ur} mortall Enemie. For hitherto the *Turke* hath laboured this onely, to settle his owne estate by dissention of the Christians. But now if he shall find that yo^{u}, *Gabriel*, the *venetians*, and certaine Princes of *Germanie* are united together? he will feare yo^{u}, and when yo^{u} have beaten the *Austrians*: he will breake yo^{ur} amitie, and lett vpon each of yo^{u} apart: and will destroy yo^{u} by the helpe of *Gabriell*, and the *venetians* by other.

[fo. 9r]

[14][1388] Those thinges w^{ch} I have lightly touched before concerninge the *Turkes* and yo^{ur} *Transiluanian Gabor*, it is not amisse for yo^{u} to know more fully, w^{ch} yo^{u} may easily vnderstand by the coppies of his letters faithfully transcribed out of the Originall: Out of them I say, yo^{u} may learne the Art of dealinge wth the *Turkes*. Neither be yo^{u} ashamed, or lett it greive yo^{u}, beinge but a scholer in the schools to learne of him w^{ch} is a beaten souldio^{ur} and hath spent a good part of his tyme of riper yeares among the *Turkes*, and yo^{u} shall also playnly perceiue, to what marke *Gabor* doth direct all his cares and cogitations. But that yo^{u} may more easily vnderstand those thinges w^{ch} are contayned in the former letters, yo^{u} ought to know, that this yo^{ur} *Gabriell*, against his owne Prince and Lord brought a mightie Army of the *Turkes* into the very hart of *Transiluania*, w^{ch} beinge miserably spoyled and wasted, and *Gabriell Bathore* being slayne he settled the Principalitie vpon himselfe: but the *Turkes* leadinge into miserable bondage many thousands of the christians departed out of *Transiluania*. And to discharge the reward w^{ch} he had promised to the *Turkes*, for the service they [fo. 9^{v}] had done him, gatheringe together all the power of *Transiluania*, he mad warre against his owne bloud and kindred, mindinge to give ouer into the hands of the *Turkes* those forces w^{ch} he had promised, and were a stronge defence for the state of *Christendome*. Which villany the garison soldio^{urs} vtterly detestinge, would not yeald vnto. But their walles beinge beaten and cast downe wth the *Cannon*, First of all *Lippa* w^{ch} was defended wth a stronge wall and two Castles, after that *Solynos*, *Eperies*, *Tovaraggia*, *Margita*, *Monostor*, *Arad*, *Syri*, *Faesat*, were taken and given up to the *Turkes*, and by his meanes onely a greater part of *Hungarie* was gott by the *Turkes*, then they had bene able to winne in the tyme of 16. yeares warre: After this worthy art, (that is the entrallinge of the cheefe part of a noble province to the slaverie of the *Turkes*) he writes his former letters to the vezir *Nakas Hasen Bassa*, from his Tentes. The latter, whence, and vpon what occasion they were written, yo^{u} shall after vnderstand out of the letters themselues.

The copie of the letters of *Bethlem Gabor* to the *vezir Nakas Hesen Bassa*.
[fo. 10r]

[1388] Given in catchword, but not in body text.

Most worthie and most magnificent *Vezir Bassa*, my most noble and honorable lord, God ever preserue and make fortunate yo^{ur} magnificence, and prolonginge yo^{ur} tyme from one day to many thousand, encrease yo^{ur} prosperitie in the service of the mightie and victorious *Cesar*, For many yeares past there have bene certaine variances and debates, betwene our most mighty and victorious *Emperour* and the kindome of *Transiluania* vpon the takinge and not restoring backe the towne of *Lippa*. I cannot denie there are many iust and evident causes, why neither the kingdome, nor the Princes therof could to this day be brought to restore the same. For since the tyme the progenito^{urs} of the ancient *Hungarians* lovinge *Scythia*, First gott this kingdome, destroyinge the ancient inhabitantes therof wth the sword, it was never heard or read by any man, that the *Hungarians*, did freely give backe vnto any man (I say not Fortes, citties, or whole countreys) but soe much as one handfull of ground, without battayle, and much slaughter and effusion of bloud. [fo. 10^{v}] And since the tyme of *Ottoman* made warre against the *Hungarians*, in whatsoeu[er] sort, howe great soever the siege and assault were, they never yealded themselues, but rather fought it out to the last man in defence of thier countrey. witnes wherof *Alba greca*, *Temesuar*, *Gyula Szigetum*, Now by our Actions and assured fidelitie, toward the most mightie *Emperour* beinge throughly declared, the state of thinges is much altered For to the end we might fully manifest our certaine fidelitie to the mightie *Emperour*, by restoringe the castle of Lippa, (notwithstandinge the practises of many w^{ch} were of the *Germane* faction, to go ther wth the rebellion of the Garison souldio[urs], and the manifold difficulties ariseninge to our army wee tooke the cittie by assault and after wanne the Castle by strong hand, although w[th] the expence of much bloud and losse of the liues of many worthy souldio^{urs}, that by this meanes we might declare our great affection to the most mighty *Emperour*. In this meane tyme, though vnder pretence of peace, many rich guiftes were presented [fo. 11^{r}] to the most mighty Emperour from the *Germans*: yet on the contrarie they sent *George Homonnay* into *Transiluania*, and *Sorban Wayuorls* into *Walachia* wth a stronge Army. They sent also against vs a great army to succo^{ur} the castle of *Lippa*, at request of the Garison therof, to prevent that we might not deliver it vp to the most mightie *Emperour*. But we by great marches prevented their co[m]minge, and had newly taken the towne when these succo^{urs} arived: soe that maintayninge the siege of the castle, and alsoe fightinge wth these

succo^{urs} by the favo^{ur} of god we happily overcame them both. And soe havinge taken the castle, and thrust out the Garison that was therin, according to the appointment of the most mightie *Emperour*, we resigned itt vp into the hands of worthy and magnificent *Mehmet Bassa Beglerbeg* of *Temesuaria*. For this declaration of o^{ur} assured fidelitie, worthie to be kept in perpetuall memorie, the like wherof no man till this day either of the whole nation of *Hungary*, peradventure neither of any other countrey hath ever shewed before. In requitall wherof, what [fo. 11^{v}] gentle protection, what plenty of wealth, wee might deservedly expect, from our most milde and most honorable *Emperour*, what favo^{ur} and friendshippe from his *vezirs*, what thankefullnes from the whole *Musulman* nation, that wee commit to the iudgment, First of the most mighty god, and after to the censure of the whole world. Such and soe great service have we performed, wth the daunger and adventure of our owne life, and wth the bloud of soe many brave and worthy souldio^{urs}, endevoringe by this meanes to demerit the grace and favo^{ur} of the most mightie *Emperour*. Our orator w^{ch} is the^ir^ residinge, will fully acquaint yo^{ur} magnificence, wth the course of this whole busines, and wth our dimaundes w^{ch} we have presented to the most mighty *Emperour*: most ernestly desiringe yo^{ur} manificence, to further wth yo^{ur} favo^{ur} our iust requests, the w^{ch} wee together wth our whole kingdome will endeuo^{ur} wth all thankfullnes to demerite. God longe preserue yo^{ur} magnificence in safetie. Given from our Tentes at the Castle of *Lippa* the 14. day of June 1616.

Yo^{ur} magnificente affectionat
servant And freind
Gabrielle Bethlem

[fo. 12^{r}]

The second letter of *Bethlem Gabor*
to *Schender Bassa*.

Most worthy and magnificent *Bassa, God* poure downe vpon yo^{ur} magnificence plentie of all good thinges. How sincerely and brotherly wth what thankfull and louing affection I haue euer endeuored to doe yo^{ur} magnificence seruice the most mighty god is my witnes yet know I not for what desert of mind, yo^{ur} magnificence at the most famous Court and other whom hath layd many snares tendinge to my destruction, from the w^{ch} god hitherto hath protected me, that I haue not fallen into them. I neuer offended against yo^{ur} magnificence, but rather

as farre as was in my power I euer laboured to demerite yo^{u}, and was almost yo^{ur} tributarie seruant. For euery yeare I must pay vnto yo^{ur} magnificence many great guifts, as Cloth of siluer, ready money, Salt: whereof I can bringe forth many witnesse when tyme shall serue, wherby the noble Court shall knowe how miserably yo^{ur} magnificence doth spoule the Countrey of *Transiluania*; yo^{ur} magnifience hath euer giuen me very kind wordes to my face, and also before the Embassado^{rs}, p[ro]misinge [fo. 12^{v}] great fauo^{rs} vnto me w^{ch} many otheres laboringe notwithstandinge wth all yo^{ur} power to procure my destruction. Witherto I have dissembled all those thinges. Yesterday I receaued the letters wherby yo^{ur} magnificence, since my departure out of *Transiluania*, sturred vp the *Saxons*, the w^{ch} havinge read I could not but marvaule that as yett yo^{ur} magnificence ceaseth not from yo^{ur} practises against *Transiluania*. I would have yo^{u} knowe that we have not deposed or sett aside all care of *Transiluania*. Wherefore I would entreat yo^{ur} magnificence to desist from such practises and that henceforth ye write not into *Transiluania*; Assuringe yo^{ur} selfe that by such meanes as hitherto ye have practised yo^{u} cannot effect what ye entend. I meddle not wth such busines as belonges to yo^{ur} magnificence sith it appertaynes not to ^*me*^ by office: neither would I that yo^{ur} magnificence should take vpon you to order such thinges as belonge vnto me, sith in this behalfe nothinge is Committed to yo^{ur} Charge.

I would wishe yo^{ur} magnificence to be p[er]swaded, that I thinke my selfe a servitor to the [fo. 13^{r}] *Emperour* my kind lord, equall to yo^{ur} magnificence. I have served, and to this day doe serve his highnes wth all faithfullnes, w^{ch} latly I have manifested. For I have brought the whole state of *Hungary*, into the same subiection to his highnes, as I have done *Transiluania*. Each of them at this tyme, together wth my selfe, and his faithfull sevauntes. I remaine now at *Polonium* in the kingdome of *Hungarie*, the Crowne is in my handes thankes be to you: Wthin 10. dayes they minde to Choose themselves a kinge. The whole Army of *Ferdinand* assembles together were aboue threescore thousand, we fought wth them before the bridge of *Vienna*: The mightie god vnder the Conduct of the myghtie *Emperour* gave vs the victorie. Wee overthewe our Enemies and droue them beyond the *Dauane*. We haue shutt vp *Vienna*. Now we minde to passe over our Army to fight wth them againe. And (by the favo^{ur} of god) *Vienna* it selfe, in short tyme shall be in o^{ur} power. I have brought the kingdome of

Bohemia, the kingdome of *Morauia*, the kingdome of *Silesia* to be frinds and well affected to the most mighty *Emperour*: their Armies are ioyned wth me. They minde to send their Ambassado^{urs} wth their guiftes to his mighty Court: while [fo. 13^{v}] in this sort I serue our most mighty lord, yo^{ur} magnificence laboreth vnderhand to withdrawe my subiectes from me, to put them in rebellion, for w^{ch} I renounce all service vnto yo^{u}; god be wth yo^{ur} magnificence. From *Polonium* the 4. Of november 1619.

15: These are many causes why yo^{u} should not thinke the *venetians* to be yo^{ur} freindes. First their state is *Aristocraticall*, they have a Prince onely in showe, the people they vtterly neglect, their *Patricians* they onely reckon fitt to governe. Therfore their state is naturally ill affected to a *Monarchie*. Neither doe I thinke it fitt for yo^{ur} nobilitie to have any familiaritie wth the *venetians*, for from them they learne the loue of libertie and the hate of Principalitie. Secondly the *venetians* are evill neighbo^{urs}, they keepe peace wth none of the *Italians*. They are frinds to none of theire neighbo^{urs}, but ielous of them all, w^{ch} they lately shewed in the warre of *Gradisca*, wherin they were forced to looke for ayd out of *Holland* and other places. Assure yo^{ur} selfe they will be noe freindes to yo^{u}. Thirdly, both of yo^{u} studie to encrease yo^{ur} dominions, and to adde to yo^{ur} governem[ent] somewhat of yo^{ur} neighbo^{urs}, there can be noe peace of continuance [fo. 14^{r}] betweene Corrivales. The cause why they now flatter yo^{u} and send *Gabriell* is, for that by yo^{ur} meanes and charges they hope to weaken the house of *Austria*, whose greatnes they envie, desiringe to have noe neighbo^{ur} whom they may feare. Soe that if yo^{ur} or *Gabriells* power growe so greate soe that they may feare itt they will by all meanes oppose yo^{u}.

Heretofore they labored to cutt of the trade of the *Portingals* into the *East Indies*. For they envie all that are myghtier then themselves. They flatter and beare wth the *Turke* though they are opprest and spoyled by him. To conclud suppose that all things fall out to *Gabriell* accordinge to his will, and give it that by helpe of the *Turkish* forces he wynne from the *Emperour Styria* and the rest and ioyne them to the kingdome of *Hungarie*, then of necessitie will the peace betwene him and the *venetians* be broken. Bee assured if thinges come to that state, *Gabor* will demaund of the *venetians*, such places as heretofore they wrongfully (takinge the occasion of other mens misorie) took from the kinges of *Hungarie* being oversett

by the *Turkes*. But suppose, that [fo. 14^{v}] hee will not reviue auncient quarrells, yet assuredly he will not neglect the present. It is all one to the venetians whether *Hungarie*, *Transiluania*, *Styria*, *Carinthia* and *Austria* be united together, or whether they be made subiect and tributarie to the *Turke*. And then will the noble Cittie of *Venice* subsist or perishe at the will and plesure of the *Turkes* Court, when against two mightie Enemies by land and by sea they shall find none to help them: all w^{ch} is so much to be feared, as it may not be hoped, that the *Turke* or *Gabriell* (occasion of encresinge their owne estate beinge offered) will never want a Colorable pretence to breake their leage as though he would not offer to the *venetian* that w^{ch} he hath often done to the *Emperour*. Neither can the *venetians* be ignorant of these thinges, but that out of envie w^{ch} they beare to the howse of *Austria*, they reckon not of the danger w^{ch} futurely may fall out. For nothing is more powerfull then Envie w^{ch} doth consume and eate vp it selfe.

16: Yo^{u} may repose some hope and Confidence in [fo. 15^{u}] the Prince and Citties of *Germanie* so longe as their feare is co[m]mon wth yo^{u}: w^{ch} when it is ended, each man will follow his owne busines. All of them looke to thier owne securitie and advauncem[ent], w^{ch} must be made good out of the Clergie mens livinges, for there is nothinge els for yo^{u} to bestowe vpon them. w^{ch} hope fallinge short, when those liveinges are bestowed, those w^{ch} are not satisfied, will fall to hate yo^{u}. For in this division, accordinge to lawe, yo^{u} will reserve the best part to yo^{ur} selfe and yo^{ur} brother and ^to^ so many *Palatines* w^{ch} are in want. The Citties also, out of desert, will looke for their reward, they loue not to lay out their money wthout consideration, Futhermore the free Citties w^{ch} are neare adioyninge will stand in awe of yo^{u}, I meane *Wormes*, *Spire*, *Francofurt*. And if yo^{u} shall growe somewhat greater, *Norimberg* also and *Vlme* will begin to feare yo^{u}, persuadinge themselues that yo^{u} will rule over them, or at the least may if yo^{u} please. For the weaker never Consider what the stronger ought to doe, but what he is able to doe. Thirdly dissentions and variances, vpon light occasions, fall out betwene Princes. Many Citties greatly hate their *Senate*. And there is noe question, the feare of the *Emperour* [fo. 15^{v}] beinge taken away, but that the Cittzens w^{ch} have bene hardly vsed by their *Senate*, will either thrust them out, or kill them. Lately *Francofurt*, *Wormes* *Norimberg* were vpon the like Co[m]motion soe will yo^{ur} leage be broken:

17: Yo^{u} must depend very Causiously vpon the freindshippe of the *Hollanders*, except it fall out that *Maurice* bringe them to his subiection. There fell out, some two yeares past a varience betwene yo^{ur} father ^*in*^ lawe of *Britaine* and them. They hate yo^{ur} Cosen *Maurice*, because they suspect, and not wthout cause, that he goes about to sett vp his owne Principallitie: and yo^{u} also began to be suspected of the same matter. But because they mortally hate the *Spaniard*, therfore will they helpe yo^{u}: Conditionally notwithstandinge, vpon this hope, that in requitall of this ayd w^{ch} they now send yo^{u}, hereafter yo^{u} will assist them to the Conquest of all *Europe*, whereto they aspire wth all their might and skill. And, if I be not deceaved, it is to bee feared, that from thence may arise some danger of ill to yo^{ur} father ^*in*^ lawe, and to others.

[fo. 16^{r}]
18: Consider then that yo^{u} are but a newe kinge, and soe assuredly vnder yoe the enmitie of many Princes and haue but a fewe frindes, and therefore yo^{u} must doe all those thinges w^{ch} *Tully* aunciently prescribed to be done by newe men.

19: Now yo^{u} know what is to be done: And though yo^{u} be wise of yo^{ur}selfe, and haue some subtile and craftie Councello^{rs}: yet of this aduice of o^{urs} may doe yo^{u} some good.

20: Hitherto yo^{u} haue made yo^{ur}selfe stronge, by two meanes, wise Counterfeitinge and dissembling: and speedie execution. The former is now lost and gone: therfore yo^{u} must rest vpon the latter. By Counterfeitinge and dissemblinge yo^{u} can now deceaue noe man of *Europe*. Therfore I would aduise yo^{u} to leaue of that will doe yo^{u} noe good. Yo^{ur} letters are yet extant, soe Curtious, soe freindly, soe farre from all ambition: that might persuade himselfe they proceeded from vertue it selfe, and from plaine simplicitie.
In the meane tyme there is a league made wth the *Hollanders*, the *Venetians*, the *Turke*, wth *Gabriell* and wth all that had [fo. 16^{v}] any power to hurt or helpe. The *Bohemians* soddainly rebell, the *Sisesians*, *Morauians*, *Austrians* revolt, and there ariseth out of the seven hills a newe Enemie as it were out of an *Engin*. I have herd it vpon good intelligence that neither the *Emperour* nor the Papist

Princes did ever believe that yo^{u} had any desire to be a kinge. At the tyme of yo^{ur} election, yo^{u} did persist in yo^{ur} dissimulation and the busines went fairely on. I thinke the Papists themselues did believe yo^{u} excluded the *Emperour* out of *Bohemia*, for love. But in good earnest doe not imagine that there is any Papist soe stuped as to thinke there is any credit to be geiven to yo^{u} if they say they beleeve yo^{u} they forsweare themselves to doe yo^{u} aduersetie. I speake thus much to lett yo^{u} know, that dissimulation the groser it is, the more it doth exasperate hatred. It is a hatefull thinge to goe about to foole yo^{ur} fellow princes in this fashion. For they all know and have the *Bohemians* owne letters to showe, that *Gabriell* hath bene solicited for ayde and the *Turke* also himselfe, by whose meanes the [fo. 17^{r}] *Polonian* hath bene diverted from infestinge *Silesia*. Wherefore then doe yo^{u} call him an Enemie, and make such a showe of detestinge him, when he is yo^{ur} good Lord, by whose power, authoritie and furtherance yo^{u} have gayned a kingdome. Without his p[er]mission, neither could *Gabriell* assist yo^{u}, nor the *Polonian* be diverted nor yo^{u} be a kinge. Wherfore since yo^{u} have cast yo^{ur}selfe into his protection, have given assurance to be his frinde by sundry Embassages wth many and large offers, and that all the world knowes this to be true, I thinke it is a thinge not fitt to be deemed. Our *Hollanders* laughed at *Bethlem* when he talked of fortifyinge his borders against the *Turke*, knowinge that he of his owne accord in the midst of his kingdome had deliuered vp vnto the *Turke Lippa* and divers other stronge places, w^{ch} he had taken by force, that in his hart he is a *Turke*, that he hath vndertaken by his letters and negotiations wth the *Turkes*, to subdue *Vienna* vnto the *Turkish* yoke. Wherfore it will stand better wth yo^{ur} credit and a^u^thoritie to professe yo^{ur} selfe a confederate of the *Turke* and threten to bringe him in. [fo. 17^{v}] It is true the Citties of *Germany* will hardly digest this, but what imports it: Confesse boldly and mayntaine that to be well done w^{ch} cannot be denied to be done.

21: Of this kinde is also the excuse w^{ch} yo^{u} make in the latter part of yo^{ur} declaration. For it is noe sufficient reason to satisfie any man to say, It is lawefull to seze of an other mans kingdome, because thou is a certaine sort of men sufforde to live there, that are seducers of greate Princes. For if such quarells as those may be admitted, what must wee thinke will become of other kingdomes.

22: Wherfore it is yo^{ur} best to proceed wth the other pollicy and yo^{u} are like inough to preuayle, I meane Celeritie. As it was well done of yo^{u}, at the very instant of yo^{ur} Coronation to pursue the Enemie at the heeles in *Bohemia*, *Moravia*, *Hungaria*, *Austria*: if yo^{u} can follow the victorie in this maner, the *Emperour* will not haue a foote of ground left him in *Germany* wthin a few monethes. Make one victorie [fo. 18^{r}] a stoppe vnto an other. And looke especially to this, that yo^{u} giue them noe tyme of breathinge. Detayne the Tenthes, for in yealdinge them yo^{u} shall but giue suspicion of feares, in wthhouldinge them yo^{u} shall appear confident. Possesse yo^{ur} selfe of all before the next springe. Yo^{u} haue *Spire*, *Ments*, *Trier*, begine wth these, yo^{u} shall gett riches and renoune, and yo^{u} shall want noe followers. The springe is to be feared, but yo^{ur} confederates noe doubt will supply yo^{u} wth men and money, in due tyme. Finally Continue on this diligence and celeritie of yo^{urs} wthout intermission, notwthstandinge that the state or successe of yo^{ur} affaires at any tyme should giue yo^{u} occasion of rest and Cessition. For know that there is nothinge can be more dangerous for yo^{u} then securitie. Wherfore proceed bouldly, solicite all men, studie howe to gaine the French, and all the rest. Be alwayes vpon some newe exploit, that may argue yo^{u} to be still in hart, make soddayne irruptions, whene yo^{u} were neuer lookt for.

23: Further this one point yo^{u} must remember, [fo. 18^{v}] Either all or nothinge, we haue alway sayd this, that if you desire to get any one peece of the *Austrian* dominion if it be but one towne of ^any^ *Bishoprike*, yo^{u} must gett all. yo^{u} shall easier make yo^{ur} selfe Emperour, then as a priuate Prince Elector defend a particuler *Abbey*. For if yo^{u} content yo^{ur} selfe wth one part, yo^{u} shall be depriued of that by those that hould the possession of the rest. If yo^{u} take the *Tigres* whelp the dame will pursue yo^{u}, if yo^{u} Catch both yo^{u} shall enioye yo^{ur} prey quietly. A kingdome cannot be deuided, wholy possessed it may be, *Germany* cannot endure two sonnes.

24: These thinges I aduise yo^{u} in generalitie. It resteth that I put yo^{u} in minde how yo^{u} are to deale wth the particulars, and first wth the *Emperour*. The *Emperour* you must entertayne wth Curteous and smoth language, entreate him to resigne his kindomes, to acknowledge yo^{u} for his sonne, not to trouble his poore

afflicted subiects nor to give credit to the *Jesuites*. And so that purpose yo[u] have done well to suborne [fo. 19[r]] yo[ur] Father of *Britannies Embassador*, havinge first dealt w[th] him to make some hopefull presentation of peace and Concord in fair and ample wordes. In the meane tyme yo[ur] must vse all yo[ur] Cunning to bringe the *Emperour* into yo[ur] power. For soe yo[u] shall quickly compas to be Chosen kinge of the *Romans*. But there is one thinge yo[u] must consider, w[ch] I spoke of in the seventh article, yo[u] must not drive the *Austrians* into desperac[i]on, vnlesse yo[u] can both Catch them and kill them at once. For extreame desperation is oftentimes the cause of victory. furie will alwayes finde weapons and they will finde an Enemie for yo[u] sundry wayes. So vast a body cannot fall w[th]out great noyce and the ruyne of many others. It is to be feared least if they once perceaue they cannot defend their owne, they will Choose ~~rather~~ to yeald. Those thinges they hould to any other rather then to their Enemie. Neither can yo[u] blame them, for if yo[u] yo[ur]selfe to e^n^large yo[ur] domination, haue entred into a league w[th] the *Turke* and opened him away into *Germany*, what [fo. 19[v]] may not they doe for their saftie, or their honour or at least for revenge sake.

25: With the *Romanists*, that is w[th] the *Pope*, the *Bishoppes* and the rest of the Clergie you must deale moderatly, yet if yo[u] have taken any thinge from them it is yo[ur] best to hould it lest it may seeme to have bene done inconsiderately and lightly.

All this kinde of people in *Germany* are given to their ease, if yo[u] feed them, vse them gently and observe them, they will never stirre. As there are some kinde of animalls that whiles their mangers be full lye downe by it and sleepe, but if they once begin to be pincht w[th] hunger they wax enraged. Soe it is w[th] those, if they levie souldio[urs], let it not trouble yo[u], though they should have an Army twise soe great and soe good as yo[urs], they will never hurt yo[u], they will kee[p]e it vp w[th]out doinge any thinge till they have consumed themselues and their freindes and at last will cast themseluves into yo[ur] protection: But if you [fo. 20[r]] force them vnto desperation, they will finde wayes of revenge, w[ch] they will prosecute vnto death. Brute beasts will also fight for thier meate. It is to be feared lest they should yeald themselues into the hands of some powerfull Princes, least they should laye their estates to pawne, least they should call in the French, least they

should doe other thinges wherof it hath bene sufficiently spoken before. For such is their power as they can if they will rayse greter forces then yo^{urs} and pay them better: and it is likely they will when they shall finde themselues pressed by necessitie, w^{ch} is the sharpest spurre that is either too good or bad actions. Wherefore let this be yo^{ur} care to gaine vnto yo^{ur} party their Councello^{urs}, their Cannons, and men of quality that are about them. For they have all of them some officers and sometymes even their Captains of the reformed religion, by whose meanes yo^{u} may be acquainted wth all their designes. When yo^{u} have besett them wth these false ministers that they can call in noe foraine succors, by falling soddenly vpon them, yo^{u} may easily put [fo. 20^{v}] them downe and make yo^{ur}selfe master of such a masse of riches as will strike a terro^{ur} into all men. This is alwayes to be feared least they devise some such strange and vnexpected plott to put vpon yo^{u} as yo^{u} have done vpon them. yo^{u} must beware of extremity. If the *venetians* have bene of such excessiue charges to oppresse the howse of *Austria*, what will not the *Romane Cardinalls* doe, to save themselues? Of the expedition of *Italy* yo^{u} must not suffer a word to be spoken, for that busines must be soddainely acted and *ex improviso*.

26: With the great *Emperour* of the *Turkes* the matter hath bene alredy well negotiated, by the Embassado^{urs} of yo^{ur} Father, of the *venetians*, and of the *Hollanders*, that he should not take it in ill part to be stiled an Enemie in yo^{ur} Patents. For there is noe other forme to be vsed to procure him frindes in *Germany*. In the meane tyme yo^{u} must not take yo^{ur}selfe to be free from all daunger of him. He will not presse yo^{u} very [...] to have stronge [fo. 21^{r}] places in *Moravia* assigned him, before yo^{u} be invested in the Roman Empire. And till that tyme yo^{u} may deferre the suppression of the *Lutherans*, whom afterwards when yo^{ur} affayres are firmely setled, yo^{u} may easily and comodiously exturpe. In the meane tyme, I can scarsly see anyway how you may be secured from the *Turke*. If yo^{u} could destroy the *Austrian* progeny in one yere, and strengthen yo^{ur}selfe wth the forces of *Germany*, and wthall perswade *Gabriell* to relinqishe the *Othomanik* vassalage, yo^{u} might noe doubt be able to resist the *Turke*. But *Gabriells* deseignes doe now rather tend to subdue as many as he can to the Turkish subiection and to enlarge and establish the bondes of his *Monarchy*, wherin I thinke he doth the office of a good servant but of a wretched kinge.

Whiles yo[u] remayne in this feare, yo[u] must worke by all meanes to winne the *Basshaes* and those purple Courtiers to be yo[urs] and espeacially to oblige them by mony. For by way of presentes yo[u] shall obtayne any thinge of them, though yo[u] were an Enemie. [fo. 21[r]] For it fallesth out often in gret kingdomes that some Councello[urs] can doe more then the Prince himselfe. In the meane tyme yo[u] must entertayne the *Turkes* w[th] fayre Complements and large promises but vnderstandinge allwayes this that the most movinge complement is that of money.

27: yo[ur] *Bohemians* yo[u] must manage in such sort as yo[u] may have them in subiection and that they may Choose yo[ur] sonnes and the sonnes of yo[ur] sonnes for their kinges. For it were a great folly in yo[u] to Cast yo[ur] selfe into the Combustion of a warre to purchase therby to yo[ur] posteritie in steed of a kingdome nothinge but Envie for their inheritance. It is not like they will make these elections of themselues and though yo[u] may have some hope they will, yet it is the part of a wise man by his owne foresight to provide for himselfe, and not to depend on the turbulent factions of an assembly. yo[u] shall bringe them into yo[ur] subiection by dissemblinge, [fo. 22[r]] by advauncinge some, by removinge others. By dissemblinge as by fayninge an absolute securitie and confidence in such sort as ^noe^ man may have cause to suspect yo[ur] purpose. Lett *Tiberius* be yo[ur] schoole-master in this point, who vsed to bestoe extraordinary favo[urs] on those that he ment to overthrowe and after when they were by this meanes out of all feare and daunger he easily oppressed them. For it is co[m]monly observed, that there are very few that can cary the hono[urs] that their fortune layeth vpon them w[th] moderation but that they will be still labouringe to rise higher then is befittinge them.

By advauncinge yo[ur] frindes, and also yo[ur] Enemies, but these last yo[u] may raise the higher, that their fall may be the greter. It is an easie way of overcominge a mans Enemie to trayne him to some place of highth from whence it is likely he should tumble downe. Britanny and the lowcountreys have advaunced many whom they knew certaynly before hand would breake their owne necks. Before yo[u] promote yo[ur] frinds that yo[u] thinke [fo. 22[v]] assured to yo[u], advaunce those that yo[u] looke should ruyne themselues.

28: Concerninge the point of removinge. The men fitt to be be removed are those of bould spirit, those of contrarie religion, those that affect little more then will stand well wth the nature of a kingdome; The bould and violent spirits must be lookt vnto, because they are co[m]monly popular and thought to be magnanimious, but the securitie of kinges consisteth in the submission and basines of their subiects. The examples hereof are Co[m]mon.

The *Lutherans* and *Hussites* yo^{u} must suppresse as they have done the *Puritans* and *Lutherans* in England. The *Papists* and *Anabaptists* are able to doe nothinge, for they are alredy sufficiently worne out. The *Lutherans* stand vpon equall termes wth the *Reformitans*, they vaunt their *Saxon*, and are supported by forrayners, wherfore yo^{u} must reduce them into conformity as the *Arminians* have bene reduced in *Holland*.

[fo. 23^{r}]

29: The maner of removing those w^{ch} yo^{u} desire to be ridde of, is vnder colour of doinge them hono^{ur} to put them vpon magnificent and expensiue employments. yo^{u} must send *Thurn* Embassador into *Brittany*, who soe longe as his liues in *Bohemia* will alwayes be more powerfull then yo^{ur}selfe. And send away *Mansfield* to some other place

Another maner there is by way of accusers, to bringe actions against them, and draw them into question by Calumniations. wher there is dissention ther will never want occasions; And yo^{u} yo^{ur}selfe must stirre vp dissentions and quarells amongest them. The lovers of libertie and imperious and unruly spirits yo^{u} must strive to pull downe by all maner of plotts and inventions possible, yo^{u} have a freshe example of this in *Holland*. *Maurice* and yo^{ur} father wth all the power they had, could not take away the life of *Barnevelt*, and yet there was a necessitie it should be done, but the busines was soe Cunninglie handled that he had his throate cutt by the states themselues.

[fo. 23v]

30: All the danger yo^{u} stand in, depends on the nobilitie of yo^{ur} kingedome. For expellinge them or deposinge them, or Cuttinge them of, this is y^{e} Course yo^{u} must hould. there are three states in *Bohemia*, of the lords, of the Contry, and of the Burgers. Amongest those there is amost fierce and sharpe Emulation. The

Burgers are in a maner contemned. yo^{ur} way is first to sett vpon the Lordes, that is the Countes and Barons, then the Gentrie, and lastly to deprive the Burgers of their priviledges and rightes. The Lordes are for the most part to be cut of; And thinke not that strange for it is a precept of regalites, to cut of to ^*the*^ heads of those plantes w^{ch} overtop their fellowes. Vnles yo^{u} cutt them, yo^{u} will be cut yo^{ur} selfe. First handle the matter soe, by the mediation of fitt instruments, that those w^{ch} are familiar wth yo^{u} and yo^{urs}, may be so animated wth great hopes that they may thervpon grow proud and begine to contemne and wrong their equalls and therby become adious [sic] vnto them. Then procure some differncs [sic] or quarells to be sett on foote betwene them, and thervpon [fo. 24^{r}] yo^{u} may take occasion to cut them of. In the meane tyme favo^{ur} and Counte^u^nce the Citties vntill yo^{u} have put downe the Gentry, to w^{ch} busines they will willingly lend their helpinge hands. For so long as the nobilitie doth florish, yo^{u} shall raigne but by way of Curtesie. They beinge once oppressed yo^{u} must fall vpon the Citties by takinge the iudicature and hearinge of causes into yo^{ur} owne hands, by hearing the complaints of the Cittizens against the magistrates, by takinge care of them and by releevinge them; soe shall yo^{u} come to the sifteinge and changinge of the Senators as it hath bene lately practised in *Holland*. when yo^{u} have composed a senate of yo^{ur} owne humo^{ur}, yo^{u} must make the Countrey bores and poorer sort, whose power is popular and as it were tribunitiall of equall ranke wth the Cittizens. And so yo^{u} shall governe absolutely and wth ease accordinge to yo^{ur} hearts desire. In a word by the death of banishm^{ent} of three hundreth of the nobilitie yo^{u} shall assure and establishe yo^{ur} kindome.

31: There is at this present affaire occasion [fo. 24^{v}] w^{ch} offereth it selfe vnto yo^{u}. yo^{u} haue an Army on foot. wth that yo^{u} may master even yo^{ur} owne followers. Countenance the soldi^{ours}. And let them be of yo^{ur} owne *Germans*, and be yo^{ur}selfe their Comannder. For if yo^{u} trust a Generall to make warre for yo^{u} his power will be greater then yo^{urs}.

32: Lett not the states have the disposinge of the tresure, if yo^{u} can soe worke it, if yo^{u} cannot tra^n^sferre it into yo^{ur} owne hands; be alwayes Cravinge, or at least bring it soe to passe that it may be devided, w^{ch} is a thinge yo^{u} may obtayne

wthout difficulty. Fynally remember this as a Cheefe pointe, keepe *Prage* in obedience.

33: Yo^{ur} *German* Princes yo^{u} must adore, To the Counts yo^{u} must be Courteous and effable, play and drinke wth them, soe yo^{u} shall learne their humo^{urs}, wth the Embassado^{urs} of the Citties yo^{u} must discourse of their Commodities. And because whole *Senates* are not to be bribed, the Syndickes and [fo. 25^{r}] Secretaries and those that are in Cheefe authoritie wth them, yo^{u} must spare noe cost to assure and make them yo^{urs}.

There is one thinge I would wish yo^{u} to doe, wayte some opportunity to seze into yo^{ur} handes the rich Citties of *Norimberg*, *Vlme* and the rest, for wth their weath yo^{u} shall be able to strenghten yo^{ur}selfe exceedingly. I[m]mitate *Julius Cesar* and others who sacked diuerse Citties onely for the Pillage yo^{u} shall not much offend the Princes and nobilitie therwth, if yo^{u} will but Cast a morsell of the pray into their mouthes. In *Holland* at this present there are secret plotts in hand to bringe *Amsterdam* into *Maurices* power, for the welth of that Cittie is soe great as will suffice to mayntayne the warre for ten yeares. If yo^{u} can lay some bayte to invade *Frankford*, it will be a mervelous strengtheninge to yo^{ur} affayres, there are a number of needie and bankrout Cittizens that in hope of spoyle will willingly ioyne with yo^{u}.

If yo^{u} finde these Citties will not be catcht [fo. 25^{v}] with Coyyinge and deceit, yo^{u} must stirre vp the Plebions and make yo^{ur}selfe a Tribune of the people, and give out that yo^{u} come to reforme and revenge the pride, insolency wronges and Contumelies of the *Patricians*. How pleasinge this will be to *Norimberg*, *Vlme*, *Frankford*, and *Wormes* yo^{u} know; when yo^{u} are possessed of these Citties and haue made yo^{ur}selfe stronge and actiue wth their sinews, yo^{u} must reduce the Counts and others of the nobilitie into order and providently strike of the lofty toppes of those poppies. Till this be done yo^{u} shall be noe kinge.

34: Aboue all thinges beware that yo^{ur} league wth the *Turke* be not discouered, lest yo^{u} be Condemned for a Catiline of yo^{ur} Countrey and a trayto^{r} to the *German* lib[er]ty. For there is noe man so ignorant but knowes it to be an infallible practise of the *Turkish* tirrany, to extirpe the Prince and nobilitie

Finally in a kindome where yo^{u} haue nothinge but force, yo^{u} must exercise force [fo. 26^{r}] but mixt wth Cunnyng and fraude, till yo^{u} haue gott the possession of all. Feare the *Turke*, beware of *Gabriell*, make ware wth the *Austrians*, haue noe feare of the *Ecclesiastickes* nor driue them into desperation. They will neuer make an offensiue warre wth yo^{u}, though they be stronger then yo^{u}. There are noe animalls that dare venter vpon the *Lion*, a thousan sheepe will not assayle one wolfe, nor a thousand Cowes one *Lion*. yo^{u} are a Lion, yo^{u} need not feare them, but turne yo^{ur} forces vpon other Enemies; Gard well *Moravia*, p[ro]uide for yo^{ur} heires in the *Spanish Netherlands*. Wee hope for the revolt of some of those states and Citties, if that happen yo^{ur} affayes will stand safe. But these thinges must be done wth expedition, for all the confederates doe earnestlie wishe to see both yo^{u} Kinge of *Germany* and *Maurice* lord of the *Lowcountrey* at one tyme. If the French will lye still and giue vs soe much respect, the Conquest is ours. Wee haue alredy solicited the Princes and Citties [fo. 26^{r}] that are in union and confederates wth yo^{u}, to prepare themselues. We meane to cast *Bullion* or his sonne into the midst of Fraunce if we can, if not him, then some other, that will ioyne himselfe wth us. And here I end, recommendinge vnto yo^{u} these admonitions drawen from the depth of the politicall art wishinge yo^{u} to lay them vp in yo^{ur} hart and to make happy vse and application of them in yo^{ur} actions. Others w^{ch} by dayly occasions shall be offered, as the tyme and state of yo^{ur} Ca^u^se shall require, I will as I can and as I ought willingly and faithfully Communicate.

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